Paper presented at the conference
North Korea Policy After The Perry Report:
A Trilateral (Japan, the Republic of Korea, and the United States)
Workshop
March 3-4, 2000
In
September 1990, when Shin Kanemaru, a Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) leader and
former vice prime minister, and Makoto Tanabe, former secretary-general of the
Japan Socialist Party, visited North Korea and issued a joint communiqué with
the Korean Workers’ Party (KWP), the prospects for normalization of diplomatic
relations between Tokyo and Pyongyang appeared very bright. With official ties
between the Soviet Union and South Korea close at hand, North Korea coveted
relations with Japan. Although the Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs was
lukewarm to reconciliation talks, public opinion, swayed by the DPRK’s recent
release of two Japanese seamen, was not overly hostile to rapprochement.
Opposition to Kanemaru’s initiative came rather from the South Korean and U.S.
governments. In Seoul, President Roh Tae Woo, taken aback by the sudden turn of
events, feared damage to hisNordpolitik
policy. U. S. Ambassador to Japan Michael Armacost warned Japanese officials of
the a grave danger to nonproliferation posed by the North Korean
nuclear-weapons development program, insisting that the DPRK accept inspection
of its suspected nuclear facilities before normalization.
Under a cloud from the start, official
negotiations between Japan and North were broken off in November 1992, after
China and South Korea established diplomatic relations, primarily because of
the DPRK’ nuclear weapons program, and the following March North Korea withdrew
from the Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty.
What later was to become the major
roadblock to normalization—a series of suspected abductions of Japanese
citizens by North Korean agents—was not a factor at the time. Only in February
1997, when the kidnapping of a 13-year-old girl, Megumi Yokota, was confirmed
by a former DPRK spy who defected to South Korea, did the suspected abductions
begin to attract much attention. For example, after the U.S.-North Korea talks
in Geneva produced the 1994 Agreed Framework, former Minister of Foreign
Affairs Michio Watanabe headed a Diet delegation from the LDP, JSP, and the New
Party Sakigake (Sakigake) to Pyongyang. Japan provided 500,000 tons of food
aid, but normalization talks were not resumed.
When
the three-year mourning period for Kim Il Sung ended in the summer of 1997,
Japan and North Korea began to feel each other out on the possibility of
resuming negotiations, which had remained suspended since 1992. The first
diplomatic contacts were in Beijing in July, an informal meeting between
foreign ministry officials at the divisional director level. In August, the
contacts became preliminary negotiations between the Deputy Director-General,
Asian Affairs Bureau , and his North Korean counterpart. They reached agreement
on such matters as early resumption of normalization talks, visits to Japan by
Japanese women married to Koreans and living in North Korea, establishment of a
joint liaison committee between the two countries’ Red Cross Societies, and an
investigation into the status and whereabouts of Japanese citizens in North
Korea. The last item referred to an inquiry about 10 Japanese citizens who had
disappeared mysteriously and were believed to have been seized by a North
Korean intelligence agency in seven incidents dating from the mid-1970s.
Japan-North Korean relations improved in
the months following the preliminary negotiations. In October 1977, the
Japanese government decided to provide North Korea with food aid worth $27
million through United Nations’ organizations. In November, the first group of
Japanese wives were allowed to travel to their homeland. The KWP organ Nodong Shinmun editorialized that “The
two peoples and the times demand normalization of relations.” In November, a
delegation of Diet members from the three parties in the coalition government
(LDP, the Social Democratic Party of Japan (SDPJ) and Sakigake), headed by
Yoshiro Mori, chairman of the LDP Executive Council, visited Pyongyang. They
agreed with KWP representatives that inter-governmental negotiations should be
resumed promptly. On the issue of suspected abductions, KWP Secretary Kim Yong
Sun assured the visitors of an investigation into “missing persons in general.”
In December, with arrangements completed for a second homecoming trip by
Japanese wives, Foreign Minister Keizo Obuchi said: “I hope negotiations for
diplomatic normalization will be reopened as soon as possible. Although that
cannot be done by the year’s end, I hope it will take place very soon.”
From February 1998, however, an intense
diplomatic tug of war began over the inquiry into the missing Japanese.
Presenting no findings from the promised investigation, North Korea started to
accuse Japan of making resolution of the “missing persons” a condition for
reopening talks. To be sure, in the diplomatic contacts the preceding summer, a
solution to the issue was not an explicit prerequisite for negotiations. North
Korea may well have concluded that all
it had to do to restart normalization talks was permit a visit by Japanese
wives and promise to look into the missing persons. Or North Korea may have
chose this interpretation as a bargaining tactic. At any rate, to acknowledge
anything at that stage would have been tantamount to admitting a
state-sponsored crime before the negotiations began. The abductions issue had
emerged as an insurmountable obstacle for North Korea.
In Japan, opposition to normalization
crystallized in March and April 1998, including a nonpartisan Diet members’
league, a 300,000-signature petition drive against talks, a speaking tour by a
DPRK defector who said Megumi Yokota was in North Korea, and a full-page
advertisement in the New York Times. These activities and extensive media
coverage focused attention on the suspected abductions. Meanwhile, in South
Korea President Kim Dae Jung had taken office in February, but the intelligence
services still adhered to the confrontational policy of his predecessor Kim
Young Sam. Not yet firmly enough in control to drop “containment” and implement
his Sunshine Policy toward the North, Kim Dae Jung was apprehensive that
Japan-North Korea talks would outpace South-North dialogue. Given these
circumstances, the Japanese government, although denying that full resolution
of the suspected abductions was a precondition, had to insist North Korea give
some credible indication of a solution.
Diplomatic contacts were already
deadlocked by April 30 when Prime Minister Ryutaro Hashimoto, in his address to
the House of Representative’s plenary session, urged the “supreme leader of
North Korea” to make a sincere effort to solve the abduction issue. On May 8,
the Nodong Shinmun carried an
editorial entitled “Japan’s Diplomatic Stance toward Korea “ that not only
dismissed allegations of wrongdoing as “baseless” but also lambasted Japan for
the forced mobilization of Koreans during the colonial period. The DPRK’s final
response was delivered on June 5 by the North Korean Red Cross Society. A
spokesperson announced that “The individuals Japan is looking for are not
within our territory, nor have they entered or stayed temporarily in this
country.” On June 9, the same spokesperson announced cancellation of a third
homecoming visit by Japanese wives.
Diplomatic contacts had been broken off
by August 31 when North Korea launched a Taepodong missile that crossed Japan’s
main island and dropped into the Pacific Ocean, Feelings ran very high on both
sides of the Japan Sea. On September 1, the Japanese government strongly
protested the missile firing and demanded an end to North Korean missile
development and exports. At the same time, the Obuchi administration suspended
efforts to reopen normalization talks, food aid to North Korea, and
contributions to the Korean Peninsula Energy Development Organization’s (KEDO).
The next day, Japan canceled permits for chartered air flights to North Korea.
On September 3, both houses of the Diet adopted resolutions protesting the
missile launch. There was also an extraordinary public backlash against North
Korea. For their part, the North Koreans on September 2 that “it is rash for
Japan to say things critical of us when it does not know for sure whether we
tested a missile or we did something else.” Two days later, North Korea
announced that a “satellite” launch had proven successful.
The
Taepodong missile had a far-reaching effect on Japan’s security policy.
Vulnerability to DPRK missiles, coupled with Pyongyang’s suspected involvement
in the disappearance of Japanese citizens and fears of nuclear proliferation,
made the government and public acutely aware of the North Korean “threat.” On
September 1, the LDP’s foreign affairs and national defense committees jointly
adopted a resolution on strengthening the country’s air defense system through
stepped-up efforts to develop a theater missile defense (TMD) system and
reconnaissance satellites. The LDP called upon the government to draft without
delay bills related to the revised Japan-United States guidelines on defense
cooperation and other emergency defense bills. The Clean Government Party
(CGP), too, demanded that the government freeze normalization talks with North
Korea and overhaul the air defense system. The Democratic Party’s attitude was
less clear, but spokesman Naoto Kan conceded a need for reconnaissance
satellites. In this tense political climate, the Joint Japan-U.S. Consultation
Committee on Security agreed in September on joint research to develop a TMD
system, and in December the Japanese government decided to acquire an
independent satellite-reconnaissance capability.
However, there was a serious flaw in
Japan’s single-minded emphasis on deterrence: it ran counter to the South
Korean and American policies of dialogue with Pyongyang, in place since
mid-1998. For instance, in September high-level U.S.-North Korean talks in
Berlin reached a tentative understanding. The Clinton administration promised
to start construction of light-water reactors in North Korea and resume the
supply of heavy fuel oil. In October, President Kim Dae Jung, his Sunshine
Policy now underway, visited Tokyo and secured a promise of close cooperation
in dealing with Pyongyang. Given these developments, Japan could not freeze its
financial commitment to KEDO. Moreover, following visits to Tokyo and Seoul in
december by U.S. Coordinator for North Korean Affairs William Perry, the three
countries began to coordinate their North Korea policies more closely,
rendering Japan’s other sanctions against the DPRK increasingly inappropriate.
In late December, the Foreign Ministry official in charge of North Korea
affairs met informally in New York with North Korean diplomats.
By early 1999, Japan’s hard-line policy
toward North Korea had changed. In his policy speech to the Diet in January,
Prime Minister Obuchi redefined the conditions for reopening normalization
talks, stating that “if North Korea responds positively and constructively on
matters of international concern and the issues outstanding between Japan and
North Korea, Japan is ready to work toward improving relations through dialogue
and exchanges.” In response to a question from an opposition Diet member,
Obuchi reiterated that Japan was sending a “a strong message to North Korea.”
At a Japan-South Korea Foreign Ministers’ Conference in February, Foreign
Minister Takamura expressed support for Seoul’s “comprehensive approach” to the
North and termed Japan’s new policy “dialogue and deterrence.” It is safe to
say that with these remarks by the premier and foreign minister, Japan deferred
to the diplomatic efforts of South Korea and the United States and made an
overture to North Korea.
To the Japanese government, a
“constructive response” by the DPRK entailed three matters: confirmation of no
more missile firings; assurance on suspected underground nuclear facilities,
and concrete steps on the abduction issue. North Korea was soon to allow an
inspection of Kumchang-ni in accordance with the agreement reached with the
United States in March and the breakdown in the preliminary negotiations had
shown that North Korea would not discuss the matter at an early stage in
negotiations. The missile threat is of a different magniture: the public
reaction to another Taepodong would rule out dialogue with North Korea.
Despite signals by the Obuchi
administration, a DPRK espionage vessel violated Japan’s territorial waters in
late March 1999, rekindling susicion and enmity toward North Korea. Despite
this provocation, the Japanese government did not change its position
significantly. Indeed, unlike the reaction to the Taepodong missile in August
1998 and despite demands for action from conservative wing of the LDP, no new
sanctions were imposed on North Korea. To keep communication open with
Pyongyang, the government only dispatched Maritime Self Defense Force’s vessels
to pursue the North Korea intruder, the maximum possible deterrence available
under the law. At a Japan-U.S. summit meeting in early April, Prime Minister
Obuchi emphasized to President Bill Clinton Japan’s intention to stick with
dialogue and deterrence in expectation of a “constructive response” from North
Korea.
William Perry went to Pyongyang in May,
however, North Korea nixed a proposed visit in June by a multi-party Diet group
led by former Prime Minister Tomiichi Murayama. There was no sign of a return
to dialogue until August 10 when the DPRK issued a policy statement that laid out
three principles: 1) Japan must abandon its attempt to crush North Korea; 2)
Japan should sincerely apologize and pay compensation for its past criminal
acts; and 3) If Japan chose a showdown by force, North Korea would take
appropriate measures in response. After this salvo, the statement called upon
Japan to “establish good neighborly relations through atonement for the past”
and urged Japan “to choose the path of reason.” In Tokyo, the foreign
ministry’s informal reply was that “North Korea is asking for dialogue, and
Japan has no reason to refuse.”
Not surprisingly, after the U.S.- North
Korea Berlin accord and the DPRK Foreign Ministry announced suspension of
missile tests, Japan and North Korea moved to reopen negotiations. At a press
conference following his address to the UN General Assembly on September 25,
North Korean Foreign Minister Paek Nam Jun said that North Korea was ready to
negotiate “if Japan atones for its past crimes and compensates for the
damages.” Japanese and North Korean foreign ministry officials met informally
in Singapore October 18-20 Although no details were released, the two sides
apparently agreed to pick up where they left off in August 1997. The diplomats
may have also achieved an understanding on how to deal with the abductions, the
most daunting barrier to normalization.
On December 1-3, a multi-party Diet
mission headed by Murayama Tomiichi held discussions in Pyongyang with leaders
of the KWP. Seven parties were represented, including the Democratic Party and
the Japan Communist Party, as well as independent Diet members. Former Chief
Cabinet Secretary Hiromu Nonaka of the LDP served as executive secretary. The
purpose of the visit, said Murayama, was to “create an environment conducive to
the smooth progress of inter-governmental negotiations for diplomatic
normalization.” According to the joint statement released on December 3, the
two sides agreed to encourage their respective governments to resume
negotiations soon. Humanitarian issues should be addressed through national Red
Cross Societies with cooperation from both governments, the parties said. DPRK
Foreign Minister Kim Yong Sun reportedly acceded to Murayma’s suggestion on
concurrent resolution of these issues. The missile question, deemed part of the
agenda for governmental talks, was not taken up.
The discussions went well because the two
sides were in agreement on unconditional resumption of negotiations and because
abductions, homecoming trips by Japanese wives, and food aid were lumped
together as humanitarian issues. Kim Yong Sun objected to the term
“abductions,” but promised a new inquiry. The North Koreans wanted food aid
before resumption of talks; the Japanese delegation insisted on linking
humanitarian issues and made no commitment on food aid. However, in all
probability, an understanding was reached on these issue prior to the
delegation’s trip. During the preceding year, LDP Diet member Masaaki Nakayama,
acting on Hiromu Nonaka’s instructions, met several times with North Korean
officials in Pyongyang and Beijing. Japan’s foreign ministry, too, had fully
supported a Diet delegation since the meeting with North Korean diplomats in
Singapore.
The remaining sanctions against North
Korea were lifted by December 14, and representatives from the Japanese and
North Korean Red Cross Societies met in Beijing December 19-21. After very
contentious discussions, the two sides agreed on four points: 1) resumption of
visits by Japanese wives; 2) a “thorough” investigation into “missing
Japanese;” 3) provision of food aid on a humanitarian basis; and 4) an inquiry
by Japan into the fate of Koreans missing since before World War II. On
December 21-22, senior officials from the Foreign Ministry’s Asian Affairs
Bureau met with their North Korean counterparts, confirmed the agreement
between the multi-party delegation and the KWP, and said diplomatic
normalization talks should resume in the near future. However, because there
was sharp division over abductions and missile development, another round of
preliminary meetings will be held in the new year.
Buoyed
by both the Berlin agreement between Washington and Pyongyang and the Perry
Report, the Obuchi administration is about to start normalization talks. For
several years Japan’s policy on North Korea has swung back and forth like a
pendulum, on the one hand impelled by domestic political interests that demand
answers on missing Japanaese citizens before resumption of negotiations or
supplying food to North Korea, and on the other external pressure to cooperate
with KEDO and to reopen talks with North Korea. At long last, the government
seems to have decided to act in concert with South Korea and the United States.
Unlike in 1991-92, when Japan’s initiative sparked great anxiety in South Korea
and the United States, this time its actions are part of the Perry process and
to be carried out in collaboration with Washington and Seoul. The Foreign
Ministry has established a special line of command for negotiations with North
Korea: from Administrative Vice-Minister for Foreign Affairs Kawashima to
Director-General of the Asian Affairs Bureau Ueda to Councilor of the Asian
Affairs Bureau Sasaki and down to Director of the Northeast Asian Division
Kazuyoshi Umemoto.
If a high-ranking North Korean official
visits Washington and the two countries announce the opening of liaison
offices, the impact in Japan will be strong enough to reopen talks with the
DPRK. However, this will mark the high-water point of international leverage.
Even if a new round of U.S.-North Korea talks gets underway, the United States
will find it virtually impossible to prevent Pyongyang from developing and
exporting missiles. Taepodongs are North Korea’s most precious bargaining chip;
the regime will never give them up until its anxieties about security are put
to rest. Meanwhile, as the presidential election draws near, the White House
will see concession to the DPRK as too risky. One scenario is that as
U.S.-North Korea negotiations lose steam, Japan-North Korea talks will slow
down. Yet it is also conceivable that the Clinton administration, troubled at
the prospect of an impasse with North Korea might, in concert with South Korea,
encourage Japan to push ahead.
At any rate, the most important and
difficult issues for Japan are the abductions and the North Korean missile
threat. Unless these are settled, no attempt to atone for colonial rule and
forge diplomatic relations will have popular support in Japan. Talking to
Pyongyang about the missing Japanese citizens is like negotiating the release
of hostages, with about zero possibility that the DPRK will be forthcoming
early in the process. But ascertaining the fate of these people must be an
integral part of normalization talks.
Regarding long-range ballistic missiles,
the only viable means of arms control seems to be through expanded and
tightened multilateral control arrangements and confidence-building measures,
perhaps by first having both Koreas join the Missile Technology Regime and then
establish a regional arms control regime. As a first step toward this end, one
goal in normalization talks should be to dissuade North Korea from deploying
missiles targeted at Japan.
A diplomatic settlement between Japan and
North Korea would ring down the curtain on the Cold War in Northeast Asia.
Cross-recognition of North and South Korea would proceed apace and capital and
technology would pour into the North. Detente would generate momentum for
U.S.-North Korea ties and the South-North dialogue, ending the DPRK’s isolation
from the international community and encouraging peace and stability in the
region.
For this cornucopia to spill out,
however, Japan and North Korea must find a way to resolve simultaneously an
array of issues from retribution for the past, abductions and food aid, to
nuclear weapons and missiles. The agenda for normalization talks—the order of
topics, the procedures to be followed—are enormously important. North Korea’s
demand for an apology and compensation will be accommodated as part of the
overall process of normalization.
In summary, diplomatic success hinges
upon four elements : a positive response from North Korea; a favorable
international environment; public support in Japan; and competent leadership.
The ongoing Perry process, with its inclusive approach to nuclear weapons,
missiles, and improved relations with the DPRK, has benefitted the Japanese
government. Yet the abductions and missile threat have hardened Japanese public
opinion against North Korea and the negotiations. To change the national mood
in Japan, some kind of breakthrough is needed that only North Korea can
provide. Otherwise, neither the Obuchi administration nor the Foreign Ministry
can overcome the obstacles at home and abroad. With a coalition cabinet in
power and a general election coming up, temporizing is more expedient than bold
leadership. Several opportunities have already been lost to delay, and time is
not on the side of diplomatic success.
Copyright March 2000