Project Summary
The National Science Foundation provided funding through SGER grant CMS 0139309 for the George Washington University Institute for Crisis, Disaster, and Risk Management to acquire and structure baseline data that will support the analysis of the inter-organizational response to the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001. GW was assisted by the University of Pittsburgh. The documentation of organizational structures and the information flow between and among emergency management and emergency medical decision makers will support future research addressing the problems of communication, inter-organizational coordination, and decision-making in complex, multi-organizational response environments. Part I of this report focuses the GW analysis on the response to the 9-11-01 attack on the Pentagon, and describes a successful, highly complex response operation. The intent was is not so much to define exactly what happened, but to identify concepts that were either deliberately or incidentally employed to effect successful management outcomes. The response structure was based on existing emergency management organizational systems and processes: local Fire/Emergency Medical Service (EMS) response, the Incident Command System (ICS), Unified Command (UC), Mutual Aid (MA), and the Federal Response Plan (FRP). In addition, a significant level of organizational creativity and adaptation was necessary to achieve success. Part II of the report describes the University of Pittsburgh’s analysis of inter-organizational coordination and adaptation at the World Trade Center.
On Tuesday September 11, the United States experienced the worst terrorist attacks in its history, losing the lives of more than 3,000 primary victims and responders. The nature and complexity of the events called for the very rapid deployment and large-scale integration of many emergency management, emergency medical, law enforcement, and military resources as prescribed by the Terrorism Annex to the FRP. The attacks also resulted in the first time activation of the National Disaster Medical System (NDMS) for a terrorist attack. The size, complexity, and speed required of the response to the September 11 devastation was unprecedented. The study participants, therefore, set out to investigate, understand and interpret the functioning mechanisms of organizations involved in the response, how these organizations manage information in such a turbulent environment, how they make best use of technology to support their decision processes and how organizational knowledge of successes and failures can best be maintained. The intent was is not so much to define exactly what happened, but to identify concepts that were either deliberately or incidentally employed to effect successful management outcomes.
Early in this project, it became apparent that there were not sufficient resources and time to examine the on-scene response to both attacks. The focus of the GW research team became the response to the Pentagon attack and the mobilization of federal resources to support both the Pentagon and World Trade Center responses. This selection was made for three reasons. First, The World Trade Center response was exceptionally large with many confounding variables, including the loss of the primary emergency operations center (EOC) and the use of two subsequent EOCs. The scope of an adequate interview investigation would have been far too large for the time frame and budget support of this project. Additionally, the World Trade Center response was examined in a parallel NSF funded project by the University of Delaware Disaster Research Center. Second, GW’s geographic location provided ready access to federal and local emergency managers in Washington, D.C. Third and most importantly, the Pentagon response was a complex, unique, and effective coordination of local, state, and federal resources that deserved close examination and documentation. Part I of this report is based upon the analysis of documents and interviews conduced by the GW team. The University of Pittsburgh, as part of this project, performed a related analysis of organizational relationships based on the print media, federal agency situation reports, and personal interviews. Professor Comfort and her University of Pittsburgh assistants analyzed the data they collected to document inter-organizational relationships, communication patterns, and organizational auto-adaptation and this analysis is presented as Part II of this report.
The purpose of the project was to observe, identify, and collect information on management and coordination issues that arose in this response, before this data was lost or the ability to interpret data was degraded. The research methodology was based upon personal observations, semi-structured interviews, and document collection. The results are intended to support future research that will enhance the emergency management and emergency response capabilities of the United States, increasing the ability to limit consequences of future mass destruction/mass casualty events.
The George Washington University Institute for Crisis, Disaster and Risk Management (GW ICDRM) team consisted of Principle Investigators John Harrald, Ph.D. and Joseph Barbera, M.D., Research Associate Irmak Renda-Tanali, D.Sc., Research Assistant Mr. Damon Coppola, B.S. and Research Scientist Greg Shaw. Co-PI Joe Barbera, M.D. served as Medical Officer of the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) Urban Search and Rescue (US&R) Incident Support Team at the Pentagon, deployed to New York City (NYC) on a fact-finding mission for HHS Secretary Thompson (September 12-13), returned to FEMA IST duties at the Pentagon from September 14-19, and then was deployed by FEMA to NYC as an advisor to the NYC Fire Commissioner. Louise Comfort, Ph.D. was the Co-P.I. for the University of Pittsburgh in this effort. Graduate research assistants Michael Carrigan and Naim Kapucu assisted Dr. Comfort.
