


Summary Record of NSC Executive Committee Meeting No. 17,  
November 2, 1962, 11:00 AM

The President referred to a newspaper story by Roland Evans which reported details of Khrushchev's private letter of October 26. The President said the White House had already issued a denial that the U.S. Government believed this letter was written by an agitated or an overwrought man. He directed that all copies of the letter be returned to the State Department. He added that apparently a copy of the letter had gone to an allied embassy in Washington. He reaffirmed an earlier instruction that the only sources of information on the Cuban situation are Mr. Bundy and Mr. Sorensen. He indicated his unhappiness with the amount of information which had been given to the press without authorization. He directed that all aerial reconnaissance information be kept out of the Top Secret CIA Bulletin until after he had seen it. He would then decide what circulation within the government was to be given the reconnaissance information. He restated his view that we must make information available to the press in our own way rather than have it leak out.

Director McCone then summarized the intelligence memorandum.



In conclusion, he reported on the current Soviet test series, including one yesterday of an estimated 1.2 megaton, at an altitude of fifty nautical miles.

Under Secretary Ball reported on a dinner meeting held last night in New York between our officials and Mikoyan, Zorin and Kuznetsov. He said Mikoyan started with a very hard position, but modified this somewhat later in the evening. He repeatedly attempted to tie Castro's five points to the agreement between President Kennedy and Khrushchev. He proposed that there be a formal exchange of documents which would conclude the Cuban missile negotiations. We opposed such a proposal and suggested instead that there be a UN Security Council meeting which would be called to hear three unilateral declarations -- one by U Thant, another by the Soviets, and a third by the U.S.

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NW-80-29

DATE 10/15/84

There was a discussion of some UN presence in the form of a peace commission. The Russians were ambiguous on the status of the SAM sites. One of the Russians said that the Cubans might agree to the dismantlement of the SAM sites in return for our promise to stop overflights. The IL-28 bomber issue was not pinned down in the conversations. The Russians said repeatedly that they could not force Castro to accept on-site inspection. There was no decision on how inspection will be carried out after the missiles have been withdrawn. Mikoyan did not ask us not to overfly, but he did admit that he could not get Castro to accept ground inspection.

Deputy Secretary Gilpatric urged that we insist upon UN inspection as promised by Khrushchev. He noted that KOMAR missiles have been given to the Cubans and recommended that we keep our quarantine until a satisfactory substitute was in place.

The President decided that in view of the unsatisfactory discussions with the Cubans and the Russians, he would cancel his planned press conference in order not to be obliged to reply to questions about what guarantees we have that Russian missiles had been withdrawn from Cuba. Under Secretary Ball read a six-point statement which he recommended the President issue in lieu of a press conference.

Secretary Rusk suggested that we not call attention to the IL-28 bombers at this point because we may want to retaliate against these planes if one of our reconnaissance planes is shot down.

The President directed that a statement be prepared for issuance by the White House or the State Department. It should include what the Russians have agreed to and what we have agreed to. He asked what had been discussed in New York about the quarantine and about our overflights. Deputy Secretary Gilpatric reported that UN officials have given up on a UN surveillance system because Castro won't accept it.

The President asked how we were going to check on Soviet missiles being withdrawn.