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Prewar Status of Iraq's Weapons of Mass Destruction

A Reference Aid

This paper was compiled by
Office of Scientific and Weapons Research, from
papers published by OSWR. Comments and queries are welcome and may be directed to the Chief.

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Prewar Status of Iraq's Weapons of Mass Destruction As of 15 January 1991, Iraq's weapons of mass destruction posed serious Summary threats to US forces and interests in the Persian Gulf. Iraq's use of Information available as of 15 January 1991 was used in this report. chemical weapons and ballistic missiles in its war with Iran, its successful development of biological weapons, and its pursuit of nuclear weapons gave Baghdad capabilities unmatched in the Arab world. Iraq apparently believes that it needs chemical weapons both as a deterrent and as a key support for its professed role as military "protector" of the Arab world. The high priority enjoyed by the chemical warfare (CW) program probably also reflects Iraq's satisfaction with the results of massive nerve agent strikes against Iranian forces in 1988 and subsequent CW use against Kurdish insurgents. Iraq's CW program was by far the largest in the Third World. Iraq's combined production capability of the blister agent mustard and the nerve agents sarin and GF-the principal agents in its arsenal-was about 2,000 tons per year. Since the cease-fire with Iran, Iraq has stressed development of advanced CW agents. It is pursuing persistent nerve agents such as VX that are much more toxic than mustard, sarin, and GF. In addition, Iraq has developed binary chemical weapons with a longer shelf life, enabling it to maintain a sizable stockpile. In concert with developing a more sophisticated CW stockpile, the Iraqis are maintaining a wide range of battlefield-proven CW agent delivery options, including bombs, shells, and artillery rockets. We believe that Iraq also possesses CW agent warheads for its Scud and modified Scud ballistic missiles. We have strong indications that Iraq is prepared to use chemical weapons in any conflict with US forces over Iraq's invasion of Kuwait. Iraq most likely would use the nerve agents sarin and GF-possibly in binary formin artillery rockets and aerial bombs on the battlefield but might also use GF and mustard against rear-area targets, such as airfields. However, Iraqi willingness to initiate use of chemical weapons in any future conflict, despite President Saddam Husayn's pronouncements to the contrary, undoubtedly will be tempered if its opponents possess credible CW capabilities and appear willing to retaliate in kind. Before the war began, Iraq's advanced biological warfare (BW) program was the most extensive in the Arab world. The Iraqis probably have already deployed

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militarily significant numbers of biologically filled aerial bombs and artillery rockets. Iraq is probably developing BW agent warheads for its indigenously produced Scuds. We believe that Iraq will hold its biological weapons in reserve as an escalatory option. The Iraqis very likely are developing additional BW agents—probably infectious agents and additional toxins— Iraq probably has the technical competence, when combined with clandestinely obtained foreign technology or assistance, to develop a nuclear weapon by the late 1990s using indigenously produced fissile material. Other worst case and much less likely scenarios exist in which Iraq could develop a nuclear explosive in as little as a few months after a decision to do so. These scenarios involve the use of a clandestine source of nuclear material——or the diversion and processing of
safeguarded research reactor tuels into material suitable for a crash nuclear explosives program.
Even though Iraq probably could develop a nuclear device before the end of the decade if its nuclear infrastructure remained intact, fitting the device
into a missile's warhead will not be a simple task.
or more years' delay in fielding a nuclear weapon.
Iraq has the most advanced ballistic missile program in the Arab world. It has three operational missiles—the Soviet Scud B and two Iraqi-modified Scud Bs called the Al Husayn and the Al Abbas. The modified Scuds are capable of reaching key targets some 600 to 700 km away in Israel, Iran,
and Saudi Arabia.
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International reactions to the invasion of Kuwait have helped slow, but not stop, Iraqi missile development efforts.
we believe that Iraq may already have received enough technology and parts to begin limited production of its own Scud-type missiles
In our judgment, Iraq will develop and manufacture chemical and possibly biological warheads for all of its missile systems under development. Chemical and biological warheads are more cost effective, result in greater numbers of human casualties, provide a psychological edge, and make the missile a more effective deterrent.
We believe that current Iraqi missile projects will be difficult to stop, short of dismantling or destroying Iraq's missile production infrastructure. The international pariah status gained by Iraq since the invasion of Kuwait may make it more difficult to obtain such support in the
future.

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
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Preface	This Reference Aid is a compendium of new information on Iraq's program and the following papers published by the Office of Scient Weapons Research and updated to 15 January 1991:	nuclear ific and
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He who launches an aggression against Iraq or the Arab nation will now find someone to repel him. If we can strike him with a stone, we will. With a missile, we will... and with all the missiles, bombs, and other means at our disposal.

Saddam Husayn 18 April 1990

Now, Iraq is in possession of the binary chemical weapon. According to our technical, scientific, and military calculations, this is sufficient deterrent to confront the Israeli nuclear weapon.

Saddam Husayn 1 July 1990

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Prewar Status of Iraq's Weapons of Mass Destruction	
	
Iraq's Chemical Warfare Program	Iron has already medicard CE
mad 2 Chémich aminic Lioriau	Iraq has already produced GF, a more persistent analog of sarin, and is seeking other analogs such as
Background	soman. We believe that the Iraqis produced and used some GF toward the end of the war with Iran and that
Iraq's concerted chemical warfare (CW) effort during	binary GF now makes up part of Irag's CW arsenal.
the Iran-Iraq war enabled it to establish a sizable and sophisticated infrastructure for R&D, production,	
testing, and storage of chemical weapons	
By the war's end, Iraq was able to annually produce about 1,000 tons each of blister and nerve	
agents. Although Iraq had little difficulty obtaining the raw materials it needed to support such produc-	
tion, it began developing an indigenous precursor production capability after the United States and	
other Western nations began controlling sales of key	Iraqi nerve agent research apparently has focused on
precursor chemicals.	VX as well
The 1988 cease-fire with Iran did not diminish the importance of Iraq's CW program, but it did signifi-	
cantly alter the program's focus. The demands of the war required that Iraq's CW program dedicate much	
of its resources to large-scale production of chemical	
weapons. Following the cease-fire, however, produc- tion of chemical weapons with a limited shelf life was	Iraq also may be researching nonstandard nerve agents similar to VX.
no longer practical or even necessary, freeing Iraq to enhance its <u>CW</u> effort in preparation for future	Improved Production Methods
conflicts.	Since the cease-fire with Iran, the Iraqis apparently
	have been optimizing their CW agent production processes and searching for new routes of manufac-
	ture. The goals of this effort probably are to simplify the production of CW agents, reduce bottlenecks in
Advanced Agents On the basis of a variety of reporting, we believe that	the process, and rely on indigenously produced or easily acquired raw materials.
Iraq has been engaged in a sizable effort to develop and produce advanced CW agents.	2,200
and produces deviations of it agoins.	
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Iraq graduali during the Ir	y built up a CW prot an-traq war, primaril m inadvertent exposu	ection capability y to minimize Iraqi			
casualties fro	m inadvertent exposu	re to its own chemi-			İ
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
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
war. In addition, we believe that the Iraqis were pleased with the minimal international response to its use of chemical weapons From a base of a well-established CW program, the development and production of biological weapons is the logical next step that a proliferating nation usually Iraq has also trained its troops to operate in a takes. Countries around the globe, including Iraq, chemical environment. have concluded that biological weapons offer much several Iraqi courses related to CW defense, in and require little: addition to unspecified training that could be either offensive or protective in nature. Biological warfare (BW) agents can be produced with relatively small expenditures of time and resources. Iraq's Biological Warfare Program BW Agents Under Development A variety of information leads us to believe that Background Iraq has developed botulinum toxin and anthrax Iraq's expertise and experience with chemical weapspores as BW agents. Botulinum toxin is nonpersisons almost certainly have reinforced its desire to tent, degrading rapidly in the enivronment. Anthrax develop additional unconventional weapons. We spores are very stable in the environment and can be believe that Iraq views its use of chemical weapons considered persistent BW agents. against Iran as a decisive factor in the outcome of the

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Open literature indicates that Iraqi veterinary authorities signed a contract with an Italian firm in 1982 to construct a Clostridium vaccine plant near Baghdad.	
	Weaponization and Use of CW and BW Agents lraq has available a wide range of weapon systems that it could use to deliver CW and BW agents. The weapons range from simple aerial bombs and artillery rockets to ballistic missiles.
	Iraq also has chemical rounds for its 82-mm and 120-mm mortars and its 122-mm and 130-mm artiflery. It also used 122-mm artiflery rockets filled with CW agents, particularly in the final year of the war.


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All these munitions could also be filled with BW agents.	
Bombs and Munitions	
Iraq has historically purchased empty napalm or	
white phosphorus munitions that it has filled with CW agents and could fill with BW agents.	-
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	We believe that Iraq has developed a chemical war- head for its Scuds and modified Scuds.
	acad for the bodds and modified bedds.)
Ballistic Missites	
raq is developing a long-range CW and BW delivery	·
capability to augment its extensive short-range tactical capabilities. Of greatest concern is Iraq's develop-	·
nent of chemical and biological warheads for its pallistic missiles.' Iraq probably will develop and manufacture these warheads for each kind of ballistic	
nissile under development	
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	Iraq's Nuclear Program Background Notwithstanding Baghdad's Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty commitment, we believe that Iraqi President Saddam Husayn judges a nuclear weapons capability to be essential to meet perceived security needs and to further regional ambitions.
Use of Chemical and Biological Weapons Past Iraqi use of chemical weapons and statements by Iraqi officials justifying the use of any weapon to defend their country suggest that Iraq would use chemical and biological weapons in a conflict. In December 1990, Iraqi officials threatened to use chemical weapons against the multinational coalition forces if fighting broke out in the Persian Gulf.	

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


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


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Tree has marked an analysis	
Iraq has worked on nuclear weapons designs,	-
However, even if a device design did not exist	- 1
before the invasion of Kuwait, Iraq could greatly	
accelerate a design and development effort by com- promising safety, reliability, efficiency, yield, com-	
pactness, and ruggedness. An expedited nuclear ex-	
plosive design, of either the gun-assembled or implosion type, could be developed within six months	
to a year if no major obstacles were encountered.	
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completed a nuclear explosive design.	
completed a filterest explosive design,	

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
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



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





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
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








The Al Hijarah
In early October 1990, Iraq announced that it possesses a new missile, called the Al Hijarah or "the stones." According to public statements, the missile is capable of striking Israel from any point in Iraq, suggesting that the missile has a range greater than 1,000 km.



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	Conclusions
	Iraq will continue to give high priority to development
	of its weapons production facilities and delivery sys- tems. We believe that Iraq seeks self-sufficiency in
	these programs to ensure immunity from supply dis-
	ruptions like the embargo during the Iran-Iraq war
	and the current UN embargo.
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Chemical Weapons We believe that tactical use of chemical weapons in support of conventional offensive and defensive operations has been incorporated into Iraqi military doctrine. Iraq utilized chemical weapons primarily during the last half of the Iran-Iraq war, which led to battlefield development of Iraq's CW doctrine. The decision to use chemicals during the war, however, was undoubtedly influenced by the lack of a significant Iranian countercapability. We believe Iraq will be less likely to initiate use of chemical weapons in fluture scenarios if its opponent is armed with a credible CW capability and appears willing to use it. Of the many CW delivery systems available to Iraq, we believe that artillery rockets and aircraft-delivered bombs are the most likely to be used. We believe that Iraq has already produced a few chemical warheads for its Scud-type missiles, which would greatly increase its capability to strike Saudi population centers, airfields, and staging areas with CW agents. We assess that Iraq's extensive CW capability poses a serious threat to US forces and interests in the Middle East. Iraq has the capability to deliver large amounts of CW agents on the battlefield and has shown a willingness to do so during the Iran-Iraq war. Recent reliable reporting indicates that, in an invasion of Saudi Arabia, Iraqi chemical weapons would be held in reserve and used immediately if Iraqi troops lose momentum. Targues for strategic CW use repoytedly would be Dhahran and Riyadh, Saudi Arabia, with emphasis placed on airfields, staging areas, and civilian populations. The targeting of civilians is in line with Iraq'i threats to "turn Kuwati tinto a graveyard" in case of forcigin intervention Recent activity at Iraqi chemical weapons production and storage areas strongly suggests that Iraq'e sexpeditions of the pression of the battlefield and bid believe that Iraq'e sexpeditions of the pression of the battlefield and wapons production and storage areas strongly suggests that Iraq'e sexpeditions of the pr		
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support of conventional offensive and defensive operations has been incorporated into Iraqi military doctrine. Iraq utilized chemical weapons primarily during the last half of the Iran-Iraq war, which led to battlefield development of Iraq's CW doctrine. The decision to use chemicals during the war, however, was undoubtedly influenced by the lack of a significant Iranian countercapability. We believe Iraq will be less likely to initiate use of chemical weapons in future scenarios if its opponent is armed with a credible CW capability and appears willing to use it. Of the many CW delivery systems available to Iraq, we believe that artillery rockets and aircraft-delivered bombs are the most likely to be used. We believe that Iraq has already produced a few chemical warheads for its Scud-type missiles, which would greatly increase its capability to strike Saudi population centers, airfields, and staging areas with CW agents. We assess that Iraq's extensive CW capability possa serious threat to US forces and interests in the Middle East. Iraq has the capability to deliver large amounts of CW agents on the battlefield and has shown a willingness to do so during the Iran-Iraq war. Recent reliable reporting indicates that, in an invasion of Saudi Arabia, Iraqi chemical weapons would be held in reserve and used immediately if Iraqi troops lose momentum. Targus for strategic CW use reportedly would be Dhahran and Riyadh, Saudi Arabia, with emphasis placed on airfields, staging areas, and civilian populations. The targeting of civilians is in line with Iraqi threats to "turn Kuwait into a graveyard" in case of foreign intervention Recent activity at Iraqi chemical weapons production and storage areas strongly suggests that Iraq's expedivation and storage areas strongly suggests	Chemical Weapons	
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