CHICANATIVE CHARLES

DRT Feb 05

MEMORANDUM FOR THE COMMANDER, U.S. CENTRAL COMMAND

SUBJ: Non-WMD Declaratory Policy for Iraq

- The attached briefing, an update of work done months ago, is a useful compendium of Iraq-related declaratory policy themes for selected key audiences.
- Please distribute it to those responsible for public affairs, public diplomacy and information operations.

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Declaratory Policy on WMD


- In addition to developing themes for key audiences, we should address the following issues having to do with declaratory policy:
 - · Declaratory policy with respect to WMD use by the Iraqi regime
 - A possible ultimatum to be issued to the Iraqi regime prior to the start of hostilities.
 - Themes for a presidential speech on the eve of an Iraqi operation.

Declaratory policy with respect to WMD use by the Iraqi regime:


- Fundamental fact is our publicly-announced policy of "regime change."
 - Saddam is likely to believe that he cannot physically survive regime change.
 - Unless we can, and are willing to, offer him some credible hope of comfortable survival, he may figure he has little to lose by using WMD, once he believes his downfall is imminent.
 - In any case, he may not be interested in exile, if that means living quietly under conditions of virtual house arrest.
- We should aim to delay Saddam's recognition of the *imminence* of his downfall for as long as possible.
 - Saddam appears to believe that he is good at political maneuvering, and that he can outmaneuver us, despite our intentions.
 - Thus, our goal should be to convince him that he has more time to maneuver that he actually does.
 - When the end comes, it must come quicker than he imagines.
- In addition, we should try to persuade those who would have to carry out his
 orders to use WMD not to do so.
 - Suggested themes are contained in the "Declaratory Policy" briefing.

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- These themes are best conveyed privately, if channels can be identified.
- · The more difficult pair is to determine what to say publicly.
 - We wish to portray our action as a *liberation* of Iraq from a tyrant thus it is difficult to threaten retaliation against Iraqi society generally for actions taken by its oppressor.



- We can make general statements, as we did in the Gulf War and since. Without withdrawing NSA, we can imply that it would not apply in this case.
 - U.S. "will not tolerate" WMD use. "The American people would demand the strongest possible response." (President Bush to Saddam, 9 Jan 91)
 - "...if any nation uses weapons of mass destruction against the United States or its allies, it may forfeit its protection from U.S. nuclear attack under the 1995 pledge [Statement of NSA by Secretary of State Christopher]." (Robert Bell, Senior Director for Defense Policy and Arms Control Policy, NSC staff, 1997)



- Message should be directed at Iraqi officialdom generally:
 - "Unless you are guilty of atrocities, you can survive the downfall of the Ba athist regime and play a role in the new Iraq."
 - Should we publish a (short) list of "wanted" criminals, in order to give hope to those not on the list?
 - However, if WMD are used, all bets are off. In that case, we may decide that no high official of the regime can be allowed to play a role in the new lrag.

 "Unless you can show that you tried to prevent WMD use, you are likely to be punished for complicity in the crimes of the Ba athist regime."

Ultimatum

- At some point, we should announce that Saddam's opportunity to accept UNMOVIC has passed.
 - We would recount the entire history of Iraq's deception and cheating with respect to inspections.
 - We would conclude that that history shows that inspections can not be an effective means to enforce the disarmament provisions of UNSCR 687.
- At that point, or soon after, we could deliver an ultimatum:
 - Iraq must unconditionally commit itself to WMD disarmament and to the war on terrorism.
 - Iraq must turn over to U.S. control all al Qaida suspects in Iraq.
 - Iraq must extradite Yasin (suspect in first WTC bombing.)
 - · Inspectors to be allowed in, with complete, unrestricted access, including:
 - Inspectors can order the destruction of any WMD facility, weapon, delivery means, etc.
 - Inspectors can interview Iraqi personnel outside Iraq (with their families also outside Iraq).
 - Inspectors to be accompanied by U.S. (and coalition?) troops to enforce these provisions.
- Iraq must comply with ___ days.

Presidential Announcement

- Present: The Danger We Face:
 - Build on State of the Union and West Point speeches.
- Past: History shows that these dangers aren't just theoretical.

- History of leaq's deception and cheating with respect to inspections.
- History of lraq's use of WMD
- Future: A better future for the Iraqi people, and for the Middle East:
 - Wrong to assume that Iraq can't enjoy the benefits of democracy and progress.
 - Iraqi people want to throw off tyranny. They should have the opportunity to do so.
 - Highlight work already done by Iraqi opposition to plan for post-Saddam Iraq.
 - Statement of political principles by the opposition.
 - Commitment to territorial integrity of Iraq.
 - Given its natural and human resources, no reason lraq can't become an advanced society.