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Special Security Center (SSC), CIA - Our job is to coordinate security on the compartmented systems in general in cooperation with the USIB committees, which are now rechristened, instead of USIB, NFIB. Everything is changing. That's sort of the theme of what I'm going to talk to you about today. The SSC, for example, is the primary source of security policy for the NRO. In my previous position as the NRO staff security officer, I was detailed there by the Special Security Center. And so we do have a policy role and some of you may wonder, well good grief, why don't they formulate some better policy than they have in the past. The truth is that years ago only the NRO, the intelligence community and the Russians knew much about our reconnaissance efforts and security policy was relatively easy to make and simple to follow.

But things are now much more complicated, for many reasons. The product, as General Kulpa said, is invaluable and, as he also indicated, it's going to a lot more places than it used to, like the Department of Agriculture, the Department of Interior, the Department of Commerce. In order for the tax payer to get his buck's worth out of that reconnaissance effort, that product has to be spread around, and it's very

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useful. People do find it extremely useful. The result is that more people than ever are receiving satellite collected intelligence.

Another factor is disclosures about these programs - first Aviation Week and Jack Anderson, and then Seymore Hirsh, and then Marcetti and Marks, and more recently Phil Agee, the former CIA officer who, although not legally labeled so, from an ideological standpoint is in fact a defector. And Agee isn't finished yet. Last week, just before I left to come out here, I was told that he had managed to dredge up 200 more names of people he had been associated with when he was a Central Intelligence Agency officer and disclosed those as well. The man has undergone a total ideological change.

And then there were the SALT negotiations where we heard about national technical means of verification. That's a nice euphemism but it adds up to another admission of fact of. There was the Rockefeller Commission, the Church Committee, the House Committee on Intelligence. In all of these, both through leaks and through official disclosures, revealed a great deal about the overhead reconnaissance

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
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effort and intelligence in general. And there's sort of a rising, a lack of agreement among the intelligence community regarding how much should be revealed publicly regarding our reconnaissance efforts, and friends, it isn't easy to formulate security policy. It's always been hard to maintain a secret, but it gets harder all the time. But we, those of us in the National Reconnaissance Organization, have kept a lot of secrets over the years. And we will have to analyze motivation to understand why, not only why people disclose information that damages our intelligence effort, but why some people are willing to undergo the inconvenience, the extra work and the anonymity that are necessary to protect those efforts.

Those who leak secrets from the inside have their own motives - revenge against an institution which has failed to recognize and reward their peculiar genius; ideology, a misguided notion that abolishing secrecy will assure world peace and a better life for everybody; fame and notariety. This sort of thing. And finally of course, I suspect the most significant motive of all, financial gain.



But we have our own motivations, those of us in this room. We have our own rewards, some of them in the form of what was popularly called a few years ago "psychic income." We have patriotism, knowing that we have contributed to the defense posture of the United States in a unique and irreplaceable way. We have pride in the skill and genius which have gone into the production of intelligence collection systems which, even today, makes some of Jules Vernes' most imaginative stories seem pale by comparison.

To be absolutely objective, of course, financial gain enters into it for us, too. The United States aerospace industry has grown and prospered through participation in the National Reconnaissance Program. Not only do these facts add up to a situation in which security policy is increasingly difficult to formulate and virtually impossible to enforce without the single minded cooperation and support of every man and woman in this room. And without the absolute support of the management of each contractor represented here. And some of us might find it confusing, irritating, even embarrassing, to read in the newspapers information that relates to programs we are restrained by security from discussing. Does it irritate you? Sure it does. You wouldn't be human if it didn't, but, let's take a look at why and

how the NRP has managed since 1960 to maintain a record of security which probably has not been surpassed in the history of intelligence and secrecy.

First, it is because of the motivational factors I mentioned earlier. Second, we have always maintained a totally unflappable attitude in the face of these disclosures and inquiries. We have never rushed to let the cat out of the bag just because he managed to get a whisker out of the opening. We have let the disclosures wear themselves out in the press. We have avoided adding to the information that was already compromised. Like any champion team, we have never abandoned our game plan. We have stuck together. We have avoided adding to the problem, and it is important that we continue to do so. When we start letting our adversaries call the shots, when we start playing their game, we are going to be in very serious trouble.

Now, should the government do something about disclosures? Should we have laws to limit the news media? Well, such laws are impossible because they are unconstitutional, and secondly, I for one wouldn't like to see them passed because they would deprive us as Americans of one of our most precious possessions, a free press.

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Security has to come from within, and recent efforts to plug security leaks have concentrated on seeking legislation to penalize those who disclose secrets which were officially entrusted to them. This is logically and legally the only way we can go among the informed and well intentioned government officials.

There is a lack of agreement on certain basics. For example, there are those who feel strongly that the fact that the United States engages in satellite reconnaissance for intelligence purposes, what we popularly call fact of, should be unclassified. And certainly the disclosures by the news media, government officials, and others lend an unassailable logic to the proposition that when everyone knows a secret it isn't a secret any more. But other officials, equally well motivated, contend that we must maintain fact of as a secret, at least officially, because of possible diplomatic and political repercussions of officially acknowledging that we are capable of gathering intelligence from any corner of the earth without the consent of the countries which are being so surveilled. This is a very serious problem and a difficult one, and I don't know how long it's going to take to reach a final decision on it, but it probably will come fairly soon.

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One thing for certain, if we are going to maintain our capabilities, facts about overhead reconnaissance have to be very closely held. Every increment of information about how our systems operate, every item of data on how effective they are, all contribute to the ability of our adversaries to mount effective countermeasures. Unfortunately, there is a link between fact of and facts about. Even people in the intelligence community sometimes ask why all the secrecy. The Russians know we have satellite reconnaissance systems, why can't we save ourselves a lot of money and do away with all these security programs. The naivete' of such a view is really appalling. The Soviet intelligence services are spending a small fortune trying to learn all about our capabilities. If they can learn with precision what our systems can do, how well they do it, they can concentrate their efforts on only those countermeasures which will be really effective against us.

The new social laws such as the Privacy Act and Freedom of Information can provide opportunities for people whose real purpose is to reveal intelligence sources and efforts. Now, I might add parenthetically that the people in the

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Central Intelligence Agency, for example, who are tasked with responding to these Freedom of Information Act inquiries find that not only are there very frequently nebulous reasons for requesting the information - but they find the same phraseology, the same format coming at them from all parts of the country, and this of course adds up to a concerted effort to disrupt and harass the intelligence community.

This kind of legislation, as the least, makes it very difficult to formulate policies which are as simple and effective as the ones in the 60's were. It will become increasingly important to understand why our policies are changing. At the same time, it will be more difficult in a rapidly evolving situation to keep track of the changes which will certainly occur. We are going to have to communicate more closely. You will have to try to foresee complications which will arise from your implementation of those changes in policy.

At this time there are a number of studies of compartmentation going on in the intelligence community. The views expressed in these studies range from favoring complete

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abolition of compartmentation through the realignment of the various categories and criteria for compartmentation, to finally a retention of the status quo. I think of those three the last is the least likely to occur over the long haul.

In addition, the techniques of compartmentation, as they are practiced in the national programs and have been for years, are being copied by departmental programs, and more code words and more slugs and more special channels are being created, which promises additional confusion, criticism of compartmentation today.

The picture I have painted may seem like a bleak one, but I believe we are near the end of a difficult time, one in which security was subordinated to a desire to probably reveal all the ills and bad features of our intelligence effort.

I feel that, in perspective, most Americans are convinced that mistakes have been made, but they were not massive as was charged, and they were not motivated by anything other than a desire to serve the best interests of the United States.

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The former Director of Central Intelligence, William Colby, was a man of patriotism, wisdom and foresight. He realized that the day of simply stamping documents with a secret stamp without any really serious consideration of why are over, and he spoke repeatedly in public speaking engagements of the need to keep good secrets while not trying to keep bad secrets. Most of his major addresses heavily stressed the importance to our nation of a strong, well founded security program, and the lessons he taught are vitally important. He pointed out the folly of trying to protect too much, of trying to conceal the unconcealable, if we try to hide things which shouldn't be hidden, which can't be hidden, we damage security by providing ammunition to our critics. We can then say look at what all the bureaucrats with their little rubber stamps have done now. The worst part about that is when we have done something that can truthfully be pointed to in fashion, we have given them ammunition. We have provided credence and it does seriously undermine our efforts to keep the good secrets. The present Director of Central Intelligence, George Bush, has already demonstrated a very keen interest in security. He is a tireless worker, he shows every promise of giving strong security leadership in the community. I think that we can be assured that he's not going to do anything to

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
weaken his ability to safeguard intelligence sources and methods which is what he's charged to do by statute. The CIA, I believe, is not about to adopt an extremist position that says we have no secrets worth keeping.

Close and continuous communication between those who make and administer policy and those who carry it out is indispensable. Those of us in Washington need to know when policies are being overtaken by events, or when circumstances dictate the need for new policies to cover new situations. All too often in history battles have been lost because the people at headquarters didn't know what was going on in the trenches. So we have got to have that very, very close communication, and it's got to be timely. We can't let the situation sit around and get worse and worse until there isn't any solution possible before we try to do something about it. I believe in the near term we are going to be able to stabilize our security programs, formulate policies that are appropriate to today's situation and get on with the business of producing the world's best intelligence collection systems.

In the long term I believe that if we maintain a rigorous, viable security program, the disclosures which have been made will fade into insignificance, as new secrets arise to

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replace the old ones, just as the U-2 reconnaissance aircraft of the 1950's have long been public knowledge. The facts about our satellite systems which have been disclosed will fade into history.

It is vitally necessary, however, that we renew our resolve at this moment to make the extra effort that spells the difference between a truly effective security program and simply making a minimal effort to give the appearance of compliance with security policies. Based on the past record, I think I know which one you are going to chose, and I believe the people of the United States owe each of you a debt of gratitude for your dedication over the past two decades. Thank you.

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Presentation by [Redacted] of the NRO Staff to the 26 May 1976 [Redacted] Security Meeting in Los Angeles. "The NRO in a Changing Environment" is [Redacted] subject, and he addresses the impact of Executive Order 11905, The NRO Charter, National Policy for Satellite Reconnaissance, and NRO Support to Military Forces.

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[Redacted] remarks have been transcribed and edited for presentation in this report of proceedings.

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