## Message Text

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ACTION SS-25

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 SSO-00 /026 W ------ 017782 R 230900Z DEC 74

FM USINT BAGHDAD TO SECSTATE WASHDC 1486 INFO AMEMBASSY TEHRAN

S E C R E T BAGHDAD 898

EXDIS

FOR UNDER SECRETARY SISCO AND ASSISTANT SECRETARY ATHERTON

E.O. 11652: GDS TAGS: PFOR, IZ, US, IR SUBJECT: U.S. POLICY ON IRAQI-IRANIAN CONFLICT

1. SUMMARY: DOWNING OF TWO IRAQI A/C BY IRANIAN MISSILES IS, AS YOU KNOW, ONLY MOST DRAMATIC EXAMPLE OF RECENT MASSIVE AND DIRECT IRANIAN INTERVENTION IN IRAQ, APPARENTLY NECESSITATED BY IRAQI ARMED FORCES SUCCESS AGAINST BARZANI IN THIS YEAR'S CAMPAIGN. IT IS, IN MY VIEW, TIME FOR U.S. TO MAKE STRONGEST POSSIBLE DEMARCHE TO SHAH TO END THIS INTERVENTION NOT ONLY IN IRAN'S INTEREST BUT IN INTEREST OF REGIONAL STABILITY. END SUMMARY.

2. SHAH'S OBJECTIVE IS APPARENTLY TO BRING ABOUT NEW GOVERNMENT IN BAGHDAD MORE AMENABLE TO HIM. IT IS TRUE THAT BAKR/SADDAM HUSSEIN REGIME IS DEEPLY COMMITTED TO VICTORY AGAINST KURDS AND CONCEIVABLY COULD BE REPLACED IF WAR DRAGS ON. IT DOES NOT NECESSARILY FOLLOW, HOWEVER, THAT SUCCESSOR REGIME WOULD BE IMPROVEMENT. SOME OBSERVERS, ASUCH AS FRENCH AND BRITISH, BELIEVE IT WOULD BE MORE RADICAL AND DISRUPTIVE, AND PROBABLY BE FORCED TO RELY HEAVILY ON USSR. ANOTHER POSSIBILITY IS ARMY TAKEOVER WHICH MIGHT BE ANTI-COMMUNIST, BUT, HISTORICALLY, MILITARY REGIMES IN IRAQ HAVE RESULTED IN INTERNAL INSTABILITY AND CHANCES ARE THIS WOULD AGAIN BE THE CASE. THIS MAY SUIT SHAH, BUT IT SECRET

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DIFFICULT TO SEE HOW IT WOULD SERVE U.S. OR WESTERN INTEREST

IN REGIONAL STABILITY.

3. BAATH REGIME, FOR ALL ITS ABHORRENT TRAITS, HAS GIVEN IRAQ OVER SIX YEARS OF STABILITY. IN ADDITION, IT IS NOW CONCENTRATING ON ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT AND ENERGETICALLY ATTEMPTING TO BRING ABOUT FULL RAPPROCHEMENT WITH WESTERN EUROPE AND CONSERVATIVE ARAB STATES (BAGHDAD 857). WHATEVER MOTIVES LAY BEHIND THIS TWIN POLICY OF DEVELOPMENT AND RAPPROCHE-MENT AND WHATEVER RADICAL RHETORIC USED TO CONCEAL IT, CHARACTERISTICS OF BAATH REGIME IF POLICIES SUCCESSFUL LIKELY TO BE QUITE DIFFERENT FROM CURRENT CHARACTERISTICS WHICH ADMITTEDLY OFTEN RESEMBLE THOSE OF CORNERED RAT.

4. KURDISH LEADERSHIP IS FIGHTING HOPELESS BATTLE. NO INTERESTED PARTY WANTS TO SEE THEM SUCCEED. EVEN THE IRANIANS SAY THEY WILL NOT GIVE THEM ENOUGH ASSISTANCE TO TAKE OFFENSIVE. THEIR SOLE HOPE AGAIN APPEARS TO BE OVERTHROW OF BAGHDAD REGIME. IN CASE OF KURDS, HOPE THAT OVERTHROW WOULD LEAD TO MORE AMENABLE POLICIES TOWARD KURDS IS EVEN GREATER DELUSION THAN IN CASE OF IRAN. ALL IRAQI REGIMES IN PAST, INCLUDING BRITISH, MONARCHY, AND MILITARY HAVE, TO BEST OF MY KNOWLEDGE, REFUSED TO GRANT KURDS KIND OF AUTONOMY THEY SEEKING. OLD IDEA OF KURDISH-SHIA COALITION IS ALSO, IN MY VIEW, BOTH A DELUSION AND UNREALISTIC. NEITHER KURDISH NOR SHIA COMMUNITIES HAVE EITHER THE INSTITUTIONS OR PERSONNEL TO GOVERN AND CONTINUE MODERNIZATION PROCESS. MAJORITY OF BOTH COMMUNITIES ARE STILL LIVING IN ESSENTIALLY TRIBAL, MEDIEVAL SOCIETIES.

5. BRITISH AMBASSADOR GRAHAM TOLD ME IN STRICTEST CONFIDENCE THAT COURT MINISTER ALAM HAD RECENTLY TOLD BRITISH THAT IRAN WAS DETERMINED TO CONTINUE THE WAR BY GIVING BARZANI NOT ONLY WHAT HE NEEDED TO GET THROUGH THE WINTER, BUT SUFFICIENT ARMS AND EQUIPMENT TO RENEW FULL SCALE HOSTILITIES IN SPRING. IF THIS REPRESENTS SHAH'S THINKING THEN WE ARE ALMOST CERTAINLY HEADING FOR LARGE SCALE REGIONAL CONFLICT.

I BELIEVE THEREFORE TIME HAS COME TO MAKE STRONGEST POSSIBLE DEMARCHE TO SHAH TO DETERMINE EXTENT TO WHICH U.S. AND SECRET

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IRANIAN INTEREST CONFLICT IN THIS MATTER AND HOW THEY MIGHT BE RECONCILED. AS PREVIOUSLY SUGGESTED, I BELIEVE MOST PROMISING APPROACH WOULD BE FOR U.S. TO RECOMMEND THAT IRAN TEST SERIOUSNESS OF IRAQI DESIRE FOR RAPPROCHEMENT RATHER THAN INFLEXIBLY MAINTAINING THAT BAATH REGIME IS INCORRIGIBLY HOSTILE TO TI. LOWRIE SECRET

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## Message Attributes

Automatic Decaptioning: Z Capture Date: 01 JAN 1994 Channel Indicators: n/a Current Classification: UNCLASSIFIED Concepts: POLICIES, INTERVENTION, COMBAT OPERATIONS, CIVIL DISORDERS Control Number: n/a Copy: SINGLE Draft Date: 23 DEC 1974 Decaption Date: 28 MAY 2004 Decaption Note: 25 YEAR REVIEW Disposition Action: RELEASED Disposition Action: RELEASED Disposition Approved on Date: Disposition Authority: shawdg Disposition Case Number: n/a Disposition Comment: 25 YEAR REVIEW Disposition Date: 28 MAY 2004 Disposition Event: Disposition History: n/a Disposition Reason: Disposition Remarks: Document Number: 1974BAGHDA00898 Document Number: 1974BAGHDA00898 Document Source: CORE Document Unique ID: 00 Drafter: n/a Enclosure: n/a Executive Order: GS Errors: N/A Film Number: D740373-0224 From: BAGHDAD Handling Restrictions: n/a Image Path: ISecure: 1 Legacy Key: link1974/newtext/t19741216/aaaaandw.tel Line Count: 114 Locator: TEXT ON-LINE, ON MICROFILM Office: ACTION SS Original Classification: SECRET Original Handling Restrictions: EXDIS Original Previous Classification: n/a Original Previous Handling Restrictions: n/a Page Count: 3 Previous Channel Indicators: n/a Previous Classification: SECRET Previous Handling Restrictions: EXDIS Reference: n/a Review Action: RELEASED, APPROVED Review Authority: shawdg Review Comment: n/a Review Content Flags: Review Date: 20 AUG 2002 **Review Event:** Review Exemptions: n/a Review History: RELEASED <20 AUG 2002 by WorrelSW>; APPROVED <19 MAR 2003 by shawdg> **Review Markings:** Declassified/Released US Department of State EO Systematic Review 30 JUN 2005 **Review Media Identifier:** Review Referrals: n/a Review Release Date: n/a Review Release Event: n/a **Review Transfer Date:** Review Withdrawn Fields: n/a Secure: OPEN Status: NATIVE Subject: U.S. POLICY ON IRAQI-IRANIAN CONFLICT TAGS: PFOR, IZ, US, IR To: STATE Type: TE Markings: Declassified/Released US Department of State EO Systematic Review 30 JUN 2005