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ANALYSIS PROGRAM

INFO  
DEPT PASS:

FROM : U.S. Delegation SALT, VIENNA DATE: February 3, 1972

SUBJECT : SALT MemCon

REF :

Attached SALT MemCon is to be reproduced and distributed in accordance with the memorandum to Mr. Miller, Deputy Executive Secretary, S/S, dated December 6, 1971 from Mr. Christopher, Special Assistant to the Director of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency.

SMITH

Attachment:

Parsons, Garthoff-Grinevsky, Kishilov Memcon  
February 1, 1972

GP-3

1972 FEB 7 AM 10 13

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FORM 3-70 DS-323

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Drafted by: SALDEL: RLGarthoff	Drafting Date: 2/2/72	Phone No.:	Contents and Classification Approved by: SALDEL: William T. Shinn <i>WS</i>
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Clearances:

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SALT VI

*Encl* -A-769

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION  
U. S. SALT DELEGATION  
VIENNA, AUSTRIA

DATE: February 1, 1972

TIME: 11:15 - 11:45 a.m.

PLACE: Soviet Embassy, Vienna

SUBJECT: SALT

PARTICIPANTS:

US

USSR

Ambassador J. Graham Parsons  
Dr. Raymond L. Garthoff

Mr. O. A. Grinevsky  
Mr. N. S. Kishilov

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Unilateral US Interpretive Statements on Verification

Garthoff berated Grinevsky and Kishilov for their repudiation of the understanding reached in September in Helsinki that the Soviet Delegation would receive without counter-argument American statements of understanding that Article XII did not call for any changes in current operating practices of national technical means, and that selective direct observation could be offered under the the provision of Article XIII explicitly referring to voluntary provision of information to clarify ambiguous situations. Grinevsky disclaimed any knowledge of such an understanding. Kishilov explained that his side had understood that the US Delegation would make such statements, and that his Delegation was not expected to make any statement of agreement, but held that each side always had the right to present its view on any subject. Garthoff noted there could not be disagreement with the latter point as a general rule, but in this particular case Timerbaev and Kishilov had told him on September 22 that the Soviet side would be prepared to listen to unilateral American interpretations without responding; it was for this reason that copies of draft texts had been provided in September, December, and January. At no time until the night before had the Soviet Delegation indicated it wished to make any counter-statement, much less had it ever offered the text of such a statement. Grinevsky said that the Soviet Delegation did not intend to make counter-statements but it did wish to reply informally stating on the record the Soviet position on the points concerned, namely that it saw no need whatsoever for any kind of on-site inspection, and that any operation of national technical means that might be inconsistent with generally recognized principles of international

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law would not be sanctioned by the treaty. Garthoff said that these Soviet views were well known; what was disturbing was the fact that we had thought there was an understanding that the Soviet side was prepared to hear American positions restated on these points without generating renewed debate on them. Parsons noted that he also recalled conversation with Timerbaev in which the latter had clearly indicated that the Soviet side saw no need to address these subjects at the time that the US side would place its unilateral interpretations on the record.

Garthoff noted that the US side would now presumably make its statements in April. Since Grinevsky had indicated that the Soviet Delegation had prepared remarks on the subjects, perhaps he would wish to make them available on an informal basis, noting Grinevsky had said there would not be formal counter-statements. Grinevsky agreed to do so.

Interpretive Statement on Article IX

Grinevsky proffered a slightly revised version of the draft interpretive statement on Article IX, removing the clause paraphrasing the article itself, as had the recent American draft. Garthoff suggested, and Grinevsky agreed, to remove an unnecessary "also" in the sentence. Garthoff then said that we considered the statement agreed. (See attachment 1.)

Future ABM Systems

Grinevsky said that the Soviet Delegation had found interesting and helpful the 5 points given by Garthoff. However, they did not see a need to move so drastically from the previous text, which had been agreed except for a few words, and did not feel that the latest US draft proposal was as good.

All four participants then addressed the several texts in an effort to find a compromise. Garthoff suggested a possible solution, and Grinevsky and Kishilov agreed to propose it to their Delegation. Grinevsky and Garthoff each had a considerably marked up paper indicating the change, but Garthoff agreed to provide a clean typed text to the Soviet Embassy that afternoon. (See attachment 2.)

(Note: a few hours later, Grinevsky called to say that he believed his Delegation could accept the proposal if the words "based on other physical principles and" were included before the phrase "including components". Garthoff replied that he saw no objection of substance,

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but considered that this change would make the sentence even more ungainly. Grinevsky nonetheless argued that inclusion of those words would be necessary to gain the agreement of his Delegation, and Garthoff agreed to propose this formulation to his Delegation. Kishilov called later, and Garthoff informed him that the American Delegation could accept the revised formulation (see attachment 3). Kishilov said that not all members of their Delegation were there, and he could not give a definite answer that day, but he and Grinevsky were 90% sure that the new formulation would be acceptable.)

Attachments:

As stated

*R&S*  
SALDEL/EXO:RLGarthoff/res  
February 1, 1972

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February 1, 1972

Agreed Interpretive Statement on Article IX

The two sides understand that Article IX of the ABM Treaty includes the obligation of the USSR and the US not to provide to other countries technical descriptions or blueprints specially worked out for the construction of ABM systems and their components limited by the Treaty.

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*5*

February 1, 1972

In order to insure fulfillment of the obligation not to deploy ABM systems and their components except as provided in Article III of the Treaty, it is agreed that in the event ABM systems including components capable of substituting for ABM interceptor missiles, ABM launchers, or ABM radars are created in the future, specific limitations on such systems and their components would be subject to discussion in accordance with Article XIII and agreement in accordance with Article XIV of the Treaty.

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**SECRET**

February 1, 1972

In order to insure fulfillment of the obligation not to deploy ABM systems and their components except as provided in Article III of the Treaty, it is agreed that in the event ABM systems based on other physical principles and including components capable of substituting for ABM interceptor missiles, ABM launchers, or ABM radars are created in the future, specific limitations on such systems and their components would be subject to discussion in accordance with Article XIII and agreement in accordance with Article XIV of the Treaty.

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