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DEPARTMENT OF STATE  
ACTION MEMORANDUM



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January 13, 1972

To: The Under Secretary  
From: PM ~~h~~ Ronald I. Spiers

SALT

Attached is a draft of the SALT "options" paper which I mentioned to you last week as possibly serving as the basis for discussion between Secretaries Rogers and Laird on our future course of action in SALT.

As I told you OSD is moving closer to the deferred hard-site option (ABM option #4 in the attached paper). Gardiner Tucker reports that Laird now favors this option and Gardiner, of course, has been hoping for State's support for this approach. However, there are substantial differences in view among the State staff on the desirability of even exploration of this alternative, and there are many good arguments on both sides of the question. Since there is no consensus within the staff, we have continued in Verification Panel Working Group deliberations to support the two present State preferred options--zero-zero or, secondly, one-for-one. Increasingly it appears that the Soviets will not accept a solution which leaves us with some ICBM defense without permitting at least a symbolic equivalent for them. Unless we were to shift to NCA, therefore, it appears that the most likely Soviet objective will be two-for-two.

In the meantime the Delegation has come in requesting authority to support new approaches on each of the unresolved issues. These are set out in SALT 1163 and 1164 (attached). These are now under consideration and the ABM approach (our present two-or-one proposal with equal interceptors for each side) will probably be strongly opposed by

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Defense as precluding their hard-site preference. My own view is that the Delegation should be authorized to make the recommended explorations on both issues, and we need to develop a State position on these questions.

I believe it would be desirable as soon as feasible to have a meeting at which all points of view can be laid out for your consideration prior to going to the Secretary on these issues. At Tab C is a list of those whom I recommend attend such a discussion.

Recommendation:

That we set up a meeting to review the attached options paper and the State preference thereon.

Approve \_\_\_\_\_

Date \_\_\_\_\_ Time \_\_\_\_\_


Disapprove \_\_\_\_\_

Attachments:

- Tab A - Major SALT Alternatives
- Tab B - SALT 1163 and 1164
- Tab C - List of Participants

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## MAJOR SALT ALTERNATIVES

I. There are two overriding, remaining issues before the first phase of the SALT talks can be brought to a successful conclusion. All other remaining issues are undoubtedly resolvable and minor in comparison. These two are:

- (a) The question of permitted ABM levels; and
- (b) The question of inclusion or exclusion of SLBMs from the offensive freeze.

II. As regards SLBMs we see four broad alternatives. These are listed in descending order of desirability from the point of view of the State Department:

(1) Inclusion of SLBM launchers in the freeze.  
This has been rejected by the Soviets as inconsistent with the May 20 understanding and as reraising the FBS problem. From the U.S. point of view, however, inclusion of SLBMs is important, although not to the extent that an agreement freezing ICBMs should be sacrificed if SLBMs cannot be included. This should remain a major U.S. negotiating objective, and we should relate possible concessions on other items, including, preeminently ABM levels-- to the achievement of this objective. We might also be prepared to consider raising with our allies the idea of a simple freeze on FBSs (e.g., including European land-based F-4s and F-111s on the U.S. side and European land-based MR/IRBMs on the Soviet side) if this is necessary to attain inclusion of SLBMs.

(2) A freeze in terms of "aggregates" of ICBMs and SLBMs. This would permit both the U.S. and the Soviet Union to proceed with further submarine launcher construction provided it was in substitution for land-based launchers. The disadvantage is that this approach highlights the "disparities" between the level to which the U.S. would be frozen

as opposed to that for the USSR (i.e., 1800 for the U.S. versus 2300 for the USSR). Also it would permit the Soviets to substitute submarines for "soft" launchers if the latter were included in the freeze. Finally, the terms and procedures for this "freedom-to-mix" provision might be difficult and complicated to negotiate. //

(3) A tacit understanding that the Soviets would not "exceed" a specified number of SLBMs. While this would reduce fears of an open-ended Soviet submarine construction program, it would remain difficult for us to deal with critics of an agreement which omitted SLBMs. Also, presumably if the Soviets were prepared to make such a tacit agreement, they should be willing to go the next step and make it more formal. *Congress //*

(4) Omission of SLBMs from the freeze. The White House seems prepared to accept this as the eventual outcome of an agreement. However, such an agreement could raise grave difficulties in terms of Congressional acceptance. (Jackson has already indicated he would oppose an agreement which omitted submarines, and he might be able to get a blocking third of the Senate.) Furthermore, unless we were able to obtain a tacit understanding along the lines of paragraph (3) above, the pressures to move ahead with a new additional submarine-building program could be overwhelming. This would mean a new stimulus to the strategic arms competition at the very time the SALT agreement was being signed and would do much to undermine the meaning of such an agreement. However, the argument can also be made that exclusion of SLBMs from the freeze gives us a "moving-to-sea" alternative which it may be desirable to exercise, since submarines are potentially a more strategically stable system. This might be preferable to deploying ABMs to protect increasingly vulnerable ICBMs.

III. As regards ABM levels, we have five broad alternatives, identified as follows in descending order of desirability from the standpoint of the Department of State:

(1) Zero-level ABM. The President has already ruled this out as an objective for this stage of negotiations, and it is far from clear that this would be negotiable with the Soviets in any event, although we have never made a real effort to determine this.

(2) One-for-one. An agreement along these lines, which lets us keep Grand Forks and the Soviets keep Moscow, would probably be negotiable. It would be simple to agree on a provision which lets us switch the one permitted site from Grand Forks to Washington at some future date. A one-for-one arrangement makes strategic sense over the long run only if we exercise this option in the future. An agreement limiting us for practical purposes to Grand Forks would be subject to attack by the Jackson element of the Senate, although it is probably extreme to say that such an agreement would ultimately be rejected. Such an agreement would mean that if we wished to do so in the future we could only deploy a hard-site ICBM defense if we terminated or amended the ABM arrangement.

(3) Two-for-two. An agreement which lets us keep Grand Forks and Malmstrom (with an option to switch one to Washington) and giving the Soviets Moscow and one ICBM site is probably the most negotiable arrangement. However, such an agreement could be criticized on the grounds that it permitted a "build-up" on the Soviet side, particularly beyond its present program objectives and thus has limited meaning as an arms control arrangement. Such an agreement could also be attacked as one which left the U.S. with an essentially meaningless ICBM defense. A variant of this proposal which might be acceptable to the Soviets would be an arrangement which deferred construction of a second site on both sides, but this would be subject to the same essential disadvantages.

(4) One-plus-one with deferred hard site. This is the alternative favored in Defense, which might possibly be negotiable with the Russians in view of their recently indicated interest in a dedicated ICBM defense and which would make treaty

ratification easier going with some in the Senate. Such an arrangement would leave us with Grand Forks (with an option to switch to Washington), giving the Soviets Moscow and writing into the agreement a provision which would let both sides deploy a dedicated ICBM defense after a given period of time (say, five years) depending upon further developments in arms control negotiations. This would permit us in due course the right to deploy a hard-site defense without terminating the ABM agreement. Such a provision might give some leverage in getting a more meaningful follow-on offensive agreement, since the option would only be exercised if we were unable to get an agreement which sufficiently contained the offensive threat. It could be criticized on the grounds that it would have a self-fulfilling aspect, stimulating both sides to work hard on preparations for deploying a hard-site defense whether or not such a program ultimately made strategic sense. (such a system might cost more than \$10 billion, involve deployment of 1000-3000 interceptors). Provisions relating to the rights of either side to proceed with such a program in the event that they were not able to reach agreement in future negotiations on the size and characteristics of such a system would probably be difficult to formulate and very hard to negotiate. A program of this nature would certainly be opposed by ACDA and a portion of the Senate that is opposed to any type of ABM defense. Also the indications are of a lack of White House interest in this approach.

(3) (5) Two-or-one with equal number of interceptors. Ultimately the Soviets might be prepared to accept a variation on our present proposal which permitted us to keep two small sites at Grand Forks and Malmstrom versus their one large site at Moscow, providing each side were permitted an equal number of interceptors (say, 150). However, this would make little strategic sense from our point of view and might also be subject to criticism in the Senate, since an ICBM defense limited to this level would

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have little utility. This alternative would be less negotiable than alternative (1) above and of not much greater value unless we, in the future, exercise the option to switch to Washington, in which case 100 interceptors would be sufficient.

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