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ANALYSIS BRANCH

FROM : U.S. Delegation SALT, VIENNA DATE: January 14, 1972

SUBJECT : SALT MemCon

REF :

The attached SALT MemCon is to be reproduced and distributed in accordance with the memorandum to Mr. Miller, Deputy Executive Secretary, S/S, dated December 6, 1971 from Mr. Christopher, Special Assistant to the Director of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency.

SMITH

Attachment:

Parsons, Garthoff-Grinevsky, Kishilov Memcon  
January 11, 1972

GP-3

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FORM 3-70 DS-323

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Drafting Date:  
1/13/72

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Clearances:

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of the word was less important than the substance of the matter. Did Grinevsky understand why the US had proposed the term "active construction?" Garthoff said that if one side or the other had at one point begun construction of ICBM launchers and then abandoned such sites, the US could not consider such sites to be under construction and eligible for further construction and completion. Specifically, he said, the Soviet Union had a few years ago begun construction of about 18 SS-9 silo launchers and some other ICBM silo launchers which it had subsequently long ago abandoned. There should be a clear understanding that there could be no renewed construction of those launchers. Grinevsky said he now understood, and would "look into the matter further" and see if there were agreement on this point.

Grinevsky suggested that the American side consider grouping its proposals on ICBM launchers, MLBM launchers, and SLBM launchers, into separate paragraphs of a single article, simply in order to reduce the discrepancies in the number of articles proposed by each side in the draft text. He noted that this was a gratuitous suggestion on his part, and represented merely a cosmetic change. Noting the latter point, Parsons and Garthoff indicated non-committally that they would think about the idea.

In a conversation on the side, Parsons referred to the language tabled by Grinevsky on December 21 in the Special Working Group on non-conversion of light ICBMs to heavy ICBMs, and noted that Grinevsky had stopped short of proposing text language. When Grinevsky replied that what they had said should be enough for us to pick up, Parsons said that the US side might soon have some new language for Article II taking account of the Soviet statement.

In a side conversation, recalling that Kishilov had stated to him following the Troika meeting earlier that day that the Soviet Delegation would address offensive limitations at the next meeting on January 14, Garthoff asked Kishilov what specifically the Soviet side would discuss. Kishilov said, confidentially, that his Delegation would propose a draft article on not converting light ICBM launchers to heavy ones. Garthoff asked whether it would include a definition or characterization of heavy missiles, and take account of the distinction between older and modern ones. Kishilov said "not yet". In a concurrent conversation with Parsons, after Grinevsky repeated that his side was firmly opposed to including definitions he none the less went on to allow the possibility of describing missiles in non-numerical terms, such as describing heavy ICBMs as "larger than an SS-11" instead of "greater than 70 cubic meters".

Stressing that he was not making a proposal, but merely thinking out loud, Garthoff asked Grinevsky whether he thought the difference between the two sides over inclusion of definitions could perhaps be met by agreed understandings on the side, rather than provisions in the formal agreement itself. Grinevsky shook his head in the negative. Garthoff and Parsons urged that he think

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further about the matter, and emphasized that it was necessary that there be clear, agreed understanding on such matters.

Parsons emphasized that continuing constraints on the defensive side would be difficult to initiate in the absence of offensive constraints. Thus, the duration and withdrawal provisions of the two agreements were in a sense linked. Grinevsky remarked that he did not yet know the American position on the duration and withdrawal provisions. Garthoff stated that we believed the interim agreement should last until there was a more complete and long-term treaty agreement on offensive limitations, and that there should be no hiatus between parallel ABM and offensive limitations. Accordingly, the interim freeze -- while remaining "interim" until a more conclusive agreement was reached -- should none the less itself be without specified duration, providing simply that after some agreed time either side would have the right of withdrawal. Grinevsky conceded that this position, while it had not been spelled out before, did not entirely surprise him. Parsons stated that we expected in the near future to advance the language of such a provision. Grinevsky did not seem to object to the approach outlined, but he did not commit himself.

"Special Concealment (Verification)

Garthoff raised the question of the continuing lack of accord on interpretation of the word "special" modifying the provision in both agreements against concealment hindering national means of verification. Grinevsky and Kishilov acknowledged the need to resolve this difference. Garthoff noted that there was another provision in the agreements on non-interference with national means which did not have the limiting qualifier "special", and also that the terms of reference of the Standing Consultative Commission dealt specifically with "unintended interference". He suggested that perhaps a comparable procedure could be considered regarding non-concealment. Grinevsky recalled the differences in the past over the special concealment language. Garthoff then suggested that perhaps if the provision concerning consultation in the Commission clearly referred both to unintended interference and unintended concealment, perhaps intended or deliberate concealment could be referred to in the verification article. Grinevsky said that this possible solution was worth further consideration, and it was agreed that both sides would think further along this line. It was also agreed that this issue should be resolved in the present phase of the talks.

The Draft ABM Treaty

Grinevsky and Kishilov both displayed considerable concern over the lack of movement in resolving the main issues concerning ABM limitation. In separate conversations, both Grinevsky and Kishilov remarked that the Soviet Delegation had some difficulty in explaining to Moscow why it was unable to

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get more contributions to advancing progress from the American Delegation.

Both Grinevsky and Kishilov referred several times to the importance of Semenov's statement at the "Troika" meeting that morning. When asked about American views, Garthoff suggested that it would be particularly timely to work on ABM radar constraint (MARC), on dealing with future ABM systems, and on OLPARs. Grinevsky said that it might facilitate things to work on all the problems at once. Parsons noted we should seek to resolve all remaining differences. Garthoff agreed, but also noted that Semenov had himself indicated that, for example, it might now be ripe to deal with the future ABM problem, but chose not to discuss the withdrawal provision. Garthoff said he concurred with both those comments; Grinevsky agreed.

Toward the close of the meeting, Grinevsky returned to this general theme to emphasize the importance of studying closely what the Soviet Delegation had said that morning about the value of considering various problems together. Garthoff and Parsons probed to get a clearer indication what Grinevsky meant, without success.

MARCs and OLPARs

Subsequently, in a separate side conversation, Kishilov told Garthoff in "strict confidence" that the point they had been trying to get at was the following: If the US would give up the OLPAR constraint, the Soviet side would agree to the MARC concept. Garthoff pointed out that the two problems were not interchangeable, and the US believed it was necessary to limit ABM radars, and also to prevent an unconstrained proliferation of other large phased-array radars with ABM potential. Kishilov urged that we consider carefully the Soviet suggestion. Grinevsky and Parsons were, at this point, agreeing that at least the importance of radar questions was now appreciated by both sides, and both sides were looking for ways to deal with this complex of questions.

Garthoff asked, in the general conversation, what the Soviet reaction was to the proposal for an Agreed Minute dealing with OLPARs through consultation and mutual agreement. Grinevsky said flatly that it would not do. Kishilov said that there could be no provision on agreement concerning non-ABM radars. Garthoff then asked whether that meant the Soviet side considered there could at least be consultation. Kishilov replied "perhaps", since Article VI(a) offered a foundation on which consultation could be based. Garthoff asked if Kishilov thought that there could be an Agreed Minute to that effect; Kishilov's reaction was non-committal. But, he said, "not now".

Kishilov remarked to Garthoff, in an aside, that the Soviet position on ABM radar limitations in the Troika Semenov had proposed for January 18 would

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be "important". He remarked with a smile that the Soviet Delegation was trying to have "something new" to present each time.

Future ABM Systems

A substantial portion of the discussion was devoted to the issue of future ABM systems. Kishilov, whom Garthoff had advised earlier that day that the US side might wish to make some changes in the formulation provided in December, pressed on what these changes would be. He asked if Garthoff had a new text. The latter replied in the negative. Kishilov then produced a text from his pocket, which on quick inspection turned out to be a Soviet translation of the language which Garthoff had provided in mid-December. He asked Garthoff to mark the changes which the American side would wish to make. Garthoff repeated that he was not prepared to provide a new text, and would not undertake to do so. However, he would point out some things that might be rendered more precisely. He then suggested that, for example, rather than referring to "consultation and agreement in the Standing Consultative Commission", it would be better to refer to consultation in the Commission and agreement between the Parties. Grinevsky nodded understanding. Garthoff said that no doubt certain other editorial improvements could be made, concerning precise reference to ABM components, etc. In general, the formulation could probably be refined in a number of ways; the important thing was the Soviet reaction to the substance of the proposition it contained. Grinevsky then suggested a "simplified" approach, which both he and Kishilov pointedly (and no doubt disingenuously) said they had just worked out on the way to the restaurant. The gist of Grinevsky's suggestion was that if the occasion should arise to consider such other systems, they could be considered in the Standing Consultative Commission in accordance with Article XIII (conveying the Commission's mandate). Garthoff asked what would happen if such consultation did not lead to an agreed conclusion. Would a party, wishing to deploy such a system, be able to do so or not? Grinevsky said that was a question which did not need to be asked, that the whole question was at present hypothetical. Garthoff said that such systems might at present be hypothetical, but the treaty as a whole either would or would not allow a party to deploy some presently unidentified ABM system or component at a future time if the matter were not resolved through consultation. Grinevsky said that it could do so, and that the other side always had the recourse of "Article XV" (withdrawal). Garthoff and Parsons noted that withdrawal would be a rather severe action, and while always available as a last resort, should not be relied upon as a solution to a problem which could be resolved in other ways. Garthoff suggested that instead of relying on Article XV, reliance should be placed on Article XIV (amendment). He suggested that perhaps an Agreed Minute might refer to both Articles XIII and XIV. At this point, the conversation divided into separate discussions between Parsons and Grinevsky on the one hand, and Garthoff and Kishilov on the other. While Grinevsky was adamant on resting

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with Article XIII, Kishilov (initially) agreed with Garthoff on possible resort to Article XIV. When the two conversations again merged, this discrepancy came to light, and after brief spirited and disjointed exchanges, Kishilov agreed with Grinevsky that the attempt to word a formulation concerning Article XIV "had not worked out".

Grinevsky said that the treaty referred to ABM systems, which were defined in Article II. It could not deal with unknown other systems. Garthoff challenged this interpretation on two grounds: first, the treaty dealt not only with ABM systems comprising components identified in Article II, but all ABM systems; second, the issue did not concern "other" systems, but rather future ABM systems. He asked Grinevsky whether in the light of Articles I, II, and III, Grinevsky considered that a party would have the right -- assuming consultations were held and did not lead to agreement -- to deploy all around the country, say, a thousand stations for firing anti-ballistic missile laser interceptor beams. Grinevsky said no, it would not have such a right. But, he countered, it should be able to place "telescopes". Garthoff asked if he meant sensors which could serve the role played by ABM radars, and Grinevsky replied that was part of the problem. Also, "other" systems might or might not be for ABM purposes, but the US wanted to have a veto over them. Garthoff remarked that he had noted that morning constant Soviet reference to "other" systems rather than "future" systems. But the two issues should not be confused. If there were a question as to whether some system was in fact an ABM system or component or not, that would clearly be a subject for consultation, and if there were a serious divergence perhaps there would be need for recourse to withdrawal, as Grinevsky had suggested. However, what Garthoff was referring to -- and what the US was particularly concerned about -- was precisely ABM systems and components of some new kind in the future. Garthoff repeated his reference to laser ABM interceptors as an example. In a side conversation, Grinevsky indicated to Parsons his own understanding of our concern, but implied that other (presumably military) members of his Delegation were unyielding, and in any case it was not an actual problem at this time.

In a briefer separate conversation, Kishilov conceded that Articles I, II, and III together would ban future ABM systems or components. (Comment: The confusion and discrepancy between the Soviet participants over interpretation of the effect of Articles I, II, and III of the ABM draft Treaty with respect to future ABM systems, and over possible solutions, seem to indicate absence of a clear and thought-through position on the part of the Soviet Delegation at the present time.)

Garthoff emphasized, and Parsons concurred, that it was essential to establish a common understanding between the two Delegations with respect to the effect of Articles I, II, and III on future ABM systems, and to reach

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agreement on a position concerning this subject. Notwithstanding the differences which had emerged in the discussion (as indicated above), Grinevsky reaffirmed the interest and readiness of the Soviet side to continue discussion directed at reaching a solution on this subject. Grinevsky specifically endorsed Garthoff's statement that this subject should be resolved in the current phase of the talks.

Further Course of SALT VI...or VII?

Grinevsky pressed for an indication of US position on duration of the present phase of the talks. Garthoff initially declined to make an estimate, noting the readiness of the American Delegation to continue until full agreement was reached, or to take a recess at any time that both sides agreed it would be useful. Grinevsky recalled the estimate made in mid-December that it would probably be useful to take a break about January 20. Garthoff said that he recalled that timing had been suggested by Semenov at a time when Semenov was contending there should be no Christmas recess, but one had occurred. Moreover, some others on the Soviet side had suggested that the Soviet Delegation was prepared to work on with no pre-determined position on the question of a recess. Grinevsky continued to press for a suggestion. Garthoff glanced at Kishilov and recalled that he had been asked a similar question soon after the opening of SALT VI in November, and that when he had then recalled Ambassador Smith's Helsinki proposal for a three-week recess at Christmas, every single Soviet Delegate had criticized the American position in calling for a recess. He did not intend to invite a repetition. Grinevsky none the less said that it was important to the Soviet Delegation to have an American suggestion in this regard. (In an aside, Kishilov remarked to Garthoff that Moscow had suggested the possibility of working through without a break, but that it was "important" that the Soviet Delegation actually be in Moscow at the time key decisions were made, and that it would therefore be in our common interest if he could indicate a possible recess.) Taking a cue from what Kishilov had said, Garthoff said that the American Delegation was prepared to work through to final agreement without a break, or to take a break for several weeks at whatever time seemed appropriate. At the present time, it would appear that a recess from about mid-February to mid-March might be in order, but this was a tentative and personal view. Grinevsky seemed relieved to have an "American suggestion", and asked if we could make it "a little bit earlier". I repeated that we could make it at any time that seemed useful, but that we hoped it would be possible to resolve a number of issues before any recess, and that following our discussion of the future ABM question, I was less sanguine than I had been when the evening began. However, we could look at a calendar; Kishilov had one out instantly. Again repeating that this was only very tentative and contingent, when Kishilov suggested February 11, Garthoff said that he thought that was possible. Accordingly, a tentative consensus among those present emerged on a possible recess from about February 11 until March 14.

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Grinevsky then raised the question of location for the concluding phase of talks prior to the May Summit. He made clear his preference for Helsinki, and said that "frankly" he wanted to inform us that he had discussed the question with colleagues in Moscow, who also were of the opinion that the talks should resume in Helsinki. In a side reference to Parsons, Grinevsky said that his Delegation was unanimous in believing the talks should be in Helsinki, and he also referred to "political reasons of theirs", as well as the need to have a reasonable balance in the rotation between the two places. (In a separate earlier conversation, Kishilov had advised Garthoff that the "working level" in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs had a preference for Helsinki but that no official decision had been taken, and that the Soviet side was "open" to an official American suggestion; he said that they had understood earlier comments by Garthoff and those of Ambassador Smith on December 22nd as being "unofficial".)

Garthoff replied to Grinevsky that, as he knew, the American Delegation --though not unanimously -- preferred continuation in Vienna. However, this was not an official position or proposal. Grinevsky said that he understood, from Ambassador Smith's comments to Semenov on December 22, that we were approaching the Finns on this matter. Garthoff said that the question was being considered in the Department of State at the present time. Grinevsky nodded, in apparent satisfaction. Garthoff remarked that this question might, perhaps, be related to the locale and timing of "follow-on" SALT talks. Grinevsky asked whether he meant "after the first agreements at the Summit," and Garthoff confirmed that was what he meant. Both Grinevsky and Kishilov indicated that this question had not yet been considered in Moscow. Garthoff said that the US also had no proposals to make at this time.

*RLG*  
SALDEL/RLGarthoff/JGParsons:res  
January 13, 1972

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