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DEPARTMENT OF STATE
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MEMORANDUM

April 20, 1967

TO: The Secretary *(21)*

THRU: S/S

FROM: G - Foy D. Kohler

SUBJECT: Security Assurances for India BRIEFING MEMORANDUM

The President has told L. K. Jha (uncleared memcon, Tab A) that we will examine closely and promptly the Soviet draft text of a possible declaration (Tab B). The President thus generally followed, but went a little beyond, the briefing memorandum for him which you and Secretary McNamara had approved (Tab C).

Jha told us shortly before he left for London that his important appointments with the British were scheduled for Monday, April 24, and that he understood from the President that the subject of nuclear assurances for India would be considered at the meeting this afternoon. Jha said that he very much hoped that if there were any further word the US Government could give him as a result of that meeting he would appreciate very much if he could have it in time for his Monday meetings.

While we will have to consider the precise text of the declaration very carefully, I believe that the Soviet text in fact provides a satisfactory basis on which we can develop a declaration, and that we should so inform Mr. Jha.

RECOMMENDATIONS:

1. That you seek the President's approval for us to go ahead and develop parallel declarations along the lines of the Soviet draft.
2. That we inform Jha that, while we will have to study further the precise content and formulation of a declaration, in general we consider the Soviet draft text a satisfactory basis for proceeding, and that we plan to draw up a draft parallel declaration roughly along the lines of the Soviet draft, and will be in further touch with the Indian Government.

Attachments:

1. Tab A - Uncleared Memcon
2. Tab B - Soviet Draft Declaration
3. Tab C - Briefing Memorandum

Concurrences: NEA - Mr. Handley S/P - Mr. Owen L - Mr. Meeker
 ACDA - Mr. Fisher DOD/ISA - Mr. McNaughton

G/PM:RLGarthoff:pep

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File 7

GROUP 3
Downgraded at 12 year
intervals; not
automatically declassified

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April 19, 1967

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

(uncleared)

TIME: Wednesday, April 19, 1967, 11 a. m.

THOSE PRESENT: President Johnson
Ambassador B. K. Nehru
L. K. Jha
Mr. V. Sarabhai
W. W. Rostow
Howard Wiggins

After welcome by the President and exchange of pleasantries, L. K. Jha indicated that he had come at the request of the Prime Minister on a visit to the Soviet Union and Washington, to explore the question of security assurances connected with the NPT. The Soviet reply had been positive and he hoped the U. S. too would be able to move ahead.

The President said that he had just received the text this morning, that it looked very interesting. From earlier statements, the Indians could know generally how interested we were in this problem; we will have to look at it with care; but we will get right at it. (He asked Mr. Rostow to be sure the staff work was ready for tomorrow's meeting.)

L. K. Jha said that the Prime Minister also wanted him to thank the President for all his help on so many fronts, including food and economic aid. If he should find it possible to come to New Delhi, the President would receive a very warm welcome.

The President replied that he had enjoyed his earlier visit and learned a great deal, particularly in the countryside, where he saw so much progress being made. Perhaps it would be possible to think about a trip for sometime next year, but he couldn't make a commitment now for so far ahead. He pointed out that Ambassadors Cooper, Gailbraith, and Bunker had all been so well received they had been made converts to India's cause; perhaps if he went, he would be converted too. L. K. Jha said he hoped that would be so.

The President indicated that he had appointed Ambassador Bunker, whom the Indians had trained, to Vietnam in the hope that some way could be found to end that conflict satisfactorily. Perhaps the Indians, who knew Ambassador Bunker, would now be able to help a bit more. Despite numerous efforts to reach agreement with North Vietnam, none of our

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many initiatives had elicited Ho's willingness to talk. No Administration had done more to ease relations with the Soviet Union: Space Treaty, East/West trade; Consular Agreement, etc. We were not rigid on anything except running out on our contracts. What a disordered world it would be if others came to assume the U. S. word was worthless!

The President wanted the Prime Minister to know how much he had enjoyed having her here; he had worried about the painful political steps she had had to go through. But after all both of them were better off than such former leaders as Ehrhardt, Macmillan and Khrushchev. Her country had many friends in the U. S. ; he had had trouble getting the support she needed; but in the end, as a result of the Congressional resolution and other steps, things were likely to come out all right.

Everyone who has been out there feels that India is part of our future, and that we are part of theirs. "And so do I," he said.

In conclusion, the President reiterated his interest in having the Russian text examined with great care and indicated we would be back to them shortly with our reactions.

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Taking into consideration the wishes of the non-nuclear States that in conjunction with the renunciation by these States of the manufacture or acquisition of nuclear weapons according to the Treaty on Non Proliferation of such weapons appropriate measures might be taken to safeguard the security of non-nuclear countries and also bear in mind that any aggression accompanied by the use of nuclear weapons will endanger the peace and security of all States, the Soviet Union declares the following:

In case of an attack by a nuclear State accompanied by the use of nuclear weapons against States not possessing nuclear weapons or a threat of such an attack an essentially new situation will arise in which the Security Council and above all its Permanent members possessing nuclear weapons will have to act immediately under the U.N. Charter which provides taking "effective collective measures for the prevention and removal of threat to the peace, and for the suppression of acts of aggression or other breaches of the peace". Any aggressor who embarks on the road of the threat of using nuclear weapons or dares unleash a war accompanied by the use of nuclear weapons and thus breaches the peace and security of nations will not go unpunished.

It goes without saying that, as it is provided in Article 51 of the U.N. Charter, the States who fall victim to an attack, a nuclear one included, have an inherent right of individual or collective self-defence until the Security Council has taken measures ultimately to maintain international peace and security.

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MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Subject: L. K. Jha Visit

Mr. L. K. Jha, Secretary to the Indian Prime Minister, is in Washington following a visit to Moscow. His mission is to obtain agreement in principle from both the Soviet Union and the United States that, when the non-proliferation treaty is signed, the two governments will issue separate but similar declarations designed to deter nuclear weapons states from attempting either nuclear blackmail or nuclear attack against non-nuclear weapons states like India. Mr. Jha believes he already has from Gromyko such an agreement in principle--contingent on our taking parallel action.

We believe that Jha should be told that the United States Government is much interested in the possibility of such declarations, that we will study very carefully any Indian or Soviet texts which may be supplied to us and that we look forward to early discussions leading towards possible agreement on parallel declarations.

We would appreciate your authorization to Secretary Rusk to convey the foregoing message to Mr. Jha when he calls on him tomorrow afternoon, April 19. Furthermore, we believe that, because of the importance of possible implications of the Jha visit, it would be most helpful if you could make time tomorrow to have a brief chat with Mr. Jha yourself and hear what he has to say.

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