THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE WASHINGTON

2 B CCT 1964

Honorable Dean Rusk Secretary of State Washington, D. C.

Dear Dean:

As requested by Bill Foster in his memorandum of 14 October, I am forwarding to you my comments on the study "The Indian Nuclear Problem: Proposed Course of Action". I am in general agreement with that paper as are the JOS; their comments, with which I agree, are attached.

It is my understanding that Chet Bowles will be returning to Washington in early December for consultation. We will have the benefit of his feeling for the Indian nuclear problem following his talks with Shastri. At about the same time as his return, I expect to receive from the Joint Chiefs a study of the implications of the Chinese nuclear capability. With the information then available, I believe it desirable that we review our overall security policy vis-a-vis India and other Asian states in light of the Chinese Communist threat. I think a review in December would be appropriate. I understand your staff agrees.

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
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THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301

JCSM-900-66

MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

Subject: The Indian Nuclear Problem: Proposed Course of Action (U)

- 1. Reference is made to a paper on the above subject, dated 13 October 1964, which was approved by the Thompson Committee on Nuclear Capability and forwarded by the Director, US Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (ACDA), to members of the Committee of Principals for approval or comment. On 19 October 1964, the Thompson Committee reviewed the paper in the light of the intervening defonition of the Chinese nuclear device on 16 October 1964. The recommended course of action and assurances to India were considered to be util applicable, and it was directed that the paper be updated accordingly.

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- 2. The Joint Chiefs of Staff have reviewed the alternative courses of action considered and concur that the action selected is proper at this time. In considering US assurances enumerated in subparagraph 5 a on page 12 of the paper, the first, second, and fourth do not exceed those previously given India by President Fiscabower on 10 December 1959, and by Ambassador Howles on 25 March 1964. These assurances were generally reaffirmed by the President's siztement on 16 October 1964. The third assurance proposes that the United States issue, at an appropriate time after detonation of a Chinese nuclear device, a unlisteral public deciaration regarding its response to Chinese use of nuclear weepons against another Asian state. This assurance was given by the President to his speech on 11 October 1964. The President did not, however, limit this sesurance to nations of Acia. Over-all, the US assurances appear appropriate as a basis for discussions with India at which time Indian intentions can be more accurately determined. At the same time, however, the Joint Chiefs of Staff consider that it is most important that no actions be taken which could allenate US allies, especially Pakistan.

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- 3. The assurances proposed are general in nature and do not commit the United States to any specific military course of action. This will permit flexibility of response consistent with US interests and other strategic commitments. Existing US forces are structured to permit implementation of current contingency plans for assistance to India as required to stop a maximum supportable Chinese communist attack and to restore the status quo that existed prior to initiation of aggression. The adequacy of current US military resources will, of course, depend on the scope of assistance required and other concurrent strategic military requirements.
- I. With respect to Soviet assurances, it is recommended that the United States not initiate discussions on this matter with either India or the Soviet Union. Any implication that the United States would encourage assurances from the Soviet Union could result in greater Soviet influence within the Indian Armed Forces. The United States is currently attempting to stem a trend in this direction.
- 5. Subject to the foregoing, the Joint Chiefs of Staff recommend approval of the Thompson Committee report,

For the Joint Chiefs of Staff:

CURTIS E. LeMAY Acting Chairman Joint Chiefs of Staff

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