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SERIAL: IIR

/\*\*\*\*\* THIS IS A COMBINED MESSAGE \*\*\*\*\*/

BODY

PASS:

COUNTRY: CHINA (CH).

SUBJECT: IIR PLA MODERNIZES ITS  
MILITARY TRAINING PROGRAM

WARNING: THIS IS AN INFORMATION REPORT, NOT  
FINALLY EVALUATED INTELLIGENCE. REPORT  
U N C L A S S I F I E D.

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DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE  
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DOI:

REQS:

SOURCE:

SUMMARY: IN EARLY 1992, THE PLA LAUNCHED A 3-YEAR  
PROGRAM TO MODERNIZE MILITARY TRAINING -- NEW DOCTRINES  
AND STRATEGIES, TRAINING EXERCISES, JOINT OPNS, SPECIAL  
FORCES AND LOGISTICS SUPPORT. THIS STUDY ANALYZES THE  
EFFECTIVENESS OF THE NEW PLA TRAINING PROGRAM.

TEXT: 1. TABLE OF CONTENTS -- PARAS 2-10 ARE TABLE  
OF CONTENTS HEADINGS WITH SUB CONTENTS "A", "B", ETC.  
FOLLOW-ON PARAGRAPHS BEGINNING WITH NUMBER 2 ARE IN  
DEPTH DESCRIPTIONS OF CORRESPONDING TABLE OF CONTENTS  
HEADINGS.

PARA 2 INTRODUCTION

UNCLASSIFIED

- PARA 3 NIGHT OPERATIONS
- PARA 4 AIR SUPERIORITY/AIR DEFENSE
- PARA 5 MOBILITY
- PARA 6 COMBINED OPERATIONS
- PARA 7 JOINT SERVICE INTEGRATION
- PARA 8 CREATION OF "SPECIAL FORCES" AND SURVIVABILITY TRAINING
- PARA 9 ART OF "DEFEATING THE SUPERIOR WITH INFERIOR" WEAPONS
- PARA 10 LOGISTICS SUPPORT
- PARA 11 CONCLUSIONS

GLOSSARY -- THE FOLLOWING ABBREVIATIONS WILL BE USED THROUGHOUT THIS STUDY --

AAA	- ANTI-AIRCRAFT ARTILLERY
ACW	- ANTI-CHEMICAL WARFARE
AMS	- ACADEMY OF MILITARY SCIENCE
APC	- ARMORED PERSONNEL CARRIER
BDE	- BRIGADE
BLUE FORCES	- OPPOSING FORCES (OPFOR)
BN	- BATTALION
CDR	- COMMANDER
CMC	- CENTRAL MILITARY COMMISSION
CO	- COMPANY
COL	- COLONEL
COSTIND	- COMMISSION ON SCIENCE, TECHNOLOGY AND INDUSTRY FOR NATIONAL DEFENSE
CPT	- CAPTAIN
DEPT	- DEPARTMENT
DIV	- DIVISION
ECM	- ELECTRONIC COUNTER-MEASURES
GEN	- GENERAL
GLD	- GENERAL LOGISTICS DEPARTMENT
GSD	- GENERAL STAFF DEPARTMENT
KM	- KILOMETER
LAD	- LIBERATION ARMY DAILY
MR	- MILITARY REGIONS
NDU	- NATIONAL DEFENSE UNIVERSITY
NVD	- NIGHT VISION DEVICE
RECON	- RECONNAISSANCE
RED FORCES	- ARMY FORCES (ARFOR)
RGT	- REGIMENT

S&T - SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY  
UI - UNIDENTIFIED  
XDT - XINHUA DAILY TELEGRAPH

## 2. INTRODUCTION

### A. BACKGROUND

(1). PERSIAN GULF WAR AS WATERSHED IN DEVELOPMENT OF PLA DOCTRINE AND TACTICS. THE PLA'S POOR PERFORMANCE DURING THE 1979 VIETNAM CONFLICT CONVINCED CHINA'S LEADERS THAT THEIR ARMED FORCES REQUIRED MAJOR REFORM AND REJUVENATION. IN THE EARLY 1980'S, THEY BEGAN THE LONG DIFFICULT PROCESS OF CONVERTING THE LARGE POORLY-EQUIPPED INFANTRY FORCE INTO A SMALLER, MORE PROFESSIONAL AND MODERN ARMY. THEY WERE PLEASED WITH THE PROGRESS OF STREAMLINING AND REORGANIZATION EFFORTS UNTIL A COALITION OF WESTERN ARMIES, LED BY THE U.S., BADLY TROUNCED THE IRAQI ARMY IN THE 1991 PERSIAN GULF CONFLICT. THE IRAQI FORCES WERE EQUIPPED WITH THE LATEST SOVIET AND CHINESE ARMS AND THERE WERE MANY PARALLELS WITH THE PLA IN THE TRAINING AND ORGANIZATION OF THE IRAQI ARMY. THE ABJECT DEFEAT OF THE IRAQ'S MILITARY BY COALITION FORCES WAS A DIRECT REFLECTION OF HOW THE PLA MIGHT FARE IF IT WERE CONFRONTED BY A WESTERN-TYPE ARMY IN A SHORT HIGH-INTENSITY "LOCAL WAR". ALTHOUGH CHINA'S LEADERS SOUGHT TO DOWNPLAY THE SIGNIFICANCE OF THE GULF WAR IN THE MEDIA, BEHIND THE SCENES THEY BEGAN AN IN-DEPTH REVIEW OF CHINA'S MILITARY STRATEGY AND TACTICS AND THE PLA'S WEAPONS MODERNIZATION PROGRAM. IN THREE EMERGENCY MEETINGS OF THE CENTRAL MILITARY COMMISSION (CMC) HELD DURING AND IMMEDIATELY AFTER THE GULF WAR, LARGE AMOUNTS OF ADDITIONAL FUNDS WERE ALLOCATED TO BE SPENT BY THE PLA DURING THE 8TH FIVE YEAR PLAN. THE PRIORITY AREAS EARMARKED FOR ACCELERATED MODERNIZATION INCLUDED COMBAT AIRCRAFT AND SUPPORTING WEAPONS SYSTEMS, NIGHT-VISION DEVICES (NVD), ELECTRONIC COUNTERMEASURES (ECM), OTHER ELECTRONIC SYSTEMS, AND LONG-RANGE ARTILLERY SYSTEMS. STEPS WERE ALSO TAKEN TO INCREASE MOBILITY OF MANEUVER FORCES, PARTICULARLY IN THE PLA'S ARMOR UNITS (HONG KONG CHING PAO NEWSPAPER, 1 APR 91).

(2). PERSIAN GULF WAR FORCES CHINA'S LEADERS TO DISCARD LONG-CHERISHED PRECEPTS OF "PEOPLE'S WAR". DESPITE THE DIE-HARD EFFORTS OF OLDER PLA VETERANS TO RETAIN THE VESTIGES OF MAO ZEDONG'S "PEOPLE'S WAR", MOST YOUNGER PLA LEADERS RECOGNIZED THE GULF WAR AS CONVINCING PROOF OF THE INADEQUACIES OF THE OLD GUERRILLA WAR CONCEPTS (SOUTH CHINA MORNING POST -

SCMP, 27 APR 91). DURING A SPEECH TO ARMY DELEGATES ATTENDING THE MAR 91 NATIONAL PEOPLE'S CONGRESS (NPC) PLENUM, CMC VICE CHAIRMAN, GENERAL (GEN) ((LIU)) HUAQING, ACKNOWLEDGED THAT THE GULF WAR HAD SHOWN THAT SOPHISTICATED WEAPONS WOULD PLAY A DOMINANT ROLE IN FUTURE "LOCAL WARS". DURING THE SAME MEETING, MINISTER OF NATIONAL DEFENSE (MND), GEN ((QIN)) JIWEI, WARNED NPC DELEGATES THAT CHINA'S MILITARY EQUIPMENT WAS 20 YEARS BEHIND THE SYSTEMS FIELDED BY THE COALITION FORCES DURING THE GULF WAR. QIN ADVOCATED A LARGER DEFENSE BUDGET AS THE ONLY WAY FOR THE PLA TO CATCH UP WITH THE DEVELOPED COUNTRIES IN MILITARY TECHNOLOGY (LIBERATION ARMY DAILY - LAD, 28 MAR 91).

(3). PLA LEADERS IDENTIFY KEY WEAPONS SYSTEMS CONTRIBUTING TO WESTERN COALITION VICTORY IN THE GULF WAR. IN ANOTHER SPEECH TO THE NPC DELEGATION, THE VICE CHAIRMAN OF THE COMMISSION ON SCIENCE, TECHNOLOGY, AND INDUSTRY FOR NATIONAL DEFENSE (COSTIND), GEN ((NIE)) LI, IDENTIFIED THE EMPLOYMENT OF HIGH-TECH ELECTRONIC SYSTEMS IN COMBAT AS ONE OF THE MOST IMPORTANT LESSONS CHINA DREW FROM THE GULF WAR. GEN NIE MENTIONED IN PARTICULAR THE NEED TO ACCELERATE DEVELOPMENT OF "ELECTRONIC JAMMING EQUIPMENT, NVDS, AND HIGH-DEFINITION AIR DEFENSE MISSILES" (SCMP, 16 APR 91). A STUDY OF MODERN AIR DEFENSE SYSTEMS USED IN THE GULF WAR LED OTHER PLA LEADERS TO CONCLUDE THAT AIR POWER HAD PLAYED A VITAL ROLE IN THE COALITION VICTORY. THESE LEADERS PROPOSED THAT AIR DEFENSE AND AIR ATTACK SYSTEMS BE GIVEN THE HIGHEST PRIORITY FOR DEVELOPMENT BECAUSE OF THE KEY PART THEY WOULD PLAY IN FUTURE LOCAL WARS (LAD, 22 MAR 91). ANOTHER STUDY OF THE GULF WAR RECOMMENDED THAT MODERNIZATION OF PLA MECHANIZED FORCES BE GIVEN THE HIGHEST DEVELOPMENT PRIORITY (LAD, 15 MAR 91). IN A TALK WITH PLA ARMOR CORPS LEADERS, GEN STAFF DEPARTMENT (GSD) CHIEF, GEN ((CHI)) HAOTIAN, PLEDGED TO INCREASE THE MOBILITY AND FIREPOWER OF THE PLA'S MECHANIZED UNITS, IN ANTICIPATION OF DIRECT ARMOR CONFRONTATIONS IN FUTURE "LOCAL WARS" (LAD, 9 MAR 91).

#### B. LEADERSHIP GUIDANCE

(1). CHINA'S LEADERS CONTEMPLATE THE INFLUENCE OF HIGH-TECH WEAPONS ON MILITARY STRATEGY AND TACTICS. ON 19 APR 91, LAD REVEALED THAT, SHORTLY AFTER THE GULF WAR, THE CMC DIRECTED THAT A NUMBER OF RESEARCH STUDIES BE CARRIED OUT TO DETERMINE THE OPTIMUM MANPOWER AND WEAPONS MIX FOR THE PLA AND THE APPROPRIATE STRATEGY AND TACTICS FOR ITS EMPLOYMENT. THE REPORT SUGGESTED THAT, ALTHOUGH SUPERIOR STRATEGY WOULD ALWAYS WIN A WAR, THE APPLICATION OF HIGH-TECH WEAPONS COULD OFTEN

ENHANCE THE EFFECTIVENESS OF MILITARY STRATEGY. IT REFLECTED THAT SOME TRADITIONAL MILITARY PRINCIPLES AND WEAPONS COULD BE APPLIED IN MODERN WAR; HOWEVER, OTHER PRINCIPLES AND WEAPONS MUST BE MODIFIED OR DID NOT APPLY AT ALL, AND MUST BE DISCARDED. A 26 APR 91 LAD ARTICLE, ENTITLED "INTERACTION BETWEEN QUANTITY AND QUALITY IN THE PLA", DIRECTLY ADDRESSED THE MAN VERSUS WEAPONS CONTROVERSY. THE AUTHOR CONTENDED THAT, IF CHINA'S LEADERS WISHED TO ARM THE PLA WITH SOPHISTICATED EQUIPMENT, THEN THE NUMBER OF UNITS MUST BE REDUCED BECAUSE OF THE HIGHER COST OF MODERN ARMS. CORRESPONDINGLY, IF THE SIZE OF THE PLA IS INCREASED, QUALITATIVE IMPROVEMENTS IN THE FORCE MUST BE DELAYED DUE TO LIMITED FINANCIAL RESOURCES. A 7 FEB 92 LAD ARTICLE STRESSED THE NEED FOR CHINA TO MODIFY ITS "MILITARY THEORY" IN LINE WITH THE LESSONS OF THE GULF WAR. IT POINTED OUT THAT IRAQ HAD SUFFERED A DISASTROUS DEFEAT IN THE GULF WAR, NOT ONLY BECAUSE ITS FORCES WERE WEAKER THAN THOSE OF THE WESTERN COALITION, BUT MORE IMPORTANTLY, BECAUSE ITS MILITARY THEORY WAS BACKWARD AND ITS LEADERSHIP INEFFECTIVE.

(2). CHINA'S LEADING PROPONENT OF RAPID PLA MODERNIZATION LAUNCHES CAMPAIGN TO PREPARE FOR MODERN "LOCAL WARS". CMC VICE CHAIRMAN LIU HUAQING IS CONSIDERED CHINA'S LEADING PROPONENT OF THE MODERNIZATION OF THE PLA'S ARMS AND EQUIPMENT. ON 6 AUG 93, AN ARTICLE PREPARED BY GEN LIU, ENTITLED "UNSWERVINGLY ADVANCE ALONG THE ROAD OF BUILDING A MODERN ARMY WITH CHINESE CHARACTERISTICS", APPEARED IN LAD. IN THE ARTICLE, THE GEN ADDRESSED THE KEY CHARACTERISTICS OF MODERN "LOCAL WAR" -- FIRST, THE FUTURE BATTLEFIELD WILL BE OF UNPRECEDENTED SIZE, ENCOMPASSING BOTH OUTER SPACE AND THE DEPTHS OF THE SEA. SECOND, AIR FORCES WILL PLAY A MORE IMPORTANT ROLE IN LOCAL WAR, BECAUSE OF THEIR ABILITY TO CARRY OUT INDEPENDENT, PROLONGED, UNINTERRUPTED LARGE-SCALE STRATEGIC ATTACKS. THIRD, ELECTRONIC WARFARE AND SOPHISTICATED COMMAND, CONTROL, COMMUNICATIONS, AND INTELLIGENCE SYSTEMS HAVE BECOME KEY FACTORS IN MODERN WAR. FOURTH, THE DEVELOPMENT OF NVDS HAS INCREASINGLY ALTERED THE TRADITIONAL METHODS OF OPERATING AT NIGHT. FIFTH, MODERN WAR PLACES HIGHER DEMANDS ON EMERGENCY LOGISTICS SUPPORT. LIU ALSO ADMONISHED ARMY LEADERS TO STUDY CAREFULLY THE GULF WAR; TO DETECT WEAKNESSES IN THE HIGH-TECH WEAPONS EMPLOYED IN THE WAR. THE PLA HAS DEFEATED BETTER-EQUIPPED ENEMIES IN THE PAST, AND MUST CONTINUE TO DO SO IN THE FUTURE. IN THE FALL OF 1993, GEN LIU AND HIS FELLOW CMC VICE CHAIRMAN, GEN ((ZHANG)) ZHEN, VISITED PLA UNITS IN THE FIELD TO OBSERVE HOW THEY WERE APPLYING THE LESSONS LEARNED IN THE GULF WAR.

THEY CALLED ON PLA LEADERS TO LEARN METHODS OF APPLYING NEW AND HIGH-TECH SYSTEMS IN COMBINED ARMS AND MULTI-SERVICE OPERATIONS. THE UNITS, COULD NOT AFFORD THE LUXURY OF WAITING FOR THE ARRIVAL OF BETTER EQUIPMENT BEFORE INTRODUCING TRAINING TO PREPARE FOR FUTURE WARFARE. THEY MUST ATTACH IMPORTANCE TO LEARNING HOW TO WIN A FUTURE HIGH-TECH LOCAL WAR WITH THEIR EXISTING EQUIPMENT (LAD, 23 SEP AND 31 OCT 93).

(3). GSD LAUNCHES 3-YEAR PROGRAM TO TRAIN A PLA THAT WOULD BE ABLE TO DEFEAT A BETTER-EQUIPPED ENEMY WITH EXISTING EQUIPMENT (LAD, 26 JAN AND 8 FEB 95). SINCE 1993, GSD HAS BEGUN EACH TRAINING YEAR BY CALLING ON ARMY UNITS TO APPLY TRAINING REFORMS DESIGNED TO ENHANCE THE CONVICTIONS OF OFFICERS AND SOLDIERS ALIKE, THAT THEY CAN DEFEAT A BETTER EQUIPPED ENEMY IN A HIGH-TECH LOCAL WAR WITH THEIR EXISTING EQUIPMENT. EACH OF THE MILITARY REGIONS (MR) AND THE ARMS AND SERVICES HAVE BEEN ENCOURAGED TO TAKE ITS SUBORDINATE UNITS TO THE FIELD IN ORDER TO PARTICIPATE IN CONFRONTATIONAL TRAINING EXERCISES, SO THAT, THE LESSONS LEARNED FROM THE GULF WAR COULD BE TESTED AND VALIDATED.

(4). THE REMAINDER OF THIS STUDY WILL PRESENT A NUMBER OF NEW STRATEGIES AND DOCTRINES DEVELOPED BY PLA THEORISTS SINCE THE GULF WAR AS WELL AS THE EFFORTS OF UNITS TO TACTICALLY APPLY THESE PRINCIPLES DURING FIELD EXERCISE TRAINING. EACH SECTION WILL PRESENT A MILITARY PRINCIPLE AS IT HAS EVOLVED IN THEORETICAL PAPERS AND EXAMPLES OF ITS APPLICATION IN THE FIELD, WHICH HAS BEEN REPORTED IN THE ARMY PAPER AND OTHER CHINESE MEDIA.

### 3. NIGHT OPERATIONS

#### A. DOCTRINE AND STRATEGY

(1). DEVELOPMENT OF MODERN NIGHT VISION EQUIPMENT FORCES PLA TO CHANGE TRADITIONAL CONCEPTS OF NIGHT OPERATIONS. IN HIS AUG 93 ARTICLE ON "BUILDING A MODERN ARMY", GEN LIU HUAQING NOTED THAT THE EMPLOYMENT OF NVDS BY MODERN ARMIES HAD MADE IT INCREASINGLY DIFFICULT FOR THE SIDE IN A CONFLICT THAT HAD NOT MASTERED NIGHT VISION TECHNIQUES TO USE DARKNESS TO MOVE ITS UNITS AND ASSEMBLE ITS FORCES (LAD, 6 AUG 93). A 15 OCT 93 LAD ARTICLE ELABORATED ON THE CMC VICE CHAIRMAN'S THEME BY WARNING THAT THE PLA MUST FACE THE REALITY THAT THE NIGHT COMBAT SKILLS IT MADE FAMOUS IN THE PAST WERE NO LONGER APPROPRIATE UNDER CONDITIONS OF MODERN NIGHT WARFARE. THE PLA CAN ONLY MEET THIS

CHALLENGE BY ALTERING THE WAY IT CONDUCTS NIGHT COMBAT. NEW CAREFULLY-PICKED AND WELL-EQUIPPED COMBAT GROUPS SHOULD BE FORMED, CONSISTING OF COMBAT ELEMENTS FROM ALL ARMS AND SERVICES. THESE GROUPS CAN BE COMBINED FOR LARGE ARMY-GROUP OPERATIONS DURING DAYLIGHT AND DISPERSED INTO SMALL INDEPENDENT COMBAT GROUPS AT NIGHT. THE NIGHT COMBAT GROUPS MUST HAVE ADDITIONAL AGILITY AND THE METHOD OF COORDINATING THEIR OPERATIONS SHOULD BE CHANGED. THE PAST METHOD OF COORDINATING THEIR ACTIVITIES IN ADVANCE IS NOT APPROPRIATE. THESE NIGHT COMBAT GROUPS SHOULD BE ORGANIZED TO STRESS COORDINATION FOR EACH SPECIFIC MISSION AND OBJECTIVE.

(2). GSD REQUIRES UNITS TO ADOPT NEW COMBAT METHODS IN NIGHT TRAINING. IN DEC 92, GSD REVEALED THAT IT HAD COMMISSIONED AN UNIDENTIFIED (UI) TANK REGIMENT (RGT) TO TEST NEW METHODS FOR CONDUCTING NIGHT TRAINING OF ARMORED AND MECHANIZED UNITS. THE RGT PRODUCED A "STANDARD NIGHT TRAINING MANUAL" AFTER CONDUCTING TRAINING TESTS ON 135 NIGHT OPERATION SUBJECTS DURING 35 NIGHT LIVE-FIRE DRILLS. THE MANUAL PRESENTED TRAINING DRILLS FOR 51 TACTICAL SCENARIOS, GROUPED INTO 8 TRAINING SUBJECTS. GSD EXAMINED THE RGT'S METHODS AND ITS TRAINING MANUAL AND THEN ANNOUNCED THAT BOTH WOULD BE INTRODUCED THROUGHOUT THE PLA (LAD, 11 DEC 92). IN A SUMMARY OF NIGHT TRAINING REFORMS PUBLISHED IN JUL 94, GSD CONCLUDED THAT MAJOR PLA UNITS HAD SUCCESSFULLY EXPLORED METHODS OF FIGHTING COMPLICATED WARFARE AT NIGHT. IN THE LIGHT OF NIGHT COMBAT CHARACTERISTICS, MANY UNITS HAD SHIFTED THEIR NIGHT TRAINING EMPHASIS FROM BASIC UNIT TACTICAL AND TECHNICAL SUBJECTS TO WHOLE RGTS AND DIVISIONS (DIV) IN COMBINED ARMS OPERATIONS AT NIGHT. IN ADDITION, THEY HAD DEVISED NEW WAYS OF CONDUCTING NIGHT COMBAT TRAINING (XINHUA DAILY TELEGRAPH - XDT, 27 JUL 94).

(3). GSD HOSTS ALL-ARMY MEETING ON NIGHT TRAINING REFORM IN JINAN MR, 10 TO 18 JUN 94. THE MAIN THEME OF THE MEETING WAS DEVELOPING METHODS OF FIGHTING A NIGHT BATTLE UNDER HIGH-TECH CONDITIONS AND WAYS TO TRAIN SOLDIERS FOR THAT PURPOSE. CMC VICE CHAIRMEN LIU HUAQING AND ZHANG ZHEN, GSD CHIEF ((ZHANG)) WANNIAN, AND OTHER SENIOR PLA LEADERS ATTENDED THE MEETING; OBSERVED A "COORDINATED AIR-GROUND NIGHT LIVE-FIRE EXERCISE"; AND THEN VISITED AN EXHIBITION OF ADVANCED NIGHT COMBAT AND TRAINING EQUIPMENT HELD IN WEIFANG, EASTERN SHANDONG PROVINCE (LAD, 20 JUN 94). IN OCT 94, THE COMMANDER OF THE JINAN MR AIR FORCE, ((WU)) GUANGYU (STC -- 0702/0342/1342), AND HIS CHIEF OF STAFF, ((XU)) JUNBAO (STC -- 1776/0193/1405), PREPARED A JOINT ARTICLE FOR THE ARMY PAPER IN WHICH THEY

OUTLINED THE LESSONS LEARNED DURING THE JUN 94 EXERCISE (ABOVE), WHICH WAS THE FIRST NIGHT EXERCISE OF THIS TYPE EVER HELD IN THE PLA. THEY CONCLUDED THAT COORDINATED GROUND-AIR NIGHT OPERATIONS SHOULD BE OFFENSIVE IN NATURE AND COMPOSED OF LOOSE AND FLEXIBLE ORGANIZATIONS. NIGHT ACTIONS OF COMBINED ARMS UNITS SHOULD BE WELL COORDINATED THROUGH UNIFIED PLANNING, ORGANIZATION AND COMMAND (LAD, 28 OCT 94).

#### B. FIELD EXERCISE TRAINING

(1). SHENYANG MR DIV DEFEATS MODERN NVD-EQUIPPED ENEMY BY EMPLOYING "MULTI-ARMS OMNI-DIRECTIONAL TACTICS" (LAD, 27 JUN 93). ON 4 JUN 93, THE DIV COMPLETED A NIGHT TRAINING REFORM PROGRAM BY CONDUCTING A OPERATION AGAINST AN ADVERSARY EQUIPPED WITH MODERN NVDS AT A CHANGBAISHAN TRAINING BASE IN JILIN PROVINCE. THE DIV COMMAND ELEMENT USED SELF-MADE LOW-LIGHT EQUIPMENT TO WORK ON SAND TABLES, READ MAPS, AND ISSUE COMBAT ORDERS. SPECIAL TEAMS INFILTRATED THE ENEMY'S FORWARD POSITIONS AND USED OPTICAL, ACOUSTIC, AND ELECTRICAL DEVICES TO "BLIND" ENEMY NVDS. THE DIV THEN ATTACKED WEARING NIGHT COMBAT CAMOUFLAGE GEAR TO CONCEAL ITS MOVEMENTS FROM THE ENEMY.

(2). NANJING MR "RED ARMY RGT" DISPLAYS NEW METHODS OF USING ITS INFERIOR EQUIPMENT TO DEFEAT A BETTER-EQUIPPED ENEMY AT NIGHT (LAD, 25 SEP 93). RGT CADRE WERE REQUIRED TO STUDY MORE THAN 40 EXAMPLES OF MODERN NIGHT WARFARE BATTLES AND ANALYZE THE PERFORMANCES AND WEAKNESSES OF THE SOPHISTICATED NVDS USED BY FOREIGN ARMIES. THEY THEN DEVELOPED OVER 60 TYPES OF OPTICAL, ACOUSTIC, AND ELECTRICAL DEVICES ABLE TO "JAM" OR "BLIND" THESE NVDS. THE RGT ALSO DEVELOPED AND TESTED NINE NEW AND DIFFERENT TACTICAL METHODS FOR CONDUCTING MODERN NIGHT COMBAT. THE RGT HAS THUS PROVEN THAT AN INFERIOR-EQUIPPED ARMY CAN DEFEAT AN ENEMY WITH SUPERIOR WEAPONS THROUGH APPLICATION OF MILITARY SKILLS AND TACTICS.

(3). JINAN MR ARTILLERY DIV DEMONSTRATES NIGHT TRAINING REFORM ACHIEVEMENTS FOR MR LEADERS (PLA PICTORIAL, MAY 94). THE DEMONSTRATION EXERCISE BEGAN ONE WINTER NIGHT IN HUABEI, ANHUI PROVINCE, WHEN ENEMY ARTILLERY AND ARMOR UNITS LAUNCHED A SUDDEN ATTACK ON PLA POSITIONS. WITHIN 10 SECONDS, THE ARTILLERY DIV'S GUNS HAD DELIVERED VOLLEYS OF ACCURATE FIRE ON ENEMY TARGETS. THE SPEED OF REACTION AND ACCURACY OF FIRE FULLY AFFIRMED THE SUCCESS OF THE DIV'S NIGHT TRAINING REFORM EFFORTS. DIV LEADERS ATTRIBUTED THE SUCCESS OF THEIR EFFORTS TO "DARING TO EAT WESTERN MEALS WITH



CHOPSTICKS". THE UNIT HAS UPGRADED ITS EXISTING EQUIPMENT THROUGH INNOVATIVE MEANS AND REFORMED ITS NIGHT TRAINING PROGRAM.

(4). NANJING MR COMPANY (CO) COMMANDER (CDR) OVERCOMES HIS MEN'S "NYCTOPHOBIA" BY STRENGTHENING THEIR FAITH IN WINNING NIGHT BATTLES (PLA PICTORIAL, MAY 94). ((CHEN)) BUBIAO, THE CDR OF A CO IN SOUTH FUJIAN, OVERCAME HIS OFFICER'S AND MEN'S FEAR OF NIGHT COMBAT BY INTRODUCING THEM TO FOREIGN NVDS. HE ALLOWED THEM TO USE BOTH CHINESE AND FOREIGN NVDS IN NIGHT TRAINING EXERCISES, SO THAT, THEY COULD COMPARE THE STRENGTHS AND WEAKNESSES OF BOTH. THE MEN DISCOVERED THAT FOREIGN NVDS WERE USELESS WHEN THEY USED VEGETATION CAMOUFLAGE NETS. SOLDIERS USING FOREIGN NVDS COULD NOT DETECT A SINGLE SOLDIER, VEHICLE, OR GUN HIDDEN BY THE VEGETATION CAMOUFLAGE. IN 1993, THE CO SPENT AN AVERAGE OF 200 HOURS ON EACH OF 26 NIGHT TRAINING SUBJECTS, WHICH ALLOWED IT TO ACHIEVE EXCELLENT RESULTS DURING FIELD TESTING.

(5). JINAN MR REINFORCED INFANTRY DIV CONDUCTS MOUNTAIN OFFENSIVE OPERATION ON NIGHT OF 14 JUN 94 (LAD, 16 JUN 94). UNITS OF THE DIV WERE HIDDEN IN MOUNTAIN RAVINES WHILE AWAITING THE ORDER TO LAUNCH THE OFFENSIVE. THEY WERE DISCOVERED AND ATTACKED BY OPPOSING FORCES (BLUE FORCES) HELICOPTERS EQUIPPED WITH NVDS, RADARS, AND ELECTRONIC DEVICES. THE ARMY FORCES (RED FORCE) IMMEDIATELY INSTITUTED CAMOUFLAGE MEASURES, CHANGING INFANTRY GROUPS INTO MOUNDS, ARTILLERY PIECES INTO TREES, VEHICLES INTO HOUSES, AND TANKS INTO RIDGES. DUMMY TARGETS WERE DISPLAYED AWAY FROM DIV POSITIONS TO CONFUSE THE BLUE FORCES. THEN, USING TERRAIN AND A SMOKE SCREEN, THE RED FORCE APPROACHED THE ENEMY FROM MULTIPLE DIRECTIONS. THE RED FORCE CDR, IN A CONCEALED COMMAND VEHICLE, OBTAINED DATA ON BLUE FORCE POSITIONS USING RECONNAISSANCE (RECON) AIRCRAFT, RADAR, LOW-LIGHT CAMERAS, BATTLEFIELD MONITORING SYSTEMS, AND THERMAL IMAGE DEVICES. HAVING STUDIED THE ENEMY, THE CDR ISSUED ATTACK ORDERS VIA HIS AUTOMATED COMMAND SYSTEM TO HIS FRONTAL, VERTICAL, AND DEEP-THRUST ATTACK GROUPS, AND HIS AIRBORNE, ANTI-TANK MISSILE, AND MOBILE SUPPORT UNITS. THE GROUND FORCES, IN CLOSE COORDINATION WITH AIR FORCE AND AIR DEFENSE UNITS, LAUNCHED A CONCERTED OFFENSIVE MANEUVER THAT DROVE THE BLUE FORCES FROM THEIR POSITIONS. A GSD TRAINING DEPARTMENT (DEPT) CADRE, OBSERVING THE EXERCISE, COMMENTED THAT MANY PLA UNITS HAVE RAISED THEIR OVERALL NIGHT OPERATIONAL CAPABILITIES BY SWITCHING THEIR EMPHASIS FROM SMALL UNIT NIGHT TECHNICAL TRAINING TO COMBINED ARMS NIGHT OPERATIONS

TRAINING AT DIV AND RGT LEVEL. (NOTE -- THIS IS PROBABLY THE EXERCISE REFERRED TO IN PARA 3A(3) ABOVE).

(6). UI BEIJING MR MOTORIZED INFANTRY BATTALION (BN) FAILS NIGHT ATTACK DUE TO POOR NIGHT DRIVING SKILLS (LAD, 1 SEP 94). THE BN HAD ORDERS TO MOVE THROUGH A DANGEROUS AREA AT NIGHT TO BYPASS THE ENEMY'S FRONT LINES AND DESTROY HIS COMMAND POST. HOWEVER, A TANK DRIVER, NOT EXPERIENCED IN NIGHT DRIVING, GOT STUCK IN THE MUD AND BLOCKED THE ENTIRE BN'S LINE OF MARCH. THE DELAY HELD UP THE ENTIRE OPERATION, ALLOWING THE ENEMY TO DISCOVER THE RED FORCE'S INTENTIONS AND BLOCK THE ATTACK. THE RGT CDR CONDUCTED AN INVESTIGATION TO DETERMINE THE CAUSE OF THE FAILURE. HE LEARNED THAT THE BN HAD TURNED IN A FALSE TRAINING REPORT ON THE LEVEL IT HAD ATTAINED IN NIGHT DRIVER TRAINING. A LAD COMMENTARY ACCOMPANYING THIS REPORT POINTED OUT THAT THIS WAS A TYPICAL FAILURE THAT WILL RESULT WHEN UNITS EXAGGERATE THEIR TRAINING ACHIEVEMENTS. IT WARNED THAT, IN A CONTEST OF REAL STRENGTH, THERE IS NO ROOM FOR DECEPTION OR FALSE AND EMPTY CLAIMS.

(7). GUANGZHOU MR REINFORCED INFANTRY RGT EXPERIENCES DIFFICULTIES IN NIGHT ASSAULT ON BLUE FORCE MOUNTAIN FORTIFICATIONS (LAD, 15 NOV 94). THE ASSAULT WAS PART OF A DIV-LEVEL 10-DAY OPERATIONAL EXERCISE USING REAL SOLDIERS AND LIVE AMMUNITION. THE RGT SUFFERED HEAVY LOSSES DURING THE NIGHT ATTACK BECAUSE IT FAILED TO DESTROY THE ENEMY'S NVDS CAPABILITY BEFORE LAUNCHING ITS FINAL ASSAULT. AFTER THE EXERCISE, THE RED FORCE SPENT FIVE DAYS REVIEWING PROBLEMS EXPOSED DURING THE MANEUVERS AND DEVISING METHODS OF OVERCOMING THESE DIFFICULTIES. IN A SIMULATED BATTLEFIELD DRILL A WEEK LATER, THE RGT WAS ABLE TO OVERCOME DISADVANTAGES OF NIGHT ATTACKS BY USING FLEXIBLE TACTICS.

(8). UI MECHANIZED GROUP ARMY TRAINS UNITS IN TECHNIQUES OF NIGHT CONCEALMENT FROM ENEMY AIR RAIDS (LAD, 14 DEC 94). THE ARMY DEPLOYED SEVERAL HUNDRED TANKS AND SELF-PROPELLED GUNS IN UNDERGROUND POSITIONS FOR 6 DAYS AND NIGHTS. BY CONCEALING MORE THAN 500 VEHICLES IN SEMI-SUBTERRANEAN SHELTERS COVERED WITH VEGETATION AND CAMOUFLAGE NETS, THE ARMY WAS ABLE TO AVOID DETECTION BY THE BLUE FORCE'S INFRARED, THERMAL IMAGING, OPTICAL AND TV SYSTEMS MOUNTED ON RECON VEHICLES. IN ORDER TO DEFEAT THERMAL IMAGING AND INFRARED RECON EQUIPMENT IN BLUE FORCE AIRCRAFT, THE ARMY COMMAND POST AND ITS HEAVY ARMAMENT WERE COVERED WITH HEAT-INSULATING MATERIALS. THE RED FORCE ALSO UNDERMINED ENEMY RECON BY SETTING UP TEN MOCK TANK

POSITIONS AND THROUGH USE OF SHORT-WAVE AND ULTRA-SHORT-WAVE JAMMING. SUDDENLY ONE NIGHT, THE RED FORCES CAME OUT OF HIDING AND LAUNCHED A FIERCE ASSAULT ON ENEMY AIRBORNE UNITS ATTEMPTING TO MAKE A LANDING.

(9). UI JINAN MR ARTILLERY DIV DELIVERS RAPID ACCURATE SUPPORT FIRES DURING NIGHT TRAINING (LAD, 4 JAN 95). DURING A MID-WINTER NIGHT TRAINING EXERCISE IN THE SHANDONG MOUNTAINS, THE DIV CARRIED OUT A RAPID MOBILITY EXERCISE. WHILE ITS ARTILLERY GROUPS DEPLOYED THEIR GUNS, ITS RECON UNITS IN FORWARD OBSERVATION POSTS QUICKLY AND ACCURATELY TRANSMITTED AUTOMATED FIRING DATA TO THE GUN POSITIONS. INSTANTLY, ARTILLERY FIRE WAS DELIVERED ON TARGETS IN THE FORWARD AREA. BY INTRODUCING INNOVATIONS IN ITS COMMUNICATIONS, COMMAND, AND FIRE CONTROL EQUIPMENT, THE DIV HAS ACQUIRED AN ALL-WEATHER, AROUND-THE-CLOCK CAPABILITY.

(10). UI LANZHOU MR ARTILLERY RGT ACHIEVES REMARKABLE PROGRESS IN NIGHT RAPID-REACTION TRAINING (LAD, 6 FEB 95). DURING A RECENT NIGHT EXERCISE IN THE LIUPAN MOUNTAINS IN NINGXIA PROVINCE, THE RGT'S GUNS WERE ABLE TO COVER DESIGNATED TARGETS WITH FIRST SALVOS WITHIN 40 SECONDS. THE UNIT FOLLOWED THE EXAMPLES OF ARTILLERY UNITS IN JINAN AND GUANGZHOU MRS IN CARRYING OUT NIGHT RAPID REACTION TRAINING REFORMS, THUS SHORTENING THE TIME NEEDED TO COMPLETE THOSE REFORMS. IT HAS EXPLOITED THE POTENTIAL OF EXISTING EQUIPMENT, SIMPLIFIED COMMAND AND FIRING PROCEDURES, WHILE DEVELOPING ITS OWN SYSTEM OF HASTY NIGHT FIRE COMMANDS.

#### 4. AIR SUPERIORITY/AIR DEFENSE

##### A. DOCTRINE AND STRATEGY

(1). PLA LEADERS SHOCKED BY HOW EASY IT WAS FOR COALITION AIR FORCES TO GAIN CONTROL OF IRAQI AIR SPACE DURING THE GULF WAR. CHINA'S MILITARY LEADERS WERE SURPRISED AND FASCINATED BY COALITION AIR OPERATIONS OVER IRAQ ON 17 JAN 91. BEGINNING ON 18 JAN AND CONTINUING FOR THE NEXT 20 DAYS, THE ARMY PAPER DEVOTED NEARLY AN ENTIRE PAGE OF ITS 4-PAGE DAILY EDITION TO DETAILED REPORTING AND COMMENTARY ON NEW AIR WEAPONS AND TACTICS EMPLOYED BY COALITION AIR FORCES. THE LAD REPORTS DWELT ON THE SOPHISTICATION OF WESTERN NVDS AND ELECTRONIC WARFARE DEVICES; THE EXTENDED RANGES, MASSIVE PAYLOADS, AND PRECISE ACCURACY OF COALITION AIRCRAFT; ITS COMPREHENSIVE RECON, EARLY WARNING AND INTELLIGENCE SYSTEMS; AND ITS CONTINUOUS AIR TRANSPORT SUPPORT AND LONG-RANGE COMMAND, CONTROL, AND COMMUNICATIONS. ON 25 JAN 91, AN ARTICLE BY THE

DIRECTOR OF THE PLA AIR FORCE LOGISTICS DEPT'S HEALTH DEPT, ((LI)) ZHIGANG (STC -- 2621/1807/0474), WAS PUBLISHED IN LAD. LI WARNED PLA LEADERS THAT THE WESTERN DEVELOPMENT OF NVDS HAD TAKEN THE NIGHT WARFARE INITIATIVE AWAY FROM DEVELOPING COUNTRIES AND HAD PLACED THEM IN A "PASSIVE POSITION". SOLDIERS WHO RELIED ON THE NAKED EYE AT NIGHT WERE IN DANGER OF SERIOUS DEFEAT. THEREFORE, THE PLA MUST ASSIGN ACQUISITION OF NVDS FOR ALL FORCES AS A TOP RESEARCH PRIORITY. A 22 MAR 91 LAD REPORT OF A RECENT PLA MODERN AIR DEFENSE STUDY CONCLUDED THAT AIR POWER HAD INCREASED IN IMPORTANCE IN RECENT YEARS DUE TO THE KEY ROLE IT PLAYED IN WINNING LOCAL WARS. THE ARMY PAPER WARNED THAT AIR POWER AND AIR DEFENSE COULD BE EXPECTED TO BE A MAJOR FORCE IN FUTURE REGIONAL WARS FOR WHICH THE PLA AIR FORCE MUST PREPARE.

(2). CHINA'S MILITARY STRATEGISTS PROMOTE THE ROLE OF AIR POWER IN FUTURE WARS. A 21 AUG 92 LAD ARTICLE POSITED THAT AIR POWER HAD BECOME THE MOST IDEAL FORCE FOR ACHIEVING A STRATEGIC VICTORY IN COMBAT WHILE AVOIDING A "BIG WAR". THE ARTICLE POINTED OUT THAT AIR POWER AND AIR DETERRENCE HAD BEEN USED VERY EFFECTIVELY IN RECENT LOCAL WARS. THE 5 MAR 93 LAD CONTAINED A REPORT PROJECTING THE APPLICATION OF AIR OFFENSIVE OPERATIONS IN THE 21ST CENTURY BASED ON A STUDY CONDUCTED ON AIR OPERATIONS CARRIED OUT IN A NUMBER OF TYPICAL HIGH-TECH LOCAL WARS OVER THE PAST DECADE. A 10 SEP 93 LAD ARTICLE URGED PLA LEADERS TO ALTER THEIR OPERATIONAL THINKING TO PREPARE FOR FUTURE "AIR-SPACE WARFARE". IT PROPOSED THAT THE GREATEST THREAT TO CHINA CAME FROM AIR AND SPACE AND NOT THE LAND AND SEA. FUTURE WARS WILL BE INITIATED FROM THE AIR AND WILL INVOLVE FULL-TIME AIR OPERATIONS. THE PLA MUST GIVE UP ITS MODE OF POSITION DEFENSE IN FAVOR OF LONG-RANGE MOBILE OPERATIONS IN UNSPECIFIED AREAS. IN A REPORT ON THE COALITION FORCE'S IMPOSITION OF "FLIGHT PROHIBITED ZONES" IN NORTHERN IRAQ, THE ARMY PAPER EMPHASIZED THE VITAL IMPORTANCE OF CHINA BUILDING UP ITS AIR POWER. IT CONCLUDED THAT, WITHOUT AIR POWER, A COUNTRY WOULD LOSE ITS AIR SOVEREIGNTY, AND WITHOUT AIR SOVEREIGNTY, IT COULD NOT MAINTAIN ITS LAND AND SEA SOVEREIGNTY AND WOULD HAVE TO ACCEPT CONDITIONS IMPOSED BY THE ENEMY (LAD, 9 APR 93).

(3). ARMY PAPER CALLS FOR PLA TO BUILD A MODERN MORE-EFFECTIVE AIR DEFENSE SYSTEM. AN ARTICLE IN THE 27 MAR 92 LAD REASONED THAT THE PLA AIR FORCE COULD NOT BUILD AIR POWER SYSTEMS ON PAR WITH THOSE OF WESTERN AIR FORCES IN THE NEAR TERM. THEREFORE, IMPROVING CHINA'S AIR DEFENSE FORCES WAS THE KEY TO

RETAINING CONTROL OVER THE COUNTRY'S SKIES. THE PLA MUST RELY ON ITS GROUND AIR DEFENSE POWER RATHER THAN ITS AIR FORCE TO RETAIN AIR SUPERIORITY FOR SOME TIME TO COME. A 22 OCT 93 LAD ARTICLE RECOMMENDED CHANGING THE PLA'S AIR DEFENSE METHOD OF RESISTING AIR ATTACKS TO AN "ALL-ALTITUDE OMNI-REGIONAL INTEGRATED SYSTEM", WITH AIR DEFENSE BELTS AT SHORT, MEDIUM AND LONG RANGES FROM PROTECTED ZONES THAT WOULD INCLUDE MANY LAYERS OF FIREPOWER AT HIGH, MEDIUM, AND LOW ALTITUDES PROVIDED BY A MIX OF GUIDED MISSILES AND ANTI-AIRCRAFT ARTILLERY (AAA) PIECES. COMBAT OPERATIONS MUST BE CHANGED FROM DEFENDING KEY POINTS AND REGIONAL AIR DEFENSE TO A MODEL COMBINING MOBILE AND PASSIVE AIR DEFENSE. NOTING THE EFFECTIVE APPLICATION OF AIR POWER DEMONSTRATED IN RECENT LOCAL WARS, A 25 FEB 94 LAD ARTICLE CALLED FOR THE PLA TO DISCARD ITS "LARGE AREA STATIC LINE AIR DEFENSE" AND ADOPT A CONCEPT OF "MOBILE OFFENSIVE AIR DEFENSE".

(4). SUPERIORITY OF AIR POWER ATTAINED THROUGH APPLICATION OF OFFENSIVE STRATEGIES (LAD, 14 OCT 94). IN THIS ARTICLE, THE ARMY PAPER PROPOSED THAT AN AIR FORCE COULD ONLY ACHIEVE AIR SUPERIORITY BY MAINTAINING ITS ATTACK CAPABILITY. HIGH-TECH LOCAL WARS IN THE 1980S HAVE PROVEN THAT "AN AIR FORCE THAT HIDES ITSELF INVARIABLE SUFFERS DISASTROUS DEFEAT". AIR ATTACK OPERATIONS ARE NO LONGER SUBORDINATED TO GROUND OPERATIONS, THE AIR FORCES MUST UNDERTAKE INDEPENDENT STRATEGIC AND OPERATIONAL MISSIONS. AIR DEFENSE OPERATIONS MUST ALSO EVOLVE FROM PASSIVE RESISTANCE TO COORDINATED ATTACK AND DEFENSE OPERATIONS, WITH ATTACK PLAYING THE DOMINANT ROLE.

THIS REPORT IS CONTINUED IN IIR [REDACTED]