

Коммунистическая Партия Советского Союза. ЦЕНТРАЛЬНЫЙ КОМИТЕТ

СОС ~~РАССЕКРЕТНО~~  
РАССЕКРЕТЕНО

№ П68/У

Т. т. Хрущеву, Громыко.

Выписка из протокола № 68 заседания Президиума ЦК КПСС  
от 22 ноября 1962 года

---

О дополнительных указаниях т. Микояну А. И. по кубинскому вопросу.

Утвердить проект указаний т. Микояну А. И. по кубинскому вопросу (прилагается).

СЕКРЕТАРЬ ЦК

Подлежит возврату не позже чем в 7-дневный срок  
в ЦК КПСС (Общий отдел, 1-й сектор)

9-мм  
ке

**CPSU Presidium Instructions to Mikoyan, 22 November 1962**

# P68/U

To comrades Khrushchev, Gromyko

Extract from protocol # 68 of Session of the Presidium of CC CPSU  
from November 22, 1962.

**On additional instructions to comrade A. I. Mikoyan on the Cuban issue**

To approve draft instructions to comrade Mikoyan on the Cuban issue (attached).

Secretary CC

To paragraph 5 of Protocol # 68

Secret

Top priority

Havana

Soviet Ambassador – for comrade A. I. Mikoyan

To your [telegrams] # 1893, 1892, 1885.

In accordance with the instructions, I report the following on the issues you raised:

1. We sent you information about Kuznetsov's and Zorin's negotiations with McCloy and Stevenson, in which it was pointed out that the U.S. representatives were planning to give us the draft of the American declaration in the next several days. We will prepare and send our draft of the declaration (which we already have) for preliminary coordination with our Cuban friends, taking into account the U.S. document. In addition, we have to keep in mind that the Americans, having stated that the form of the protocol does not suit their needs, have not made any statements regarding the substance of the protocol so far.

2. We were worried about the information that the directive from the Cuban Foreign Ministry to their representative in New York, Lechuga, contained the following phrase: "We have tactical nuclear weapons, which we should keep."

Your considerations regarding the response to our Cuban friends on this issue were seen as correct.

In your conversations, start from the assertion that these weapons belong to us, and are to be kept in our hands only; we have never transferred them to anyone, and we do not intend to transfer them to anyone. In addition, as we have told the Americans, all nuclear weapons have been removed from Cuba.

It would be advisable for our Cuban friends to correct urgently the directive given to Lechuga in that part, and to tell him clearly that there are no nuclear weapons in Cuban hands. It is important to give such a directive to Lechuga immediately so that he will not be able to make some statement in a careless conversation which could be eavesdropped upon, referring to that mistaken directive. All this is very important, because otherwise it could seriously complicate matters if the Americans obtained information that does not correspond to reality as a result of the directive the Cuban Ministry of Foreign Affairs gave to Lechuga.

3. As far as the new military agreement is concerned, we should start from the assumption that the issue of such an agreement will be discussed after you return to Moscow and that it would be inexpedient to discuss it now in Havana.

419-nb  
zf

*[Source: Archive of the President of the Russian Federation, special declassification April 2002. Translated by Svetlana Savranskaya, The National Security Archive.]*