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Pinal Draft

-Scenario for Airstrike against offensive missile bases and bombers in Cuba.

ADVANTAGES

Interpouse to meeting 10/25 am para 7 Minute 4

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
DEPARTMENT OF STREET LANGE CHAPTER CONTROL OF STREET CONTROL OF ST successful maintenance of offensive weapons in Cube.

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DISADVANTAGES

- 1. This action may force Khrushchev to react strongly and could result in some type of war. Khrushchev will not order launch of a missile from Cuba unless he is ready for war essentially on other grounds. There is greater likelihood of a riposte in kind. However, it is unlikely that the risks of major war are greater than through escalation of blockade.
- 2. There is remote possibility that some local Soviet commander in Cuba may order firing of a missile.
- 3. Adverse effect on U.S. image of initiation of use of force against a small country. This can be minimized by making attack selective and focused on Soviet offensive weapons. At same time there would be positive increments to our image from demonstration of clear willingness to take on the Soviets in protection of our vital interests.
- 4. Unless carefully handled could damage long-range U.S.-Cuben relations.
- 5. May not totally eliminate offensive weapons thus calling for follow up attacks and/or invasion, unless full and unlimited international inspection is agreed to.



PREREQUISITES FOR DECISION

- 1. Veto of U.S. resolution in Security Council.
- 2. Evidence that Soviets have continued build-up of existing offensive capability in Cube in defiance of Presidential warning and OAS resolution.

- 1. White House statement that offensive build-up is continuing, a dengarous and provocative act, which increases gravity of situation. Repeats warning for those engaged in this work.
- 2. Delivery of copy of White House statement to Cuban representative at UM.
- 3. Evecuation warning (as long as militarily feasible) to personnel in strike areas by leaflet drop. A strike plan designed to accomplish mission with minimum damage to non-military targets.
 - 4. Inform OAS (Chairman) shortly in advance of strike.
- 5. Arrange for Ambassadors to notify Latin American heads of state at zero hour.
 - 6. Inform NATO Allies and others at appropriate time.
- 7. Letter to K delivered at zero hour, describing action and indicating regret that continuation of work at offensive sites had forced action, limited nature of operation, our effort to limit personnel losses, and calling for immediate consultations to reduce world-wide tensions.

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Final Draft

FOLLOW UP ACTIONS

- 1. Continuation of close air surveillance.
- 2. Be prepared to hit SAM sites and airfields if recommaissance planes attacked.
- 3. Immediate report to Organ of Consultation (OAS) and adoption of resolution requesting Soviets to evacuate offensive forces from Cube under international inspection.
- 4. Report to UH Security Council explaining limited nature of operation and requesting immediate despatch of UN observer term to Cuba.
- 5. Haintenance of blockade extended to include POL until clear evidence is available that offensive bases have them:
 aliminated.
- 6. Major Presidential address including special message to Cuban people.
 - 7. Appropriate leaflet drops over Cuba.

ANNOTATED COPY FOLLOWS

Scenario for Airstrike against offensive missile bases and bombers in Cuba.

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TOP SECRET SENSITIVE

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
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
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SECRET

Final Draft

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