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PSYCHOLOGICAL STRATEGY BOARD

Washington

INTERIM U. S. PSYCHOLOGICAL STRATEGY PLAN FOR EXPLOITATION OF UNREST IN SATELLITE EUROPE

References

NSC Action 817-~~2~~

NSC Action 826

NSC 158

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 1.6

WAD 131001

By mc/20 Date 3/1/84

WARNING

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PSB D-45
July 1, 1953

PSYCHOLOGICAL STRATEGY BOARD
Washington 25, D. C.

INTERIM U. S. PSYCHOLOGICAL STRATEGY PLAN FOR EXPLOITATION
OF UNREST IN SATELLITE EUROPE

Reference:


NSC Action 817-e

NSC Action 826

NSC 153

Note by the Secretary

This paper was approved by the Board at its Informal
Meeting on July 1, 1953.


Charles E. Johnson
Secretary to the Board


June 29, 1953

PSYCHOLOGICAL STRATEGY BOARD
WASHINGTON, D. C.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PSYCHOLOGICAL STRATEGY BOARD

SUBJECT: Interim U.S. Psychological Strategy Plan for Exploitation of Unrest in Satellite Europe (NSC Action 217-e), PSB D-45, June 29, 1953

The Staff of the Psychological Strategy Board has prepared the attached revised draft of the plan for consideration by the Board. A summary of this plan was approved, subject to minor drafting changes and to the reservation of the Department of Defense, at the Board meeting of June 24th. The National Security Council approved the summary the following day, with one further change and an instruction regarding emphasis in implementation. The attached draft has been revised accordingly, and also incorporates Departmental and Agency comments on the original draft of the basic paper. The revised draft is submitted for consideration by the Board at its meeting scheduled for July 1.


George A. Morgan
Acting Director

Attachment:

PSB D-45, dated June 29,
1953, Copy No. 43.

PSYCHOLOGICAL STRATEGY BOARD
WASHINGTON, D. C.

INTERIM U.S. PSYCHOLOGICAL STRATEGY PLAN FOR EXPLOITATION
OF UNREST IN SATELLITE EUROPE
(RSC Action 817-e)

1. Problem

To assess the significance of recent signs of unrest in the European satellites of the USSR, particularly in the so-called German People's Republic, to estimate U.S. psychological capabilities for influencing the situation, and to develop a realistic program of coordinated U.S. psychological operations to exploit rapidly existing opportunities for furthering U.S. and Free World objectives in the satellite states of Europe, while laying the foundations for more ambitious programs in the future if events should warrant them.

2. The Situation

A dramatic new element has been introduced into the European situation by the current wave of unrest in satellite Europe. Popular discontent over Communist oppression has flared into open defiance of Communist authority in Czechoslovakia, where workers' demonstrations of a violence and temerity hitherto unknown in the satellite states broke out early this month. Though these riots appear to have been triggered by resentment over monetary reforms, in Pilsen, at least, they had broader implications. There, by the admission of the governmental press, an angry mob trampled on the Soviet flag and hoisted the American one. Minor acts of resistance have been reported elsewhere in Czechoslovakia and in Rumania. For some time, there has been unrest in Albania, and a sober U.S. press observer, after a recent visit to Budapest, compares Hungary to a volcano which could erupt at any time.

It is in the so-called German Democratic Republic, however, that the most significant and spectacular developments have occurred. The anti-regime demonstrations which began in East Berlin on June 16, and developed the next day into bloody mass rioting, subsequently spread throughout a large part of the Soviet Zone and were frankly characterized by the governmental press and radio as a rebellion. Despite the proclamation of martial law and the deployment of Soviet armed forces in East Berlin and in several parts of the Soviet Zone, calm had not been fully restored six days after the outbreak of the uprisings. Several hundred thousand Germans appear to have participated in the movement. There were widespread strikes. The rioters were mainly workmen, many of them from heavy industry and public utilities. Several strategically important large plants were either destroyed or badly damaged. The communist press has reported what it termed "murderous assaults" on Party officials and police or other state employees, and mob attacks on government offices, jails, Party headquarters and other installations have been noted.

In East Berlin and elsewhere where mass riots occurred, the puppet police appeared to be ineffectual. A number of defections from the Communist police occurred. The pusillanimous behavior of Deputy Minister Otto Nuschke and other puppet officials did not enhance the prestige of the regime. The reenforcement or replacement of East German by Soviet military forces, including tank units, naturally tended to suppress large-scale mob demonstrations but did not immediately cow the rebellious workers. A number of audacious attempts to spike the guns or sabotage the treads of Soviet tanks were reported. Clearly there was no magic even in the most impressive manifestations of Soviet military strength. The tearing-down of the huge Soviet flag that has waved over the Brandenburg Gate in Berlin since the Red Army first entered the city was a symbolic act of great portent.

The drastic and sweeping Soviet repression, involving thousands of arrests and a number of summary executions, had not broken the spirit of resistance in Eastern Germany a week after the beginning of the uprisings. Official communist statements reported in the Western press on June 22, declared that many of the "fascist provocateurs" alleged to be responsible for the disorders were still at large and admitted that even in factories where work had resumed a number of the workers still exhibited an embittered spirit. Food shortages appear to be aggravating the unrest in Berlin.

Efforts of the East German puppet officials to win over the rebellious population by announcements that workers who were merely misled will not be dealt with harshly, by abject self-criticism which almost certainly foreshadows a sweeping Party purge, and by promises of drastic reform and economic relief, seemingly have been even less successful than the Soviet repression of the rebellion. Though resentment over excessive production quotas, food shortages and hard conditions of life generally triggered off the revolts in Germany as in Czechoslovakia, these grievances were overshadowed by the clearly expressed political objectives of the German rebels. More than anything else the German uprisings appear to have been a kind of spontaneous direct-action plebiscite in which the East German masses voted with their fists for free elections, the reunification of Germany and the withdrawal of Soviet occupation forces.

The repeated mob shouts of "Russki Go Home" and similar slogans gave the uprisings a clear anti-Soviet character from the start, but it would be a mistake to view them as pro-Western. Their essential motivation was nationalist. Unless the Soviets are prepared to come to terms with German nationalism--which seems unlikely--or to adopt savage measures of mass repression, there seems little likelihood that the spirit of resistance in Eastern Germany will abate. On the contrary, the partial victory over

the puppet government indicated by the promises of reform which have already been wrung from it, is likely to enhance the morale and step up the expectations of the resistance forces. Even if Soviet and satellite authority should succeed in suppressing current unrest and in re-establishing control, it can be assumed that the present demonstrations of overt and active resistance have weakened their grip on the captive populations and that attempts may be renewed, in different areas, to start local strikes, demonstrations or other manifestations of continuing resistance.

At the same time the sweeping concessions which the Kremlin has forced the puppet authorities in Germany to make, or promise, are almost certain to stimulate demands for similar concessions in the other satellites where the Kremlin can less easily afford to grant them. This communist dilemma, plus the indications that popular resentment in all the European satellites is near the boiling point, plus the discrediting of the German puppet regime and the revelation that Soviet power in Eastern Germany has no basis but naked force, plus the demonstration furnished by the German rebels that defiance of Soviet authority is not always equivalent to suicide, adds up to the greatest opportunity for initiating effective policies to help roll back Soviet power that has yet come to light.

We must, of course, bear in mind that popular uprisings in the satellites cannot cope with effective military force. The only counteraction here is other military force which the West will not now use. However, the use of military force by the Soviet to deal with revolt in a satellite state is a confession of major defeat for their policy, and in areas where there is no Soviet military force present, as in Czechoslovakia, popular uprisings may reach a point where the local military force is unwilling to intervene, thus creating a situation in which the Soviet would be forced to cross an international boundary to make its force applicable.

In certain situations it is conceivable that the Soviet might be reluctant to take this step, especially if it considered there was any danger of the revolutionary infection spreading to its own armed forces.

3. U.S. Psychological Capabilities

a. United States capabilities in the satellite states of Europe --including European or non-official American organizations normally responsive to U.S. official influence--are comparatively great in the psychological field, especially in East Germany. In no other part of the Soviet orbit is our position so favorable for influencing the thoughts and actions of large numbers of men. In one area at least--Eastern Germany--the population is probably more responsive to U.S. leadership than it is in many free countries. Yugoslavia claims significant psychological capabilities with respect to Bulgaria which might be used to support common objectives.

(1) The greatest single U.S. capability in Eastern, as in Western Europe is the personality and prestige of President Eisenhower, both as an individual leader and as the symbol of America's enormous power in the service of the cause of human freedom which most inhabitants of Eastern Europe still regard as their own.

(2) The importance of the President as a U.S. psychological capability is enhanced by the relative effectiveness of U.S. controlled mass media in most of the satellite areas of Europe. This makes it possible to project U.S. leadership rapidly throughout a large and populous region. The most important vehicles of U.S. influence in Eastern Europe are the following radio stations or programs: RIAS, Radio Free Europe, and the Voice of America. Throughout most of the Soviet Zone of Germany, RIAS has a popularity and an influence probably unequalled in the history of psychological warfare. Radio Free Europe is operated by a private

American organization, but its staff will conform their programs to the national interest. Despite intensive jamming and danger to the individual in listening, RFE exercises an important local influence throughout Czechoslovakia and Hungary. VOA, though heavily jammed, is heard throughout most of the region.

[REDACTED]

b. Apart from the direct U.S. or U.S.-controlled capabilities listed above, there are significant free world capabilities for supporting common objectives in the satellite areas. By appropriate methods it should be possible in most cases to stimulate more effective exploitation of these foreign capabilities and to coordinate them more closely with U.S. capabilities. Both the BBC and the French national radio system have substantial listening audiences behind the Iron Curtain and both could effectively support overt U.S. programs if the two governments could be persuaded to adopt more dynamic psychological policies.

[REDACTED]

Existing West German capabilities, official and non-official, are being exploited quite effectively at present, but some expansion is probably possible [REDACTED]

Radio Madrid puts a strong signal into much of the region and its programs include a good deal of hard-hitting psychological warfare against the Soviet and puppet authorities in satellite Europe. It is said to have a large listening audience.

The Italian Government radio facilities and Radio Vatican have been developing regular programs for the captive nations of the Soviets and should be useful in an integrated program.

The Protestant, Orthodox and Catholic churches, particularly the latter, have potential capabilities behind the Iron Curtain, but efforts to exploit these in the past have been hampered by the fact that church organizations behind the Iron Curtain are subject to rigorous police controls and the fact that church and U.S. government policies are often governed by different considerations.

4. Conclusions

a. While the current unrest in the satellite states of Europe may not foreshadow the beginning of a major anti-communist and nationalist revolt throughout the Soviet empire, it does unquestionably offer the most promising opportunity yet seen for effective U.S. psychological and political attack upon Soviet power in the area, taking into account the possibilities and limitations of the situation as indicated in par. 2.

b. U.S. psychological capabilities are not yet adequate to support a widespread revolt against Soviet power in the European satellites, but they can contribute to maintaining a psychological climate of resistance. In view of the limitations of present U.S. capabilities, particularly the lack of substantial military power in Western Europe, we should be careful not to fan the sparks of revolt in Eastern Europe to the point where they risk flaring up into mass, open rebellion in areas at present under Soviet military control.

c. Since we cannot accurately predict the development of the situation in / Eastern Europe, even in the immediate future, our psychological programs to exploit the present situation should be sufficiently flexible to:

(1) Taper off without loss of confidence or prestige in the eyes of the local population if the present unrest should die away in a few weeks, contrary to the indications noted in par. 2.

(2) Permit rapid expansion and intensification if the national resistance movements in the satellite areas not subject to Soviet military control appear to be gathering momentum; in any event to maintain a continued attitude of resistance among the people of the satellites, and to intensify attacks upon the morale and loyalty of the Soviet and satellite forces engaged in maintaining order in these areas.

d. In order to increase free world capabilities for vigorous and coordinated action in Eastern Europe, we should exploit as appropriate operational liaison with the French, British, West German, Yugoslav, Italian and other friendly governments, with the authorities of the Protestant, Orthodox and Catholic churches (Radio Vatican), and with trade union and democratic political organizations.

5. Psychological Objectives

a. For the purpose of this interim plan, our first objective is simply to nourish throughout the European satellites, particularly in Czechoslovakia, the spirit of active resistance to communist oppression evidenced in Eastern Germany and elsewhere. Pursuit of this objective, however, must be qualified by the following considerations:

(1) We must avoid stirring up resistance to the point of open rebellion in areas under Soviet military control.

(2) U.S. measures to encourage the spirit of resistance must not be so obvious as to throw doubt on the spontaneous nature of the resistance, which we should exploit as a valuable psychological asset.

b. While we should encourage resistance for its own sake as indicated in the foregoing paragraph, we should also seek whenever feasible to direct it towards certain targets. The most immediately important target is the puppet regimes in all the satellite states, especially Czechoslovakia. We should seek to discredit them, to undermine their prestige and authority, and to weaken them in every possible way. [REDACTED]

c. We should exploit every evidence of significant unrest in the satellite states of Europe, as vigorously as developing events justify, to convince the peoples of the USSR, of Communist China and North Korea, and of the neutralist nations in Asia, that the Soviet empire is beginning to crumble. [REDACTED]

d. Finally, we should seek to convince our friends and allies in the free world, particularly those in Western Europe, that the love of liberty and the hatred of alien oppression are stronger behind the Iron Curtain than they have dared to believe, and that the problem of popular resistance to ruthless totalitarian authority is less hopeless than they have imagined.

6. U.S. Courses of Action: Phase I.


(Actions which can be launched within sixty days on the basis of existing U.S. capabilities and within the framework of the estimate of the situation as indicated in par. 2).

a. Basic Tasks

(1) Intensify [REDACTED] U.S. information programs to the European satellites, including Eastern Germany, aimed at nourishing

the spirit of resistance everywhere. In programs to Eastern Germany seek to convince the population that their resistance has already wrung promise of important concessions from the Soviet authorities and that continued or increased resistance will produce additional concessions, culminating in the withdrawal of Soviet armed forces and free elections for the unification of Germany. In other satellite areas--unless or until new major acts of resistance occur outside of Germany--the emphasis [redacted] [redacted] should be upon rapid, strictly-factual reporting of all resistance-news, from Germany or elsewhere, with particular attention to successful techniques of resistance, and to the unquenchable love of freedom from which resistance springs. In [redacted] information programs outside Germany [redacted] [redacted]--great emphasis should be put on the gains won by the German resistance--particularly the de-collectivization measures and all relief to peasant land-owners and small businessmen--as indicating the immediate goals of local resistance activities.





(5) Strengthen operational liaison where appropriate with the French, British, Yugoslav, Italian and other friendly governments, with the authorities of the Protestant, Orthodox and Catholic churches, with trade unions and other significant non-government groups in order to stimulate all free world activities behind the Iron Curtain and to coordinate them more effectively with U.S. activities.

(6) In information programs to the free world, to the USSR, to Communist China and North Korea and to the neutralist nations of Asia, emphasize themes which relate particularly to the objectives indicated in 5 d.

b. Special Undertakings

(1) Through appropriate official statements or diplomatic acts, emphasize at the earliest possible moment the strong support of the United States for the unification of Germany based on free elections to be followed by a peace treaty, and the continuing U.S. desire to conclude a treaty for Austria.

(2) Complete as rapidly as possible consultations with Western European governments in regard to NSC 143 in order to permit early release of the planned official announcement and its timely psychological exploitation.

(3) Consider bringing the question of Soviet repression of East German revolt before the U.N.

(4) Launch immediately a world-wide movement to honor the martyrs of the East German revolt, linking it with the achievements and sufferings of the Czechoslovak resistance forces, but focussing attention

upon Berlin. The proposed campaign should include one or more of the following subsidiary campaigns or actions:

- (a) Cash collection, offer of scholarships, presentation of various gifts, etc. for the widow and children of Willi Goettling.
 - (b) Erection of a memorial in Berlin to all heroes of anti-Soviet resistance.
 - (c) Annual ceremonies in Germany on each anniversary of June 17 revolt.
- (5) Urge the U.S. Red Cross to ask International Red Cross to investigate conditions in East Germany in wake of Soviet repressions, to determine the need for medical supplies, food, clothing and other relief for victims of the oppression and their families.
- (6) Stimulate the international organization of free trade unions in Brussels to denounce Soviet repression of East German revolt and demand investigation of economic and labor conditions which set it off.
- (7) Stimulate religious, humanitarian and cultural organizations in the United States--and if possible in other free countries--to collect funds and gifts for the families of the victims of Soviet repression in Germany.
- (8) [REDACTED]
- (9) Undertake immediately a study aimed at identifying possible gaps in the coordination of U.S. psychological programs in Europe, with particular emphasis upon improving cooperation where necessary with Allied governments and with the governments of Spain and Yugoslavia, and take all appropriate steps to effect rapidly any administrative improvements which may be desirable for the purpose of this plan.

(10) The announcement by the President of allocation of specified funds to MSA for the alleviation of the suffering of escapees to Germany should be vigorously exploited.

(11) Efforts should be made to induce countries with vast under-populated areas such as Brazil to make a public offer to re-settle large numbers of escapees who have fought against tyranny and have been forced to flee their homelands.



7. U.S. Courses of Action: Phase II.

(Actions requiring lengthy preparation, or contingent upon developments)

a. Basic Tasks







b. Special Undertakings

(1) Consider U.S. advocacy of (1) free elections in the satellites and association with the Western European community with emphasis on economic cooperation and rehabilitation, and (2) subsequent withdrawal of all foreign troops from Germany, Austria and the satellites.

(2) Encourage the expansion of existing radio programs to the satellites, whether official or private, to increase coverage of the whole area and to emphasize the free cooperation among the various national resistance movements as foreshadowing a free European commonwealth of independent but associated states.



(b) A program specifically dedicated to



oblige the Kremlin to relax further

its oppressive nationality policies.

(c) A high-level "UNESCO"-type appeal to Soviet intellectuals attracted by Western culture which could be used to spread subtle defeatist propaganda and to discredit individuals.

(4) Consider the feasibility and desirability of launching Phase II of the Volunteer Freedom Corps program to include nationals of the USSR.

(5) When conditions are considered appropriate, launch large-scale regular balloon-deliveries of suitable propaganda material--

