| Press
Release - October 7, 2003 |
Contact:
William Burr - 202 / 994-7000
|
Kissinger
Gave Green Light for Israeli Offensive Violating 1973 Cease-Fire;
U.S.-Israeli
Decisions Touched Off Crisis Leading to 1973 U.S. Nuclear Alert
New
Documents Correct Previous Accounts in Kissinger Books
Washington, D.C., 7 October 2003 - During
the 1973 October War, Secretary of State Henry Kissinger secretly
gave Israeli authorities a green light to breach a cease-fire
agreement arranged with the Soviet Union, according to new documents
published by the National Security Archive today on the war's
30th anniversary. Declassified documents
detail Kissinger's efforts to buy time for Israeli military
advances despite the impending cease-fire deadline. This episode
is not discussed in Kissinger's new book, Crisis, and
was downplayed in his memoirs.
Kissinger secretly told the Israelis that he could accept them
"taking [a] slightly longer" time in observing the
deadline (see Document 51). In
talks with Golda Meir, Kissinger winked at the prospect of Israeli
forces taking military action against Egypt despite the cease-fire:
Meir…The Egyptians and the Syrians
haven't said anything [about the cease-fire]. They have said
that the fighting continues.
Kissinger: You won't get violent protests from Washington
if something happens during the night, while I'm flying. Nothing
can happen in Washington until noon tomorrow.
Meir: If they don't stop, we won't.
Kissinger: Even if they do … [from Document
54]
"During the night," Israeli forces launched
a major attack and surrounded Egypt's Third Army. Major violations
of the cease-fire precipitated a diplomatic crisis with the
Soviet Union, whose leaders suspected that Kissinger had made
a deal with the Israelis. Diplomatic tensions led to a Soviet
bluff to intervene that in turn led to a U.S. Defcon III nuclear
alert. To settle the crisis, Kissinger would have to exert strong
pressure against Tel Aviv. This marked the beginning of 30 years
of U.S. focus on the Arab-Israeli conflict as a major policy
priority.
Drawing on recently declassified material from the
National Archives, this briefing book shows the complex role that
the Nixon administration played during the crisis, maintaining backchannels
with Arabs and Israelis, facilitating an Israeli military edge,
while deterring a disastrous Arab defeat. Published here for the
first time are documents disclosing:
-
advance warnings of a possible Egyptian-Syrian
attack received by the Israelis and Kissinger's advice against
Israeli preemptive action (documents 7,
9, 10,
and 18)
-
Kissinger's early decisions to provide military
aid to Israel (documents 18
and 21) but stay in touch with
Arab leaders, to maximize U.S. diplomatic influence (documents
20, 44,
and 63)
-
Kissinger's "shock" at, and refusal
to follow, Nixon's instruction to establish with Brezhnev
a superpower condominium to force a peace settlement ( documents
47 and 48)
-
Brezhnev's use of the U.S.-Soviet hotline
to protest Israeli cease-fire violations and entrapment of
Egypt's Third Army ( documents 61A
and B)
-
Brezhnev's 24 October letter that prompted
the U.S. Defcon III alert ( document
71)
-
Kissinger's rage at West European governments,
whom he saw acting like "jackals" and "hostile
powers," for failing to support U.S. policy (documents
63 and 75)
-
tense meetings of NATO's North Atlantic Council
where U.S. Ambassador Donald Rumsfeld heard complaints about
the lack of advance notice on the Defcon ( documents
79A and B)
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