



SECRET/EXDIS

Classification

Department of State 30

128634

# TELEGRAM

IND  E:  
 COLLECT  
 CHARGE TO

DISTRIBUTION

ACTION: Amembassy NEW DELHI PRIORITY

INFO: Amembassy ISLAMABAD  
Amconsul DACCA  
USUN NEW YORK  
WHITE HOUSE

EXDIS  
STATE 149

TOSEC  PLEASE PASS SAN-CLEMENTE FOR SECRETARY ROGERS  
SUBJECT: Indo-Pakistan Situation

REF: State 127423

1. SUMMARY. Indian Ambassador Jha lunched with Acting Secretary Irwin July 15. During lunch Under Secretary took occasion to review with Jha our concerns about possible effect of Indian support for cross border operations, Indian views on political accommodation with Awami League, and negative Indian position on UN presence in refugee camps on both sides of Indo-Pak border. END

SUMMARY

2. Ambassador Jha noted as he had to Assistant Secretary Sisco (reftel) that India greatly appreciated US economic assistance over the years. GOI recognized that we had

|   |                          |                    |                                      |
|---|--------------------------|--------------------|--------------------------------------|
| DRAFTED BY:<br>NEA/INC:ACEQuainton:emg/jd | DRAFTING DATE<br>7/15/71 | TEL. EXT.<br>21289 | APPROVED BY:<br>The Acting Secretary |
|---|--------------------------|--------------------|--------------------------------------|

CLEARANCES:

NEA - Mr. Van Hollen

S/S - Mr. Miller

SECRET/EXDIS

Classification

SECRET/EXDIS  
*Classification*

supported India economically but regretted we had not supported India politically. When questioned, Jha referred specifically to lack of support in India-Pakistan conflict of '65 and with respect to Kashmir.

3. Acting Secretary in reply reviewed history of our respective political positions over past 20 years going back to cold war and Indian neutralist policies. He commented that India was a leader of the neutral nations during this period and seemed to wish to keep a certain distance from the US. He also noted fact that throughout this period US had given India economic assistance and he believed this demonstrated continuing hope that our political relations would become more in tune in future. While recognizing problems of the past it was more important, however, to look toward future.

4. Acting Secretary outlined for Jha some of our current concerns about situation in South Asia. He realized danger of armed conflict was inherent in present situation. He recognized the psychological and other pressures which were bearing in on the Indian government but no one could foretell how disastrous a war would be, for India, the region or the rest of the world. With

SECRET/EXDIS

*Classification*

SECRET/EXDIS  
*Classification*

hindsight perhaps Pakistan would not have done what it did in March if it could have foreseen the problems, dilemmas and dangers which have resulted. USG is pursuing disinterested policy in South Asia. It is not seeking anything for itself. Such disinterest is not so certain on the part of other external powers such as China and perhaps the USSR. War is disastrous generally, but perhaps particularly so for India politically and economically in the light of the economic and social progress India is making. It also could lead to growing influence in area of outside powers.

5. Acting Secretary stressed that both India and US working toward same ultimate goal of political accommodation in East Pakistan, cessation of fighting and return of refugees. The dilemma was how to create conditions to achieve these results. Even if Pakistan wished to stop the fighting it could be difficult to achieve so long as guerrilla activity continued. Whatever degree of support India gave to guerrillas would seem only to work toward keeping this conflict alive. We share with India the desire to move Pakistan as soon as possible to a cessation of all military activity. We recognize psychological needs of those who want an independent Bangla Desh or autonomy

SECRET/EXDIS  
*Classification*

SECRET/EXDIS

*Classification*

within Pakistan which push them to fight. Nonetheless, as long as they continue to fight, particularly if encouraged to, it will be difficult to create conditions in which refugees would return.

6. Acting Secretary also noted Indian public statements that a political accommodation was necessary with Awami League and Mujib. We are aware that Awami League swept elections and that political accommodation will be difficult without them. We also recognize practical problems which Yahya faces and do not believe that accommodation with Awami League should be a precondition. We are not saying Yahya should not deal with Awami League, but merely that he should not be forced to deal with it in order to begin process of creating more stable government and conditions, if he can, favorable to the return of refugees.

7. Acting Secretary also touched on desirability of UN presence in refugee camps on both sides of border. It was needed on Pakistani side to receive and care for returning refugees and start them on way back to their homes. On Indian side a UN presence need not be necessarily equal or in same border areas.

SECRET/EXDIS

*Classification*

SECRET/EXDIS

Classification

It could however facilitate return of refugees and dissemination of information on how to return.

8. In response Jha analyzed basic cause of refugee flow. He said that even though there was guerrilla activity here and there, scale of fighting was not such as to create continued refugee flow of present magnitude, i.e., 45,000-50,000 per day. Cause of refugee flow was not fighting but fact that Hindus being driven out selectively by Pak army from East Pakistan. First step was to stop the Pak army from taking further action. Similarly, if GOP would stop selectively driving out Hindus and if refugee flow were <sup>reduced</sup> ~~reduced~~ to a trickle it would be easier to ask India to agree to such moves, as a UN presence to help with the return of refugees. When such conditions created, India might be able accept proposal, whereas now proposal appeared to equate India and Pakistan. One of real problems for GOI in trying to persuade refugees to go back at this time was that they might succeed with a few Muslims whereas Hindus without any prospect of getting back their homes and property would not return. This could give a false impression of "peace" whereas millions of refugees would be left in India. US should be stressing first need to stop refugee flow not guerrilla

SECRET/EXDIS

Classification

SECRET/EXDIS  
*Classification*

activity. It would be helpful if GOP could announce that army planning to withdraw to barracks..

9. Jha stated that GOI extremely conscious of danger of armed conflict and desperately concerned about it. What was needed was government in East Pakistan which would be tolerant of minorities. It seemed to him that US was arguing only for civilian administration. This was not enough. What was required was an administration which would encourage minorities to go back, return their property to them and treat them fairly.

Acting Secretary fully agreed and said US was not thinking merely in terms of civilian administration, but rather one which would encourage the return and fair treatment of all refugees.

10. Acting Secretary also commented to Jha on problem of military and economic assistance to Pakistan. He explained US policy on arms shipments, noting that recent shipments, essentially of parts, presented particular psychological problem in India. We had stopped all future authorizations and had halted any shipment of the "one time exception." What remained in pipeline, although recognizing it as having a psychological effect in India, was of no real military significance. The position on economic aid was the same. We had not

SECRET/EXDIS

SECRET/EXDIS

Classification

really given aid since March 25. Our position was fundamentally no different from that of other Consortium countries. Other Consortium countries had said they would not give aid while political situation remained as it was. We do not intend to put such political strings on our aid, but the actual position was much the same. It was more a question of atmosphere than actions.

Near the end of the luncheon after India-Pak questions had been fully covered, Ambassador Jha switched the conversation and asked about both the Paris negotiation, particularly the North Vietnamese seven points, and about Vietnamization in general.

END

IRWIN

SECRET/EXDIS