

No. 12-5137

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

JUDICIAL WATCH, INC.,
Plaintiff-Appellant,

v.

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE AND
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY,
Defendants-Appellees.

ON APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES
DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

BRIEF FOR APPELLEES

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**APPELEES' CERTIFICATE AS TO PARTIES,
RULINGS, AND RELATED CASES**

A. Parties and Amici.

1. Plaintiff in district court and appellant on appeal is Judicial Watch, Inc.
2. Defendants in district court and appellees in this Court are the United States Department of Defense and the Central Intelligence Agency.
3. There were no amici curiae in the district court.

B. Ruling Under Review.

The ruling that is the subject of this appeal is the district court's opinion and order entered on April 26, 2012 (per the Honorable James E. Boasberg), *Judicial Watch v. U.S. Department of Defense*, 857 F.Supp.2d 44 (D.D.C.), granting defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment and denying plaintiff's Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment.

C. Related Cases.

Counsel for appellees is not aware of any related case within the meaning of D.C. Cir. Rule 28(a)(1)(C).

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GLOSSARY

CIA.....	Central Intelligence Agency
DoD	Department of Defense
Exemption 1	5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(1)
Exemption 3	5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(3)
E.O. 13,526	Executive Order 13,526
FOIA	Freedom of Information Act
JA.	Joint Appendix
NCS.....	National Clandestine Service

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BRIEF FOR APPELLEES

**STATEMENT OF SUBJECT MATTER AND
APPELLATE JURISDICTION**

The district court's jurisdiction was based upon 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(4)(B).
The district court entered final judgment in favor of defendants on April 26, 2012.
Plaintiff filed a timely notice of appeal the same day. Joint Appendix ("JA") 238.
This Court's jurisdiction is based upon 28 U.S.C. § 1291.

STATEMENT OF THE ISSUE

Whether the district court properly determined that the government validly invoked Exemption 1 of the Freedom of Information Act to withhold classified images depicting Osama bin Laden's dead body.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

A. Course Of Proceedings And Disposition Below.

Plaintiff brought this FOIA action against the Department of Defense ("DoD") and the Central Intelligence Agency ("CIA") seeking any photographs and/or video recordings of Osama Bin Laden taken during the operation that resulted in his death. The parties filed cross-motions for summary judgment. On April 26, 2012, the district court granted the government's motion for summary judgment, and denied plaintiff's cross-motion for summary judgment. Plaintiff then filed the present appeal.

B. The Statutory Background: The Freedom Of Information Act.

Under the Freedom of Information Act ("FOIA"), "each agency, upon any request for records * * * shall make the records promptly available to any person." 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(3). Congress, however, exempted nine categories of information from disclosure. *See* 5 U.S.C. § 552(b). In the present case, materials were withheld as exempt under Exemptions 1 and 3, 5 U.S.C. §§ 552(b)(1), 552(b)(3).

1. Exemption 1 provides that FOIA's disclosure requirements do not apply to matters that are "(A) specifically authorized under criteria established by an Executive order to be kept secret in the interest of national defense or foreign policy and (B) are in fact properly classified pursuant to such Executive order." 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(1).

In this case, the responsive materials were classified pursuant to Executive Order 13,526, 75 Fed. Reg. 707 (Dec. 29, 2009). *See* JA 24. A copy of the full text of that order is attached as an addendum to this brief. A prerequisite for classification under the Executive Order is that an "original classification authority determines that the unauthorized disclosure of the information reasonably could be expected to result in damage to the national security, which includes defense against transnational terrorism, and the original classification authority is able to identify or describe the damage." E.O. 13,526, § 1.1(a)(4). "Information shall not be considered for classification unless its unauthorized disclosure could reasonably be expected to cause identifiable or describable damage to the national security in accordance with section 1.2 of this order, and it pertains to one or more of the following:

- (a) military plans, weapons systems, or operations * * *;

(c) intelligence activities (including covert action), intelligence sources or methods, or cryptology;

(d) foreign relations or foreign activities of the United States * * *.”

Id., § 1.4. National security is defined as the “national defense or foreign relations of the United States.” *Id.*, § 6.1(cc). “‘Damage to the national security’ means harm to the national defense or foreign relations of the United States from the unauthorized disclosure of information, taking into consideration such aspects of the information as the sensitivity, value, utility, and provenance of that information.” *Id.*, § 6.1(l). Information may be classified at different levels, ranging from “Confidential” to “Top Secret,” depending on the degree of harm to national security that unauthorized disclosure “could be expected to cause.” *Id.*, 1.2.

2. Exemption 3 states that materials are also exempt from disclosure where disclosure is prohibited by another federal statute that “(A) (i) requires that the matters be withheld from the public in such a manner as to leave no discretion on the issue; or (ii) establishes particular criteria for withholding or refers to particular types of matters to be withheld; and (B) if enacted after the date of enactment of the OPEN FOIA Act of 2009, specifically cites to this paragraph.” 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(3).

C. Statement Of The Facts

1. Images of Bin Laden's Body from May 1, 2011

On Sunday night, May 1, 2011, President Obama announced that the United States had conducted an operation that killed the leader of al-Qaeda, Osama bin Laden. The President said: "Today, at my direction, the United States launched a targeted operation against th[e] compound in Abbottabad, Pakistan [where Osama bin Laden was hiding out]. A small team of Americans carried out the operation with extraordinary courage and capability. No Americans were harmed. They took care to avoid civilian casualties. After a firefight, they killed Osama bin Laden and took custody of his body."¹

Bin Laden's dead body was transported to the aircraft carrier USS Carl Vinson in the North Arabian Sea. JA 102. There, it "was washed and then placed in a white sheet." JA 79. Religious remarks were read, and the prepared body was placed in weighted bag and onto a flat board. As the board was tipped up, bin Laden's body slipped into the sea. *Ibid.*

The President subsequently confirmed that photographs were taken of bin Laden and that facial analysis was used to confirm his identity. JA 118. On May

¹ Transcript of President Obama's May 1, 2011 remarks, <http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2011/05/02/remarks-president-osama-bin-laden>.

4, Press Secretary James Carney announced that “the President ha[d] made the decision not to release any of the photographs of the deceased Osama bin Laden.”

Ibid. The President himself later explained this decision, in an interview with 60 Minutes reporter Steve Kroft:

KROFT: Did you see the pictures?

PRESIDENT OBAMA: Yes.

KROFT: What was your reaction when you saw them?

PRESIDENT OBAMA: It was him.

KROFT: Why haven't you released them?

PRESIDENT OBAMA: You know, we discussed this internally. Keep in mind that we are absolutely certain this was him. We've done DNA sampling and testing. And so there is no doubt that we killed Osama bin Laden. It is important for us to make sure that very graphic photos of somebody who was shot in the head are not floating around as an incitement to additional violence. As a propaganda tool.

You know, that's not who we are. You know, we don't trot out this stuff as trophies. You know, the fact of the matter is this was somebody who was deserving of the justice that he received. And I think Americans and people around the world are glad that he's gone. But we don't need to spike

the football. And I think that given the graphic nature of these photos, it would create some national security risk. And I've discussed this with Bob Gates and Hillary Clinton and my intelligence teams and they all agree.²

2. The Judicial Watch FOIA Requests.

On May 2 and May 4, 2011, Judicial Watch sent requests under the FOIA to the DoD and CIA seeking "all photographs and/or video recordings of Osama (Usama) Bin Laden taken during and/or after the U.S. military operation in Pakistan on or about May 1, 2011." JA 211; *see also* JA 40-41, 45, 50-51. The agencies both provided interim responses stating that it was unlikely that they would be able to provide substantive responses within the 20-day statutory period under the FOIA. JA 43, 53.

3. The District Court FOIA Action

a. On May 13, 2011, Judicial Watch filed a district court action under the FOIA against DoD seeking release of the requested records. On June 8, 2011, it filed an amended complaint that added the CIA as a defendant. JA 8. In the meantime, both agencies finished processing Judicial Watch's requests. DoD located no responsive records. JA 44-47. The CIA located a total of 52 unique

² Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment, 3 (quoting May 8, 2011 60 Minutes interview with President Obama, transcript available at http://www.cbsnews.com/8301-504803_162-20060530-10391709.html).

responsive records. JA 22-23. In his declaration, John Bennett, Director of the National Clandestine Service (“NCS”) of the CIA explained that these records contain images of Osama bin Laden’s body after he was killed. JA 22. NCS Director Bennett stated that many of the images are graphic and gruesome, as they depict the fatal bullet wound to bin Laden’s head “and other similar gruesome images of his corpse.” *Ibid.* Some of the images were taken inside the compound in Abbottabad, Pakistan, where bin Laden was killed. Other images were taken as bin Laden’s body was transported from the Abbottabad compound to the location where he was buried at sea. *Ibid.* Several images depict the preparation of Osama bin Laden’s body for the burial as well as the burial itself. *Ibid.*

NCS Director Bennett’s declaration further detailed that some of the images were taken so that the CIA could conduct a facial recognition analysis in order to confirm that the body was that of Osama bin Laden. The CIA’s facial recognition technology, which is highly classified, compares unique facial features, such as bone structure, age spots, hair growth patterns, and the size and shape of the eyes, ears, and nose, as well as the relative positioning of facial features. JA 22-23. The CIA compared historic photographs of bin Laden with some of the responsive photographs and concluded with high confidence that the deceased individual was in fact Osama bin Laden. *Ibid.*

NCS Director Bennett's declaration explained that the CIA withheld the fifty-two responsive records in their entirety pursuant to FOIA Exemptions 1 and 3, 5 U.S.C. §§ 552(b)(1), (3). JA 23-38. Bennett is an original classification authority, with authority to render and review classification decisions, JA 26, and with the responsibility of ensuring that "any determinations regarding classification of CIA information are proper," JA 18. He determined that the "responsive records at issue in this case are currently and properly classified in accordance with the substantive and procedural requirements of" Executive Order 13,526. JA 24. Bennett declared: "all of the responsive records are classified TOP SECRET because their unauthorized disclosure reasonably could be expected to result in exceptionally grave damage to the national security." JA 28. He further attested: "all of the responsive records are the product of a highly sensitive, overseas operation that was conducted under the direction of the CIA; accordingly, I have determined that all of the records pertain to intelligence activities and/or methods as well as the foreign relations and foreign activities of the United States." JA 27.

NCS Director Bennett explained that release of "the responsive records would provide terrorist groups and other entities hostile to the United States with information to create propaganda which, in turn, could be used to recruit, raise funds, inflame tensions, or rally support for causes and actions that reasonably

could be expected to result in exceptionally grave damage to both the national defense and foreign relations of the United States.” JA 30. He explained in detail that if released, al-Qaeda could use these images of bin Laden’s body to inflame jihadist support and inspire attacks on the United States and its citizens. JA 30-32. Based on his “twenty-five years of experience with the CIA, including [his] extensive service in hostile overseas environments,” JA 19, Bennett concluded that “that disclosure of the responsive records reasonably could be expected to cause exceptionally grave damage to the United States.” JA 32.

NCS Director Bennett further determined that, in addition to those harms stated above, which he said would apply to all of the records, release of “certain responsive records” could also risk revealing “intelligence activities and methods.” JA 32. For example, release of post-mortem photographs taken to conduct facial recognition analysis could provide insight into the manner in which such analysis is conducted or the extent or limitation of such analysis. JA 34. Release of other images could reveal the types of equipment or other tools that were utilized (or not) during the execution of a highly sensitive intelligence operation, as well as information regarding the purpose, extent, or limitations of such tools. *Ibid.* Because the insights that could be drawn from the records could “assist those who wish to detect, evade, replicate, or counter such methods,” Bennett concluded that

release of those “certain responsive records reasonably could be expected to result in exceptionally grave damage to the national security.” JA 35.

In addition to identifying the national security harms of disclosure of the records, NCS Director Bennett explained that “no information concerning the records responsive to plaintiff’s FOIA request has been classified in order to conceal violations of law, or administrative error; prevent embarrassment to a person, organization or agency; restrain competition; or delay the release of information that does not require protection in the interests of national security.” JA 26. Finally, he specifically determined that no reasonably segregable, non-exempt portions of the responsive records could be released. JA 38.

b. The government filed a motion for summary judgment. In addition to the 22-page sworn declaration of NCS Director Bennett, the government supported its withholding of the images and invocation of Exemptions 1 and 3 with declarations from: Admiral William H. McRaven, Commander, United States Special Operations Command; Lieutenant General Robert B. Neller, Director of Operations, J-3, on the Joint Staff at the Pentagon; and William T. Kammer, Chief, Office of Freedom of Information Division, Executive Services Directorate, Washington Headquarters Service, a Component of DoD. The government also

submitted Admiral McRaven's declaration in a classified form, pursuant to 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(4)(B) (providing for ex parte, in camera review).

Admiral McRaven's declaration explained that release of the responsive records could reasonably be expected to: "[m]ake the special operations unit that participated in this operation and its members more readily identifiable"; "[r]eveal classified Sensitive Site Exploitation Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures"; and "[r]eveal methods that special operations forces use for identification of captured and killed personnel so that the enemy could develop counter-measures to defeat future military operations." JA 55-56. The unredacted, classified version of the declaration provides additional details. *See* Classified Supp. Appendix 1-7.

Lieutenant General Neller's declaration observed that "[i]nsurgent elements in Afghanistan continue to attack the process of democratic transition by mounting violent and deadly assaults against the U.S. and Coalition forces that remain posted in the region." JA 67. Based on his review of past incidents and his extensive experience in the field, he believed that "release of the responsive records will pose a clear and grave risk of inciting violence and riots" and "will expose innocent Afghan and American civilians to harm as a result of the reaction of extremist groups, which will likely involve violence and rioting." *Ibid.* Lieutenant General Neller explained, it is "likely that extremist groups will seize upon these images as

grist for their propaganda mill, which will result, in addition to violent attacks, in increased terrorist recruitment, continued financial support, and exacerbation of tensions between the Afghani people and U.S. and Coalition Forces.” JA 67. He noted that after past news reports that incorrectly reported that military personnel at Guantanamo had desecrated the Koran, there were violent protests in Afghanistan and beyond. JA 68. Lieutenant General Neller further cited the substantial worldwide violence that occurred after the re-publication of the Danish cartoon of the Prophet Muhammad. *Ibid.* Lieutenant General Neller concluded that “release of the responsive records could reasonably be expected to:

- a. Endanger the lives and physical safety of the Soldiers, Sailors, Airmen, and Marines in the United States Armed Forces presently serving in Afghanistan, as well as other U.S. officials, Coalition Forces allied with the United States, and contractors serving with these forces;
- b. Endanger the lives and physical safety of Afghan civilians at large, and police and military personnel of the Government of Afghanistan working in coordination with the United States and Coalition Forces operating in support of Operation ENDURING FREEDOM, NATO-led operations, and contractors serving with these forces.

c. Aid the recruitment efforts and other activities of insurgent elements, weaken the new democratic government of Afghanistan, and add extremist pressures on several of our regional allies; and

d. Increase the likelihood of violence against United States interests, personnel and citizens worldwide.”

JA 64-65.

c. Plaintiff opposed the government’s motion for summary judgment and filed a cross-motion for summary judgment.

In reply to plaintiff’s arguments regarding whether the responsive records met the procedural and substantive criteria for classification set forth under E.O. 13,526, the government submitted the declaration of Elizabeth Culver, Information Review Officer for the National Clandestine Service. JA 203-207. Ms. Culver explained that each of the records at issue was marked “TOP SECRET” and that the records were consistently maintained and treated in accord with that classification level. JA 206 & n.1. Pursuant to Section 2.1 of the Executive Order, when the CIA received the records, they were classified in the first instance CIA personnel acting pursuant to derivative authority under the CIA’s classification guidance manual. JA 206-207. She further explained that after that initial derivative classification, the records were reviewed by NCS Director Bennett and

that he reaffirmed that each record was properly classified. JA 207. She specifically attested to the fact that NCS Director Bennett's classification review of these records was undertaken at the direction of the CIA Director. *Ibid.*

4. The District Court Ruling.

On April 26, 2012, the district court granted the government's motion for summary judgment and denied plaintiff's cross motion.

As an initial matter, the court upheld the adequacy of the government's search for responsive documents. JA 216-220. Plaintiff does not challenge that ruling on appeal.

The district court then examined whether the 52 responsive documents were properly withheld from disclosure and held that they were. The court recognized that an agency may invoke Exemption 1 in withholding records only if it complies with classification procedures established by the relevant executive order and withholds only such material as conforms to the order's substantive criteria for classification. JA 220. The court held that the declarations from NCS Director Bennett and Ms. Culver were adequate to establish that the procedural requirements of E.O. 13,526 were satisfied. The court explained that, even if plaintiffs were correct that there were procedural flaws in the initial classification, the subsequent classification decision by the two declarants, both of whom possess

original classification authority, cured any potential problem. JA 221-227.

The court further held that the declarations submitted by the government demonstrated that the substantive requirements of E.O. 13,526 were met. The court observed that plaintiff may be correct that the declarations do not establish that all of the records would reveal “intelligence methods” or “military plans * * * or operations.” JA 229. The court held, though, it was “patently clear * * * that all fifty-two records * * * pertain to the ‘foreign activities of the United States.’” *Ibid.* (quoting E.O. 13,526 § 1.4). “Given that the records in question ‘were the product of a highly sensitive, overseas operation that was conducted under the direction of the CIA’ * * *, no further information is required to conclude that each of them ‘pertains’ —notably, not a very demanding verb — to the United States’ foreign activities.” JA 229-230.

“Having concluded * * * that all of the records pertain to at least one of the classification categories,” the court proceeded to examine “whether the CIA’s declarations demonstrate that the release of the images and/or videos ‘reasonably could be expected to cause exceptionally grave damage to the national security.’ EO 13526 § 1.2(1); *see also id.* §§ 1.1(4), 1.4.” JA 230. The court held that the declarations were more than adequate in that regard. The court noted that the declarations of Bennett, Neller, and McRaven all attest that releasing these

materials reasonably could be expected to result in exceptionally grave damage to the national security. “These assessments, moreover, are not announced in a conclusory fashion. Rather, each declarant expounds his evaluation of the national-security risk in detail, describing the basis for his beliefs and focusing on those risks that relate to his area of expertise.” JA 231.

While the court agreed with plaintiff that “some of the declarants’ testimony, by their own admission, applies only to certain of the fifty-two records at issue,” JA 231, “Bennett and Neller’s explanations of the national-security risks apply to any photograph or video recording of Bin Laden’s body,” JA 234 (emphasis in original). The court concluded that Bennett and Neller’s specific and detailed averments, which are based on long and distinguished careers in the intelligence community, suffice to carry the government’s burden. JA 233.

The court noted plaintiff’s “concern that deferring to an agency’s assessment of generalized risks related to potential propagandizing and the inflammation of anti-American sentiment opens the door to potentially unlimited withholdings.” JA 234. The court explained, however, that “such justifications will only pass muster where, as here, they are sufficiently detailed and both plausible and logical.” *Ibid.* The court explained in this case, the “United States captured and killed the founding father of a terrorist organization that has successfully—and

with tragic results—breached our nation’s security in the past. Bennett and Neller’s testimony that the release of images of his body could reasonably be expected to pose a risk of grave harm to our future national security is more than mere speculation. While al-Qaeda may not need a reason to attack us, that does not mean no risk inheres in giving it further cause to do so.” JA 234-35. The court observed that the “Director of the NCS, the USSOCOM Commander, and a Director of Operations on the Joint Staff of the Pentagon—not to mention the President of the United States—believe that releasing the photographs and/or videos of Bin Laden's body would threaten the national security.” JA 235-36. The court found the declarations supporting that finding to be “comprehensive, logical, and plausible.” JA 236. The court held that it would not “overturn the agency’s determination on plaintiff’s speculation that these executive-branch officials made an over-cautious assessment of the risks involved.” *Ibid.*

The court concluded: “FOIA permits an agency to withhold properly classified information in the interest of national security; as the CIA has established that the records Judicial Watch seeks were properly classified, the Court will not order them released.” JA 236.

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT

At issue here is whether the government must publicly disclose classified images of Osama bin Laden's dead body, taken as part of the May 1, 2011 special forces operation in Abbottabad, Pakistan. Plaintiff argues that the FOIA mandates release of the images, notwithstanding the declarations of the government's national security and intelligence experts explaining in detail how the public release of these records would endanger not only the lives and safety of U.S. personnel and property abroad, but also the lives and physical safety of Coalition forces, contractors, Afghan civilians, Afghan police and Afghan military personnel, and lead to worldwide violence. The district court properly declined plaintiff's invitation to second-guess the government's experts and held that the cogent, detailed declarations more than adequately demonstrated that the records were properly classified pursuant to Executive Order 13,526. That ruling is correct, fully in accord with this Court's precedents and should be affirmed.

I. As an initial matter, the district court correctly held that all of the records fall within the subject-matter categories listed in the Executive Order. The government's sworn declarations established that the records pertain to several of the categories, including intelligence activities and methods; and foreign relations or foreign activities of the United States. The district court properly recognized

that there was no need to address whether or not all of the records “pertain” to intelligence methods or the other categories, because there can be no question that the May 1, 2011 operation that caused the death of bin Laden at the compound in Abbottabad, Pakistan, the removal of the his dead body from that foreign compound, and the burial at sea all pertain to “foreign activities” of the United States. Plaintiff’s argument that the “foreign activities” category should be limited to where disclosure would harm foreign relations is inconsistent with the plain language of the Executive Order. Under the Executive Order, the question of “harm” is addressed not at the category inquiry, but at the next stage, where a determination is made as to whether disclosure of the information within the category could reasonably be expected to harm national security.

As to that harm inquiry, the district court correctly held that the government’s detailed declarations more than met the applicable standard, mandating “plausible” and “logical” explanation of how disclosures of these records could reasonably be expected to harm national security. The declarations do not, as plaintiff suggests, merely assert that the post-mortem images of bin Laden would be used for anti-American propaganda. Notably, in his declaration, John Bennett, Director of the National Clandestine Service of the CIA, explained how release of the images of bin Laden’s dead body would provide al-Qaeda and

other entities hostile to the United States with material they could use to recruit, raise funds, inflame tensions, and rally support. Based on his extensive experience fighting al-Qaeda and his understanding of its history, NCS Director Bennett detailed how al-Qaeda would use these images to inflame jihadist support and inspire attacks on the United States and its citizens.

NCS Director Bennett's conclusions were further affirmed by Lieutenant General Robert Neller, Director of Operations J-3 (which is responsible for all DoD operational matters outside of the United States), on the Joint Staff at the Pentagon. Citing past instances of violence, Lieutenant General Neller detailed how the release of these records would lead to worldwide violence against United States interests, personnel and citizens worldwide, and also endanger the lives and physical safety of Coalition forces, contractors, Afghan civilians, Afghan police and Afghan military personnel.

Plaintiff argues that these experts must be mistaken about the risk of harm because the release of post-mortem photographs of other notable figures, such as Saddam Hussein's sons and Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, an Iraqi insurgent leader, did not harm national security. Plaintiff, however, has no basis for its assumption that the release of those photographs did not produce a real threat of harm to national security. In any event, the release of other post-mortem photographs cannot be

compared to the impact of the release of post-mortem images of bin Laden, founder of al-Qaeda.

Plaintiff's contention that the district court was overly deferential to the government's declarations is without merit. Given the expertise and experience of the affiants, and given the nature and subject of the images at issue, the district court properly understood its role was to judge whether the declarations were plausible and sufficiently detailed. Plaintiff is simply wrong in suggesting that the court should have second guessed "the CIA's facially reasonable concerns" of how release of the images will harm national security. *Frugone v. CIA*, 169 F.3d 772, 775 (D.C. Cir. 1999).

II. Plaintiff argues that all of the records here must be disclosed because the government failed to comply with the procedural criteria of the Executive Order. This district court properly rejected that argument.

Plaintiff has provided no basis for doubting the sworn declarations of Elizabeth Culver, Information Review Officer for the National Clandestine Service and NCS Director Bennett explaining that the procedural aspects of the executive order were met in this case. Ms. Culver ratified the fact that each of the 52 records were properly marked and that they were consistently maintained at a TOP SECRET classification level.

Plaintiff argues, nonetheless, that the declarations are flawed because they do not provide the date the initial classification markings were actually put on the records. As the district court held, however, Executive Order 13,526 does not require markings of the date of initial classification. Plaintiff argues that it needs the date to know whether § 1.7(d) of the E.O. -- pertaining to information classified after an agency has received a FOIA request for it -- applies. That subsection does not apply, as the district court explained, but even if § 1.7(d) was applicable here, the government's declarations show that its procedural requirements (mandating review on a document-by-document basis with the personal participation or under the direction of the agency head, the deputy agency head) were met.

Thus, the district court was plainly correct in holding that the procedural and substantive requirements of the Executive Order were satisfied here and that these classified records are properly withheld under Exemption 1.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

In cases arising under the FOIA, this Court reviews “*de novo* the district court’s grant of summary judgment, applying the same standards that governed the district court’s decision.” *Kimberlin v. Department of Justice*, 139 F.3d 944, 947 (D.C. Cir. 1988). *See also Ancient Coin Collectors Guild v. U.S. Department of State*, 641 F.3d 504, 509 (D.C. Cir. 2011). In an Exemption 1 case, that “*de novo*

review in the context of national security concerns * * * must accord substantial weight to an agency's affidavit concerning the details of the classified status of the disputed record." *Wolf v. CIA*, 473 F.3d 370, 374 (D.C. Cir. 2007) (internal quotation marks omitted) (emphasis in original).

ARGUMENT

I. THE DISTRICT COURT PROPERLY HELD THAT THE MATERIALS ARE EXEMPT FROM DISCLOSURE.

A. Exemption 1.

The Freedom of Information Act, 5 U.S.C. § 552 ("FOIA"), embodies "a general philosophy of full agency disclosure," *Dep't of the Air Force v. Rose*, 425 U.S. 352, 360-61 (1976) (*quoting* S. Rep. 89-813, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. 3 (1965)). FOIA's overall goal is to "open agency action to the light of public scrutiny." *Id.* at 361 (internal quotation marks omitted). Accordingly, the general rule under FOIA is that a federal agency's records are subject to full disclosure. *See* 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(3). The Act, however, also recognizes "that public disclosure is not always in the public interest." *Baldrige v. Shapiro*, 455 U.S. 345, 352 (1982). Consequently, FOIA "provides that agency records may be withheld from disclosure under any one of the nine exemptions defined in 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)." *Ibid.* The statutory exemptions represent a balance struck by Congress "between the right of the public to know and the need of the Government to keep information

in confidence.” *John Doe Agency v. John Doe Corp.*, 493 U.S. 146, 152 (1989) (quoting H.R. Rep. 89-1497, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. 6 (1966)). Thus, despite the general policy of disclosure, the exemptions must be construed “to have meaningful reach and application.” *Id.* at 152.

Exemption 1, 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(1), authorizes the withholding of classified national security information. The exemption provides nondisclosure of matters that are “(A) specifically authorized under criteria established by an Executive order to be kept secret in the interest of national defense or foreign policy and (B) are in fact properly classified pursuant to such Executive order.” *Ibid.* In reviewing classification determinations under FOIA Exemption 1, this Court has stressed that “substantial weight” must be accorded agency affidavits concerning classified status of the records at issue, and that summary judgment is appropriate if the agency submits a detailed affidavit showing that the information logically falls within the exemption. *See Students Against Genocide v. Department of State*, 257 F.3d 828, 833 (D.C. Cir. 2001); *Halperin v. CIA*, 629 F.2d 144, 147-48 (D.C. Cir. 1980); *Goland v. CIA*, 607 F.2d 339, 352 (D.C. Cir. 1978). In a FOIA Exemption 1 case, thus, a court’s review is properly limited to determining whether the agency affidavits “describe the justifications for nondisclosure with reasonably specific detail, demonstrate that the information withheld logically falls

within the claimed exemption, and are not controverted by either contrary evidence in the record nor by evidence of agency bad faith.” *Miller v. Casey*, 730 F.2d 773, 776 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (internal quotation marks omitted), quoted in *Larson v. Department of State*, 565 F.3d 857, 862 (D.C. Cir. 2009). In short, “an agency’s justification for invoking a FOIA exemption is sufficient if it appears ‘logical’ or ‘plausible.’” *Wolf v. CIA*, 473 F.3d 370, 374-75 (D.C. Cir. 2007) (quoting *Gardels v. CIA*, 689 F.2d 1100, 1105 (D.C. Cir. 1982), and *Hayden v. NSA*, 608 F.2d 1381, 1388 (D.C. Cir. 1979)), quoted in *Larson*, 565 F.3d at 862, in turn quoted in *ACLU v. Department of Defense*, 628 F.3d 612, 619 (D.C. Cir. 2011). See also *Morley v. CIA*, 508 F.3d 1108, 1123-24 (D.C. Cir. 2007 (“little proof or explanation is required beyond a plausible assertion that information is properly classified”); *Center for National Security Studies v. Department of Justice*, 331 F.3d 918, 927 (D.C. Cir. 2003) (this Court has “consistently deferred to executive affidavits predicting harm to the national security”). As explained below, the district court correctly ruled that the declarations in this case easily satisfy that standard.

B. The District Court Correctly Found That The Government's Declarations Provided Ample Justification For Classification And Withholding Of The Responsive Records.

Exemption 1 requires that the records at issue be “specifically authorized under criteria established by an Executive order to be kept secret in the interest of national defense or foreign policy.” As noted above, a court reviewing whether records are properly withheld under Exemption 1 first determines whether the information falls within the categories listed in the relevant executive order and then proceeds to examine whether the agency's explanations as to why the records meet the criteria of the executive order appear logical and plausible. *Wolf*, 473 F.3d at 374-75. Here, the district court properly undertook that analysis and held that the government's declarations more than adequately demonstrated that the records were all properly classified TOP SECRET pursuant to Executive Order 13,526.

1. The District Court Correctly Held That All Of The Records Pertain To Foreign Activities Of The United States.

To be classified under Executive Order 13,526, information must “pertain[]” to one or more of the following categories:

- (a) military plans, weapons systems, or operations * * *;
- (c) intelligence activities (including covert action), intelligence sources or methods, or cryptology;

(d) foreign relations or foreign activities of the United States, including confidential sources; [or]

(e) scientific, technological, or economic matters relating to the national security * * *.

E.O. 13,526, § 1.4(d).

Here, the sworn declarations submitted by the government established that the responsive records pertain to the several of these categories: military plans, weapons systems, or operations; intelligence activities and intelligence sources or methods; and foreign relations or foreign activities of the United States. JA 32-35, 55, 57-59. In the district court, and again on appeal (Judicial Watch Br. 11-17), plaintiff argues that while some of the materials meet the Executive Order categories, not all of the records necessarily concern intelligence methods or military plans. The district court properly rejected this argument. The court held that, whether or not all of the records pertain to intelligence methods or military plans, it was “patently clear * * * that all fifty-two records * * * pertain to the ‘foreign activities of the United States,’ EO 13526 § 1.4(d).” JA 229.

As the district court held, JA 229, it is sufficient that the records “pertain” to “foreign activities of the United States.” E.O. 13,526 § 1.4(d). There can be no question that the May 1, 2011 operation at the compound in Abbottabad, the

removal of bin Laden's dead body from the compound and the burial of the body at sea were "foreign activit[ies] by the United States." JA 27. As NCS Director Bennett attested, "all of the responsive records are the product of a highly sensitive, overseas operation" and "all of the records pertain to * * * foreign activities of the United States." JA 27. Plaintiff has no coherent argument as to why this highly sensitive operation in Abbottabad, Pakistan and the burial of the body at sea do not "pertain" to the foreign activities of the United States. And no such argument can be made. Similarly, given that the entire May 1, 2001 operation was conducted under the "direction of the CIA," JA 27, it is equally clear that all of the records at issue also "pertain" to "intelligence activities."

Because all 52 documents plainly "pertain" to both "foreign activities" and "intelligence activities," there was no need for the district court to address the other applicable categories. And the court properly proceeded to address whether the declarations adequately explained the national security harm that could reasonably be expected if the information were to be disclosed.

On appeal, plaintiff argues (Judicial Watch Br. 17-18) that the district court erred in relying upon the "foreign activities" category. Plaintiff erroneously urges this Court to construe the Executive Order's reference to information pertaining to "foreign relations or foreign activities of the United States," to encompass only

records that could reveal and impair the United States' foreign relations with another country.³ That, of course, would make the "foreign activities" category superfluous and in essence read that category out of the Executive Order. It also ignores the word "pertain," which as the district court noted is "not a very demanding verb." JA 230. Contrary to plaintiff's view, the Executive Order categories mean exactly what they say. They cover, *inter alia*, all intelligence activities and all foreign activities of the United States and include, without qualification, all information that "pertains" to those categories. While plaintiff asks this Court to import a "harm" to foreign relations test to limit the category, the plain language of the Executive Order contains no such limitation. Under the Executive Order the question of harm comes not at the "category" inquiry," but at the next step, where a determination is made as to whether the information within that category can be reasonable expected to harm national security. E.O. 13,526 § 1.4.

Under Exemption 1, the plain language of the Executive Order is controlling, and cannot be ignored or rewritten as plaintiff suggests. As the

³ As we explain below, this is not the standard. We note, however, that the government's declarations addressing the likelihood of violence in foreign countries (which we discuss in detail below, pp. 33-36) certainly demonstrate that the release of the materials would implicate "foreign relations."

Supreme Court has explained, the “language of Exemption 1 was chosen with care. * * * Rather than some vague standard, the test was to be simply whether the President has determined by Executive Order that particular documents are to be kept secret.” *EPA v. Mink*, 410 US 73, 81-82 (1973). While the E.O. categories may not be as narrow as plaintiff would want, Congress, in enacting Exemption 1, elected to defer to the President to craft, by executive order, the procedures, substantive terms and categories of information that may be properly classified. Narrowing of the categories designated by the President in the Executive Order would, therefore, contravene the intent of Congress. *Cf. CIA v. Sims*, 471 US 159, 168-69 (1985).

2. The District Court Properly Found That The Declarations Adequately Demonstrated That Release of the Images Could Reasonably Be Expected To Cause Damage To The National Security.

Having properly concluded “that all of the records pertain to at least one of the classification categories,” JA 230, the district court held that the government met its burden of showing that disclosure of these records “could reasonably be expected to cause identifiable or describable damage to the national security.” E.O. 13,526 § 1.4. The court observed that the declarations all attest that releasing these materials reasonably could be expected to result in exceptionally grave damage to the national security. “These assessments, moreover, are not announced

in a conclusory fashion. Rather, each declarant expounds his evaluation of the national-security risk in detail, describing the basis for his beliefs and focusing on those risks that relate to his area of expertise.” JA 231.

That ruling is correct, well grounded and should be affirmed. The government submitted declarations from persons with “original classification authority,” each of whom determined that the “unauthorized disclosure of the information reasonably could be expected to result in damage to the national security.” E.O. 13,526, § 1.1(a)(4). The primary declaration submitted by the government was that of John Bennett, Director of the National Clandestine Service of the CIA. His 25 years of experience with the CIA has included a variety of leadership positions with the Agency, including Chief of the Special Activities Division and Deputy Chief of the Africa Division. Most of his career with the CIA has been spent in overseas operational positions, including four tours as the Chief of overseas CIA Stations. JA 17. As Director of the National Clandestine Service, he is head of “the organization within the CIA responsible for conducting the CIA’s foreign intelligence and counterintelligence activities.” JA 17-18. Director Bennett oversees the National Clandestine Service’s “mission of strengthening the national security and foreign policy objectives of the United States through the

clandestine collection of human intelligence, technical collection, and Covert Action.” JA 18.

Based on his “twenty-five years of experience with the CIA,” JA 19, his familiarity with the May 1, 2011 operation in which bin Laden was killed by the United States and the responsive records related thereto, and his “experience in countering the current threat that the United States faces from al-Qa’ida and other hostile groups around the world,” JA 19-20, NCS Director Bennett concluded that “disclosure of the responsive records [in this case] reasonably could be expected to cause exceptionally grave damage to the United States.” JA 32.

He explained in detail that release of the images of bin Laden’s dead body, many of them very graphic (depicting the fatal bullet wound to bin Laden’s head), JA 22, would provide al-Qaeda and other entities hostile to the United States with material they could use to recruit, raise funds, inflame tensions, and rally support. JA 30. NCS Director Bennett declared that the expected damage to national security caused by disclosure of the images, is not “merely conjectural.” *Ibid.* He explained, based on his extensive experience fighting al-Qaeda and his understanding of its history, that al-Qaeda would use these images to inflame jihadist support and inspire attacks on the United States and its citizens. *Ibid.* NCS Director Bennett noted that al-Qaeda already has used the circumstances

surrounding Osama bin Laden's death and burial to recruit and further its goals. JA 30-31. These images, if released, could enhance al-Qaeda's "efforts to use these events to further attack and otherwise inflict exceptionally grave damage to the security interests of the United States." JA 31. Bennett further explained that "the release of graphic and posthumous images of [bin Laden], including images of his burial, could be interpreted as a deliberate attempt by the United States to humiliate the late al-Qa'ida leader." JA 32. He noted that "media scenes involving photos of [bin Laden] juxtaposed against scenes of celebration in the United States could cause feelings of denigration and could trigger violence, attacks, or acts of revenge against the United States homeland or its citizens, officials, or other government personnel living or traveling overseas." *Ibid.*

The declaration of Lieutenant General Robert Neller, Director of Operations J-3 (which is responsible for all DoD operational matters outside of the United States), on the Joint Staff at the Pentagon, JA 63, reaffirmed NCS Director Bennett's conclusions, and further explained that release of the records would reasonably be expected to endanger not only the lives and safety of U.S. personnel and property abroad, but also the lives and physical safety of Coalition forces, contractors, Afghan civilians, Afghan police and Afghan military personnel, and lead to worldwide violence. JA 64-66, 69. He cited the fact that, after past news

reports that incorrectly reported that military personnel at Guantanamo had desecrated the Koran, there were violent protests in Afghanistan and beyond. JA 68 (“[T]wo United Nations guest-houses were attacked, as were shops and government buildings. Two offices of international aid groups were destroyed. Uprisings were not limited to Afghanistan * * *. [A]bout 12,000 people gathered in Egypt * * *. A similar number gathered in Beirut, Lebanon, where the crowd carried black banners and burned American and Israeli flags. In Bangladesh’s capital of Dhaka, about 5,000 people rallied after Friday prayers, spitting on U.S. flags and burning them. While doing so, they shouted ‘Death to America’ and ‘Destroy America!’”). Lieutenant General Neller further cited the substantial worldwide violence that occurred after the republication of the Danish cartoon of the Prophet Muhammad. JA 68-69 (11 dead due to violent protests in Afghanistan (including two at the Bagram airbase), 150 killed in Nigeria, five killed in Pakistan, one killed in both Somalia and Turkey). He concluded, “I believe that the release of the responsive records would reasonably be expected to endanger the lives and physical safety of the approximately 98,000 U.S. troops in Afghanistan, endanger the lives and physical safety of Afghan civilians at large, and police and military personnel of the Government of Afghanistan, aid the recruitment efforts

and other activities of insurgent elements, and increase the likelihood of violence against United States interests, personnel and citizens worldwide.” JA 69.

As the district court held, these declarations more than meet the standard mandating “plausible” and “logical” explanation of how these disclosures could reasonably be expected to harm national security. *ACLU*, 628 F.3d at 619. The court explained that it was not basing its decision on a generalized hypothetical threat that the images will cause harm to national security. The court made clear that claims that images will be used to motivate violence or aid the cause of a hostile entity “will only pass muster where, as here, they are sufficiently detailed and both plausible and logical.” JA 234. Here, where the “United States captured and killed the founding father of a terrorist organization that has successfully—and with tragic results—breached our nation’s security in the past,” the sworn declarations convincingly explain the risk that release of “the photographs and/or videos of Bin Laden’s body would threaten the national security.” JA 235-36. The court found the declarations to be “comprehensive, logical, and plausible,” JA 236, and said that it would not “overturn the agency’s determination on Plaintiff’s speculation that these executive-branch officials made an over-cautious assessment of the risks involved.” *Ibid.*

Plaintiff's contention that the district court was overly deferential to the government's declarations is without merit. This Court has recognized that, in light of the Executive Branch's "unique insights into what adverse affects [sic] might occur as a result of public disclosure of a particular classified record," *Salisbury v. United States*, 690 F.2d 966, 970 (D.C. Cir. 1982) (quoting S. Rep. 1200, 93rd Cong., 2d Sess. 12 (1974)), and the courts' comparative lack of "expertise in either international diplomacy or counterintelligence operations," *Frugone v. CIA*, 169 F.3d at 775, courts are "in no position to dismiss the CIA's facially reasonable concerns" that release of a document will harm national security. *Ibid.* Consequently, where as here, the affidavits from the agency experts contain "reasonable specificity of detail" explaining how withheld material fits within Exemption 1, "the court is not to conduct a detailed inquiry to decide whether it agrees with the agency's opinions." *Halperin*, 629 F.2d at 148; *see also Larson*, 565 F.3d at 865 (reaffirming "deferential posture in FOIA cases regarding the 'uniquely executive purview' of national security"). As this Court explained in *American Civil Liberties Union v. U.S. Dept. of Defense*, 628 F.3d 612, 624 (D.C. Cir. 2011), "we have consistently deferred to executive affidavits predicting harm to national security, and have found it unwise to undertake searching judicial review." *Ibid* (quoting *Center for National Security*, 331 F.3d at 927). Here, given

the expertise and experience of the affiants, and given the nature and subject of the images at issue, the district court properly understood its role was to judge whether the declarations were plausible and sufficiently detailed. And the district court correctly held that the declarations more than meet those standards.

Plaintiff also suggests that the likelihood of damage to national security must be a near certainty. *See* Judicial Watch Br. 26 (“potential harm cannot be speculative”). Under the Executive Order, however, the prospect of damage to national security (which includes damage to foreign relations) need not be certain or inevitable. Rather, the terms of the Executive Order require only a showing that unauthorized disclosure “reasonably could be expected” to result in such harm. E.O. 13,524, § 1.1(a)(4). This Court has recognized that “any affidavit or other agency statement of threatened harm to national security will always be speculative to some extent, in the sense that it describes a potential future harm.” *Halpern v. CIA*, 629 F.2d at 149. *See also Wolf*, 473 F.3d at 374. Thus, the district court properly concluded, “[t]his Court will not overturn the agency’s determination on Plaintiff’s speculation that these executive-branch officials made an overcautious assessment of the risks involved.” JA 236.

3. Plaintiff's Challenges To The Expert Intelligence And National Security Declarations Are Without Merit.

a. In its brief on appeal, plaintiff erroneously reads the declarations as asserting that the only harm that is reasonably expected to follow from release of the post-mortem images of bin Laden is their use for anti-American propaganda. Instead, the declarations clearly state that the concern is not with propaganda in and of itself, but that it could be expected to lead to violent attacks against U.S. personnel and property, as well as violence directed against our allies. Release of these images would also aid al-Qaeda and other hostile entities with their recruitment and in obtaining support. JA 29-32 (“the release of these graphic photographs and other images of [bin Laden’s] corpse reasonably could be expected to inflame tensions among overseas populations that include al-Qa’ida members or sympathizers, encourage propaganda by various terrorist groups or other entities hostile to the United States, or lead to retaliatory attacks against the United States homeland or United States citizens, officials, or other government personnel traveling or living abroad”); JA 66-69 (“release of the responsive records will pose a clear and grave risk of inciting violence and riots against U.S. and Coalition forces. I also believe that release of the responsive records will expose innocent Afghan and American citizens to harm as the result of the reaction of extremist groups, which will likely involve violence and rioting. It is likely that

extremist groups will seize upon these images as grist for their propaganda mill, which will result, in addition to violent attacks, [in] increased terrorist recruitment, continued financial support, and exacerbation of tensions between the Afghani people and U.S and Coalition Forces.”).

Plaintiff is also wrong that defendants’ withholding based on the potential for a retaliatory attack is “unprecedented.” Judicial Watch Br. 26-27. Courts have, in fact, frequently accepted this reason as a basis to withhold information under Exemption 1. *See, e.g., Miller*, 730 F.2d at 777 (confirmation of an attempted hostile action against foreign country by United States “might provide the critical bit of information that would support retaliation against former intelligence sources”); *Afshar v. Dep’t of State*, 702 F.2d 1125, 1131, 1133 n.12, 1134 (D.C. Cir. 1983) (official acknowledgment of intelligence relationship could cause retaliation by foreign governments); *Int’l Counsel Bureau v. CIA*, 774 F. Supp.2d 262, 270 (D.D.C. 2011) (CIA claimed that if its interest in a foreign national was publicly acknowledged, countries where that foreign national lived could use the information as a reason for retaliation against former associates, including American citizens or other American interests); *Riquelme v. CIA*, 453 F. Supp.2d 103, 110 (D.D.C. 2006) (acknowledgment of clandestine activities could elicit retaliatory action against American citizens). Courts have also permitted

withholding under Exemption 1 where, as here (JA 32) release of information could publicly humiliate our adversaries, adversely affecting national security. *See, e.g., Phillippi v. CIA*, 655 F.2d 1325, 1332-33 (D.C. Cir. 1981).

b. Plaintiff's reliance on dicta from *ACLU v. Department of Defense*, 389 F. Supp.2d 547 (S.D.N.Y. 2005), opining that terrorists do not need a pretext to attack us, is wholly misplaced. In that case, the government did not invoke Exemption 1. Rather, it claimed that photographs depicting abusive treatment of detainees by U.S. soldiers in Iraq and Afghanistan were exempt from disclosure under FOIA Exemption 7(F), pertaining to law enforcement records that could reasonably be expected to endanger any individual. The court there read Exemption 7(F) as operating very differently from Exemption 1. Notably, it read Exemption 7(F) to permit balancing by the court of the public interest in disclosure against the risks of harm. *ACLU*, 389 F. Supp.2d at 578.⁴ Exemption 7(F) has also been read by some courts, including the court of appeals in a subsequent appeal in *ACLU*, as requiring the risk of harm to specific identifiable individuals, as opposed to risks of violence in general or threats to national security. *ACLU v. Department of Defense*, 543

⁴ That does not represent the majority view of that exemption. *See Raulerson v. Ashcroft*, 271 F. Supp.2d 17, 29 (D.D.C. 2002) (“[u]nlike Exemption 7(C), which involves a balancing of societal and individual privacy interests, 7(F) is an absolute ban against certain information”).

F.3d 59, 71 (2d Cir. 2008), *vacated*, 130 S. Ct. 777 (2009). Had Exemption 1 been invoked in the *ACLU* case, the question would have been whether the government declarations made out a plausible case of expected “[d]amage to the national security” -- meaning harm to “the national defense or foreign relations of the United States,” E.O. 13,526 § 6.1(l) – as opposed to whether the government could identify a specific individual who was put at risk of harm or whether in the court’s view the value of public disclosure outweighed the risk of harm.⁵ Thus, *ACLU* is wholly inapposite and has no bearing here.

c. Plaintiff also takes issue with the opinions of the government’s national security experts, claiming that post-mortem photographs of notable figures such as Saddam Hussein’s sons and Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, an Iraqi insurgent leader, were released in the past without any harm to the national security. *See* Judicial Watch

⁵ The district court in *ACLU* acknowledged the risk that release of the photographs could incite violence, but went on to balance it against the benefits of disclosure (to show the abuses by the government) and ordered the photographs released. 389 F. Supp.2d at 578-79. In a subsequent appeal in that same case, the Second Circuit also assumed that “the photographs could reasonably be expected to incite violence against United States troops, other Coalition forces, and civilians in Iraq and Afghanistan,” *ACLU*, 543 F.3d at 67 n.3, but disposed of the case, at the time, by interpreting Exemption 7(F) to require the government to “identify at least one individual with reasonable specificity and establish that disclosure of the documents could reasonably be expected to endanger that individual.” *Id.* at 71 (Exemption 7(F) does not apply to “some unspecified member of a group so vast as to encompass all United States troops, coalition forces, and civilians in Iraq and Afghanistan”).

Br. 25-26. As an initial matter, plaintiff has no basis for its assumption that the release of those photographs did not produce a real threat of harm to national security. See Juan Cole, *The Zarqawi Effect*, *Salon*, June 27, 2006 (“Al-Qaida leader Ayman al-Zawahiri * * * vowed revenge on the U.S. Some reports suggest that the two U.S. soldiers captured at Yusufiyah were tortured and killed by Zarqawi’s shadowy successor. The three weeks after his death have witnessed daily bombings with dozens of casualties throughout Iraq. And Zarqawi’s demise has stirred up trouble throughout the region”), available at http://www.salon.com/2006/06/27/zarqawi_11/; Associated Press, *Zarqawi’s Successor Vows Revenge*, posted by *The Indian Express*, June 14, 2006 (“The new leader of al-Qaida in Iraq vowed to avenge Abu Musab al-Zarqawi’s death and threatened horrific attacks ‘in the coming days,’”), available at <http://www.indianexpress.com/news/zarqawi-s-successor-vows-revenge/6419/>.

In any event, whether or not past disclosures of other post-mortem photographs caused harm to national security does not speak to whether these records are properly classified. See *Military Audit Project v. Casey*, 656 F.2d 724, 740 (D.C. Cir. 1981) (CIA not required to show specific harm materialized as a result of earlier revelations to protect information still secret). The release of other post-mortem photographs cannot be compared to the impact of the release of post-

mortem images of bin Laden, founder of al-Qaeda and a *sui generis* enemy of the United States.⁶

4. There Is No Need To Address Whether The Other Harms That Would Be Caused By Disclosure Apply To All Of The Records.

The district court recognized that the declarations submitted by the government supplied additional grounds for the classification of the records. JA For example, Admiral McRaven's declaration explains that release of the responsive records could reasonably be expected to: "[m]ake the special operations unit that participated in this operation and its members more readily identifiable;" "[r]eveal classified Sensitive Site Exploitation Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures;" and "[r]eveal the methods that special operations forces use for identification of captured and killed personnel so that the enemy could develop counter-measures to defeat future military operations." JA 55-56. Likewise, NCS

⁶ Furthermore, the fact that the government released post-mortem photographs of others, but not of bin Laden, strengthens rather than weakens the government's assessment of harm expected from the release of the images of bin Laden. It shows that the government military and intelligence experts conducted a careful analysis tailored to the specific images at issue here, and determined that even though it had released different post-mortem images in the past, these particular images cannot be released without risking grave harm to national security. *See Military Audit Project*, 656 F.2d at 754 (fact that agency released related documents suggests a stronger, rather than a weaker, basis for the classification of documents still withheld).

Director Bennett explained that release of “certain responsive records” could reveal “intelligence activities and methods.” JA 32. For example, release of post-mortem photographs taken to conduct facial recognition analysis could provide insight into the manner in which such analysis is conducted or the extent or limitation of such analysis. JA 34. Release of other images could reveal the types of equipment or other tools that were utilized (or not) during the execution of a highly sensitive intelligence operation, as well as information regarding the purpose, extent, or limitations of such tools. *Ibid.* Because the insights that could be drawn from the records could “assist those who wish to detect, evade, replicate, or counter such methods,” Bennett concluded that release of those “certain responsive records reasonably could be expected to result in exceptionally grave damage to the national security.” JA 35.

On appeal, plaintiff concedes that such records are properly withheld,⁷ but argues that the government’s declarations do not demonstrate that the harms from

⁷ See Judicial Watch Br. 2 (“Plaintiff does not seek any sensitive information such as images of the equipment or tools used during the May 1, 2011 raid. Nor does Plaintiff seek information about the identities of the members of the U.S. Navy SEAL team that carried out the raid, site exploitation tactics, techniques, or procedures used by the team, or methods used by the team or by other U.S. military personnel to identify bin Laden’s body or used generally by Defendants to identify persons who have been captured or killed. Nor does Plaintiff seek any information about the CIA’s facial recognition capabilities and techniques.”).

disclosure to intelligence activities and methods, and the dangers to the special forces members, apply to all of the records at issue. Plaintiff asserts that this ambiguity requires reversal of the district court's ruling. The district court did not, however, rely upon these types of harm to national security. Having concluded that the other harms identified by NCS Director Bennett and Lieutenant General Neller (discussed above, pp. 31-40) were more than adequate to cover all 52 responsive records, the court held that there was no need for it to determine whether the harms to intelligence activities and methods, and dangers to the special forces members, would by themselves justify withholding of all of the documents or a subset thereof under Exemption 1. JA 231-35. Similarly, the court held there was no need to address whether the records were properly withheld under Exemption 3.⁸ JA 221.

⁸ Exemption 3 permits the withholding of information "specifically exempted from disclosure" by another federal statute provided that the statute "(A) (i) requires that the matters be withheld from the public in such a manner as to leave no discretion on the issue; or (ii) establishes particular criteria for withholding or refers to particular types of matters to be withheld; and (B) if enacted after the date of enactment of the OPEN FOIA Act of 2009, specifically cites to this paragraph." 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(3). Here, the government cited to the National Security Act, 50 U.S.C. § 403-1(i), which protects intelligence sources and methods from unauthorized disclosure, and Central Intelligence Agency Act of 1949, 50 U.S.C. § 403g, which authorizes the CIA to withhold information pertaining to intelligence methods and activities that is related to the CIA's core functions.

The district court was correct in finding the other harms identified by NCS Director Bennett and Lieutenant General Neller supporting classification of all 52 records to be “comprehensive, logical, and plausible.” JA 236. As we have explained, that holding is well grounded and should be affirmed. If this Court were to disagree, however, the proper course would be to remand the case to the district court for it to address, in the first instance, whether all of the records are properly withheld under Exemption 3, and whether, under Exemption 1, all or a subset of the records are disclosed, it could be reasonably expected to cause harms to intelligence activities and methods and to endanger the members of the special forces who participated in the May 1, 2011 operation.

II. THE DISTRICT COURT PROPERLY REJECTED PLAINTIFF’S ARGUMENT THAT ALL OF THE RECORDS MUST BE DISCLOSED DUE TO FAILURE TO COMPLY WITH THE RELEVANT CLASSIFICATION PROCEDURES.

Plaintiff argues that all of the records here – no matter what the harm to national security or risk to the lives of service members – must be disclosed because the government failed to comply with the procedural criteria of the Executive Order. The district court properly rejected this argument.

“To be classified properly, a document must be classified in accordance with the procedural criteria of the governing Executive Order as well as its substantive terms.” *Lesar v. DOJ*, 636 F.2d 472, 483 (D.C. Cir. 1980). This Court has held,

however, that insignificant procedural violations of the Executive Order do not undermine the withholding of documents under Exemption 1. *Id.* at 484-85. Here, the procedures were all properly followed. To the extent there is any arguable flaw, however, it would be insignificant and would not draw the classification of the records at issue here into question.

The Executive Order requires a classification determination by an “original classification authority.” *See* E.O. 13,526 § 1.1(4). It also requires that the records be marked with the classification level and that those markings include, among other things, the identity of the original classification authority, the agency of origin, and declassification instructions. *See id.*, §§ 1.6, 2.1(b).

The declaration of Elizabeth Culver, Information Review Officer for the National Clandestine Service, explained that all of the Executive Order’s procedural requirements were satisfied here. JA 203. Ms. Culver holds “original classification authority at the TOP SECRET level.” JA 204. She has authority to review all classification determinations made regarding CIA information. *Ibid.*

Ms. Culver explained in her sworn declaration that each of the 52 records at issue were marked “TOP SECRET,” JA 205-206, and that they were consistently maintained and treated consistent with that classification level, JA 206 & n.1. Ms. Culver further attested that each of these records contain “all of the markings

required by the Executive Order and its implementing directives, including information that reveals the identity of the person who applied derivative classification markings, citations to the relevant classification guidance and reasons for classification, and the applicable declassification instructions.” JA 206.

Ms. Culver further explained that when the CIA received the records they were classified in the first instance by CIA personnel acting pursuant to the CIA’s classification guidance manual. JA 206-207. In accord with §2.1 of the Executive Order, a person, who is not an original classification authority, may render an initial classification decision “as directed by a classification guide,” and such a person “need not possess original classification authority.” Such an initial classification is termed a “derivative” classification because the official is acting under the derivative authority of the classification guidance manual. In the present case, the “classification guidance” manual was issued by the CIA’s Director of Information Management, who is an original classification authority. JA 206-207.

Ms. Culver further noted that after that initial derivative classification, the records here were reviewed by NCS Director Bennett, JA 207, who also holds the role of original TOP SECRET classification authority and has the responsibility of ensuring that “any determinations regarding the classification of CIA information are proper.” JA 18. Bennett reaffirmed that each record was properly classified at

the TOP SECRET level. JA 207. Ms. Culver specifically stated that NCS Director Bennett undertook this subsequent review acting under the direction of the CIA Director. JA 207. NCS Director Bennett's declaration likewise states that he expressly determined that the all of "responsive records at issue in this case are currently and properly classified in accordance with the substantive and procedural requirements of Executive Order 13,526." JA 24.

The declarations of Ms. Culver and NCS Director Bennett are more than adequate to demonstrate compliance with the Executive Order's procedural requirements. *See Schoenman v. FBI*, 575 F. Supp.2d 136, 152 (D.D.C. 2008) (in light of declarant's sworn statement that document was properly marked and the presumption of good faith accorded agency affidavits in FOIA cases, plaintiff's speculation that the document may not have been properly marked was insufficient to establish procedural noncompliance, even if the declaration could have been "more specific as to the procedural requirements of [the] Executive Order"). Notably, plaintiff has provided no legitimate basis for doubting Ms. Culver's description of the documents and their markings or to question NCS Director Bennett's classification authority or his sworn declaration that the procedural aspects of the executive order were met in this case. *See United States v. Chemical Found., Inc.*, 272 U.S. 1, 14-15 (1926) ("[C]ourts presume that [public officers]

have properly discharged their official duties.”); *see National Archives & Records Admin. v. Favish*, 541 U.S. 157, 174 (2004) (“the [FOIA] requester must produce evidence that would warrant a belief by a reasonable person that the alleged Government impropriety might have occurred”).

In speculating that the records here lacked the proper marking required by Executive Order 13,526, plaintiff relies upon *Allen v. Central Intelligence Agency*, 636 F.2d 1287, 1291-92 (D.C. Cir. 1980). In *Allen*, the Court noted the absence of notation of “the date or event for declassification or review” and “the identity of the original classification authority,” which were required by Executive Order 12,065, *id.* at 1292, and remanded the case for *in camera* review of the records, *id.* at 1300. Here, Executive Order 13,526 requires markings indicating “the identity, by name and position, or by personal identifier, of the original classification authority” and “declassification instructions.” The sworn declaration of Ms. Culver makes clear that the records at issue all contain such markings. JA 206 (“each of each of these records contains all of the markings required by the Executive Order and its implementing directives, including information that reveals the identity of the person who applied derivative classification markings, citations to the relevant classification guidance and reasons for classification, and

the applicable declassification instructions.”). Thus, the potential flaws noted in *Allen* are not present here.

Plaintiff also argues that the declarations describing the markings are flawed because they do not address the date the initial classification markings were actually put on the records. As the district court held, Executive Order 13,526 does not, however, require the date of initial classification to be indicated on the records. JA 225. Moreover, the district court correctly noted that plaintiff’s “explanation for why it needs this information * * * does not hold water.” JA 225. Plaintiff claimed it needed to know when the records were classified to determine if document-by-document review under E.O. 13,526, § 1.7(d) was required. Section 1.7 addresses information classified after an agency has received a FOIA request for it. It has no application here, where the initial classification of these records was effected prior to the FOIA request. As the district court noted, even under plaintiff’s own chronology, the decision to classify the images of bin Laden was made before the CIA received plaintiff’s FOIA request for them on May 5, 2011.⁹

⁹ The district court explained:

Judicial Watch’s speculation that the records were classified subsequent to the agency’s receipt of its
(cont. on next page)

In any event, even if § 1.7(d) was applicable, the government's declarations show that its procedural requirements were met here. JA 225. Under subsection 1.7(d), information that "has not previously been disclosed to the public under proper authority may be classified or reclassified after an agency has received a request for it under the Freedom of Information Act * * * only if such classification meets the requirements of this order and is accomplished on a document-by-document basis with the personal participation or under the direction of the agency head, the deputy agency head, or the senior agency official designated under section 5.4 of this order." E.O. 13,526 § 1.7(d). Here, as the sworn declarations detail, the records were reviewed by NCS Director Bennett on a

(cont.)

request is belied by Bennett's declaration and its own chronology. Bennett attests, and Judicial Watch does not appear to dispute, that the CIA received its FOIA request, which was dated May 4, 2011, *see* Letter from Michael Bekesha, May 4, 2011, at 1, on May 5. *See* Bennett Decl., ¶ 5. Even according to Plaintiff's own timeline, however, classification occurred before then. *See* Pl.'s Mot. & Opp. at 25. Indeed, the formal announcement that the records would not be released came on May 4. *See* Press Briefing by Jay Carney, May 4, 2011, at 1. Judicial Watch's suggestion that the operative date is May 3, the day DOD received its request, * * * rather than the day the CIA received its request, moreover, is flawed, since the request at issue was made to the CIA.

JA 226.

document-by-document basis under the direction of the CIA Director. JA 19-20, 24 (NCS Director Bennett declaring that he “personally reviewed” “each” of the responsive records and determined each was properly classified); JA 207 (NCS Director Bennett was acting under the direction of the CIA Director when he conducted his review). Thus, even if § 1.7(d) applied here, the district court correctly held its terms were fully satisfied. JA 226.

Plaintiff further speculates that the CIA “did not even attempt to comply with the ‘marking’ requirements of Executive Order 13526 until at some point after September 26, 2011, nearly five months after Plaintiff served its FOIA requests.” Judicial Watch Br. 33. Even if true, it does not change the reality that today the records are properly marked, that they meet the substantive criteria for classification (pp. 28-40, *supra*), and that at all times they were “consistently maintained in a manner appropriate for their classification level.” JA 206 n.1. The materials have been reviewed by two high-level officials, each of whom holding original classification authority powers (and the assigned function to review such determinations) has reaffirmed that the documents are properly classified as TOP SECRET. And as noted above, NCS Director Bennett’s document-by-document review was performed at the specific direction of the CIA Director. As the district court held, even if there were initial procedural flaws, the subsequent classification

decisions by the two declarants, both of whom possess original classification authority, cured any potential procedural issue. JA 221-27 (“At the end of the day, given the derivative classification and two subsequent classification reviews, all by individuals with original classification authority, the averments that EO 13526’s procedural requirements were satisfied, the seemingly undisputed procedural conformity of the derivative-classification process, and the lack of any evidence tending to undermine the agency’s classification decision, the Court finds that any possible procedural errors plainly do not warrant release.”).

Nor would the timing of the classification reviews or timing of the marking be legitimate grounds for ordering release of the records, as plaintiff demands. As this Court explained in *Lesar*: “To release these materials because of a mere mishap in the time of classification, when the documents are sworn to contain sensitive information, would only be perverse.” *Lesar*, 636 F.2d at 484. Where, as here, the declarations “submitted and reviewed by the district court provided the court with sufficient means to ascertain that the requisite harm could occur if the materials were disclosed” and support a finding of the likelihood of “grave damage

to the national security,” a court should not order release over such claimed minor procedural defects. *Id.* at 485.¹⁰

Here, however, there was no defect. The declarations of Ms. Culver and NCS Director Bennett demonstrate that the review process and markings fully met the Executive Order procedural criteria. Thus, plaintiff’s arguments for release based on speculation of procedural defects are all without merit and were properly rejected by the district court. JA 223-27.

¹⁰ Even in the case of more significant procedural defects, which are not present here, the remedy is *in camera* review, not release of information that is likely to cause grave harm to national security. *Ibid.* (“For procedural violations, some may be of such importance to reflect adversely on the agency’s overall classification decision, requiring a remand * * * for in camera inspection; while others may be insignificant, undermining not at all the agency’s classification decision”).

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the district court's judgment should be affirmed.

Respectfully submitted,

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D.C. CIRCUIT RULE 32(a) CERTIFICATION

Pursuant to Rules 28.1(e)(3) and 32(a)(7)(C) of the Federal Rules of Appellate and D.C. Circuit Rule 32(a), I hereby certify that this brief complies with the type-volume limitation in FRAP Rule 28.1(e)(2). The foregoing brief contains 11,409 words, excluding exempt material, and is under the 14,000 word limitation. The brief is presented in Times New Roman 14-point typeface, and was prepared using Microsoft Word 2010.

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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I hereby certify that on November 29, 2012, I served the foregoing brief by ECF, as well as by first-class U.S. mail, upon the Court and the following counsel of record:

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ADDENDUM

EXECUTIVE ORDER 13,526

Executive Order 13526- Classified National Security Information

This order prescribes a uniform system for classifying, safeguarding, and declassifying national security information, including information relating to defense against transnational terrorism. Our democratic principles require that the American people be informed of the activities of their Government. Also, our Nation's progress depends on the free flow of information both within the Government and to the American people. Nevertheless, throughout our history, the national defense has required that certain information be maintained in confidence in order to protect our citizens, our democratic institutions, our homeland security, and our interactions with foreign nations. Protecting information critical to our Nation's security and demonstrating our commitment to open Government through accurate and accountable application of classification standards and routine, secure, and effective declassification are equally important priorities.

NOW, THEREFORE, I, BARACK OBAMA, by the authority vested in me as President by the Constitution and the laws of the United States of America, it is hereby ordered as follows:

PART 1 -- ORIGINAL CLASSIFICATION

Section 1.1. Classification Standards. (a) Information may be originally classified under the terms of this order only if all of the following conditions are met:

- (1) an original classification authority is classifying the information;
- (2) the information is owned by, produced by or for, or is under the control of the United States Government;
- (3) the information falls within one or more of the categories of information listed in section 1.4 of this order; and
- (4) the original classification authority determines that the unauthorized disclosure of the information reasonably could be expected to result in damage to the national security, which includes defense against transnational terrorism, and the original classification authority is able to identify or describe the damage.

(b) If there is significant doubt about the need to classify information, it shall not be classified. This provision does not:

- (1) amplify or modify the substantive criteria or procedures for classification; or
- (2) create any substantive or procedural rights subject to judicial review.

(c) Classified information shall not be declassified automatically as a result of any unauthorized disclosure of identical or similar information.

(d) The unauthorized disclosure of foreign government information is presumed to cause damage to the national security.

Sec. 1.2. Classification Levels. (a) Information may be classified at one of the following three levels:

- (1) "Top Secret" shall be applied to information, the unauthorized disclosure of which reasonably could be expected to cause exceptionally grave damage to the national security that the original classification authority is able to identify or describe.

(2) "Secret" shall be applied to information, the unauthorized disclosure of which reasonably could be expected to cause serious damage to the national security that the original classification authority is able to identify or describe.

(3) "Confidential" shall be applied to information, the unauthorized disclosure of which reasonably could be expected to cause damage to the national security that the original classification authority is able to identify or describe.

(b) Except as otherwise provided by statute, no other terms shall be used to identify United States classified information.

(c) If there is significant doubt about the appropriate level of classification, it shall be classified at the lower level.

Sec. 1.3. Classification Authority. (a) The authority to classify information originally may be exercised only by:

(1) the President and the Vice President;

(2) agency heads and officials designated by the President; and

(3) United States Government officials delegated this authority pursuant to paragraph (c) of this section.

(b) Officials authorized to classify information at a specified level are also authorized to classify information at a lower level.

(c) Delegation of original classification authority.

(1) Delegations of original classification authority shall be limited to the minimum required to administer this order. Agency heads are responsible for ensuring that designated subordinate officials have a demonstrable and continuing need to exercise this authority.

(2) "Top Secret" original classification authority may be delegated only by the President, the Vice President, or an agency head or official designated pursuant to paragraph (a)(2) of this section.

(3) "Secret" or "Confidential" original classification authority may be delegated only by the President, the Vice President, an agency head or official designated pursuant to paragraph (a)(2) of this section, or the senior agency official designated under section 5.4(d) of this order, provided that official has been delegated "Top Secret" original classification authority by the agency head.

(4) Each delegation of original classification authority shall be in writing and the authority shall not be redelegated except as provided in this order. Each delegation shall identify the official by name or position.

(5) Delegations of original classification authority shall be reported or made available by name or position to the Director of the Information Security Oversight Office.

(d) All original classification authorities must receive training in proper classification (including the avoidance of over-classification) and declassification as provided in this order and its implementing directives at least once a calendar year. Such training must include instruction on the proper safeguarding of classified information and on the sanctions in section 5.5 of this order that may be brought against an individual who fails to classify information properly or protect classified information from unauthorized disclosure. Original classification authorities who do not receive such mandatory training at least once within a calendar year shall have their classification authority suspended by the agency head or the senior agency official designated under section 5.4(d) of this order until such training has taken place. A waiver may be granted by the agency head, the deputy agency head, or the senior agency official if an individual is unable to receive

such training due to unavoidable circumstances. Whenever a waiver is granted, the individual shall receive such training as soon as practicable.

(e) Exceptional cases. When an employee, government contractor, licensee, certificate holder, or grantee of an agency who does not have original classification authority originates information believed by that person to require classification, the information shall be protected in a manner consistent with this order and its implementing directives. The information shall be transmitted promptly as provided under this order or its implementing directives to the agency that has appropriate subject matter interest and classification authority with respect to this information. That agency shall decide within 30 days whether to classify this information.

Sec. 1.4. Classification Categories. Information shall not be considered for classification unless its unauthorized disclosure could reasonably be expected to cause identifiable or describable damage to the national security in accordance with section 1.2 of this order, and it pertains to one or more of the following:

- (a) military plans, weapons systems, or operations;
- (b) foreign government information;
- (c) intelligence activities (including covert action), intelligence sources or methods, or cryptology;
- (d) foreign relations or foreign activities of the United States, including confidential sources;
- (e) scientific, technological, or economic matters relating to the national security;
- (f) United States Government programs for safeguarding nuclear materials or facilities;
- (g) vulnerabilities or capabilities of systems, installations, infrastructures, projects, plans, or protection services relating to the national security; or
- (h) the development, production, or use of weapons of mass destruction.

Sec. 1.5. Duration of Classification. (a) At the time of original classification, the original classification authority shall establish a specific date or event for declassification based on the duration of the national security sensitivity of the information. Upon reaching the date or event, the information shall be automatically declassified. Except for information that should clearly and demonstrably be expected to reveal the identity of a confidential human source or a human intelligence source or key design concepts of weapons of mass destruction, the date or event shall not exceed the time frame established in paragraph (b) of this section.

(b) If the original classification authority cannot determine an earlier specific date or event for declassification, information shall be marked for declassification 10 years from the date of the original decision, unless the original classification authority otherwise determines that the sensitivity of the information requires that it be marked for declassification for up to 25 years from the date of the original decision.

(c) An original classification authority may extend the duration of classification up to 25 years from the date of origin of the document, change the level of classification, or reclassify specific information only when the standards and procedures for classifying information under this order are followed.

(d) No information may remain classified indefinitely. Information marked for an indefinite duration of classification under predecessor orders, for example, marked as "Originating Agency's Determination Required," or classified information that contains incomplete declassification instructions or lacks declassification instructions shall be declassified in accordance with part 3 of this order.

Sec. 1.6. Identification and Markings. (a) At the time of original classification, the following shall be indicated in a manner that is immediately apparent:

- (1) one of the three classification levels defined in section 1.2 of this order;
- (2) the identity, by name and position, or by personal identifier, of the original classification authority;
- (3) the agency and office of origin, if not otherwise evident;
- (4) declassification instructions, which shall indicate one of the following:
 - (A) the date or event for declassification, as prescribed in section 1.5(a);
 - (B) the date that is 10 years from the date of original classification, as prescribed in section 1.5(b);
 - (C) the date that is up to 25 years from the date of original classification, as prescribed in section 1.5(b); or
 - (D) in the case of information that should clearly and demonstrably be expected to reveal the identity of a confidential human source or a human intelligence source or key design concepts of weapons of mass destruction, the marking prescribed in implementing directives issued pursuant to this order; and
- (5) a concise reason for classification that, at a minimum, cites the applicable classification categories in section 1.4 of this order.

(b) Specific information required in paragraph (a) of this section may be excluded if it would reveal additional classified information.

(c) With respect to each classified document, the agency originating the document shall, by marking or other means, indicate which portions are classified, with the applicable classification level, and which portions are unclassified. In accordance with standards prescribed in directives issued under this order, the Director of the Information Security Oversight Office may grant and revoke temporary waivers of this requirement. The Director shall revoke any waiver upon a finding of abuse.

(d) Markings or other indicia implementing the provisions of this order, including abbreviations and requirements to safeguard classified working papers, shall conform to the standards prescribed in implementing directives issued pursuant to this order.

(e) Foreign government information shall retain its original classification markings or shall be assigned a U.S. classification that provides a degree of protection at least equivalent to that required by the entity that furnished the information. Foreign government information retaining its original classification markings need not be assigned a U.S. classification marking provided that the responsible agency determines that the foreign government markings are adequate to meet the purposes served by U.S. classification markings.

(f) Information assigned a level of classification under this or predecessor orders shall be considered as classified at that level of classification despite the omission of other required markings. Whenever such information is used in the derivative classification process or is reviewed for possible declassification, holders of such information shall coordinate with an appropriate classification authority for the application of omitted markings.

(g) The classification authority shall, whenever practicable, use a classified addendum whenever classified information constitutes a small portion of an otherwise unclassified document or prepare a product to allow for dissemination at the lowest level of classification possible or in unclassified form.

(h) Prior to public release, all declassified records shall be appropriately marked to reflect their declassification.

Sec. 1.7. Classification Prohibitions and Limitations.

(a) In no case shall information be classified, continue to be maintained as classified, or fail to be declassified in order to:

(1) conceal violations of law, inefficiency, or administrative error;

(2) prevent embarrassment to a person, organization, or agency;

(3) restrain competition; or

(4) prevent or delay the release of information that does not require protection in the interest of the national security.

(b) Basic scientific research information not clearly related to the national security shall not be classified.

(c) Information may not be reclassified after declassification and release to the public under proper authority unless:

(1) the reclassification is personally approved in writing by the agency head based on a document-by-document determination by the agency that reclassification is required to prevent significant and demonstrable damage to the national security;

(2) the information may be reasonably recovered without bringing undue attention to the information;

(3) the reclassification action is reported promptly to the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs (National Security Advisor) and the Director of the Information Security Oversight Office; and

(4) for documents in the physical and legal custody of the National Archives and Records Administration (National Archives) that have been available for public use, the agency head has, after making the determinations required by this paragraph, notified the Archivist of the United States (Archivist), who shall suspend public access pending approval of the reclassification action by the Director of the Information Security Oversight Office. Any such decision by the Director may be appealed by the agency head to the President through the National Security Advisor. Public access shall remain suspended pending a prompt decision on the appeal.

(d) Information that has not previously been disclosed to the public under proper authority may be classified or reclassified after an agency has received a request for it under the Freedom of Information Act (5 U.S.C. 552), the Presidential Records Act, 44 U.S.C. 2204(c)(1), the Privacy Act of 1974 (5 U.S.C. 552a), or the mandatory review provisions of section 3.5 of this order only if such classification meets the requirements of this order and is accomplished on a document-by-document basis with the personal participation or under the direction of the agency head, the deputy agency head, or the senior agency official designated under section 5.4 of this order. The requirements in this paragraph also apply to those situations in which information has been declassified in accordance with a specific date or event determined by an original classification authority in accordance with section 1.5 of this order.

(e) Compilations of items of information that are individually unclassified may be classified if the compiled information reveals an additional association or relationship that: (1) meets the standards for classification under this order; and (2) is not otherwise revealed in the individual items of information.

Sec. 1.8. Classification Challenges. (a) Authorized holders of information who, in good faith, believe that its classification status is improper are encouraged and expected to challenge the classification status of the information in accordance with agency procedures established under paragraph (b) of this section.

(b) In accordance with implementing directives issued pursuant to this order, an agency head or senior agency official shall establish procedures under which authorized holders of information, including authorized holders outside the classifying agency, are encouraged and expected to challenge the

classification of information that they believe is improperly classified or unclassified. These procedures shall ensure that:

- (1) individuals are not subject to retribution for bringing such actions;
 - (2) an opportunity is provided for review by an impartial official or panel; and
 - (3) individuals are advised of their right to appeal agency decisions to the Interagency Security Classification Appeals Panel (Panel) established by section 5.3 of this order.
- (c) Documents required to be submitted for prepublication review or other administrative process pursuant to an approved nondisclosure agreement are not covered by this section.

Sec. 1.9. Fundamental Classification Guidance Review.

(a) Agency heads shall complete on a periodic basis a comprehensive review of the agency's classification guidance, particularly classification guides, to ensure the guidance reflects current circumstances and to identify classified information that no longer requires protection and can be declassified. The initial fundamental classification guidance review shall be completed within 2 years of the effective date of this order.

(b) The classification guidance review shall include an evaluation of classified information to determine if it meets the standards for classification under section 1.4 of this order, taking into account an up-to-date assessment of likely damage as described under section 1.2 of this order.

(c) The classification guidance review shall include original classification authorities and agency subject matter experts to ensure a broad range of perspectives.

(d) Agency heads shall provide a report summarizing the results of the classification guidance review to the Director of the Information Security Oversight Office and shall release an unclassified version of this report to the public.

PART 2 -- DERIVATIVE CLASSIFICATION

Sec. 2.1. Use of Derivative Classification. (a) Persons who reproduce, extract, or summarize classified information, or who apply classification markings derived from source material or as directed by a classification guide, need not possess original classification authority.

(b) Persons who apply derivative classification markings shall:

(1) be identified by name and position, or by personal identifier, in a manner that is immediately apparent for each derivative classification action;

(2) observe and respect original classification decisions; and

(3) carry forward to any newly created documents the pertinent classification markings. For information derivatively classified based on multiple sources, the derivative classifier shall carry forward:

(A) the date or event for declassification that corresponds to the longest period of classification among the sources, or the marking established pursuant to section 1.6(a)(4)(D) of this order; and

(B) a listing of the source materials.

(c) Derivative classifiers shall, whenever practicable, use a classified addendum whenever classified information constitutes a small portion of an otherwise unclassified document or prepare a product to allow for dissemination at the lowest level of classification possible or in unclassified form.

(d) Persons who apply derivative classification markings shall receive training in the proper application of the derivative classification principles of the order, with an emphasis on avoiding over-classification, at least once every 2 years. Derivative classifiers who do not receive such training at least once every 2 years shall have their authority to apply derivative classification markings suspended until they have received such training. A waiver may be granted by the agency head, the deputy agency head, or the senior agency official if an individual is unable to receive such training due to unavoidable circumstances. Whenever a waiver is granted, the individual shall receive such training as soon as practicable.

Sec. 2.2. Classification Guides. (a) Agencies with original classification authority shall prepare classification guides to facilitate the proper and uniform derivative classification of information. These guides shall conform to standards contained in directives issued under this order.

(b) Each guide shall be approved personally and in writing by an official who:

(1) has program or supervisory responsibility over the information or is the senior agency official; and

(2) is authorized to classify information originally at the highest level of classification prescribed in the guide.

(c) Agencies shall establish procedures to ensure that classification guides are reviewed and updated as provided in directives issued under this order.

(d) Agencies shall incorporate original classification decisions into classification guides on a timely basis and in accordance with directives issued under this order.

(e) Agencies may incorporate exemptions from automatic declassification approved pursuant to section 3.3(j) of this order into classification guides, provided that the Panel is notified of the intent to take such action for specific information in advance of approval and the information remains in active use.

(f) The duration of classification of a document classified by a derivative classifier using a classification guide shall not exceed 25 years from the date of the origin of the document, except for:

(1) information that should clearly and demonstrably be expected to reveal the identity of a confidential human source or a human intelligence source or key design concepts of weapons of mass destruction; and

(2) specific information incorporated into classification guides in accordance with section 2.2(e) of this order.

PART 3 -- DECLASSIFICATION AND DOWNGRADING

Sec. 3.1. Authority for Declassification. (a) Information shall be declassified as soon as it no longer meets the standards for classification under this order.

(b) Information shall be declassified or downgraded by:

(1) the official who authorized the original classification, if that official is still serving in the same position and has original classification authority;

(2) the originator's current successor in function, if that individual has original classification authority;

(3) a supervisory official of either the originator or his or her successor in function, if the supervisory official has original classification authority; or

(4) officials delegated declassification authority in writing by the agency head or the senior agency official of the originating agency.

(c) The Director of National Intelligence (or, if delegated by the Director of National Intelligence, the Principal Deputy Director of National Intelligence) may, with respect to the Intelligence Community, after consultation with the head of the originating Intelligence Community element or department, declassify, downgrade, or direct the declassification or downgrading of information or intelligence relating to intelligence sources, methods, or activities.

(d) It is presumed that information that continues to meet the classification requirements under this order requires continued protection. In some exceptional cases, however, the need to protect such information may be outweighed by the public interest in disclosure of the information, and in these cases the information should be declassified. When such questions arise, they shall be referred to the agency head or the senior agency official. That official will determine, as an exercise of discretion, whether the public interest in disclosure outweighs the damage to the national security that might reasonably be expected from disclosure. This provision does not:

(1) amplify or modify the substantive criteria or procedures for classification; or

(2) create any substantive or procedural rights subject to judicial review.

(e) If the Director of the Information Security Oversight Office determines that information is classified in violation of this order, the Director may require the information to be declassified by the agency that originated the classification. Any such decision by the Director may be appealed to the President through the National Security Advisor. The information shall remain classified pending a prompt decision on the appeal.

(f) The provisions of this section shall also apply to agencies that, under the terms of this order, do not have original classification authority, but had such authority under predecessor orders.

(g) No information may be excluded from declassification under section 3.3 of this order based solely on the type of document or record in which it is found. Rather, the classified information must be considered on the basis of its content.

(h) Classified nonrecord materials, including artifacts, shall be declassified as soon as they no longer meet the standards for classification under this order.

(i) When making decisions under sections 3.3, 3.4, and 3.5 of this order, agencies shall consider the final decisions of the Panel.

Sec. 3.2. Transferred Records. (a) In the case of classified records transferred in conjunction with a transfer of functions, and not merely for storage purposes, the receiving agency shall be deemed to be the originating agency for purposes of this order.

(b) In the case of classified records that are not officially transferred as described in paragraph (a) of this section, but that originated in an agency that has ceased to exist and for which there is no successor agency, each agency in possession of such records shall be deemed to be the originating agency for purposes of this order. Such records may be declassified or downgraded by the agency in possession of the records after consultation with any other agency that has an interest in the subject matter of the records.

(c) Classified records accessioned into the National Archives shall be declassified or downgraded by the Archivist in accordance with this order, the directives issued pursuant to this order, agency declassification guides, and any existing procedural agreement between the Archivist and the relevant agency head.

(d) The originating agency shall take all reasonable steps to declassify classified information contained in records determined to have permanent historical value before they are accessioned into the National Archives. However, the Archivist may require that classified records be accessioned into the National Archives when necessary to comply with the provisions of the Federal Records Act. This provision does not apply to records transferred to the Archivist pursuant to section 2203 of title 44, United States Code, or records for which the National Archives serves as the custodian of the records of an agency or organization that has gone out of existence.

(e) To the extent practicable, agencies shall adopt a system of records management that will facilitate the public release of documents at the time such documents are declassified pursuant to the provisions for automatic declassification in section 3.3 of this order.

Sec. 3.3. Automatic Declassification. (a) Subject to paragraphs (b)–(d) and (g)–(j) of this section, all classified records that (1) are more than 25 years old and (2) have been determined to have permanent historical value under title 44, United States Code, shall be automatically declassified whether or not the records have been reviewed. All classified records shall be automatically declassified on December 31 of the year that is 25 years from the date of origin, except as provided in paragraphs (b)–(d) and (g)–(i) of this section. If the date of origin of an individual record cannot be readily determined, the date of original classification shall be used instead.

(b) An agency head may exempt from automatic declassification under paragraph (a) of this section specific information, the release of which should clearly and demonstrably be expected to:

(1) reveal the identity of a confidential human source, a human intelligence source, a relationship with an intelligence or security service of a foreign government or international organization, or a nonhuman intelligence source; or impair the effectiveness of an intelligence method currently in use, available for use, or under development;

(2) reveal information that would assist in the development, production, or use of weapons of mass destruction;

(3) reveal information that would impair U.S. cryptologic systems or activities;

(4) reveal information that would impair the application of state-of-the-art technology within a U.S. weapon system;

(5) reveal formally named or numbered U.S. military war plans that remain in effect, or reveal operational or tactical elements of prior plans that are contained in such active plans;

(6) reveal information, including foreign government information, that would cause serious harm to relations between the United States and a foreign government, or to ongoing diplomatic activities of the United States;

(7) reveal information that would impair the current ability of United States Government officials to protect the President, Vice President, and other protectees for whom protection services, in the interest of the national security, are authorized;

(8) reveal information that would seriously impair current national security emergency preparedness plans or reveal current vulnerabilities of systems, installations, or infrastructures relating to the national security; or

(9) violate a statute, treaty, or international agreement that does not permit the automatic or unilateral declassification of information at 25 years.

(c)(1) An agency head shall notify the Panel of any specific file series of records for which a review or assessment has determined that the information within that file series almost invariably falls within one or more of the exemption categories listed in paragraph (b) of this section and that the agency proposes to exempt from automatic declassification at 25 years.

(2) The notification shall include:

(A) a description of the file series;

(B) an explanation of why the information within the file series is almost invariably exempt from automatic declassification and why the information must remain classified for a longer period of time; and

(C) except when the information within the file series almost invariably identifies a confidential human source or a human intelligence source or key design concepts of weapons of mass destruction, a specific date or event for declassification of the information, not to exceed December 31 of the year that is 50 years from the date of origin of the records.

(3) The Panel may direct the agency not to exempt a designated file series or to declassify the information within that series at an earlier date than recommended. The agency head may appeal such a decision to the President through the National Security Advisor.

(4) File series exemptions approved by the President prior to December 31, 2008, shall remain valid without any additional agency action pending Panel review by the later of December 31, 2010, or December 31 of the year that is 10 years from the date of previous approval.

(d) The following provisions shall apply to the onset of automatic declassification:

(1) Classified records within an integral file block, as defined in this order, that are otherwise subject to automatic declassification under this section shall not be automatically declassified until December 31 of the year that is 25 years from the date of the most recent record within the file block.

(2) After consultation with the Director of the National Declassification Center (the Center) established by section 3.7 of this order and before the records are subject to automatic declassification, an agency head or senior agency official may delay automatic declassification for up to five additional years for classified information contained in media that make a review for possible declassification exemptions more difficult or costly.

(3) Other than for records that are properly exempted from automatic declassification, records containing classified information that originated with other agencies or the disclosure of which would affect the interests or activities of other agencies with respect to the classified information and could reasonably be expected to fall under one or more of the exemptions in paragraph (b) of this section shall be identified prior to the onset of automatic declassification for later referral to those agencies.

(A) The information of concern shall be referred by the Center established by section 3.7 of this order, or by the centralized facilities referred to in section 3.7(e) of this order, in a prioritized and scheduled manner determined by the Center.

(B) If an agency fails to provide a final determination on a referral made by the Center within 1 year of referral, or by the centralized facilities referred to in section 3.7(e) of this order within 3 years of referral, its equities in the referred records shall be automatically declassified.

(C) If any disagreement arises between affected agencies and the Center regarding the referral review period, the Director of the Information Security Oversight Office shall determine the appropriate period of review of referred records.

(D) Referrals identified prior to the establishment of the Center by section 3.7 of this order shall be subject to automatic declassification only in accordance with subparagraphs (d)(3)(A)–(C) of this section.

(4) After consultation with the Director of the Information Security Oversight Office, an agency head may delay automatic declassification for up to 3 years from the date of discovery of classified records that were inadvertently not reviewed prior to the effective date of automatic declassification.

(e) Information exempted from automatic declassification under this section shall remain subject to the mandatory and systematic declassification review provisions of this order.

(f) The Secretary of State shall determine when the United States should commence negotiations with the appropriate officials of a foreign government or international organization of governments to modify any treaty or international agreement that requires the classification of information contained in records affected by this section for a period longer than 25 years from the date of its creation, unless the treaty or international agreement pertains to information that may otherwise remain classified beyond 25 years under this section.

(g) The Secretary of Energy shall determine when information concerning foreign nuclear programs that was removed from the Restricted Data category in order to carry out provisions of the National Security Act of 1947, as amended, may be declassified. Unless otherwise determined, such information shall be declassified when comparable information concerning the United States nuclear program is declassified.

(h) Not later than 3 years from the effective date of this order, all records exempted from automatic declassification under paragraphs (b) and (c) of this section shall be automatically declassified on December 31 of a year that is no more than 50 years from the date of origin, subject to the following:

(1) Records that contain information the release of which should clearly and demonstrably be expected to reveal the following are exempt from automatic declassification at 50 years:

(A) the identity of a confidential human source or a human intelligence source; or

(B) key design concepts of weapons of mass destruction.

(2) In extraordinary cases, agency heads may, within 5 years of the onset of automatic declassification, propose to exempt additional specific information from declassification at 50 years.

(3) Records exempted from automatic declassification under this paragraph shall be automatically declassified on December 31 of a year that is no more than 75 years from the date of origin unless an agency head, within 5 years of that date, proposes to exempt specific information from declassification at 75 years and the proposal is formally approved by the Panel.

(i) Specific records exempted from automatic declassification prior to the establishment of the Center described in section 3.7 of this order shall be subject to the provisions of paragraph (h) of this section in a scheduled and prioritized manner determined by the Center.

(j) At least 1 year before information is subject to automatic declassification under this section, an agency head or senior agency official shall notify the Director of the Information Security Oversight Office, serving as Executive Secretary of the Panel, of any specific information that the agency proposes to exempt from automatic declassification under paragraphs (b) and (h) of this section.

(1) The notification shall include:

(A) a detailed description of the information, either by reference to information in specific records or in the form of a declassification guide;

(B) an explanation of why the information should be exempt from automatic declassification and must remain classified for a longer period of time; and

(C) a specific date or a specific and independently verifiable event for automatic declassification of specific records that contain the information proposed for exemption.

(2) The Panel may direct the agency not to exempt the information or to declassify it at an earlier date than recommended. An agency head may appeal such a decision to the President through the National Security Advisor. The information will remain classified while such an appeal is pending.

(k) For information in a file series of records determined not to have permanent historical value, the duration of classification beyond 25 years shall be the same as the disposition (destruction) date of those records in each Agency Records Control Schedule or General Records Schedule, although the duration of classification shall be extended if the record has been retained for business reasons beyond the scheduled disposition date.

Sec. 3.4. Systematic Declassification Review. (a) Each agency that has originated classified information under this order or its predecessors shall establish and conduct a program for systematic declassification review for records of permanent historical value exempted from automatic declassification under section 3.3 of this order. Agencies shall prioritize their review of such records in accordance with priorities established by the Center.

(b) The Archivist shall conduct a systematic declassification review program for classified records: (1) accessioned into the National Archives; (2) transferred to the Archivist pursuant to 44 U.S.C. 2203; and (3) for which the National Archives serves as the custodian for an agency or organization that has gone out of existence.

Sec. 3.5. Mandatory Declassification Review. (a) Except as provided in paragraph (b) of this section, all information classified under this order or predecessor orders shall be subject to a review for declassification by the originating agency if:

(1) the request for a review describes the document or material containing the information with sufficient specificity to enable the agency to locate it with a reasonable amount of effort;

(2) the document or material containing the information responsive to the request is not contained within an operational file exempted from search and review, publication, and disclosure under 5 U.S.C. 552 in accordance with law; and

(3) the information is not the subject of pending litigation.

(b) Information originated by the incumbent President or the incumbent Vice President; the incumbent President's White House Staff or the incumbent Vice President's Staff; committees, commissions, or boards appointed by the incumbent President; or other entities within the Executive Office of the President that solely advise and assist the incumbent President is exempted from the provisions of paragraph (a) of this section. However, the Archivist shall have the authority to review, downgrade, and declassify papers or records of former Presidents and Vice Presidents under the control of the Archivist pursuant to 44 U.S.C. 2107, 2111, 2111 note, or 2203. Review procedures developed by the Archivist shall provide for consultation with agencies having primary subject matter interest and shall be consistent with the provisions of applicable laws or lawful agreements that pertain to the respective Presidential papers or records. Agencies with primary subject matter interest shall be notified promptly of the Archivist's decision. Any final decision by the Archivist may be appealed by the requester or an agency to the Panel. The information shall remain classified pending a prompt decision on the appeal.

(c) Agencies conducting a mandatory review for declassification shall declassify information that no longer meets the standards for classification under this order. They shall release this information unless withholding is otherwise authorized and warranted under applicable law.

(d) If an agency has reviewed the requested information for declassification within the past 2 years, the agency need not conduct another review and may instead inform the requester of this fact and the prior review decision and advise the requester of appeal rights provided under subsection (e) of this section.

(e) In accordance with directives issued pursuant to this order, agency heads shall develop procedures to process requests for the mandatory review of classified information. These procedures shall apply to information classified under this or predecessor orders. They also shall provide a means for administratively appealing a denial of a mandatory review request, and for notifying the requester of the right to appeal a final agency decision to the Panel.

(f) After consultation with affected agencies, the Secretary of Defense shall develop special procedures for the review of cryptologic information; the Director of National Intelligence shall develop special procedures for the review of information pertaining to intelligence sources, methods, and activities; and the Archivist shall develop special procedures for the review of information accessioned into the National Archives.

(g) Documents required to be submitted for prepublication review or other administrative process pursuant to an approved nondisclosure agreement are not covered by this section.

(h) This section shall not apply to any request for a review made to an element of the Intelligence Community that is made by a person other than an individual as that term is defined by 5 U.S.C. 552a(a)(2), or by a foreign government entity or any representative thereof.

Sec. 3.6. Processing Requests and Reviews. Notwithstanding section 4.1(i) of this order, in response to a request for information under the Freedom of Information Act, the Presidential Records Act, the Privacy Act of 1974, or the mandatory review provisions of this order:

(a) An agency may refuse to confirm or deny the existence or nonexistence of requested records whenever the fact of their existence or nonexistence is itself classified under this order or its predecessors.

(b) When an agency receives any request for documents in its custody that contain classified information that originated with other agencies or the disclosure of which would affect the interests or activities of other agencies with respect to the classified information, or identifies such documents in the process of implementing sections 3.3 or 3.4 of this order, it shall refer copies of any request and the pertinent documents to the originating agency for processing and may, after consultation with the originating agency, inform any requester of the referral unless such association is itself classified under this order or its predecessors. In cases in which the originating agency determines in writing that a response under paragraph (a) of this section is required, the referring agency shall respond to the requester in accordance with that paragraph.

(c) Agencies may extend the classification of information in records determined not to have permanent historical value or nonrecord materials, including artifacts, beyond the time frames established in sections 1.5(b) and 2.2(f) of this order, provided:

(1) the specific information has been approved pursuant to section 3.3(j) of this order for exemption from automatic declassification; and

(2) the extension does not exceed the date established in section 3.3(j) of this order.

Sec. 3.7. National Declassification Center (a) There is established within the National Archives a National Declassification Center to streamline declassification processes, facilitate quality-assurance measures, and implement standardized training regarding the declassification of records determined to have permanent historical value. There shall be a Director of the Center who shall be appointed or removed by the Archivist in consultation with the Secretaries of State, Defense, Energy, and Homeland Security, the Attorney General, and the Director of National Intelligence.

(b) Under the administration of the Director, the Center shall coordinate:

(1) timely and appropriate processing of referrals in accordance with section 3.3(d)(3) of this order for accessioned Federal records and transferred presidential records.

(2) general interagency declassification activities necessary to fulfill the requirements of sections 3.3 and 3.4 of this order;

(3) the exchange among agencies of detailed declassification guidance to enable the referral of records in accordance with section 3.3(d)(3) of this order;

- (4) the development of effective, transparent, and standard declassification work processes, training, and quality assurance measures;
- (5) the development of solutions to declassification challenges posed by electronic records, special media, and emerging technologies;
- (6) the linkage and effective utilization of existing agency databases and the use of new technologies to document and make public declassification review decisions and support declassification activities under the purview of the Center; and
- (7) storage and related services, on a reimbursable basis, for Federal records containing classified national security information.

(c) Agency heads shall fully cooperate with the Archivist in the activities of the Center and shall:

(1) provide the Director with adequate and current declassification guidance to enable the referral of records in accordance with section 3.3(d)(3) of this order; and

(2) upon request of the Archivist, assign agency personnel to the Center who shall be delegated authority by the agency head to review and exempt or declassify information originated by their agency contained in records accessioned into the National Archives, after consultation with subject-matter experts as necessary.

(d) The Archivist, in consultation with representatives of the participants in the Center and after input from the general public, shall develop priorities for declassification activities under the purview of the Center that take into account the degree of researcher interest and the likelihood of declassification.

(e) Agency heads may establish such centralized facilities and internal operations to conduct internal declassification reviews as appropriate to achieve optimized records management and declassification business processes. Once established, all referral processing of accessioned records shall take place at the Center, and such agency facilities and operations shall be coordinated with the Center to ensure the maximum degree of consistency in policies and procedures that relate to records determined to have permanent historical value.

(f) Agency heads may exempt from automatic declassification or continue the classification of their own originally classified information under section 3.3(a) of this order except that in the case of the Director of National Intelligence, the Director shall also retain such authority with respect to the Intelligence Community.

(g) The Archivist shall, in consultation with the Secretaries of State, Defense, Energy, and Homeland Security, the Attorney General, the Director of National Intelligence, the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency, and the Director of the Information Security Oversight Office, provide the National Security Advisor with a detailed concept of operations for the Center and a proposed implementing directive under section 5.1 of this order that reflects the coordinated views of the aforementioned agencies.

PART 4 -- SAFEGUARDING

Sec. 4.1. General Restrictions on Access. (a) A person may have access to classified information provided that:

- (1) a favorable determination of eligibility for access has been made by an agency head or the agency head's designee;
- (2) the person has signed an approved nondisclosure agreement; and
- (3) the person has a need-to-know the information.

(b) Every person who has met the standards for access to classified information in paragraph (a) of this section shall receive contemporaneous training on the proper safeguarding of classified information and on the criminal, civil, and administrative sanctions that may be imposed on an individual who fails to protect classified information from unauthorized disclosure.

(c) An official or employee leaving agency service may not remove classified information from the agency's control or direct that information be declassified in order to remove it from agency control.

(d) Classified information may not be removed from official premises without proper authorization.

(e) Persons authorized to disseminate classified information outside the executive branch shall ensure the protection of the information in a manner equivalent to that provided within the executive branch.

(f) Consistent with law, executive orders, directives, and regulations, an agency head or senior agency official or, with respect to the Intelligence Community, the Director of National Intelligence, shall establish uniform procedures to ensure that automated information systems, including networks and telecommunications systems, that collect, create, communicate, compute, disseminate, process, or store classified information:

(1) prevent access by unauthorized persons;

(2) ensure the integrity of the information; and

(3) to the maximum extent practicable, use:

(A) common information technology standards, protocols, and interfaces that maximize the availability of, and access to, the information in a form and manner that facilitates its authorized use; and

(B) standardized electronic formats to maximize the accessibility of information to persons who meet the criteria set forth in section 4.1(a) of this order.

(g) Consistent with law, executive orders, directives, and regulations, each agency head or senior agency official, or with respect to the Intelligence Community, the Director of National Intelligence, shall establish controls to ensure that classified information is used, processed, stored, reproduced, transmitted, and destroyed under conditions that provide adequate protection and prevent access by unauthorized persons.

(h) Consistent with directives issued pursuant to this order, an agency shall safeguard foreign government information under standards that provide a degree of protection at least equivalent to that required by the government or international organization of governments that furnished the information. When adequate to achieve equivalency, these standards may be less restrictive than the safeguarding standards that ordinarily apply to U.S. "Confidential" information, including modified handling and transmission and allowing access to individuals with a need-to-know who have not otherwise been cleared for access to classified information or executed an approved nondisclosure agreement.

(i)(1) Classified information originating in one agency may be disseminated to another agency or U.S. entity by any agency to which it has been made available without the consent of the originating agency, as long as the criteria for access under section 4.1(a) of this order are met, unless the originating agency has determined that prior authorization is required for such dissemination and has marked or indicated such requirement on the medium containing the classified information in accordance with implementing directives issued pursuant to this order.

(2) Classified information originating in one agency may be disseminated by any other agency to which it has been made available to a foreign government in accordance with statute, this order, directives implementing this order, direction of the President, or with the consent of the originating agency. For the purposes of this section, "foreign government" includes any element of a foreign government, or an international organization of governments, or any element thereof.

(3) Documents created prior to the effective date of this order shall not be disseminated outside any other agency to which they have been made available without the consent of the originating agency. An agency head or senior agency official may waive this requirement for specific information that originated within that agency.

(4) For purposes of this section, the Department of Defense shall be considered one agency, except that any dissemination of information regarding intelligence sources, methods, or activities shall be consistent with directives issued pursuant to section 6.2(b) of this order.

(5) Prior consent of the originating agency is not required when referring records for declassification review that contain information originating in more than one agency.

Sec. 4.2. Distribution Controls. (a) The head of each agency shall establish procedures in accordance with applicable law and consistent with directives issued pursuant to this order to ensure that classified information is accessible to the maximum extent possible by individuals who meet the criteria set forth in section 4.1(a) of this order.

(b) In an emergency, when necessary to respond to an imminent threat to life or in defense of the homeland, the agency head or any designee may authorize the disclosure of classified information (including information marked pursuant to section 4.1(i)(1) of this order) to an individual or individuals who are otherwise not eligible for access. Such actions shall be taken only in accordance with directives implementing this order and any procedure issued by agencies governing the classified information, which shall be designed to minimize the classified information that is disclosed under these circumstances and the number of individuals who receive it. Information disclosed under this provision or implementing directives and procedures shall not be deemed declassified as a result of such disclosure or subsequent use by a recipient. Such disclosures shall be reported promptly to the originator of the classified information. For purposes of this section, the Director of National Intelligence may issue an implementing directive governing the emergency disclosure of classified intelligence information.

(c) Each agency shall update, at least annually, the automatic, routine, or recurring distribution mechanism for classified information that it distributes. Recipients shall cooperate fully with distributors who are updating distribution lists and shall notify distributors whenever a relevant change in status occurs.

Sec. 4.3. Special Access Programs. (a) Establishment of special access programs. Unless otherwise authorized by the President, only the Secretaries of State, Defense, Energy, and Homeland Security, the Attorney General, and the Director of National Intelligence, or the principal deputy of each, may create a special access program. For special access programs pertaining to intelligence sources, methods, and activities (but not including military operational, strategic, and tactical programs), this function shall be exercised by the Director of National Intelligence. These officials shall keep the number of these programs at an absolute minimum, and shall establish them only when the program is required by statute or upon a specific finding that:

(1) the vulnerability of, or threat to, specific information is exceptional; and

(2) the normal criteria for determining eligibility for access applicable to information classified at the same level are not deemed sufficient to protect the information from unauthorized disclosure.

(b) Requirements and limitations. (1) Special access programs shall be limited to programs in which the number of persons who ordinarily will have access will be reasonably small and commensurate with the objective of providing enhanced protection for the information involved.

(2) Each agency head shall establish and maintain a system of accounting for special access programs consistent with directives issued pursuant to this order.

(3) Special access programs shall be subject to the oversight program established under section 5.4(d) of this order. In addition, the Director of the Information Security Oversight Office shall be afforded access to these programs, in accordance with the security requirements of each program, in order to perform the

functions assigned to the Information Security Oversight Office under this order. An agency head may limit access to a special access program to the Director of the Information Security Oversight Office and no more than one other employee of the Information Security Oversight Office or, for special access programs that are extraordinarily sensitive and vulnerable, to the Director only.

(4) The agency head or principal deputy shall review annually each special access program to determine whether it continues to meet the requirements of this order.

(5) Upon request, an agency head shall brief the National Security Advisor, or a designee, on any or all of the agency's special access programs.

(6) For the purposes of this section, the term "agency head" refers only to the Secretaries of State, Defense, Energy, and Homeland Security, the Attorney General, and the Director of National Intelligence, or the principal deputy of each.

(c) Nothing in this order shall supersede any requirement made by or under 10 U.S.C. 119.

Sec. 4.4. Access by Historical Researchers and Certain Former Government Personnel. (a) The requirement in section 4.1(a)(3) of this order that access to classified information may be granted only to individuals who have a need-to-know the information may be waived for persons who:

(1) are engaged in historical research projects;

(2) previously have occupied senior policy-making positions to which they were appointed or designated by the President or the Vice President; or

(3) served as President or Vice President.

(b) Waivers under this section may be granted only if the agency head or senior agency official of the originating agency:

(1) determines in writing that access is consistent with the interest of the national security;

(2) takes appropriate steps to protect classified information from unauthorized disclosure or compromise, and ensures that the information is safeguarded in a manner consistent with this order; and

(3) limits the access granted to former Presidential appointees or designees and Vice Presidential appointees or designees to items that the person originated, reviewed, signed, or received while serving as a Presidential or Vice Presidential appointee or designee.

PART 5 -- IMPLEMENTATION AND REVIEW

Sec. 5.1. Program Direction. (a) The Director of the Information Security Oversight Office, under the direction of the Archivist and in consultation with the National Security Advisor, shall issue such directives as are necessary to implement this order. These directives shall be binding on the agencies. Directives issued by the Director of the Information Security Oversight Office shall establish standards for:

(1) classification, declassification, and marking principles;

(2) safeguarding classified information, which shall pertain to the handling, storage, distribution, transmittal, and destruction of and accounting for classified information;

(3) agency security education and training programs;

(4) agency self-inspection programs; and

(5) classification and declassification guides.

(b) The Archivist shall delegate the implementation and monitoring functions of this program to the Director of the Information Security Oversight Office.

(c) The Director of National Intelligence, after consultation with the heads of affected agencies and the Director of the Information Security Oversight Office, may issue directives to implement this order with respect to the protection of intelligence sources, methods, and activities. Such directives shall be consistent with this order and directives issued under paragraph (a) of this section.

Sec. 5.2. Information Security Oversight Office. (a) There is established within the National Archives an Information Security Oversight Office. The Archivist shall appoint the Director of the Information Security Oversight Office, subject to the approval of the President.

(b) Under the direction of the Archivist, acting in consultation with the National Security Advisor, the Director of the Information Security Oversight Office shall:

(1) develop directives for the implementation of this order;

(2) oversee agency actions to ensure compliance with this order and its implementing directives;

(3) review and approve agency implementing regulations prior to their issuance to ensure their consistency with this order and directives issued under section 5.1(a) of this order;

(4) have the authority to conduct on-site reviews of each agency's program established under this order, and to require of each agency those reports and information and other cooperation that may be necessary to fulfill its responsibilities. If granting access to specific categories of classified information would pose an exceptional national security risk, the affected agency head or the senior agency official shall submit a written justification recommending the denial of access to the President through the National Security Advisor within 60 days of the request for access. Access shall be denied pending the response;

(5) review requests for original classification authority from agencies or officials not granted original classification authority and, if deemed appropriate, recommend Presidential approval through the National Security Advisor;

(6) consider and take action on complaints and suggestions from persons within or outside the Government with respect to the administration of the program established under this order;

(7) have the authority to prescribe, after consultation with affected agencies, standardization of forms or procedures that will promote the implementation of the program established under this order;

(8) report at least annually to the President on the implementation of this order; and

(9) convene and chair interagency meetings to discuss matters pertaining to the program established by this order.

Sec. 5.3. Interagency Security Classification Appeals Panel.

(a) Establishment and administration.

(1) There is established an Interagency Security Classification Appeals Panel. The Departments of State, Defense, and Justice, the National Archives, the Office of the Director of National Intelligence, and the

National Security Advisor shall each be represented by a senior-level representative who is a full-time or permanent part-time Federal officer or employee designated to serve as a member of the Panel by the respective agency head. The President shall designate a Chair from among the members of the Panel.

(2) Additionally, the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency may appoint a temporary representative who meets the criteria in paragraph (a)(1) of this section to participate as a voting member in all Panel deliberations and associated support activities concerning classified information originated by the Central Intelligence Agency.

(3) A vacancy on the Panel shall be filled as quickly as possible as provided in paragraph (a)(1) of this section.

(4) The Director of the Information Security Oversight Office shall serve as the Executive Secretary of the Panel. The staff of the Information Security Oversight Office shall provide program and administrative support for the Panel.

(5) The members and staff of the Panel shall be required to meet eligibility for access standards in order to fulfill the Panel's functions.

(6) The Panel shall meet at the call of the Chair. The Chair shall schedule meetings as may be necessary for the Panel to fulfill its functions in a timely manner.

(7) The Information Security Oversight Office shall include in its reports to the President a summary of the Panel's activities.

(b) Functions. The Panel shall:

(1) decide on appeals by persons who have filed classification challenges under section 1.8 of this order;

(2) approve, deny, or amend agency exemptions from automatic declassification as provided in section 3.3 of this order;

(3) decide on appeals by persons or entities who have filed requests for mandatory declassification review under section 3.5 of this order; and

(4) appropriately inform senior agency officials and the public of final Panel decisions on appeals under sections 1.8 and 3.5 of this order.

(c) Rules and procedures. The Panel shall issue bylaws, which shall be published in the Federal Register. The bylaws shall establish the rules and procedures that the Panel will follow in accepting, considering, and issuing decisions on appeals. The rules and procedures of the Panel shall provide that the Panel will consider appeals only on actions in which:

(1) the appellant has exhausted his or her administrative remedies within the responsible agency;

(2) there is no current action pending on the issue within the Federal courts; and

(3) the information has not been the subject of review by the Federal courts or the Panel within the past 2 years.

(d) Agency heads shall cooperate fully with the Panel so that it can fulfill its functions in a timely and fully informed manner. The Panel shall report to the President through the National Security Advisor any instance in which it believes that an agency head is not cooperating fully with the Panel.

(e) The Panel is established for the sole purpose of advising and assisting the President in the discharge of his constitutional and discretionary authority to protect the national security of the United States. Panel decisions are committed to the discretion of the Panel, unless changed by the President.

(f) An agency head may appeal a decision of the Panel to the President through the National Security Advisor. The information shall remain classified pending a decision on the appeal.

Sec. 5.4. General Responsibilities. Heads of agencies that originate or handle classified information shall:

(a) demonstrate personal commitment and commit senior management to the successful implementation of the program established under this order;

(b) commit necessary resources to the effective implementation of the program established under this order;

(c) ensure that agency records systems are designed and maintained to optimize the appropriate sharing and safeguarding of classified information, and to facilitate its declassification under the terms of this order when it no longer meets the standards for continued classification; and

(d) designate a senior agency official to direct and administer the program, whose responsibilities shall include:

(1) overseeing the agency's program established under this order, provided an agency head may designate a separate official to oversee special access programs authorized under this order. This official shall provide a full accounting of the agency's special access programs at least annually;

(2) promulgating implementing regulations, which shall be published in the Federal Register to the extent that they affect members of the public;

(3) establishing and maintaining security education and training programs;

(4) establishing and maintaining an ongoing self inspection program, which shall include the regular reviews of representative samples of the agency's original and derivative classification actions, and shall authorize appropriate agency officials to correct misclassification actions not covered by sections 1.7(c) and 1.7(d) of this order; and reporting annually to the Director of the Information Security Oversight Office on the agency's self-inspection program;

(5) establishing procedures consistent with directives issued pursuant to this order to prevent unnecessary access to classified information, including procedures that:

(A) require that a need for access to classified information be established before initiating administrative clearance procedures; and

(B) ensure that the number of persons granted access to classified information meets the mission needs of the agency while also satisfying operational and security requirements and needs;

(6) developing special contingency plans for the safeguarding of classified information used in or near hostile or potentially hostile areas;

(7) ensuring that the performance contract or other system used to rate civilian or military personnel performance includes the designation and management of classified information as a critical element or item to be evaluated in the rating of:

(A) original classification authorities;

(B) security managers or security specialists; and

(C) all other personnel whose duties significantly involve the creation or handling of classified information, including personnel who regularly apply derivative classification markings;

(8) accounting for the costs associated with the implementation of this order, which shall be reported to the Director of the Information Security Oversight Office for publication;

(9) assigning in a prompt manner agency personnel to respond to any request, appeal, challenge, complaint, or suggestion arising out of this order that pertains to classified information that originated in a component of the agency that no longer exists and for which there is no clear successor in function; and

(10) establishing a secure capability to receive information, allegations, or complaints regarding over-classification or incorrect classification within the agency and to provide guidance to personnel on proper classification as needed.

Sec. 5.5. Sanctions. (a) If the Director of the Information Security Oversight Office finds that a violation of this order or its implementing directives has occurred, the Director shall make a report to the head of the agency or to the senior agency official so that corrective steps, if appropriate, may be taken.

(b) Officers and employees of the United States Government, and its contractors, licensees, certificate holders, and grantees shall be subject to appropriate sanctions if they knowingly, willfully, or negligently:

(1) disclose to unauthorized persons information properly classified under this order or predecessor orders;

(2) classify or continue the classification of information in violation of this order or any implementing directive;

(3) create or continue a special access program contrary to the requirements of this order; or

(4) contravene any other provision of this order or its implementing directives.

(c) Sanctions may include reprimand, suspension without pay, removal, termination of classification authority, loss or denial of access to classified information, or other sanctions in accordance with applicable law and agency regulation.

(d) The agency head, senior agency official, or other supervisory official shall, at a minimum, promptly remove the classification authority of any individual who demonstrates reckless disregard or a pattern of error in applying the classification standards of this order.

(e) The agency head or senior agency official shall:

(1) take appropriate and prompt corrective action when a violation or infraction under paragraph (b) of this section occurs; and

(2) notify the Director of the Information Security Oversight Office when a violation under paragraph (b)(1), (2), or (3) of this section occurs.

PART 6 -- GENERAL PROVISIONS

Sec. 6.1. Definitions. For purposes of this order:

(a) "Access" means the ability or opportunity to gain knowledge of classified information.

(b) "Agency" means any "Executive agency," as defined in 5 U.S.C. 105; any "Military department" as defined in 5 U.S.C. 102; and any other entity within the executive branch that comes into the possession of classified information.

(c) "Authorized holder" of classified information means anyone who satisfies the conditions for access stated in section 4.1(a) of this order.

(d) "Automated information system" means an assembly of computer hardware, software, or firmware configured to collect, create, communicate, compute, disseminate, process, store, or control data or information.

(e) "Automatic declassification" means the declassification of information based solely upon:

(1) the occurrence of a specific date or event as determined by the original classification authority; or

(2) the expiration of a maximum time frame for duration of classification established under this order.

(f) "Classification" means the act or process by which information is determined to be classified information.

(g) "Classification guidance" means any instruction or source that prescribes the classification of specific information.

(h) "Classification guide" means a documentary form of classification guidance issued by an original classification authority that identifies the elements of information regarding a specific subject that must be classified and establishes the level and duration of classification for each such element.

(i) "Classified national security information" or "classified information" means information that has been determined pursuant to this order or any predecessor order to require protection against unauthorized disclosure and is marked to indicate its classified status when in documentary form.

(j) "Compilation" means an aggregation of preexisting unclassified items of information.

(k) "Confidential source" means any individual or organization that has provided, or that may reasonably be expected to provide, information to the United States on matters pertaining to the national security with the expectation that the information or relationship, or both, are to be held in confidence.

(l) "Damage to the national security" means harm to the national defense or foreign relations of the United States from the unauthorized disclosure of information, taking into consideration such aspects of the information as the sensitivity, value, utility, and provenance of that information.

(m) "Declassification" means the authorized change in the status of information from classified information to unclassified information.

(n) "Declassification guide" means written instructions issued by a declassification authority that describes the elements of information regarding a specific subject that may be declassified and the elements that must remain classified.

(o) "Derivative classification" means the incorporating, paraphrasing, restating, or generating in new form information that is already classified, and marking the newly developed material consistent with the classification markings that apply to the source information. Derivative classification includes the classification of information based on classification guidance. The duplication or reproduction of existing classified information is not derivative classification.

(p) "Document" means any recorded information, regardless of the nature of the medium or the method or circumstances of recording.

(q) "Downgrading" means a determination by a declassification authority that information classified and safeguarded at a specified level shall be classified and safeguarded at a lower level.

(r) "File series" means file units or documents arranged according to a filing system or kept together because they relate to a particular subject or function, result from the same activity, document a specific kind of transaction, take a particular physical form, or have some other relationship arising out of their creation, receipt, or use, such as restrictions on access or use.

(s) "Foreign government information" means:

(1) information provided to the United States Government by a foreign government or governments, an international organization of governments, or any element thereof, with the expectation that the information, the source of the information, or both, are to be held in confidence;

(2) information produced by the United States Government pursuant to or as a result of a joint arrangement with a foreign government or governments, or an international organization of governments, or any element thereof, requiring that the information, the arrangement, or both, are to be held in confidence; or

(3) information received and treated as "foreign government information" under the terms of a predecessor order.

(t) "Information" means any knowledge that can be communicated or documentary material, regardless of its physical form or characteristics, that is owned by, is produced by or for, or is under the control of the United States Government.

(u) "Infraction" means any knowing, willful, or negligent action contrary to the requirements of this order or its implementing directives that does not constitute a "violation," as defined below.

(v) "Integral file block" means a distinct component of a file series, as defined in this section, that should be maintained as a separate unit in order to ensure the integrity of the records. An integral file block may consist of a set of records covering either a specific topic or a range of time, such as a Presidential administration or a 5-year retirement schedule within a specific file series that is retired from active use as a group. For purposes of automatic declassification, integral file blocks shall contain only records dated within 10 years of the oldest record in the file block.

(w) "Integrity" means the state that exists when information is unchanged from its source and has not been accidentally or intentionally modified, altered, or destroyed.

(x) "Intelligence" includes foreign intelligence and counterintelligence as defined by Executive Order 12333 of December 4, 1981, as amended, or by a successor order.

(y) "Intelligence activities" means all activities that elements of the Intelligence Community are authorized to conduct pursuant to law or Executive Order 12333, as amended, or a successor order.

(z) "Intelligence Community" means an element or agency of the U.S. Government identified in or designated pursuant to section 3(4) of the National Security Act of 1947, as amended, or section 3.5(h) of Executive Order 12333, as amended.

(aa) "Mandatory declassification review" means the review for declassification of classified information in response to a request for declassification that meets the requirements under section 3.5 of this order.

(bb) "Multiple sources" means two or more source documents, classification guides, or a combination of both.

(cc) "National security" means the national defense or foreign relations of the United States.

(dd) "Need-to-know" means a determination within the executive branch in accordance with directives issued pursuant to this order that a prospective recipient requires access to specific classified information in order to perform or assist in a lawful and authorized governmental function.

(ee) "Network" means a system of two or more computers that can exchange data or information.

(ff) "Original classification" means an initial determination that information requires, in the interest of the national security, protection against unauthorized disclosure.

(gg) "Original classification authority" means an individual authorized in writing, either by the President, the Vice President, or by agency heads or other officials designated by the President, to classify information in the first instance.

(hh) "Records" means the records of an agency and Presidential papers or Presidential records, as those terms are defined in title 44, United States Code, including those created or maintained by a government contractor, licensee, certificate holder, or grantee that are subject to the sponsoring agency's control under the terms of the contract, license, certificate, or grant.

(ii) "Records having permanent historical value" means Presidential papers or Presidential records and the records of an agency that the Archivist has determined should be maintained permanently in accordance with title 44, United States Code.

(jj) "Records management" means the planning, controlling, directing, organizing, training, promoting, and other managerial activities involved with respect to records creation, records maintenance and use, and records disposition in order to achieve adequate and proper documentation of the policies and transactions of the Federal Government and effective and economical management of agency operations.

(kk) "Safeguarding" means measures and controls that are prescribed to protect classified information.

(ll) "Self-inspection" means the internal review and evaluation of individual agency activities and the agency as a whole with respect to the implementation of the program established under this order and its implementing directives.

(mm) "Senior agency official" means the official designated by the agency head under section 5.4(d) of this order to direct and administer the agency's program under which information is classified, safeguarded, and declassified.

(nn) "Source document" means an existing document that contains classified information that is incorporated, paraphrased, restated, or generated in new form into a new document.

(oo) "Special access program" means a program established for a specific class of classified information that imposes safeguarding and access requirements that exceed those normally required for information at the same classification level.

(pp) "Systematic declassification review" means the review for declassification of classified information contained in records that have been determined by the Archivist to have permanent historical value in accordance with title 44, United States Code.

(qq) "Telecommunications" means the preparation, transmission, or communication of information by electronic means.

(rr) "Unauthorized disclosure" means a communication or physical transfer of classified information to an unauthorized recipient.

(ss) "U.S. entity" includes:

- (1) State, local, or tribal governments;
- (2) State, local, and tribal law enforcement and firefighting entities;
- (3) public health and medical entities;
- (4) regional, state, local, and tribal emergency management entities, including State Adjutants General and other appropriate public safety entities; or
- (5) private sector entities serving as part of the nation's Critical Infrastructure/Key Resources.

(tt) "Violation" means:

- (1) any knowing, willful, or negligent action that could reasonably be expected to result in an unauthorized disclosure of classified information;
- (2) any knowing, willful, or negligent action to classify or continue the classification of information contrary to the requirements of this order or its implementing directives; or
- (3) any knowing, willful, or negligent action to create or continue a special access program contrary to the requirements of this order.

(uu) "Weapons of mass destruction" means any weapon of mass destruction as defined in 50 U.S.C. 1801(p).

Sec. 6.2. General Provisions. (a) Nothing in this order shall supersede any requirement made by or under the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended, or the National Security Act of 1947, as amended. "Restricted Data" and "Formerly Restricted Data" shall be handled, protected, classified, downgraded, and declassified in conformity with the provisions of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended, and regulations issued under that Act.

(b) The Director of National Intelligence may, with respect to the Intelligence Community and after consultation with the heads of affected departments and agencies, issue such policy directives and guidelines as the Director of National Intelligence deems necessary to implement this order with respect to the classification and declassification of all intelligence and intelligence-related information, and for access to and dissemination of all intelligence and intelligence-related information, both in its final form and in the form when initially gathered. Procedures or other guidance issued by Intelligence Community element heads shall be in accordance with such policy directives or guidelines issued by the Director of National Intelligence. Any such policy directives or guidelines issued by the Director of National Intelligence shall be in accordance with directives issued by the Director of the Information Security Oversight Office under section 5.1(a) of this order.

(c) The Attorney General, upon request by the head of an agency or the Director of the Information Security Oversight Office, shall render an interpretation of this order with respect to any question arising in the course of its administration.

(d) Nothing in this order limits the protection afforded any information by other provisions of law, including the Constitution, Freedom of Information Act exemptions, the Privacy Act of 1974, and the National Security Act of 1947, as amended. This order is not intended to and does not create any right or benefit, substantive or procedural, enforceable at law by a party against the United States, its departments, agencies, or entities, its officers, employees, or agents, or any other person. The foregoing is in addition to the specific provisions set forth in sections 1.1(b), 3.1(c) and 5.3(e) of this order.

(e) Nothing in this order shall be construed to obligate action or otherwise affect functions by the Director of the Office of Management and Budget relating to budgetary, administrative, or legislative proposals.

(f) This order shall be implemented subject to the availability of appropriations.

(g) Executive Order 12958 of April 17, 1995, and amendments thereto, including Executive Order 13292 of March 25, 2003, are hereby revoked as of the effective date of this order.

Sec. 6.3. Effective Date. This order is effective 180 days from the date of this order, except for sections 1.7, 3.3, and 3.7, which are effective immediately.

Sec. 6.4. Publication. The Archivist of the United States shall publish this Executive Order in the Federal Register.

BARACK OBAMA

THE WHITE HOUSE,
December 29, 2009