

## **Declassification Anomalies**

Document 12 in this briefing book includes a near-final draft of the April 16, 1992 Defense Planning Guidance that Secretary Cheney issued in January 1993 in declassified form as the “Regional Defense Strategy” (see Document 15). Much of the language in the two documents is identical or nearly so. Nevertheless, the version of the April 16 draft as released by the Defense Department included excised words and phrases—such as Israel, Japan, India, Pakistan, and North Korean nuclear program—that later appeared in the unclassified strategy document. To illustrate this, the Archive has produced an edited version of Document 12, with the excised language filled in. Not all of the words and phrases that we have added are exact matches to the excised portions, but they are very close. These examples demonstrate the subjectivity of the declassification review process; that the country names appeared in a classified document made it look like the information was still sensitive, even though it was not.

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

4/23

Larry -

NSC staff edits at paperclips.  
While some may appear as editorial,  
they are "conforming language" with  
some Presidential speeches planned  
for the next two months. The Middle  
East comments are becoming issues.  
Thanks for the opportunity.

- Dan Poley

cc:

PP (Zal/Wade)

R&P (Dale/Dave)

Larry

Carol

SL(orig)

DECLASSIFIED DEC 10 2007

Authority: EO 12958, as amended  
Chief, Records & Declass Div, WHS

Doc #2 R-4  
07-11-1928-41

Defense Planning Guidance, FY 1994-1999 (U)

(U) This Defense Planning Guidance addresses the fundamentally new situation which has been created by the collapse of the Soviet Union -- the disintegration of the internal as well as the external empire, and the discrediting of Communism as an ideology with global pretensions and influence. The new international environment has also been shaped by the victory of the United States and its Coalition allies over Iraqi aggression -- the first post-Cold War conflict and a defining event in U.S. global leadership. In addition to these two great successes, there has been a less visible one, the integration of the leading democracies into a U.S.-led system of collective security and the creation of a democratic "zone of peace."

(U) Our fundamental strategic position and choices are therefore very different from those we have faced in the past. The policies that we adopt in this new situation will set the nation's direction for the next century. Guided by a fundamentally new defense strategy, we have today a compelling opportunity to meet our defense needs at lower cost. As we do so, we must not squander the position of security we achieved at great sacrifice through the Cold War, nor eliminate our ability to shape the future security environment in ways favorable to us and those who share our values.

## I. DEFENSE POLICY GOALS (U)

(U) The national security interests of the United States are enduring, as outlined in the President's 1991 National Security Strategy Report: the survival of the United States as a free and independent nation, with its fundamental values intact and its institutions and people secure; a healthy and growing U.S. economy to ensure opportunity for individual prosperity and resources for national endeavors at home and abroad; healthy, cooperative and politically vigorous relations with allies and friendly nations; and a stable and secure world, where political and economic freedom, human rights and democratic institutions flourish.

(U) These national security interests can be translated into four mutually supportive strategic goals that guide our overall defense efforts:

- Our most fundamental goal is to deter or defeat attack from whatever source, against the United States, its citizens and forces, and to honor our historic and treaty commitments.

**Australia, Thailand and the Philippines.**

**Japan and South Korea** We will continue to encourage in particular to assume greater responsibility sharing, urging both to increase prudently their defensive capabilities to deal with threats they face and to assume a greater share of financial support for U.S. forward deployed forces that contribute to their security. **Japanese** We will also persist in efforts to ensure an equitable, two-way flow of technology in our security cooperation with advanced allies such as **Japan**. We must plan to continue to safeguard critical SLOCs linking us to our allies and trading partners. **OSD 1.4 (a)(d)**

(U) The East Asia Strategy Initiative of April 1990 remains the framework for adjustments to our forward-deployed forces in the region. Because our Pacific friends and allies are assuming greater responsibility for their defense, we can restructure our forces and reduce the number of ground and support forces forward deployed there. As Phase I of our planned withdrawals we anticipate that more than 25,000 troops will be withdrawn from bases in East Asia by December 1992. This includes the withdrawal from the Philippines. Plans to remove additional forces from **South Korea** have been suspended while we address the problem posed by the **North Korean nuclear program**. In time we will look to implement Phases II and III of the East Asia Strategy Initiative, with the objective of keeping substantial forces forward deployed in Asia for the foreseeable future. **OSD 1.4 (a)(d)**

(C) Despite recent positive trends toward political liberalization and market-oriented economic reforms, the East Asia and Pacific region continues to be burdened by several legacies of the Cold War: the Soviet annexation of the Northern Territories, the division of the **Korean Peninsula**, and the end of Communism in Europe is likely to bring pressure on remaining Communist regimes with unknown consequences for regional stability. We should continue to pursue the opening **of China** but also should ensure that **Taiwan** has the modernized armaments needed to defend itself as provided by the **Taiwan Relations Act**. **OSD 1.4 (a)(d)**

(C) Our most active regional security concern remains the conventional military threat posed by North Korea to our treaty ally, the Republic of Korea. Our concerns are intensified by North Korea's efforts to develop weapons of mass destruction and delivery systems. Although we have begun some reductions in our forces as part of shifting greater responsibility to our ally, we must maintain sufficient military capabilities together with the Republic of Korea to deter aggression by the North or to defeat it should deterrence fail. Our overall objective with regard to the Korean peninsula is to support its peaceful unification on terms acceptable to the Korean people. We should plan to maintain an alliance relationship with a unified democratic Korea.

(U) The emergence of ASEAN as an increasingly influential regional actor has been an important positive development.

will increase our presence compared to the pre-crisis period. We will want to have the capability to return forces quickly to the region should that ever be necessary. This will entail increased prepositioning of equipment and material through

OSD 1.4 (a)(d)

improved in-theater command, control, and communications, and a robust naval presence. We will also strengthen our bilateral security ties and encourage active regional collective defense.

We can strengthen stability throughout the region by sustaining and improving the self-defense capabilities and other regional friends. The United States is committed to the security of Israel and to maintaining the qualitative edge that is critical to confidence in its security and U.S.-Israel strategic cooperation contribute to the stability of the entire region, as demonstrated once again during the Persian Gulf war. At the same time, our assistance to our Arab friends to defend themselves against aggression also strengthens security throughout the region, including for Israel.

OSD 1.4 (a)(d)

(U) We can help our friends meet their legitimate defensive needs with U.S. foreign military sales without jeopardizing power balances in the region. We will tailor our security assistance programs to enable our friends to bear better the burden of defense and to facilitate standardization and interoperability of recipient country forces with our own. We must focus these programs to enable our regional friends to modernize their forces, upgrade their defense doctrines and planning, and acquire essential defensive capabilities.

We will build on existing bilateral ties and negotiate multilateral agreements to enhance military access and prepositioning arrangements and other types of defense cooperation. These protocols will strengthen and broaden the individual and collective defense of friendly states.

(U) The infusion of new and improved conventional arms and the proliferation of ballistic missiles and weapons of mass destruction during the past decade have dramatically increased offensive capabilities and the potential danger from future wars throughout the region. We will continue to work with all regional states to reduce military expenditures for offensive weapons and reverse the proliferation of nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons and long-range missiles, and prevent the transfer of militarily significant technology and resources to states which might threaten U.S. friends or upset the regional balance of power.

OSD 1.4 (a)(d)

India and Pakistan,

We will seek constructive, cooperative relations with [redacted] strive to moderate tensions between them and endeavor to prevent the further development of a nuclear arms race on the subcontinent. In this regard, we should work in South Asia

work in South Asia weapons of mass destruction

SECRET//NOFORN -- DRAFT  
Here, the Regional Security and Arms Control Working Group established in Moscow offers a valuable venue. We also continue to work with the leading suppliers of conventional weapons to the region (as in the President's 1991 middle East arms control initiative.) to

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