JAPAN: DUAL-USE TECHNOLOGIES AND NATIONAL SECURITY
JOSHUA M. ARNESTAD

INTRODUCTION
In the aftermath of WW II, Japan and the United States began an exceptionally close relationship spanning political, economic and military realms. As the US-Japanese relationship and the global security environment have evolved, so has Japan's national security policy. The political situation in and around the Pacific Rim has remained unstable during the post-war period. This instability has its roots in the conflicting interests of nations with democratic ideals and those with communist/socialist ideals. The Soviet Union's close proximity and the repercussions of its collapse further troubled the region. The instability of the successor states, and the incomplete nature of their democratic transitions, has served to raise the likelihood of weapons proliferation. Today, Japan faces several possible regional threats. Japan's likely reaction to a hostile event in the Pacific Rim depends on a number of factors. To understand Japan's geopolitical and economic environment, one must examine the political structure's ability to call for the use of force, what that force would look like and the historical events shaping current policy. Japan's current situation is shaped by its historical experience, its current economic strength, and its international position. All these factors shape how Japan might enlist dual-use space technologies if faced with a major conflict.

JAPAN—AN INTRODUCTION
Today, Japan is a constitutional monarchy, with Emperor Akihito as the symbolic head of state. Japan's political system is a representative democracy consisting of a national legislature, a prime minister, and a judicial system. These three components closely resemble the US legislative, executive, and judicial branches respectively. The National Legislature consists of a Bicameral Diet comprised of a 500 member House of Representatives and a 252 member House of Councilors. The next election will be held in July 2001.
The Prime Minister is elected directly by the Diet and must appoint a majority of the cabinet members from the Diet. Policy formulation, administration of the various government organizations and the coordination of government affairs are the joint responsibility of both the cabinet and the prime minister's office. Through this arrangement, Japan has attempted to retain a central governing capability without placing too much power in the hands of any single entity.

CURRENT POLITICAL AND STRATEGIC CONSIDERATIONS Russia: The close proximity of Japan and Russia led to a certain rivalry and a degree of mistrust between the two nations. This rivalry was especially evident during the first half of the 20th century, when the two nations were rivals for power in the Pacific Rim. Russia and Japan clashed between 1904 and 1905 in the Russo-Japanese War. Japan's victory in the war cemented its control of Korea and led Russia to cede partial control of Sakhalin Island to Japan.
Japan's relations with the USSR were also less than harmonious. "In 1938 and 1939 Soviet and Japanese armies tested each other in two full-scale battles along the border of Manchukuo. But in April 1941, a neutrality pact was signed with the Soviet Union, with German acting as an intermediary." 1 As a result of the allied victory in World War II, the USSR seized Sakhalin Islands and the Kuril Islands. Japan and the USSR re-established diplomatic relations in 1956, but relations between the two nations were cool at best. During the Cold War, Japan's dependence on the United States, and its role as a staging point for the Korean War and other demonstrations of US influence hindered the development of Soviet-Japanese relations. The USSR and Japan never formally concluded a peace treaty resolving World War II.
Since the dissolution of the USSR, Russian-Japanese relations have improved to a degree. The unresolved nature of the Kuril Islands has proved a hindrance to closer relations between Japan and Russia. However, Russia (unlike the USSR) has proved willing to discuss the status of the far northern territories with Japan. "Recent summits in 1997 and 1998 between former PM Hashimoto and [former] President Yeltsin have accelerated work on a peace treaty which would settle the northern territories dispute and normalize bilateral relations." 2 Japan has also increased aid to Russia to enhance Russian reforms and nonproliferation efforts. Since the fall of communism in the early 1990's, Japan has been more concerned about the Russian contribution to global arms trade and nuclear proliferation than about a direct Russian military attack.
South Korea: South Korea and Japan have a long, historically contentious relationship. Japan's historic role in the Asia-Pacific included its occupation of Korea in the early 20th century. After World War II, Japan and South Korea were pushed together by their mutual dependence on the United States. South Korea and Japan engaged in intermittent negotiations starting in 1951. The last round of negotiations resulted in the June 1965 establishment of diplomatic relations between South Korea and Japan. Since then, South Korea and Japan have not had a close relationship, but have found each other to be useful regional partners. The nations' close ties to the United States, both economically and militarily, led to a certain convergence in interests.
In the last ten years, South Korea and Japan have moved toward improving their relationship. Japan and South Korea are increasingly important trading partners. Japan trades over $30 billion per year with South Korea and maintains a positive trade balance. The Japanese also contribute significant amounts of foreign direct investments to South Korea. Strong ties in trade have begun to be supplemented by broader patterns of cooperation. In 1998 South Korea and Japan established a Korea-Japan Security Consultative Meeting to "promote mutual understanding and trust in the area of national security" and pledged to "actively cooperate for the stable development of the world economy through international organizations." 3
In 1995, the United States, Japan and South Korea established the Korean Peninsula Energy Development Organization (KEDO), which works with North Korea to replace its current nuclear reactors with types of nuclear reactors that could not be used to produce plutonium for nuclear weapons. Stable and peaceful relations between the two Koreas are very important to Japan's interests. Any outbreak between the two countries would draw in US forces stationed in Japan, presenting political and possible security problems for the nation.
North Korea: North Korea's isolationism, and its anti-US stance have led to minimal, but antagonistic relations between Japan and North Korea. In recent years, North Korea's attempts to develop nuclear weapons and missile technology, especially coupled with its close geographic proximity to Japan, are of great concern to Japanese strategists. North Korea has launched negative media attacks on Japan, and has proved unreliable in paying back debts owed to Japanese industry. In response to these acts, as well as North Korean terrorism against South Korea in the 1980s, Japan levied economic sanctions on North Korea. Tensions between Japan and North Korea increased following North Korea's 1998 launch of a Taepo-Dong missile over Japan. Concern over North Korea's actions and its other developments in missile technology have led some in Japan to believe in the necessity of enhancing Japan's self defense force. In recent years, relations between Japan and North Korea have improved slightly. North Korea's need for foreign aid has led it to tone down its anti-Japanese rhetoric to some degree. Japanese and North Korean negotiators held several meetings in fall 2000. "Negotiations between Japan and North Korea have been stalled for a decade over the charge that North Korea kidnapped at least 10 Japanese citizens during espionage forays on the Japanese coast between 1977 and 1980." 4 North Korea has a strong motivation to improve its relations with Japan, for that is "the country that may be most crucial to North Korea's future because it holds the key to the bank." 5 Japan is already one of the main providers of humanitarian aid to North Korea. Improved relations with North Korea would enhance Japanese security by lessening the threat posed by that nation.
China: China and Japan share a long and often contentious history. The Chinese are still mindful of Japan's military hegemony and brutal conduct during World War Two. Japan's security relationship with the United States helped make China and Japan Cold War enemies. The continued close relationship between the United States and Japan ensures a US military presence in China's back yard.
Japan's policy toward China since World War II has been closely linked to US policy. Until 1971, Japan, like the United States, recognized Taiwan, not the PRC. China and Japan established formal relations in 1972. "Japanese government leaders indicated a willingness to compromise ties with Taiwan in favor of a closer relationship with Peking." 6 Since the establishment of formal relations Japan and China have become important trading partners. The two nations signed a peace treaty in 1978, and Japan has invested in Chinese modernization projects. "Both trade and cultural contacts between Japan and China have expanded dramatically...and in the early 1990s China became Japan's second largest trading partner, surpassed only by the United States." 7
Despite their increasing economic interdependence, the Chinese-Japanese relationship remains troubled by differing stances on issues of defense and security. Chinese leaders have been disturbed by indications that recent events may cause Japan to take a more active military role in the region- including Japanese encouragement of US deployment of Theater Missile Defense. China does not likely present a direct military threat to Japan, but internal unrest or conflicts with its neighbors could impact security and trade and possibly draw in US forces just as in the Korean War. Although China possesses a nuclear force capable of striking Japan and commands both a large army and navy, its forces are geared mainly for mainland defense. The steady call for Taiwan unification by Chinese government officials has kept Japan on edge, as a conflict between the two countries would likely affect its shipping lanes and fishing industry. If US relations with China deteriorate substantially, Japan may be forced to choose between the necessity of US security guarantees, and the economic benefits of continued trade with China.
Taiwan: Taiwan and Japan share a contentious mutual history. The island of Taiwan was under Japanese control during the first half of the 20th Century, and throughout World War II. Since the founding of the modern nation of Taiwan, however, Japan and Taiwan have developed a better relationship with each other. Both nations are close allies with the United States, and have faced many of the same regional security issues, factors that nudged them into a closer relationship.
As stated above, until the 1970s, Japan, like the United States, recognized the Republic of China (i.e., Taiwan), not the PRC, as the legitimate nation of China. Even after the truncation of formal relations, "Japan has maintained economic but not diplomatic relations with Taiwan, where a strong bilateral trade relationship thrives." 8 As both nations' economies developed, Japan became one of Taiwan's most important trading partners. Japan has worked to deepen its ties with Taiwan, as well as other newly industrializing nations in Asia.
While Japan has been careful not to provoke the PRC in its dealings with Taiwan, Japan has indicated an understanding of Taiwan's security dilemma vis--vis China, and a certain sympathy for the fate of one of the few other stable Asian democracies. At the same time, Japan's first priority is to safeguard its own security. Japan has stressed the necessity of a peaceful resolution to the Taiwan situation.

MILITARY -STRUCTURE, DOCTRINE AND TECHNOLOGIES
Japan's defense agency heads the four staff offices. These offices oversee the daily operations of the Ground Self-Defense Force (GSDF), the Air Self-Defense Force (ASDF) and the Maritime Self-Defense Force (MSDF), collectively called the Self-Defense Force (SDF). The SDF is a modest force commanding a budget of no more than 1% of Japan's Gross Domestic Product (GDP) and is designed mainly to ward off attack until the United States can send reinforcements or to aid its domestic counterparts in responding to natural disasters. In the case of a national emergency, the Prime Minister as head of the Defense Agency, must obtain the approval of the Diet before authorizing Japan's Self Defense Forces into action. The following table lists the major decisions and policy formulations since the end of WWII regarding the SDF.

Historical Events in Japanese Defense Programs
1945- Allied forces occupy Japan.
1947- Article 9 of the Constitution ratified on May 3 precludes offensive forces through a "war renunciation Clause."
1952- Mutual Security Assistance Pact ratified. The US agrees to target external aggression and allow Japan to deal with both internal threats and natural disasters.
- Armaments production resumes, in large part to repair and maintain US equipment.
1954- Self-Defense Forces Law enabled the creation of the GSDF, MSDF and ASDF under civilian control.
- Domestic defense industry began to arm the newly formed SDF.
1956- National Defense Council organized to advise the cabinet on defense related matters.
- The Basic Atomic Energy Law limits the research, development and utilization of nuclear power for peaceful purposes.
- National policy dictates that Japan will not possess, manufacture or traffic in nuclear weapons.
1957- The Basic Policy for National Defense is set. Japan agrees to support the UN, promote international cooperation, stabilize domestic affairs, enhance public welfare, gradually develop a self-defense force and deal with external aggression in conjunction with the United States.
1960- Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security with the United States is approved. Either party can revoke the treaty with one year's notice.
1970- Defense Agency director Yasuhiro establishes five objectives for the SDF: (1) maintain Japan's industrial base for national security; (2) acquire equipment from domestic R&D and production efforts; (3) use civilian industries for domestic arms production; (4) set long term goals for R&D and production; and (5) introduce competition into defense production.
1976- The National Defense Program Outline was adopted by the cabinet. The outline clearly defined the defensive role and specified the mission of the SDF. The SDF budget was limited to 1% of GDP and exports of weapons and weapons technology were banned.
- Japan accedes to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, as a non-nuclear state, underscoring its 1956 policies on nuclear weapons.
1980s- Ships in the MSDF were armed with live torpedoes for more effective deterrence of aggression.
- The Joint Staff Council was enlarged, and a central command and communications system was established, connecting all tactical and HQ based defense units.
1986- The FY 1986 - 1990 Midterm Defense Estimate targeted upgrades to air defense, interceptor-fighter aircraft, surface-to-air missiles, antisubmarine warfare capability, the destroyer fleet, patrol aircraft and intelligence, reconnaissance, command, control and communications
- The Defense Council was dissolved, and the National Security Council under the prime minister's control.
1987- The 1% ceiling on defense expenditures was lifted.
- SDF communication systems were upgraded to a microwave network with a communications satellite relay.
- Japanese government reviews ways to help allies protect shipping lanes in the Persian Gulf, including the benign activity of deploying minesweepers. The government funds the installation of radio navigation guides for gulf shipping.
1992- The National Diet passed the UN Peacekeeping Cooperation Law, permitting the SDF to participate in UN medical assistance, refugee aid, transportation, infrastructure repair, and election monitoring and policing operations under limited conditions.
1993- 600 SDF personnel were deployed to Cambodia for UN engineering and election monitoring projects.
-53 SDF personnel were deployed to Mozambique to participate in peacekeeping operations.

As the above chronology suggests, Japan has been slowly upgrading its self-defense capabilities and has developed a limited ability to contribute to international peacekeeping efforts. It has also taken more responsibility in funding the US installations on its territory. Japan now spends about 10% of its total defense budget to support US forces, and has assumed all responsibility for utilities and building maintenance costs associated with US bases. In 1990, Japan's government raised its defense R&D spending from 2% to 5% of the total defense budget. In order to boost domestic defense production, lower the procurement of equipment from foreign nations, and build a more robust industrial base for its defense contractors, Japan has recently lifted some export bans on defense technology. This action has allowed economies of scale to emerge in some sectors, and has improved efficiency. Dual-use electronic sub-components, vehicles, and transport and communications equipment are now exported to the United States and selected other countries.
The structure in figure 1 was implemented following WW II, and was intended to prevent the concentration of power seen in Japan's pre-war system. The structure also ensures civilian oversight of the military, via the Prime Minister and six internal bureaus. The Prime Minister and these bureaus are charged with drafting policy, training, education, personnel, financial and equipment requirements for the SDF. Civilian control and separation of powers across the forces has resulted in problems with inter-service coordination. However, recent command and communication upgrades have helped unify the forces.

Figure 1: The Command Structure of the Japanese Self Defense force. The Prime Minister, the civilian commander, is, in extreme emergencies, authorized to use the force without consulting with the national Diet. The heads of the three services, and of the Joint Staff Council, are of equal power, and report to the director general of defense.

Japanese forces provide a deterrent to any potential adversary. In a conflict, Japan's forces would quickly be supplemented by US forces and weapons. Japan's military is often enlisted by civil authorities to aid in disaster relief. Public sentiment in Japan is still highly averse to offensive capability. The following brief description of the forces will allow a better understanding of the high-technology, and defense-orientated focus of Japan's military. Maps detailing the locations of the military bases and installations can be found in Appendix A.

Air Self-Defense Force—The mission of Japan's Air Self-Defense Force (ASDF) is to defend Japan from seaborne and airborne attack, maintain constant alert status, and deter invasion. Other responsibilities include providing air support to the Ground Self-Defense Force and Maritime Self-Defense Force. The ASDF consists of three ground attack squadrons, nine fighter squadrons, one reconnaissance squadron, and five transport squadrons. Total manpower numbers 46,000. The ASDF has 330 combat aircraft, including the F15-J. Airlift Capabilities include the C-1, C-130H and YS-11 Aircraft, and ground systems include Basic Air Defense Ground Environment, an integrated network of radar installations and air defense direction centers.
The weaknesses of this force include: the low levels of precision guided munitions, little open water flight training, and a poor base defense capability. Additional Units include the Airborne Early Warning Group (Misawa), Tactical Reconnaissance Group (Hyakuri), Air Support Command, Air Development Test Command, and the Air Material Command.

Maritime Self-Defense Force—The mission of the Maritime Self-Defense Force (MSDF) is to defend Japan from maritime invasion and secure the safety of maritime traffic around Japan. This last is essential, since 90% of all imports are delivered through sea routes. Operations include patrol, escort, and defense of key ports and straits. Formations consist of five district units, the fleet guard, and five district headquarters. The MSDF's capabilities include Anti Submarine warfare, Anti Air warfare, Anti Surface warfare, Mine warfare, Electronic warfare, Surveillance, Transport, and Rescue. Total manpower numbers 44,000. The Maritime Self-Defense Force also has aviation capabilities consisting of 205 total fixed wing aircraft, as well as EP-3 multipurpose aircraft, used primarily for electronic warfare. Electronic warfare includes electronic detection and missile alarm, electronic jamming, chaff rocket launches and radar evasion. Other aviation capabilities include amphibious rescue planes, helicopters, and the SH-60J for conducting submarine searches. Sea power includes 13 submarines, 43 mine warfare ships, 11 patrol craft, and 6 amphibious ships. The maritime force is exceptionally well trained. All recruits learn patrol, gunnery, mine sweeping, convoy and transport techniques. The weaknesses of the Maritime Self-Defense Force include reliance on the ASDF for air cover, limited resources to conduct extended patrols, an absence of aircraft carriers, low levels of long-range surface to air missiles and close-range weapons, few replenishment ships, and a low level of logistical support.

the Ground Self-Defense Force (GSDF) is to deter attack, repulse a small invasion, and provide a holding action until reinforced by US forces.
Formations include of five regional armies consisting of one armored division, 12 infantry divisions, one airborne brigade, two combined brigades, one artillery brigade, two air defense brigades, one helicopter brigade and antitank helicopter platoons. Manpower totals 156,000. Aircraft include CH-47J carrier helicopters, UH-1J Utility helicopters and AH-1 Antitank Helicopters.
Ground equipment includes Surface-to-Ship Missile Launchers, Multiple Rocket Systems, Antitank / Antiaircraft Missile Launchers, Tanks, Type 89 Fighting Vehicles and Type 93 Surface-to-Air Missiles. The weaknesses of this force are that the number of personnel is insufficient to enable an immediate shift onto emergency footing. The ratio of enlisted to officer personnel is high, requiring augmentation by minimally trained reserves and volunteers during crisis. Because of a high population density, live fire training opportunities are limited, resulting in less than optimal combat training conditions and low troop morale.

SPACE TECHNOLOGIES AND APPLICATIONS
THE JAPANESE SPACE PROGRAM

Japan is one of the few nations worldwide with indigenous launch capability. Japan's government funded space activities are principally the responsibility of the National Space Development Agency of Japan (NASDA). NASDA reports directly to the prime minister's office. Mission success and cooperation are NASDA's guiding principles. The agency has received increased funding and levels of personnel without exception since its inception in 1969. NSDA was established explicitly for peaceful principles, and reflects Japan's view of outer space as the haven for the future of humanity. NASDA commands an extensive infrastructure of both ground based and space based assets, including 13 separate facilities, and seven operational satellites. Major missions include monitoring the earth for environmental conditions, conducting communication satellite experiments, and demonstrating technologies for future space operations. Through these activities, NASDA has also developed an extensive data management capability.
Since 1969 NASDA has managed 24 successful launches, using four booster types, and three classes of satellites. It consistently seeks cooperation with other nations in almost all its endeavors and has current ongoing projects with NASA, the European Space Agency, French Space Agency and the German Aerospace Center. A major effort is underway to provide the Japanese Experiment Module for the International Space Station Project. This module, named Kibo, is slated to be launched in 2004. Kibo will be assembled in orbit after its launch. Through cooperation and partnerships, Japan has been able to develop an overarching national context for space, in which space contributes to both its economic and military stability.
Japan's space program reflects the overwhelmingly peaceful orientation of the nation. However, given Japan's space capabilities, if Japan is ever seriously threatened, it could enlist the services of its own space-based assets and use its civil ground infrastructure to aid in a defensive stand. Additionally, its high level of space related knowledge could be leveraged by allied nations operating their own space platforms. The expertise represented by NASDA's 11,000+ workforce is also a substantial asset. Japan has an impressive capability to verify and integrate commercial satellite capabilities or information into defense plans. Because launch technologies for boosters and long-range missiles are similar and Japan relies heavily on electronic warfare, creative solutions to evade enemy missile attack could also be employed.

NASDA GROUND FACILITIES
Tsukuba Space Center (TKSC)—Approximately 4,000 people work at TKSC, a consolidated operations center. TKSC serves as the central command and control hub for the entire network of stations in the tracking and control network. Main functions include continuous orbital tracking, telemetry analysis, and evaluating the health of all spacecraft. In addition to operations, the center is responsible for the identification and development of new facilities, technologies and software necessary to operate future space systems. Other capabilities include spacecraft integration and test facilities, vacuum chamber test facilities, and a computing center.
Tanegashima Space Center (TNSC)—The TNSC is NASDA's largest facility. It performs a wide range of functions, including spacecraft testing and assembly, booster integration, launch for both the J-I and H-II boosters, and post-launch tracking. Also at the center are engine test facilities, the range control room, two radar stations, an optical observation facility and a space museum.
Kakuda Propulsion Center (KPC)— The KPC is the prime facility for the development of new rocket-propulsion systems. KPC's facilities include a High Altitude Test Firing Stand for performing test firings of upper stage rockets in a simulated space environment. Additional functions include the testing of liquid hydrogen and oxygen systems, high vacuum simulations for thermal modeling, solar environment replication and data analysis.
Katsuura / Masuda / Okinawa / Kiruna Tracking and Communication Stations— These four facilities complete the tracking and control systems coordinated by the TKSC. NASDA's remaining facilities are devoted to management, research and data management, and do not contribute to the daily operations of space assets. (See Appendix 1 for facilities.)

SPACE LAUNCH
Two indigenously developed launch vehicles are currently available to Japan. The first is the H-II, a two-stage launch vehicle, capable of launching a two-ton satellite into geostationary orbit. Since the beginning of its operation in 1993, this launch vehicle has successfully been used to launch 11 satellites into orbit. Its second stage is liquid fueled and contains an inertial guidance system. Japan's second indigenous launch vehicle is the J-1 three stage solid launch vehicle capable of lifting a one ton satellite into geostationary orbit. The J-1 combines the upper stage of the H-II with the upper stage of the MU-3S II, a rocket developed by Japan's Institute of Space and Astronautical Science. The J-1 is intended to enable rapid launch capability and lower the cost of launch site operations. The integration of these two boosters demonstrates Japan's progress in making space technologies more interoperable and is a testament to the Japanese ability to integrate existing complex technologies. This capability and technological expertise could be leveraged in a crisis, and could enable the application of civil capabilities to warfighting.

EARTH OBSERVATION SATELLITES
Japan's earth observation experience dates to the 1987 launch of the Marine Observation Satellite. Japan then launched the Japanese Earth Resource Satellite and the Advanced Earth Observation Satellite (ADEOS), which failed prematurely. ADEOS II is scheduled to launch in late 2001 and will carry two 250 meters resolution sensors. ADEOS II designed to monitor the oceans, the ozone layer, the atmosphere, the weather, and rain forest conditions, and will carry a suite of near infrared, synthetic aperture radar, microwave, electro-optical and multi-spectral imagers.
The Advanced Land Observing Satellite and two Information Gathering Satellites (IGS) are scheduled to be launched in 2002. They will add substantial flexibility and resolution to imaging operations by improving resolution to 2.5 meters and 1 meter respectively. One IGS satellites will be electro-optical and the other will be a synthetic aperture radar satellite, enabling imaging operations under any weather condition. In addition, four satellites are being planned to replace ADEOS II in order to better monitor global environmental changes.

FIGURE 2: THE REMOTE SENSING SYSTEM IN JAPAN: Organizations in blue are Incorporated Foundations, private sector foundations that perform non-profit activities in support of public interest. The structure is complex and seeks to satisfy the requirements of both government and industry. This bureaucracy yields closer relationships across industry and government, and an integrated system capable of using both commercial and government data.

Space Advisory Council (SAC)
--Conducts inter-ministerial coordination.
User Ministries
--Provide remote sensing requirements to responsible organizations.
Science and Technology Agency (STA)
--Overall responsibility for space policy, technological development and international standards
Remote Sensing Technology Center of Japan (RESTEC)
--Supervised by both STA and NASDA, RESTEC is an incorporated foundation founded in 1975 to support
public interest. Distributes data for commercial use.
National Space Development Agency of Japan (NASDA)
--NASDA initiates and implements most spacecraft developments.
Office of Earth Observation Systems
--Responsible for policy, planning, design, research and development of all remote sensing satellites
Earth Observation Center (EOC)
--Established in 1978, the EOC receives, processes and stores data from Japanese and foreign
satellites (LANDSAT, SPOT and ERS)
Earth Observation Research Center (EORC)
--Established in 1995, the EORC focuses on data utilization and is developing map production, land
use, resource exploration and disaster monitoring capabilities. Distributes data for public use
Ministry of International Trade and Industry (MITI)
--Responsible for payload developments and commercialization of both technology and data
Earth Remote Sensing Data Analysis Center (ERSDAC)
--Incorporated foundation to promote technological development and data analysis for
non-commercial use
Japan Resource Observation System Org. (JAROS)
--Payload development for non-commercial use

COMMUNICATION SATELLITES
The only communications satellite currently operated by NASDA is the Communications and Broadcasting Engineering Test Satellite. This satellite operates in geostationary orbit, and, although a test satellite, relays data to Japan's ground stations. The next two communication satellites, both planned for launch in early 2001, will be able to transmit and receive laser signals, enabling tracking and control of spacecraft from other space platforms, and development of space communications networks.
In addition to earth observation and communication satellite technology development, NASDA is testing and verifying a variety of technologies. These technologies will enable less expensive and more readily available access to space, as well as the operation of both larger satellite infrastructures, and smaller, more capable, satellites. They will focus on studying the environment around the moon, in order to lay the groundwork for possible future habitation and commercial development.

IMPLICATIONS OF SPACE ACTIVITIES
THE SDF AND NASDA AS CRITICAL NATIONAL INSTITUTIONS
Both the Japanese Defense Agencies' Self-Defense Force (SDF) and the National Space Development Agency of Japan (NASDA) are integral to Japan's space power structure. The SDF's inclusion is essential, as its mandate is to be the main line of Japan's defense against external threats. NASDA's inclusion is appropriate because the organization represents Japan's economic strength, technological prowess, peaceful approach, and the bulk of its space capability.

Figure 3: Japan's political structure responsible for the research, development and operation of capabilities to enable national defense and space development. Although strictly segregated, both functions are managed jointly through the Prime Minister and the cabinet.

The chart in figure 3 presents the main decision-making chain for research, development and operational issues pertaining to both organizations. It also serves to highlight the joint control shared by the prime minister and the cabinet in areas of both space and defense. With joint purview over both the space and defense sectors it becomes an inherently collective effort to balance national security concerns with a broader vision for space use and associated economic benefits. Such collective oversight leaves the door open for the dual-use of technological capability.
Japan is a technologically advanced nation with a highly educated workforce. Despite Japan's peaceful orientation, it is possible that in a conflict, the SDF would call on civil or even commercial space organization and their vast institutional knowledge for assistance. The close geographical proximity of SDF and NASDA facilities suggests that the relationships to allow use of civil space assets for defense support may already be in place. While the technical potential for Japan's space assets to become dual-use exists, it is difficult to imagine a situation where the strict borders between Japan's military and its civilian and commercial structures would be broken down in this way. In fact, it is widely acknowledged that there exists no plan to support the SDF with civilian aircraft or merchant fleets in times of crisis, and no cooperative contingency planning has been acknowledged with any other civilian agency.
Japan's mainland is not rich in natural resources; thus, Japan relies heavily on the Middle East for its energy needs. The Indian Ocean, Strait of Malacca, and South China Sea are all important to Japanese trade. In any regional conflict Japan would require US naval aid to guide and escort its ships safely through disputed areas. This arrangement is necessary because of the MSDF's prohibition from active participation in military conflicts unless Japan has been directly attacked. The MSDF could, however, provide surveillance, intelligence and search-and-rescue assistance to US operations. Under these conditions space-based remote sensing systems and communication capabilities could be useful, even though they were developed for environmental purposes. The high concentration of MSDF and NASDA facilities in and around Tokyo could aid in the rapid utilization of these capabilities.
Certain characteristics of Japan's space systems also make them potentially useful in a conflict situation. For example, in addition to the sensors aboard the planned ALOS and IGS spacecraft outlined above, the suite of sensors on the ADEOS II satellites could be used to provide moderate resolution intelligence data during war. As well, NASDA'S Communications and Broadcasting Engineering Test Satellite could become highly integral to a regional conflict. This geostationary satellite has constant visibility of one half of the earth radiating out from Japan. NASDA's Earth Observation and Earth Observation Research Center could in a crisis, enhance Japan's intelligence gathering and capabilities. Japan's advanced civil and commercial communications grid could also prove a potential asset.

US POLICY CONSIDERATIONS- JAPAN AND THE PACIFIC RIM Defeat in World War II led Japan to adopt a defensive and non-aggressive military stance. In 1952, the Mutual Security Pact between the US and Japan was ratified. In 1960, the Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security further increased the bond between the two countries. Japan and the US now collaborate on $250 million of joint research and development activities that include upgrades to ammunition, engine development, laser technology and work on ballistic missile defense systems. President Bush is seeking to strengthen ties with the island nation, because of Japan's strategic location and its close proximity to both Russia and China.
Japan and the United States share a common interest in maintaining peace in the Asian theatre. Post-WWII ties between the two nations have remained strong and further integration of activities is not only beneficial to the two nations' mutual security, but necessary to maintain peace in the international system. Japan currently operates 100 P-3C's which are used to perform surveillance missions within 1,000 nautical miles of its coastline. The US Navy maintains 251 of the same aircraft to perform a broad array of missions, including surveillance and anti-submarine warfare. Officials from both countries have stated that they have a strong desire to ensure interoperability of the replacement platform chosen for both nations' aircraft, which are slated for replacement by 2010. Talks are currently underway for possible cooperative development of the successor platform. Even if joint development does not come to fruition, both countries desire joint surveillance capabilities.
Of the $250 million spent on joint research and development activities with the US, about $10 million of it is on missile defense. This issue is especially sensitive to Japanese policymakers because Japan's constitution prohibits them from acting collectively with other militaries. If a national missile defense system were deployed jointly by Japan and the US, Japan would conceivably be violating its own constitution. Additional complications arise from the fact that missile defense would target primarily nuclear weapons and potentially violate Japan's non-nuclear policies. A decision to implement national missile defense would also appear to imply an expansion of Japan's military capability, a move that might cause public opposition within Japan.
The barriers to full cooperation between the US and Japan in purely military matters are sidestepped by the joint development and interoperability of surveillance and intelligence systems. Japan's independent development of the Information Gathering Satellites shows a commitment to advancing indigenous remote sensing capabilities and decreasing their reliance on the United States for monitoring activities in Asia. Despite their path toward increased independence, the Japanese intend to maintain intelligence systems that are interoperable with US systems, as is shown by discussions with the US about the P-3C successor plane. Given current close links between US and Japanese intelligence sector, perhaps, the logical next step for the two nations is not to push for joint deployment of a national missile defense system, but first to approach the issue from a perspective centered on cooperation in space-based intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance. After the Information Gathering Satellites are launched, the US and Japan can investigate ways to collaboratively gather information as is already done for surveillance aircraft. Such an arrangement would not violate Japan's constitution and would allow the two nations to explore and determine how space systems can be independent, but synergistically employed.

CONCLUSIONS
As is evident throughout this paper, Japan is technically adept and has a rich history of space system development and operations. The lingering memory of World War II has helped make today's Japan an advocate for peace and stability. The Japanese government has demonstrated its commitment to the peaceful utilization of space through participation in the International Space Station. Thanks to the trend of increasing military autonomy and the close proximity of military and space facilities, there is little question that Japan can utilize aspects of space systems to augment its military if required. The launch and initialization of its IGS satellites will only strengthen this capability. The US should respect Japan's rich history and benign tendencies and seek to engage Japan in interoperable efforts to enhance security in and through space. US-Japan cooperation has been very successful on Earth and should be expanded to encompass space security missions in a matter that will not counter national principles.


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APPENDIX A- JAPAN'S SELF DEFENSE FORCE- MAPS AND FIGURES
The following force breakouts are intended to provide a brief glimpse of Japan's defense capability. Although not all divisions and units are displayed, the basic geographical spread of each force is accurate. The high concentration of MSDF assets around Tokyo is a testament to the importance placed on protecting the vibrant trade industry.

AIR SELF-DEFENSE FORCE
BASES AND FACILITIES

MARINE SELF-DEFENSE FORCE
BASES AND FACILITIES

Ground Self-Defense Force
Bases and Facilities

Japanese Space Systems
Center, Launch Sites, and Installations
NOTE
- As noted in the text of this paper, Japan's space programs are not military in nature. The display of this graphic in this appendix is for convenience only, and should not be taken to imply a military purpose for Japan's space program.

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