JUNE 22ND, 2000

Symposium Summary
Prepared by Becky Jimerson

In his welcoming remarks, Dr. Logsdon took note of the increasing and important convergences among international affairs, national security, and space policy. These convergences make discussions such as this at the Space Policy Institute, as well as other forums for science and technology policy, increasingly significant.

Dr. Williamson reflected that the study of dual-purpose technologies must incorporate knowledge from a broad range of specialties, and experts. The key to productive examination of dual-purpose[1] technologies is to bring the security and space communities together. They each hold different expectations of the technologies that both sectors shares. This symposium provides a chance to set forth the security and civil space issues that will be important in the near future. Technologies such as satellite communications, remote sensing, and GPS, as well as launch vehicles, are developing rapidly and have deep implications for U.S. economic, space, and security policy.

Examining space and security policy first necessitates an understanding of the vision, objectives, guidelines, and implementation measures that constitute policy-courses of action that are designed to influence future related decisions. A policy articulates the need for capabilities. Policy, doctrine, and strategy are not identical concepts, though the terms are often used as though they are interchangeable.
HISTORICAL CONTEXT- The geopolitical realities of the Cold War shaped the development and execution of space policy. Principles from the Eisenhower Administration-the right to self-defense, the importance of defense/security commitments to US allies, the separation of the national security and civil space sectors, freedom of transit through space, and sovereignty of space vehicles- molded US space policy. During the Cold War, national policy focused on US-Soviet nuclear competition, and peacetime nuclear deterrence. This focus led to the rise of a specialized R&D subculture within defense, with tight security controls and also to national security space assuming the highest priority. This prioritization resulted in a government focus on developing leading edge technology to support security objectives. US space policy has remained fairly consistent, throughout numerous administrations, with space activities recognized as a topic that requires presidential attention. Since the late 1950s, space policies have been evolutionary, rather than revolutionary, building on maturity and experience. US leadership in space technology emerged as a common thread with high priority in each administration.
EXTANT POLICY - In September 1996, the Clinton Administration issued its national space policy. This was the first post-Cold War assessment, and directed that the US maintain leadership by supporting a strong, stable, balanced space program that serves national security and other goals. This document sets out the vision and direction for conduct of US space activities, in defense, intelligence, the civil sector, interaction with commercial and intersector guidance on matters that cut across government and private sectors. This document also deals with foreign access to US remote sensing, nonproliferation, ballistic missiles/ ABM treaty, and the convergence of defense and civil weather satellites. It is a broad umbrella document for issues and themes in US space policy.
KEY FACTORS AND TRENDS - Several key factors and trends have shaped policy formulation over last decade. One key factor is the changing international security environment, that is, the shift from a bipolar to a multipolar international environment. As well, the current era is marked by a diffusion of political, military, economic power, in which the United States is left as the only superpower. Thus, today's national strategy has shifted from a focus on the global challenge posed by the USSR, to protecting US peace and prosperity through engagement and enlargement. The goal is not containment, but democratic and economic engagement. Other main characteristics of the post-Cold War era are the changes in resource allocation and force structure. Defense funding has decreased by 30% since 1989, and forces have declined by 33%. At the same time, there have been increased operational and personnel requirements, for the United States has been involved in numerous foreign engagements, including peacekeeping missions. These changes make space forces increasingly utilized and valuable to US decision making and military operations. Space is a practical, not just theoretical asset.
Today's rapid pace of innovation and resultant advancements in sensors, computers, and communications technologies, have made it much easier to gather, process, fuse, exploit, and disseminate information. As well, today's non-nuclear weapons have greater range, penetration, accuracy, and lethality than ever before. In the civil community, commercialization and globalization of space technologies has grown. Increases in private sector investment, and increasing commercial launches and revenues are changing how space is approached by policymakers. Further, the private sector has focused on value-added services. Intersector cooperation is also an increasing, an increasingly significant trend, as the barriers between sectors decrease, Such cooperation allows the military to adapt to constrained budgets, improve coordination and integration, increase government/private sector partnerships, and cooperate internationally. Because the use of outer space remains expensive, nations, firms, and other actors are beginning to pool their resources to access it more effectively. The worldwide proliferation of space capabilities, including technologies, space systems, and knowledge, has resulted in more nations that are capable of accessing space. Hence, more nations are able to use space in a military context- possibly posing a challenge to US defense strategy and operations.
IMPLICATIONS- The ability to exploit the vantage point of space is a vital US national interest, space has important roles in national security, economic well-being, and the successful transition to globalization. Space systems now provide one of the major components of a global, national defense, information-based infrastructure. The uninterrupted flow of information is key, and requires access to space and space systems. Hence, the US armed forces are expected to be vigilant in protecting space as a key area of national interest. Space technologies enable the pursuit of a comprehensive military doctrine, and have key roles in the national military strategy, as set forth in Joint Vision 2020. Key capabilities such as deterrence and force projection depend on space capabilities. Space capabilities help to sustain force posture, support the credibility of threats, and, if deterrence fails, make US forces more effective. Space capabilities are one of several essential high technology force multipliers which increase combat power, and effectiveness of forces.
History shows that no medium has ever remained a "sanctuary" from armed conflict once it was used, even indirectly, for military purposes. This suggests that there will be some degree of militarization of space. As well, the expansion of commerce to new regions often leads to development of military capabilities to protect economic interests. It is essential to realize, therefore, that US space control is likely to be challenged in various ways in the coming years. It is also essential to continue to leverage partnerships, enhance intersector and international cooperation, and find other ways to minimize the risk and cost of space activities. Even as cooperation is pursued, however, it is important to keep defense and security issues in mind. Cooperation, while generally positive, can add to proliferation and the diffusion of space capabilities- trends which must be monitored to ensure they do not damage US security.
CONCLUSIONS - The evolution of US government policy on space is guided by the interlocking desires for enhanced US prestige and influence, stronger national security, and greater economic growth. It is very likely that access and use of outer space will become even more important in future years, emerging as an indisputable national interest. Trends such as globalization, the growth and advancements of information technologies, and the increasing use of space-based components of information systems make space highly relevant to US interests. The United States cannot afford to abandon use of space, or cede control of space, if vital US interests are to be protected.

Questions and Answers
Question- When talking to commercial providers of satellite and launch services about incorporating defense-oriented hardening and other specifications into their hardware, they say that there are few threats, and these modifications are not necessary or feasible within their business plans. Do you have a comment on that?
Response- It is certainly true that, in general, the private sector doesn't see protection from threats as key. Meeting defense requirements is seen as too expensive, and unlikely to be necessary. There is a need to build awareness in commercial sector that there may be threats, and to provide incentives for commercial firms to meet defense needs.
Comment- The commercial sector has, so far, been more successful in cooperating with NASA than with the Defense Department.
Response- This is true, and DOD is now working to improve relations with the commercial sector. DOD is beginning to do more to leverage cooperation with private firms.
Question- There is a lot of talk about transparency- do you believe it is a credible factor in policy trends?
Response- Transparency is not an easy issue to address- there are rarely easy yes or no answers to questions about transparency. Usually transparency is a positive factor, because, in general, greater access to information supports US principles. While transparency is usually better for the United States than for its adversaries, there is, of course, a need to ensure that increased transparency doesn't threaten US interests.

General Moorman stated that he has a long-term interest in space commercialization, dual-use technologies, and national security. Indeed, 25 years ago, he worked on policy for the then secret National Reconnaissance Office. The last 40 years have brought striking changes in technologies and policies. For 40 years, activities in space have been overwhelmingly the sphere of governmental and quasi-governmental actors. Yet, in 1996, for the first time, commercial launches exceeded government launches. More money is now being made from, and invested in, commercial space than ever before, and there is a growing new commercial market for space businesses.
Nevertheless, we must must mix a substantial dose of caution with this optimism. Outer space is still expensive to access and a risky investment. The failure of Iridium and the fact that the earlier predictions of 100 commercial launches a year proved overly optimistic have led to hesitancy about the use of outer space. Considering commercial space today requires examining the lessons learned from the mid-1990's, and trying to determine what works, and what doesn't work in commercial space.
If policy-makers are to address the complexity of commercial space they must first assess the current situation. Today, expectations are lower than they were 5 years ago. Successes and failures have been quite different than predictions- direct to home television has been an area of rapid growth, but many of the new satellite communications ventures have failed to live up to their promises. Remote sensing has advanced technologically, but it remains to be seen whether these systems are actually commercially viable. The growth of the GPS market seems more secure, at least for GPS units and services. GPS units have become cheaper and more popular, and GPS has increasingly been integrated with GIS. The recent discontinuation of selective availability increases expectations for GPS's commercial potential.
The second key task for policy-makers is to re-evaluate government strategies for partnerships. In satellite communications, US government funding has helped different programs to succeed. Yet, it has proved difficult to balance government and commercial interests. Launch is especially challenging because demand for launches is highly dependent on fluctuations in satellite needs. In remote sensing, it is becoming obvious that the greatest potential profit lies in the value-added sector-that is, in the analysis leading to useful information, not in the imagery itself. In the coming decades, government and industry must work as partners to develop and utilize space systems. This means that both sides must be willing to modify their strategies, and adapt their operational styles.
The need for governmental re-evaluation of partnerships is based, in large part, upon the fact that, as the available federal budget for space activities decreases, acting alone in space becomes increasingly difficult. The government (civil, defense, and intelligence) and industrial sectors all have unique capabilities. These sectors should pursue their unique capabilities when possible, and benefit from each others' expertise. The government will need some dedicated satellite capacities; yet, many governmental needs for satellite services can be met through appropriately constructed cooperative arrangements. There are significant differences in the culture and terminology of the sectors, differences that will have to be overcome in forming partnerships. Today, industry wants to obtain funding from the government, but is largely unwilling to accept governmental input concerning system design. However, if the government is playing a major funding role, some oversight and input should also be available. In the launch sector, new partnerships are being pursued. One example of this is NASA's transfer of shuttle operations to a private company.
It is likely that future years will see the creation of more systems intended to serve both commercial and national security requirements. This will require a philosophical change in the government, not only in the mission offices, but also in regulatory organizations, as well as in Congress. It is not possible- or necessary- to police everything- instead, it is essential to focus on the major threats, and still allow free trade. It is important to establish an export control regime that works for both the government and private sectors, and work to create partnerships between national security and commercial sectors. A history of partnerships and trust will make it easier to deal with security issues if they arise. It is essential to consider the financial health of this industry- space ventures can and do fail, but investment in, and attention to, the industry must continue. The next president must keep space as a high priority, and encourage the growth of commercial space. Interdependence between all aspects of space is an increasingly important trend. Space policies must address and consider the various commercial sectors, as well as national security space.

Questions and Answers
Question- Is there sufficient industrial base for a fully commercial launch business?
Response- Today there is not yet such an industrial base. It is important for the government to act as a partner in the launch business. The government will have to manage this sector to a degree in order to maintain competitiveness.
Question- Regarding the practice of buying on orbit (buying completed and orbiting satellite systems), do you think there is a connection between launch failures and lack of government oversight?
Response- The government still has an essential role in guaranteeing range safety. With proper oversight, buying on orbit can be safe and practical. It is possible for government and commercial interests to work together for oversight and safety.
Question- Considering the convergence between space sectors, what are your recommendations for the next administration concerning the organization of space?
Response- First of all, it was a mistake to have done away with the National Space Council. Today, conflicts between sectors are far too often resolved based on the personalities of individuals, rather than within an organizational framework. It is important for the government to guide convergence between sectors, and to examine the organization and management of national security space.

Outer space has proved to be a highly fluid medium. Today, the sectors that make up commercial space are very different from earlier predictions. The continuing theme, which encompasses such issues as export control, missile proliferation, spectrum allocation, and the growing challenges of dual-use aspects, is of tensions between public and private sectors. The role of the government is no longer always clear.
This new conflict can be characterized as the conflict between merchants and guardians. Merchants are characteristically flexible, concerned with profits, able to deal with other cultures, and don't require history, or common culture for interactions. Security is not a high priority in the merchant culture. Guardians, on the other hand, tend to be hierarchical and place a high value on tradition, loyalty and noncorruption. Guardians are slower moving, and take the position that history matters, and that trust should be built up over time. Innovation is not necessarily valuable or desirable, from a guardian perspective.
These two different cultures result in very different perspectives, priorities, and views of the spread of information. Merchants and guardians do not balance the threat of information proliferation with profits from information in the same way. The tensions between these two groups are unavoidable, but must be dealt with, because the two groups are linked, and are both part of modern national power. Guardians are necessary for efficient functioning of merchants, for society and markets are enabled by guardians and their rules. Merchants in turn provide the wealth and resources necessary for the support of the guardians. If there is, indeed, such a linkage, the question is how are we to encourage and optimize interaction? The former National Space Council was valuable in this respect because it forced representatives from different communities together, and required them to interact with and learn from each other. Today, there is a search for other forums in which to do this.
The merchants and guardians conflict is not restricted to the United States. It can be seen in Japan, in Europe, with Galileo, and in the Russian launch debates. Many international aspects of these tensions are dealt with by organizations such as the International Telecommunication Union (ITU), the World International Property Organization, various UN agencies, and the World Trade Organization. The United States needs to work with these agencies, many of which are centered in Geneva, not Washington. This is especially necessary now, with the growth of dual-use space systems.
It is important for the United States to participate in multilateral organizations, and develop rules for interacting with Europe, Russia, China and other key players. To a large extent, the United States has focused on missile proliferation, and has paid little attention to maintaining stable and friendly relations with Europe in other areas of space trade. US-European tensions have arisen over the allocation of radio spectrum, encryption, privacy, and export controls, yet the United States has not made these issues a high international priority. Decisions made in foreign nations can and will impact both U.S. merchants and guardians. Thus, it is essential to develop common values for space, and common guidelines for dual-use systems in space.
The tension between merchants and guardians goes to very fundamental questions about how to achieve security, prosperity, and freedom and is part of the evolution of social structures and societal values. Preserving and improving the international system and what we call Western values is a necessary aspect of the continuation and development of space systems. It is also necessary to remember that space policy issues touch on many other political issues, both domestic and international. The United States is, in many ways, fortunate because the US values of openness and democracy are also characteristic of the the international development of global space-based information systems and are necessary for the future international exploration of space.

Questions and Answers
Question- You mentioned working with organizations in Geneva- what about working with organizations in Vienna, with COPUOS (Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space)? What role do you see for the UN and COPUOS?
Response- COPUS is still working to reform itself, and is still, to a large extent, mired in past practices. However, the debate is beginning to change as the importance of commercial activities are acknowledged. COPUOS is starting to re-appraise the extant space treaties, to make them more relevant to space activities today, and to move beyond the 1979 moon treaty. COPUOS has played a helpful role in GPS discussions, and in improving international awarness of the importance of GPS applicationsto developing nations.
Question- To a large extent, the government has been able to step out of Silicon Valley, to ease export controls and give up its early role in the Internet. Why hasn't the government been able to step out of space in a similar way?
Response- Computers have changed more rapidly than satellites have. There will always be significant differences between the two industries, for the ability to reach and operate in space is expensive and closely linked to national security. However, export controls should probably return to the interagency agreements of the early 1990s, where most satellite technologies were regulated by the Commerce Department, and a very few by the State Department. It may be necessary to create a broader, more consistent space trade regime, which incorporates, not just satellites, but other comparable technologies.
Question- Would you say that the success of the US delegation at the recent ITU meeting was due to preliminary bilateral meetings?
Response- Preliminary bilateral meetings did play an important role. However, cooperation with Congress, the State Department, and other parts of the US government was just as important. Without cooperation within the US community, setting up pre-meetings would have proved impossible, and without cooperation and preparation, success at the conference would not have been possible.

In the interests of time, I will be very brief. In crafting the Space Policy Institute's project on dual-purpose, space-related technologies, we made the decision to deal with information technologies- with GPS, satellite communications, and remote sensing in order to give our study greater coherence. Programs such as NPOESS were not examined, and neither were launch services-a classic example of both dual-use (i.e., some components can be used to build missiles) and dual-purpose (designed for both military and civil use) technology. Nevertheless, for the concluding public event of the study, I thought it was important to examine these technologies, in order to compare experience in these fields with those of our central focus. I am delighted to be able to welcome experts in these domains to our study, as their insights will contribute greatly to our understanding of the relationship between civil and national security use of space.
The tensions between merchants and guardians can be seen throughout this field. One of the most striking features of this "Brave New World" is the dramatic increase in global transparency. Commercially available high-resolution imagery and other information technologies are redefining what can be considered worthy of classification protection. Imagery of places that were once off limits to the public is now for sale. Transparency is inescapable, for good or ill. Policymakers here and abroad are faced with answering the questions of what can and should be be done to respond to a regime of increased transparency.
It is not yet clear what the global proliferation of space capabilities means for US defense and security capabilities. The openness of the US system has helped spread advanced technologies, and it would be naïve to assume that other nations will not take advantage of the military utility of these technologies. For example, nations are now buying, and will continue to buy, imagery of their adversaries, thus providing nations that lack indigenous high-resolution satellites easy access to this capability. However, the ability to purchase imagery is not equivalent to the ability to interpret and use that imagery to advantage. That is, there is a broad disparity between access to a capability and the ability to utilize it fully. Infrastructure and training are necessary to maximize complex high-technology systems. The United States currently leads the world in both possession and use of high-technology, dual-purpose systems. It has helped other countries learn to use these capabilities, both intentionally through outreach programs, and unintentionally through the openness of the US system and the commercial marketplace.
Dr. Pace has skillfully laid out many of the tensions between the merchants-the culture of commercial competition and business and the guardians-the culture of caution, security, protection. While there will always be tensions between the two sectors, they can also learn from one another. Rather than attempting to limit access to technology and information by instituting cumbersome technology transfer controls, government officials need to take a lesson from successful commercial firms, who maintain competitiveness by staying ahead technologically. Retaining the ability to operate, lead, and profit requires flexibility, and an enhancement of the relationship between innovation and competitiveness. The US government cannot step back from the use of space for defense, but must make sure its policies help- not hinder- the commercial sector. On the other hand, advocates of commercial space systems might benefit from a more careful examination of the risks of increased dependence on outer space, especially if they wish to include the security sector in their list of important customers.
Further, the United States must explore in detail the effects of the commercial availability of satellite technologies on regional balances of power. U.S. policymakers have focused in great detail on limiting the proliferation of launch technology through the MTCR, for the most part because of the fear that such technologies could be transferred to use in missiles. In my view, they have not given sufficient attention to the effects, for good and ill, of the proliferation of commercial satellite technologies. In our examination of this important issue, we have found that the broad availability of commercial communications satellites, GPS receivers, and high resolution Earth observation data can both contribute to, and undermine, regional stability, depending on the specific situation. We have, for example, examined the effects of the prolferation of commercial satellite technologies on the Mid East and on the Far East. The time is too short to go into details about our findings, but it is clear that U.S. policy generally needs to be highly flexible and crafted to suit the particulars of the region and U.S. political, as well as security, aims.
I look forward to the remaining presentations and discussion, as they will shed light on other aspects of the civil/commercial/national security aspects of space and security policy. These inputs will, I am sure, be extremely enlightening as we put together a final report for this project.

JOHN BAKER- Through my time at the Space Policy Institute and now at RAND, I have gained an appreciation for the challenge of forming a durable, farsighted space policy. There is a marked incease in the importance of outer space over the last fifty years. There are continuing challenges in dealing with the changing nature of space endeavors and in addressing the tensions between the merchants and guardians as well new tensions between international and domestic space policy. The question, then, is, where are we now in terms of policy toward dual-purpose space technologies? The upcoming administration is likely to craft a new space policy. What guidance can we give the new administration?
COMMENT- I am surprised at General Moorman's fairly pessimistic assessment of the satellite industry. I see great growth in the satellite industry, an increase in revenues, and the growth of several sectors. One sector may be having problems, and the other sectors have been somewhat hurt by this. The merchants and guardians dichotomy can be a useful tool. The different mindsets (in the commercial and security communities) over profit vs loss and risk vs security means that meeting national security needs with commercial satellites requires careful coordination.
COMMENT- The growth in satellite industries is significant, but not necessarily focused in the areas that the defense community would have hoped. DOD will still have to invest money in developing new or upgraded systems. Upgrading technology is a time-consuming process, especially in the government and defense sectors. For example, because of requirements for durability and security, adopting new ground-based terminals takes a long time. Commercial and government markets have different developmental time-frames.
JOHN BAKER- It is definitely not easy to see whether it is better for the government to stay out (deregulate) or stay involved in, and guide and invest in, the industry. Balancing the two options is necessary.
COMMENT- From a government perspective, profit is not the mission. For example, any degree of commercialization raises the question of how commercially viable remote sensing going to be. The government likely needs to fund the development of value-added applications from remote sensing in order to commercialize this industry.
JOHN BAKER- Are there are risks inherent in diffusion of these technologies? The recent diffusion of high resolution imagery, GPS equipment, the discontinuation of selective availability, and so on, may not be surprising technological developments, particularly within the space community, but they pose significant policy challenges, and may constitute security risks. Are risks inevitable, or are there ways to deal with, and minimize these risks? There is also the question of how to deal with these issues on an international- not just domestic- scale.
COMMENT- Export controls seem short term by their very nature. Maybe, instead of trying to delay the diffusion of technology, we should focus on making the spread of technology a safer phenomenon. Just because there is a spread of technology does not mean there will be problems with such a proliferation.
COMMENT- It is important that the methods of dealing with the spread of technologies are fitted both to the technologies themselves, and to the nature of the governments of the nations we are trying to keep information from. That is, the Soviet regime was extremely structured, and the tight control within the USSR actually helped make US export controls more effective. In a country without a strong central government or police force, export controls will be less effective, because information will spread within the nation much more rapidly. The key is to, somehow, shape the policy environment so as to remove the incentives to proliferate.
COMMENT- One of the continued needs is to create the opportunities for better interactions between merchants and guardians. The lack of fluency in each others' worlds makes cooperation difficult.
COMMENT- That is a key point. General Moorman and other military officials are given very few briefings on business plans, and whether technologies are feasible in the commercial world.
COMMENT- In France, a way around this split has been to have government people work for industry for 2 or 3 years, and then return to the government. This allows them to gain experience in both the commercial and governmental sectors. This program has allowed knowledge to circulate better through the French system. Could a similar system work in the United States?
COMMENTS/RESPONSES- In the United States, similar programs are being tried, but it is far more difficult here. The line between commercial and government is much more definite and strict in this country. There are numerous rules which prevent that kind of circulation, for fear of conflict of interest. There are certainly cultural differences at work here. In Japan, for example, it is perfectly acceptable for the Japanese government to invest in new technologies. The United States, with its still clearly defined public-private split, needs to find other ways to accomplish these goals. A number of US companies and government agencies, such as the Aerospace Industries Association, are trying to establish business-government exchanges.
COMMENT - One solution to the merchants and guardians conflict is to always be developing even more advanced technologies, so that there are always new technologies for the merchants to commercialize- without damaging national security. There must be an investment in the government's ability to stay ahead of commercializable technologies.
JOHN BAKER- Commercial space used to be dominated by a few firms, many of which were American owned. Now, there are not just US firms, but internationally owned firms, firms that constitute joint ventures among different nations, and firms that partner with various governmental agencies. All this adds to the increasing complexity of commercial space.

INTRO- DANA JOHNSON- NPOESS, the National Polar-Orbiting Operational Environmental Satellite System, is a three-way partnership between NASA, DOD, and the Department of Commerce (specifically NOAA). Its origins are found in the drive to reinvent government, and the resultant calls for convergence and cost reduction through convergence. The aim is to reduce costs and still meet the needs of all the parties involved. NPOESS has to be able to ensure operational environmental data, assure access, and to provide the ability to deny access if necessary. NPOESS was based on the realization that civil and military systems were already converging in usage and technology so actually forcing their convergence into one system would be an important money-saving step. Thus, this project represents the creation of a space system capable fo serving bother civil and national security needs, a difficult task indeed.
There are significant external constraints on this project. These include the realities of the international security environment, various commercial trends, and budgetary constraints. Barriers to convergence have included differing user and data requirements, problems with lack of support and accountability, differing organizational structures and processes, cultural resistance to convergence, programmatic instability and risk, difficulties in staffing, and the lack of adequate, consistent, long-term stakeholder support.
The realization of NPOESS is far from complete, but it seems likely to be successful. There have been several key aspects of this project which have allowed convergences to occur. First was the establishment the Integrated Program Office, and its development of metrics for success. It is necessary to maintain budget stability, and continually re-evaluate and adjust the division of tasks and funds. It is also necessary to put constant efforts into maintaining stakeholder, administration, and congressional support. There has been a strong focus on developing policy metrics, on ensuring agency funding stability, on promoting international cooperation, and on developing ties with the commercial sector.

JOHN CUNNINGHAM- NPOESS is a presidentially directed tri-agency effort. The goal is to converge the DOD and NOAA polar-orbiting environmental satellite programs, while incorporating new technologies from NASA. NPOESS will replace the Defense Meteorological Satellite System and the civilian Polar Earth Orbiting System. It is also meant to encourage international cooperation, fulfill tasks of national importance, and predict and analyze the weather in the ways required by both NOAA and the military. The military's attitude toward weather has shifted over recent years- now, the military does not just seek to cope with the weather, but, rather, to anticipate and exploit it. The military's satellites and NPOESS orbit over the poles, provide global coverage, and gather a variety of data, not just weather.
This program is intended to take advantages of the strengths, and minimize the weaknesses of each participant agency. Thus, NASA has the lead in the development of advanced technologies, DOD has the lead in acquisition, and NOAA/Commerce has the lead in operations, coordination, and management. One key aspect of NPOESS is that the process of setting requirements, and evaluating how well requirements are being met, is done outside of the organization. Removing the evaluation of data needs from those immediately involved in the project allows for more objective evaluation of NPOESS's progress. Outside evaluation and feedback is absolutely essential to a project like this.
More and more satellites are being flown, for a variety of purposes. Today, there are four operational polar satellite systems. By 2003, the United States plans to have three satellites in orbit, and Europe to have one. By 2008, we expect to operate only two converged US satellites, and one European satellite. An additional aspect of NPOESS is the Initial Joint Polar system agreement (IJPS). This agreement, between the United States and EUMETSAT (a conglomerate of European nations fielding a polar satellite) is part of an extremely complex relationship.
NPOESS is unique because the requirements define the mission. This is not a program designed to fly specific instruments; rather, this is a program designed to carry out a defined set of operational tasks, using the best instruments possible. The first meteorological satellites, flown approximately 40 years ago, gathered black and white imagery with extremely poor resolution. Today's most advanced weather satellites have 800 meter resolution. This is key because better resolution allows for more accurate weather predictions. A variety of advanced sensors will be flown on NPOESS. The Visible/Infrared Radiometer Suite (VIRS) can provide infrared, low light imagery, and is useful for fire detection (civilian and military), sea surface temperature, and ocean color (useful for chlorophyll monitoring and detecting red tides). In order to meet DOD requirements, this system will provide nighttime visible imagery. The Conical Microwave Imager Sounder (CMIS) has 15 km resolution, and is useful because it can see below clouds, and is useful for sea surface winds, and analysis of storms. The Cross-Track Infrared Sounder will measure temperature and pressure throughout the atmosphere. A variety of ozone sensors will also be flown (which will help fulfil US obligations under various ozone treaties). The Space Environmental Sensor Suite will measure the near-Earth space environment, including solar flares, and help predict the impact on satellites in orbit.
Encouraging international cooperation has been challenging, but it is an important part of NPOESS. Cooperation with Europe will help ensure pre-convergence coverage, and will, eventually, result in cost savings. Another important part of NPOESS has been a focus on risk reduction, to minimize instrument failure. Operational convergence of the military and civilian systems is being accomplished, in part, through the joint Command and Control center in Suitland, MD. As a result of the converged system, $1.8 billion has already been saved, cooperation between agencies and with Europe has been improved, and risk and cost reduction have become high priorities. The requirements of a successful converged, dual-purpose system appear to include: establishing clear requirements and accountability in writing; constantly analyzing and re-evaluating spending; ensuring a clear and realistic policy; and maintaining flexibility at all points.

Mr. Schneider focused on the specifics of the convergence of the civil and military systems under the auspices of NPOESS. Between the two systems, there were 61 types of measurements that needed to be obtained. All of these types of data, therefore, need to be collected through the converged system. It was essential to know what instruments to fly, how often various instruments had to be flown (and at what time of day) and other specifics. Then, this information was used to decide which satellites would carry what instrumentation.
Creating a dual purpose system should not mean duplicating or ignoring current, good aspects of either the civil or the military systems. If there are already agreements in place with other government agencies that meet NPOESS requirements, there is no need to break these agreements and make new ones. Similarly, if sensors and instruments exist that will fulfill the needed purposes, there is no need to pay for others to be developed specifically for this project. If the necessary sensors have not yet been developed, NPOESS works to support the development of such sensors. NPOESS has reserved 25% of the payload on each satellite for new technologies that become available by launch dates.
NASA's role in NPOESS is primarily to support the scientific side of the mission. NASA has brought technologies and sensors to the program, and has generally acted as a scientific reviewer. NASA programs have also served as test beds for NPOESS technologies. Some instruments and sensors that are the same or similar to those NPOESS is likely to use have been flown on the NASA aircraft, NASA satellites, and the shuttle. By preflying instruments, NPOESS can increase its likelihood of success. NASA and NPOESS are also working to align NASA's Earth Science enterprise with NPOESS to further reduce duplication of efforts.
NPOESS is projected to be operational in 2008. The NPOESS preparatory project is scheduled for 2005. NPOESS will continue to prefly instruments and to sponsor scientific missions until it is fully operational. The key to NPOESS, and to any dual-use, converged system, is that all participants must have their needs met. The cooperation needs to be win-win. There is simply not enough money for separate programs, and it is possible- though not easy- to meet everyone's needs through a converged program. Working with the European partner, EUMETSAT has proved challenging, in part because EUMETSAT is a 17-nation consortium. Nevertheless, the outcome of US-EUMETSAT cooperation will be highly beneficial to the United States and to Europe.

Questions and Answers
question- How does NPOESS's interagency nature impact the way it interacts with Congress? NPOESS has to deal with numerous committees. What does this mean for funding?
Panel Responses- It has generally been fairly easy for DOD to find funding for NPOESS, because the $76 million a year is a comparatively small part of the defense budget. It can be more challenging to obtain funding on the civil side, because NOAA's overall budget is much smaller.
One of the other issues we've had to grapple with is our interaction with the Europeans. The European view of dealing with satellites has generally been quite different from the American view. In Europe, data is denied for the inability to pay for it. In the United States, data is denied mainly for political and security reasons. NPOESS and EUMETSAT have had to find a data policy that Europe and the United States can agree on. This is extremely challenging, but progress is being made.
question- Is there any one key issue you would highlight in this project?
Response- NPOESS is set up fairly well. One challenge has been that reorganizations within the Defense Department have changed who DOD's NPOESS officials report to and who is in charge of NPOESS. Again, NPOESS seems to be working fairly well but it has not been easy.
Response- One of NPOESS's funding quirks is that NOAA and DOD split the costs 50-50, by year. This yearly equality doesn't necessarily reflect the program, but rather the requirements of the budgetary process.
question- Is there any thought of privatizing NPOESS in the future?
Response- Congress has specifically precluded that option. However, the raw data and products from NPOESS may well lend themselves to future value-added services that have considerable commercial value, much as do the current products from today's DOD and NOAA environmental satellite programs.

LT COL VILLHARD - The EELV program is an integral part of the Clinton Administration's strategy for sustaining and modernizing the nation's launch capabilities. The President's 1994 National Space Transportation Policy established a clear division of responsibilities: DoD is operating, improving and evolving the current fleet of ELVs, while NASA is improving the Shuttle and developing and demonstrating RLV technologies. Last spring, the President asked the Secretary of Defense to report on the DoD and commercial launch failures in 1998 and 1999. DoD undertook a review focused on flying the remaining current ELVs and assuring mission success during the transition to EELV. Ten of the 19 recommendations address the current fleet, with emphasis on clear lines of responsibility, value-added government oversight, independent reviews, balancing risk mitigation with cost, and workforce issues. The other nine address the same issues in the transition plan for the EELV. The Air Force is building this EELV transition plan to reevaluate mission assurance approaches, whether to buy insurance, and to update the business case for company investments.

NASA's Integrated Space Transportation Plan, with continuing Shuttle upgrades and the three-part Space Launch Initiative, is another part of the Clinton Administration's strategy. Operating the Shuttle safely is NASA's number one objective. Since 1992, NASA has improved Shuttle safety by more than 80%, increased performance by a third, cut processing time in half, and reduced operating costs by a third. President Clinton's FY 2001 Budget for NASA quadrupled Shuttle safety investments to $400 million per year. The President's Policy called for decisions by the end of the decade on the development of an operational, next-generation RLV. NASA is applying the lessons learned from the X-vehicles to its plans for the Space Launch Initiative-a $4.5 billion project over the next five years-that fulfills the "end of the decade" decision. The goal of the Space Launch Initiative is for NASA to meet its future space flight needs using commercial launches. The initiative is based on (1) Commercial Convergence, (2) Competition, (3) Assured Access, and (4) The Ability to Evolve. The initiative includes investments to (1) enable full-scale development of competing, privately owned RLVs by 2005 so they will be operational by 2010, (2) develop hardware to fly on commercial launches to meet NASA's unique needs; and (3) buy commercial launch services for near-term assured access to the International Space Station. In parallel, NASA plans a decision in 2003 whether to continue with the X-38 CRV design or to develop a Crew and Cargo Transfer Vehicle instead.

Since the early 1990s, commercial launch rates more than tripled and now make up about 40 percent of the manifest. To address the implications of this change, the National Security Council and OSTP co-chaired an interagency review on the Future Management and Use of the U.S. Space Launch Bases and Ranges between March 1999 and January 2000. The Secretaries of Defense, Commerce, and Transportation, the National Reconnaissance Office, the NASA Administrator, and the President approved the resultant recommendations and national strategy. The recommendations focus on expanding the federal-state-industry partnership to enable civil and commercial space sector users (including spaceports) to have a greater voice in improving operational flexibility and efficiency of the ranges, use nonfederal funding as appropriate to maintain and modernize launch ranges, modify current law to allow a more complete federal-state-industry partnership to develop, develop common range safety requirements for government and commercial launches at federal and nonfederal launch sites, and invest in next-generation range technology development and demonstration. The national strategy is to allow market forces and the pace of new commercial developments to help determine the future role of commercial industry at the ranges.

The Clinton Administration's overarching policy on space is to take advantage of the synergies among the U.S. civil, commercial, and national security space sectors.

The United States has pursued decade-long effort to modernize US launch capabilities. All communities involved in space - intelligence, DOD, civil space, and so on- have been involved and interested in this effort. In 1994, the Space Launch Modernization Plan was adopted. In all dual-use/converged systems, particularly launch systems, it has become obvious that deciding on the requirements of the converged system is absolutely essential. It is also important to develop and utilize partnerships with industry. Partnerships with industry can allow for simultaneous development of new technologies and cost saving. Co-development with industry has allowed the United States to save six billion dollars on the EELV's so far. The United States invests 500 million dollars per concept, and industry pays for the rest. The current main launch systems-the Delta 2 and 3, the Titan, and the Atlas II and III-are capable, but not very cost effective, nor operationally effective. They are basically niche systems. These rockets are generally on the pad integrating all systems and preparing for launch for as much as three to five months.

The EELV project represents an effort to make launch services competitive, commercial, cheaper, and better. Lockheed and Boeing are both working to develop next generation expendable launch vehicles. Both companies are developing ELVs that are tailored for a variety of payloads. As well, these new rockets will spend a much shorter time on the launch pad, removing what is now a significant bottleneck. These are true dual-purpose systems, where there is no difference between the rockets used for civilian and military launches. The use of commercial contracts, and business practices, as well as the continuing emphasis on competition and flexibility, are resulting in overall lower costs and higher efficiency. There are incentives for the government, the military, and private companies to stay committed to this program. One of the challenges for the Defense Department has been the necessity of protecting commercial data, and information related to commercial contracts. This is not a challenge that arises in typical government procurement. Basically, creating a dual-purpose, converged system is difficult. The system must be competitive, for both government/military and commercial partners. The system must be useful to all participants. It is essential to set and maintain clear and stable requirements. Dual-purpose systems will not be feasible for most military needs; however, when such systems are feasible, they can have significant pay-offs and should be pursued.

Lockheed Martin is currently at work on the Atlas V, under the Air Force's EELV program. The Atlas V was developed from the Atlas IIA and IIAS. The evolved approach used has resulted in a new engine, with fewer parts to break. The RD-180 engine used is a result of increased post-Cold War Russian-American cooperation, and is adapted from the existing RD 170. Eighty percent of the systems in the Atlas V were tested in use in the Atlas III. The success of the Atlas V in early tests has led to a great deal of excitement about this rocket's potential as a launch vehicle. (link)

It is important to consider the requirement, challenges, and rewards of successful dual-use systems. Commercial firms are developing new sources of investment, and new partnerships. Partnering with the government means working with many agencies and people, dealing with cost and infrastructure, considering Congressional and Administrative support, and working on a different timetable. Of course, even when companies do not partner with the government, government regulations are always a consideration - for example, export control requirements and FAA safety regulations must be considered. Under the EELV program, Boeing is developing the Delta IV launch vehicle, which will be capable of launching payloads ranging from 4,200 kg to 13,000 kg to geostationary transfer obit (8,100 kg - 23,000 kg to LEO). The wide range of payload capability will allow the Delta IV to serve a range of civil, military, and commercial customers. (link).

In examining current government partnerships, the general consideration must be, are dual-use systems a good investment for the taxpayer? Do they represent a good strategy in the development of the US space programs? In recent years, government investment in launch system development and operation has decreased and private funds have increased. Taking these trends into account, it is probably more beneficial to allow the government to act as a purchaser and investor, and allow the commercial sector to play the primary role in development. Government-industry interactions in pursuit of dual-use systems, have, to this point, ranged between being beneficial to both and being a significant loss to both. It is possible for the government and industry to partner in manners that help both parties, but achieving this condition is not easy.
The EELV program shows evidence that government-industry partnerships can be mutually beneficial. The dual-purpose nature of the EELV program seems to be resulting in significant cost savings. Yet it is too early to tell how much money will be saved, in part because launch costs change with shifts in the market, and because the Air Force, the General Accounting Office, and the commercial partners all calculate costs differently. The different operational styles of the various participants lead to different priorities in risks, returns, profits and goals. The success of some cooperative space projects, such as EELV, and the failures of others, such as Iridium, show that meshing government and industry is still far from easy. Developing more dual-purpose systems may require more research into the peculiarities of government-industry relationships.

The post-Cold War era has brought significant economic and military changes. The American economy is no longer isolated or self-sufficient. The essential technologies for military performance are, very often, technologies developed in or for the commercial sectors. Applying technology to military needs depends upon having the technology, and having enough money to properly integrate the technology into military systems. In both the United States and Europe, it is becoming more and more difficult to label any technology as wholly military or wholly civilian, as totally safe or totally unsafe to export. The DOD has found it extremely challenging to deal with the new ambiguity of high technology systems, and some of its practices have made private companies reluctant to deal with DOD. Governments worldwide are slowly realizing that new export control regimes, and new ways of dealing with the spread of advanced technologies, are necessary.
The politics of national security means that the issue of export control regulations is about far more than the technology. Xenophobia, electoral politics, funding, and multiple other issues all impact this policy. The transfer of export control responsibility for satellites and satellite components to the Department of State in early 1999 was initiated on a political level. For some it was a way to make Clinton look bad. For others, it was centered in a genuine concern for the outflow of militarily useful US technology abroad, especially to China. They noted that when the Bush Administration shifted responsibility for these controls to the Department of Commerce from State in 1992, only about 200 licenses per year were granted to China, mainly to allow the launch of US satellites on Chinese launch vehicles. When Commerce was in charge, 1000-plus licenses were granted, to China and other nations, for numerous purposes and technologies. Hence, some policymakers felt that the diffusion of technologies capable of being employed by military forces as well as civilian users might have gone too far.
However, the shift of license responsibility to the Department of State caused a marked shift in the rules regarding transfer and a sharp slowdown in the processing of applications, in part because of bureaucratic nervousness and in part because State did not have personnel in place to handle the volume of requests. The resultant slowdown, along with the imposition of tougher rules for contacts between US companies and their foreign partners has hurt US companies by reducing the share of new satellite technology sales for U.S. companies. Foreign companies have become much more cautious in their willingness to entertain proposals for subcontracts and joint ventures.
As a short-term solution, the administration announced new reform initiatives in export controls which would rework the approach to controls for allied nations. Nevertheless, the sheer volume and diversity of technologies involved poses problems for an overworked and overcautious State Department staff. Further, The State Department, the DOD, Congress, and Department of Commerce all have different ideas about the appropriate location and management of export controls. Additional issues are raised by the fact that other governments have their own policies and priorities for export controls. Globalization and the resultant increasingly international nature of firms has added further complexities. It is evident that the issue of export controls on satellite and space-related technologies is far from resolved at this time. In the long run, continued loss of US business will harm US national security by causing US companies to be less nimble and innovative in the international marketplace, reducing their ability to compete in delivering cutting-edge technologies to the military at home and abroad.