During the 1990s, North Korea emerged as one of the most pressing security challenges for Japan and the United States as well as for South Korea. In addition to continuing its seemingly irrational, international provocations, North Korea demonstrated its growing ability to produce missiles--possibly nuclear in the not-too-distant future, which are capable of targeting territories at least as distant as Japan--and a willingness to sell these weapons to countries with dubious intentions. All three governments have tried to address this threat with varied results. The most recent of these is a trilateral effort of the governments of South Korea, Japan and the United States (US), to coordinate policy geared towards fostering a stable peace on the Korean Peninsula. This initiative emanated from the recommendations of the Perry Report, written by a North Korea policy review team in the US and published in October 1999 after extensive consultation with officials from many countries with interests in Northeast Asia and the Korean Peninsula, including South Korea, Japan as well as North Korea. The three-way policy coordination toward North Korea has since been institutionalized in the form of the Trilateral Coordination and Oversight Group (TCOG).
That such a collaborative international effort is undertaken at all is remarkable in its own right, but it begs certain questions regarding effectiveness: What should be the coordinated policy towards North Korea? What should be the specific goals? How do we ensure that all three countries adhere to it? Is it strong enough to withstand a crisis? And most importantly, will it have the desired effect of resulting in a stable peace on the Korean Peninsula? The challenge in answering these questions stems not only from the fact that the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) is secretive and inherently unpredictable. It also results from the domestic pressures unique to the Republic of Korea (ROK), Japan and the US.
It is for these reasons that the George Washington University’s Sigur Center for Asian Studies in collaboration with Yonsei University’s Graduate School of International Studies organized a two-day, trilateral workshop, inviting East Asian experts from the ROK, Japan and the US to discuss “North Korea Policy after the Perry Report.” Presentations were heard and discussed on three main topics:
During each session speakers addressed the current status and potential future developments of the trilateral coordination of North Korea policy paying special attention to the relationships of each country with North Korea, between each country, and of the government of each country to its public. Of particular interest was how the North Korea policy of each country will be influenced by upcoming elections.
This conference summary highlights the major themes that emerged over two days of discussion and the points of divergence and convergence both within and across nationality groups. As this was a non-attribution discussion, the workshop provided participants an open forum for fleshing out key debates and identifying unresolved issues. These included to what extent we can consider North Korea a military threat; the stability of the DPRK regime; the likelihood that it will reform; and the longevity of the Perry process in light of domestic politics and potential sudden crises. In general, most tended to favor engagement over maintaining the status quo or exercising coercive diplomacy, the only two other strategies given any consideration; but whether this policy should follow a harder or softer line remained open to debate. In the end, although little consensus was reached about how to pursue engagement from now on to maximize effectiveness and durability of the coordinated policy, several promising suggestions were proposed which could provide the basis for future such seminars.
The Challenges of Domestic Politics
Presenters from all three countries seemed to think that TCOG has indeed enhanced alliance coordination, but recognized the need to discuss various different approaches of formulating North Korea policy given the specific objectives of each nation in dealing with the DPRK. The willingness of each country to adopt a given approach was constrained by its perception of North Korea’s military threat, specific problems each nation has faced in coordinating North Korea policy in the past, how domestic politics of each country affect its North Korea policy, and whether the coordinated policy approach will survive changes in domestic political elections. Conference presenters demonstrated that there are substantial differences in domestic politics from country to country, and interestingly, the closer to North Korea one gets, the more domestic politics becomes important in determining policy.
United States
According to the American perspective, the North Korea policy debate in the US has not reached the greater public. There are critics, particularly in Congress, but the issue seems motivated more by partisan politics than by the issue itself. Experts explained how the Clinton Administration contends that if the North Korean regime faced either collapse or a threatening outside pressure it would launch an apocalyptic war. This portrayal serves to justify the Administration’s policy of providing ever-expanding amounts of economic assistance to North Korea in order to prevent such a scenario. The alternative in their view is war. Although there was some debate between Americans during the seminar about the validity of the conventional belief that a war with North Korea would result in enormous destruction and devastating losses, experts reported that the Administration and its critics do not disagree that North Korea is a threat. There is universal concern in the US about the threat of missile capability in a hostile nation, nuclear proliferation, credibility for support for an ally, and dedication to ensuring security on the Korean Peninsula. But the divisive issue is how to design a policy to resolve those issues.
In general, critics have a more hawkish slant. They do not challenge the North Korean threat, but they argue that the Clinton Administration is “paying off” North Korea for good behavior and overlooking errant behavior. To prove this point critics search for “smoking gun” indications of such, like diverting humanitarian food aid to the military and continuing clandestine nuclear and missile development in spite of the 1994 Agreed Framework. Nevertheless, they are unwilling to advocate limits or conditions on food aid and agricultural reforms for fear of being accused of starving North Korean children. In fact, the narrow focus of the US concerns on nuclear weapons and missiles limits critics from developing a stronger critique of North Korea’s terrorist policies, its human rights violations, economic policies and other concerns important to South Korea and Japan. Experts foresee, however, that these issues will be revisited in the future, perhaps in the next Administration.
One speaker believed that the Perry report has helped to diffuse the politics of this situation to some extent. The policy recommendation is a two-path joint strategy that seeks to contain the North Korea threat by either negotiation or, if negotiation fails, through more formidable means of persuasion -a strategy that placates both softliners and hardliners fairly effectively. Furthermore, since the South Korean Government supports for the Clinton Administration’s North Korean policy, criticism in Congress seems to have lost strength. In addition, critics do not seem to have offered many alternatives of their own. The exception has been a position paper on North Korea by the Armitage Working Group, which called for more explicit measures to strengthen military deterrence, and a bill passed in the House of Representatives in 1999 that would require Congress to vote on a US-North Korean bilateral nuclear cooperation agreement. The former has received little attention, and the latter was not supported by the Senate. Nevertheless, American speakers observed that domestic politics could yet present a bigger challenge to the longevity of the Perry process. With an upcoming presidential election North Korea could be a divisive issue depending on how much time each candidate gives to foreign policy. At present, the presidential candidates have not indicated that they would change policy, but history suggests that foreign policy changes in a new Administration are not unusual.
Japan
According to the Japanese presenters, relations with North Korea are very contentious issues both politically and diplomatically. But this was not always so -one panel member presented a detailed summary of the history of Japanese-North Korean relations to illustrate this. In 1990 the prospects for normalization of diplomatic relations between Tokyo and Pyongyang appeared bright. But official negotiations broke off in November 1992 and have never regained the same momentum. In 1997 Japan and North Korea began to feel each other out again on resuming negotiations but when North Korea launched a Taepodong ballistic missile over Japanese territory in 1998 the North Korea threat flashed into public focus and spurred a domestic political debate about developing a Theatre Missile Defense (TMD) system as well as an independent reconnaissance satellite capability. Japan also threatened to freeze its commitment of $1 billion to the Korean Peninsula Energy Development Organization (KEDO) to start construction of light water reactors in North Korea and supply heavy fuel oil. North Korea now tops Japan’s list of security concerns.
Japanese experts at the seminar concurred that North Korea has become an extremely emotional issue in Japan. But the missile threat is not the only source of hostility toward North Korea. The Japanese public is concerned with the thousands of Japanese women married to North Koreans who for many years were denied visits to their families in Japan and many of whom continue to be denied home visits. In 1997 the issue of abductions rose to the fore when a former DPRK spy who defected to South Korea confirmed the kidnapping of a thirteen-year old girl from Japan. The Japanese had suspected the North Koreans of kidnapping Japanese citizens in the past, but it was not until this confession that the abductions attracted considerable attention among the Japanese public. Although Pyongyang has paid some lip service to the Japanese demand of resolving the abduction issue, it has done little more. As a result of this, experts believed that the government has no choice but to make this among its top issues for a successful diplomatic settlement with North Korea.
In light of these events, Japan adopted a hard line policy towards North Korea last year. This stance, however, ran counter to South Korean and American policies of dialogue with Pyongyang because they could not afford Japan’s withdrawal from its commitments to KEDO during the delicate negotiations with the DPRK. Japan eventually changed its hard line as a compromise to the US and South Korea, but public sentiment toward North Korea remains antagonistic.
One presenter explained that Japanese domestic politics towards North Korea is complicated by several other factors. The Prime Minister and the Diet are not the key decision makers of foreign policy in Japan, rather the ruling political party directs the government. Although Japanese foreign policy in general, and particularly regarding Pyongyang, follows the American lead, political log-rolling and competition for political funds and prestige often inspire Japanese politicians to foray into foreign policy. However, these politicians have little experience with the stakes and subtleties of international politics. He also added that the Japanese government recognizes the benefit of cooperating with the US and South Korea to mitigate the North Korean threat, but the credibility of the government has been recently called into question. Consequently, public opinion has become a bigger factor in shaping the government’s North Korea policy. Lastly, Japan’s historical aggression on the Korean Peninsula complicates policymaking. Not only must politicians assess whether it should honor North Korean claims for wartime compensation, but also it must contend with the powerful pro-North Korean supporters within Japan (Chosen Soren), who comprise nearly half the Korean residents in Japan. This group apparently even stirs controversy in South Korea because, as one South Korean representative pointed out, until Hyundai came along it provided the largest source of currency to North Korea.
In short, the Japanese recognize that diplomatic progress between Japan and North Korea would facilitate the warming of relations of North Korea with South Korea and the US, so are willing to compromise on many fronts. But North Korea remains an emotional issue in Japan, particularly relative to the missile and abduction issues, and it demands a “constructive response” by the DPRK. One expert thinks that unless these issues are settled, no attempt to atone for colonial rule or forge diplomatic relations will have popular support in Japan.
Republic of Korea
Given South Korea’s proximity and historical ties to North Korea, relations are much more politicized there than in Japan or the US. A Korean presenter identified and defined four schools of thought in South Korea: accommodation, engagement, linkage and containment. Of these four, engagement and linkage represent the competing mainstream views. Implicit in the former is an assumption that the primary objective of North Korea is regime survival, not a military takeover of South Korea. Also, that dialogue, trade and investment should be embraced over confrontation. The core assumption of the latter is that North Korea poses a military threat and that its primary objective is a military takeover of South Korea. It calls for more reciprocity by North Korea for ROK aid and concessions. There are powerful interest groups behind each school, and the fundamental source of disagreement between them is the unpredictable behavior of North Korea.
Currently, President Kim Dae Jung is firmly committed to his Sunshine Policy, the primary objective of which is to establish peaceful co-existence between the two Koreas, with reunification as the ultimate goal. Supporters of this policy believe that incentives and assurances of non-aggression and peace will change North Korea’s perceptions and thus, behavior. But the three main obstacles of this policy are: 1) Pyongyang’s weapons of mass destruction, 2) lack of transparency in its nuclear program, and 3) refusal to comply with the 1991 Basic Agreement. According to the presenter, Kim Dae Jung initially enjoyed high support for his policy and still does to a large extent. Recently, however, public support for the engagement policy has been declining. In fact, opposition parties in South Korea are stepping up attacks against Kim Dae Jung for the April elections along three strategy lines: taking advantage of the public’s fear of war; arousing a strong sense of nationalism; and raising human rights issue, especially about the handling of North Korean defectors.
Although many participants observed that President Kim is bearing the political cost of his policy, the presenter believed that it is unlikely that Kim will change his policy -rather, he may try to maintain or even strengthen it in spite of growing domestic opposition. In fact, this expert predicted little change in policy after the elections regardless of which party wins. According to him, this is because there appears to be little internal debate within the South Korean government over North Korea policy. Korean participants wondered why support was so high and speculated that it is because of a lack of public knowledge of the issue. In other words, if more people understood the policy better, public support would dwindle. Others speculated that even if support declines the policy would remain in tact, in part because the goals of the Sunshine policy are so open ended that there is no way of measuring its success or failure short of a North Korean attack on the South, and in part because no other strategy exists.
One last factor mentioned that is affecting the South Korean domestic political situation is the growing animosity against the US military presence in both left and right-wing circles. One American expert foresaw a coming debate in South Korea over the role of the US military there.
Evolution or Deterioration?
An observation was made that five years ago in Washington DC experts spoke confidently about the imminent collapse of North Korea. But today it shows no signs of demise, and the majority of experts now predict that North Korea is more likely to “muddle through” than it is to self-combust. The irony of this is probably best explained by frequent remarks during the conference about the difficulty of knowing exactly what is happening in North Korea and, therefore, the challenge of predicting its future. In spite of this, however, seminar participants presented very informative summaries of the evolving situation in North Korea based on a wide range of sources and about where it might be headed. They arrived at many areas of consensus:
Representatives of every country agreed that the military has emerged as the linchpin of the state. In an effort to shore up control, the military is allocated the first slice of the economic pie. In fact, one observer claims that it has become a militarized state. Since 1995 Kim Jong Il has frequently traveled to military sites to make the military a bigger part of the state. Kim has intensified the juche propaganda and relied more heavily on the military to control the people and formulate foreign policy. One observer notes, however, that one reason for this may be because of the country’s eroding military readiness. The DPRK, aware of this, thus sees its weapons of mass destruction (WMD) as its main deterrence against outside threats. In light of this, the trilateral countries can assume that the DPRK is unlikely to give them up.
The deterioration of the North Korean economy is also not in dispute. One speaker presented some startling statistics: North Korea’s economy has been shrinking by approximately 5% each year since 1990; the country’s $11 billion net external debt, which amounts to 50% or more of its annual GNP, has been left unpaid since 1980; factories are estimated to be operating at less than 30% of capacity; and estimates of trade statistics suggest that North Korea’s foreign trade declined by 55% from 1990 to 1997. It was noted, however, that the official economy is very likely small by comparison to the black market economies, which prevail. Because these shadow economies operate more akin to capitalist markets North Korea is not in danger of collapsing economically any time soon.
The extent of the poor economic situation was subject to some debate. A Korean speaker spoke of an economic crisis and massive starvation that has led to the formation of two groups of people: the ruling and the ruled. People must fend for themselves because the government cannot provide for them. And because a widespread network of informants willing to report traitorous comments of citizens exists, individuals unable to direct their frustration at the government turn their hostility instead on their neighbors. Others noted the shocking differences in height and weight that have emerged between peoples in North Korea and South Korea as examples of the catastrophic consequences to public health of the economic crisis. A representative of the Chinese perspective, however, expressed a more optimistic view. Apparently, the Chinese see the economy as deteriorating, but not collapsing, the society as bad, but not dire, and the food shortage as grim, but not devastating.
With regards to North Korea’s political environment, speakers were also in agreement about many points. Kim Jong Il seems to be in firm control and there is no evidence of factionalism or opposition. Political corruption has become institutionalized as a way of life. And most importantly, foremost in North Korean political strategy is ensuring regime survival. This means several things: it will not pursue negotiations with South Korea because it would threaten the regime, especially if the goal of the negotiations is reunification. However, the DPRK has an interest in cultivating good relations with the US. It realizes that the US is able to both facilitate necessary economic assistance if it is cooperative as well as threaten its regime if it is uncooperative. For this reason, North Korea has given priority to its relations with the US. As for Japan, speakers concurred that North Korean-Japanese relations remain fairly hostile at present. North Korea has presented a list of demands for Japan, which Japan is wont to consider until North Korea makes an overture of conciliation about the abduction issue.
Whither North Korea?
While most experts ultimately agreed that North Korea would continue to “muddle through” in some way, speakers had somewhat different outlooks on North Korea’s development to date and its future prospects. The Japanese, for example, expressed the most positive perspective. Although the DPRK has a history of practicing brinkmanship, one Japanese speaker noted that strengthened cooperation among the US, South Korea and Japan created by the Perry process has begun to contain North Korea with the tacit consent of China and Russia. In a bid to escape encirclement and in anticipation of a Republican Administration in the White House in 2001, he sees North Korea shifting from a US-centered foreign policy, reestablishing cordial ties with China, and exploring opportunities offered by multilateral diplomacy. For example, North Korea has improved relations with several countries and the 1999 Berlin agreement with the US has improved the climate for Western countries to open dialogue with North Korea. The DPRK Foreign Minister attended the UN General Assembly session right after the Berlin agreement, the first time a DPRK foreign minister had appeared at the UN since 1992. Kim Jong Il has abandoned his father’s agricultural policy and formulated a new policy around the advice of the United Nations. All of these examples demonstrate a certain amount of flexibility. Nevertheless, the Japanese recognize that this runs far short of reform, and concluded that North Korea is unlikely to reform because it would be regime suicide to do so.
The American presenters had a more sober assessment. The economy has bottomed out and is plugging along thanks to the black markets or shadow economies. The regime accepts the economic decline because the political system comes first, and the DPRK attitude shows no signs of changing. The common people, who bear the brunt of the regime’s misguided policies, remain docile and accepting of the propaganda line because it is the only news available to them.Thus, the people pose no threat to the regime except by a lack of motivation that prevents the regime from achieving its economic goals.
Some signs of possible opening were noted, however. Najin-Sonbong was chosen as a location for North Korea’s first (and only) foreign trade and tourist zone. Private ownership of stores by Koreans is permitted there, and its exchange rate is more realistic there than in the rest of the country. Also, in the next few years several thousand foreigners (mostly South Koreans) will live and work in the KEDO nuclear complex at Sinpo. One presenter was careful to point out, however, that these changes should not be misconstrued as signs of reform. First, Najin-Sonbong is far removed from the rest of the population and it still lacks basic infrastructure. Second, the KEDO agreement was born of a tough political bargain between the US and North Korea and therefore cannot be considered a sign of détente. Furthermore, the US depends upon South Korea and Japan for KEDO funding, but North Korea refuses officially to acknowledge the participation of these two neighbors. Thus, the American view was that North Korea will probably “muddle through” in the short term, and perhaps even for another ten years or longer.
The South Korean outlook at the conference was the most grim. Given the widespread changes on the Korean Peninsula in the 1990s, Kim Jong Il confronts widely divergent challenges compared to his father. The end of the Cold War has unraveled the tight political-military alliances North Korea had enjoyed with China and the Soviet Union, and the US and South Korea have maintained a credible deterrence. The acceleration of systemic decline in the North has increased the risk of unconventional conflict. Because of economic and political realities, North Korea’s future is likely to be some variant of a “hard landing.” Whether it muddles through or reforms, the DPRK will eventually collapse. It is merely a matter of time before the system can no longer sustain the stagnation or it succumbs to some external or internal source of instability. The path of reform would still result in collapse because the implementation of reform would inevitably undermine the regime’s political authority. Therefore, chances are slim that Pyongyang will undertake the changes necessary to revitalize its economy. The South Korean speakers, however, felt that North Korea would not resort to war even if pressured by the outside because Pyongyang recognizes that such a conflict would not only be devastating, but also unwinnable. According to the South Koreans, for lack of a better alternative, North Korea will see “muddling through” as its best option.
In sum, although the economic and social situation in North Korea has become particularly serious over the past five years, the trilateral nations are handicapped by the paucity of concrete information. But one thing is certain: North Korea will remain a source of regional instability because of its provocative stance towards other nations and its domestic economic problems.
PERRY REPORT: The Basis for Engagement and Trialteral CoordinationOn the second day of the seminar, experts discussed the value of trilateral policy coordination from the perspective of each country. In general, the representatives of all three countries thought the Perry process was a good one and for many of the same reasons. Many of the participants viewed the Perry Report not so much as a unilateral, American report, but as a trilateral one because it was formulated with the concerns of all three countries in mind. The report considered and rejected the options of maintaining the status quo and containment: the former due to North Korea’s interest in proliferating and developing weapons of mass destruction, and the latter due to the fear of provoking an unstable North Korea into what could be a devastating war.
In the end, the Perry Report advocated an engagement strategy as the best of all options because it promotes stability and peace by encouraging North Korean cooperation but without relying on such cooperation. According to the Perry process, engagement policy involved a two-path approach. In the first path, the US, ROK and Japan would seek “complete and verifiable assurances that the DPRK does not have a nuclear weapons program,” and “complete and verifiable cessation of testing, production and deployment of missiles, and the complete cessation of export sales of such missiles and the equipment and technology associated with them.” In return, the allies would, “in a step-by-step and reciprocal fashion, move to reduce pressures on the DPRK that it perceives as threatening.” This includes normalizing relations with the DPRK and relaxing sanctions. If North Korea rejects the first path, the allies would resort to “Plan B” - that is, they would take “firm but measured steps” to persuade the DPRK to return to the first path. Although these “measured steps” have not been defined, the response would not rule out the use of military force.
Value of TCOG
The speakers all noted that TCOG, an outgrowth of the Perry review process, has had a galvanizing effect on formulating and implementing North Korean policy, which has been much more successful than previous efforts, such as the Four-Party Talks and the KEDO negotiations. They agreed that TCOG has helped to narrow policy gaps and prevent policy overlaps. American participants in particular favored a combination of “carrots” and “sticks." For example, meting out rewards to North Korea for compliant behavior in the form of additional economic assistance and easing sanctions can then serve as a punishment if they are withdrawn as a result of provocative activities. The more “carrots” North Korea gains by cooperating with TCOG, the more it stands to lose if it backslides thereafter.
The most common benefit observed during the conference was that a trilateral cooperative dialogue would negate the possibility that North Korea could succeed in “divide and rule” tactics in its diplomatic dealings with them -a practice it has used on many occasions in the past to pit one country against another. Also, because all three nations agree to coordinate diplomatic interactions with North Korea, none of them need fear being left behind in the normalization process. For the ROK and Japan, each of which has worried about US abandonment in the past, this is a particularly valuable benefit. They also see the trilateral process as way to gain a voice in dealing with North Korea, which otherwise has refused dialogue with Japan and the ROK. Lastly, it was mentioned that if the trilateral group is honed into more of an alliance it could result in other side benefits, such as promoting a free trade zone between Japan and South Korea, and helping to prepare for Korean reunification, all of which would promote further stability. The TCOG process has already resulted in closer relations between Japan and the ROK. In fact, North Korea’s missile launch last year facilitated rapid repair of damaged relations between South Korea and Japan. Japan apologized for its past aggression and colonial rule and incorporated the apology into a bilateral declaration between the two countries.
Inherent Weaknesses
As
much as experts noted the benefits of trilateral policy coordination, they also
identified numerous problems with it.
Perhaps the most discussed of these was the different priority of issues
for each nation: for Japan the issues of missiles and abductions are most
important; for the US, the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction; and
for the ROK, a cessation of North Korean acts of provocation and the initiation
of serious North-South dialogue. This
raises the obvious question of whether TCOG could weather a crisis and if so,
how? The North Korean missile issue,
for example, remains controversial despite the fundamental agreement on basic
principles. The three nations have expressed markedly different takes on the
issue:
Changing
domestic politics in each country cast doubt on TCOG’s ability to mobilize
enough support in each country to sustain the coordinated policy for a
sufficient amount of time to see an impact on North Korean behavior, which, it
was agreed, is precisely what is needed.
But even if support for the policy is garnered, there were many
unresolved questions: To what extent should each country support the others’
interests? How much progress on each
issue is required of North Korea -in other words, how should we define the
“verifiable assurances” of Perry’s recommendation? How should TCOG deal with
the humanitarian aspect of negotiations with North Korea?
Should engagement run a softer or harder
line? If it is the latter, what kind of response will this elicit from the
Chinese and the Russians? What kind of
impact will the development of TMD have? In the event that a coercive policy
(Plan B of the Perry Report) is needed what would each country’s role be?
Could each country be counted on to follow
through on that role? If North Korea collapses suddenly is South Korea ready to
absorb it and would there be a surge of refugees? For
South Korea, in particular, the current policy seems to be controversial.
Although the government of President Kim Dae
Jung strongly embraces open engagement with its Sunshine Policy, the Korean
delegation at this conference was predominantly of a different mind. In
principle, they agreed that the trilateral process of engagement is a good one
because the “realist” approach has clearly not brought stability to the region
and another approach is in order. In fact, they see US leadership as the key to
bringing about peace dividends to South Korea, but not necessarily for the same
reasons as proponents of the Sunshine Policy do.
The Sunshine Policy hinges on President Kim’s belief that
improved relations between North Korea and the US will certainly lead to better
relations between the two Koreas. But
Korean representatives at this conference did not see a historic precedent for
this. Therefore, speakers advocated
that the three countries take a harder line with the DPRK, pointing out that
engagement is not risk free if lack of reciprocity encourages bolder and more
aggressive demands and behavior. “Carrots,” like easing sanctions and giving
food aid, might prove to be good “sticks” if taken away for poor North Korean
behavior, they said, but in the end it is the people of North Korea who suffer,
not the DPRK regime. The speakers
firmly believed that North Korea does not want war, so if pressured more, it
will concede. They believe that to
date, however, the DPRK has not been given enough motivation to
reciprocate.
Advocated Changes
This
enumeration of unresolved questions demonstrates that participants at the
conference concluded that for all its advantages, the trilateral coordination
of policy must address future challenges and exhibit real progress.
Yet, little consensus was achieved on how
the policy should evolve from this point on.
There were varied suggestions, however, as follows: Since
the 1994 Agreed Framework, South Korea has seen little change in the DPRK’s
stance towards the ROK. In fact, communication is so scant that the ROK cannot
even be sure whether the North’s primary goal is still communization of the
South, as in the past, or just regime survival.
Because reducing tension between these two governments would go a
long way towards fostering regional stability, TCOG should incorporate some mechanism
into the talks to induce North Korea to start talking with South Korea. One
of the Japanese representatives suggested that TCOG members and North Korea
exchange lists of demands in order to give the negotiations a clear launching
pad. The North Koreans have apparently
expressed an interest in being a part of talks so long as the ROK is not
involved. Although in the long-term
talks between the Koreas must be a priority, in the short term why not consider
setting up two tracks of trilateral discussions, one US-Japan-South Korea and
the other US-Japan-North Korea? TCOG
should also move to reinvigorate previous agreements and negotiations with
North Korea, like the 1991 Basic Agreement, the Four-Party Talks and the KEDO
negotiations while building on the relative successes of the 1994 Agreed
Framework and 1999 DPRK-US Berlin Agreement. The
Korean delegation reiterated that TCOG should put more pressure on North Korea.
They do not believe that the DPRK would really risk war if pressured because it
would be a certain failure and would lead to the downfall of the regime.
But in the meantime, North Korea will
continue to blackmail the international community for concessions if it feels
it can get away with it. In short,
North Korea has not yet been given a reason to compromise. The
American representation recommended defining “verifiable assurances” in order
to draw a clear “line in the sand” for both the DPRK and TCOG members.
In this way any grey area would be
eliminated in ascertaining whether North Korea were holding up its end of the
agreement. The true litmus test
of the longevity of TCOG will be when it is challenged, but no one is quite
clear what would happen in such an event.
Therefore, it is imperative for members to design crisis plans for
multiple, possible incidences ranging from another North Korean missile test to
the death of Kim Jong Il to a clash over Taiwan. In
the pursuit of mutual understanding and evaluation of progress of the
trilateral policy, it was suggested that this seminar be institutionalized and
held on an annual basis, perhaps ultimately expanding it to include Russia and
China.
After
two days of discussion it was clear that much expectation has been placed on
trilateral policy coordination since the Perry Report.
TCOG has proven to be quite effective so
far, but fundamental differences still exist, leaving the coordination efforts
vulnerable in the long run. TCOG’s
strength is in its effort to balance the agendas of all three countries and
ensure that no one gets too far ahead or behind the others. It is also
instrumental in preventing divisiveness among the three nations.
Despite of the existence of common concerns,
however, the burden of continuing to bring in line national interests of three
different nations will remain a daunting challenge, especially in the face of
upcoming elections in each country.
There were varying opinions of what TCOG should do henceforth to retain
its effectiveness and elicit positive results from North Korea.
No one advocated embracing a different
policy alternative, but everyone agreed that the current policy must be
modified to overcome its inherent weaknesses.
Nevertheless, what these modifications should be remained open to
debate. Perhaps the suggestion most
likely to be pursued, therefore, is for experts to continue to meet at
workshops similar to this one in a continuing effort to align their
perspectives and agendas.
Copyright March 2000