March 3-4, 2000
After
the death of President Kim Il Sung in July 1994, the Democratic People’s
Republic of Korea (DPRK) seemed to be immobilized by “mourning.” The veil of
enigma that had shrouded his son Kim Jong Il became more opaque; the younger
Kim was not seen in public for more than three months. Meanwhile, in a massive
propaganda and educational campaign, the government called for strict obedience
to “the will of The Great Leader” and emphasized that Kim Jong Il was as
important to the country as the late president. Kim Jong Il went to
extraordinary lengths to maintain stability and establish the legitimacy of his
succession.
When the official three-year mourning period ended in July 1997, Kim Jong Il consolidated his position through election as general secretary of the Korean Workers’ Party (KWP) in October 1997 and as chairman of the National Defense Commission (NDC) in September 1998, gradually asserting his own style of leadership in domestic affairs and foreign policy.
Foreign Policy
In
August 1997, Kim Jong Il affirmed his foreign policy of giving priority to
relations with the United States: “We hope to normalize the Korea-U.S.
relationship.”1 When U.S. distrust of North Korea heightened over a secret
underground nuclear facility at Kumchang-ni, the test-firing of a Taepodong
missile in August 1998, and missile exports, North Korea resorted to
brinkmanship and demands for compensation. Although Pyongyang’s risky policy
poses a major threat to regional security, its primary objective is regime
survival. Having squared off against the United States for 50 years, North
Korean leaders cannot conceivably dream of winning an all-out war against
America. North Korea took a hard-line stance on the underground site and
another missile launch out of fear. A simple fact should be kept in mind about
North Korea’s pattern of behavior: The goal is to survive, not to lash out
convulsively against South Korea or its allies.
North
Korea’s signalled a conciliatory approach on missile testing in a statement by
the spokesman for the DPRK Foreign Ministry on July 26, 1999: “We do not want
to regard the United States as the sworn enemy.” This key phrase had been used
only once before, by Kim Jong Il in August 1997. In August 1999, Kim Yong Sun,
secretary of the KWP, said, “If a visitor brings us cake, we will also give
cake.” These “soft “ words helped to defuse the tense situation.2
For years North Korea denied it was
exporting missiles. In June 1994, for example, Pyongyang declared: “It is our
country’s policy not to supply or export weapons of mass destruction such as
missiles, and we will not waver from this.”3 However, in June 1998, the DPRK made a
complete about-face, admitting missile sales and demanding that if the United
States wanted to stop them, Washington should quickly lift its economic embargo
and pay compensation for losses stemming from the discontinued exports.4
During the Cold War, North Korea’s nuclear
weapons and missile development were shielded by ideological and security ties
with China and the former Soviet Union. The collapse of communism and
Pyongyang’s economic difficulties forced a change of policy: nuclear arms and
missile became political weapons to ensure the regime’s survival. North Korea
has fashioned a policy of brinkmanship, raising the value of these cards to extract
the maximum advantage.
If missiles are political weapons, the
next launch would be timed for maximum political effect. North Korea presumably
intended to test a Taepo- dong 2 missile, with a range covering Alaska and the
Hawaiian Islands, as a mega bargaining chip in negotiations with the United
States. But Washington, Seoul, and Tokyo warned of harsh sanctions: the United
States would cut off humanitarian food aid, South Korea would suspend economic
cooperation projects, and Japan would halt remittances to North Korea.
The Clinton administration also began
dangling a carrot: it would relax economic sanctions if Pyongyang refrained
from a missile test. North Korea would gain something from doing nothing.
Weighing the benefits and losses, the DPRK entered into negotiations with the
United States. Decision makers in Pyongyang knew they could resume testing if
talks failed. As long as North Korea continues missile development, at some
point a Taepodong obviously must be test fired.
In December 1998, tension mounted amidst
speculation over a test launch in March or June 1999. Yet North Korean leaders
also had grounds for fear. U.S.-led air raids against Iraq and Yugoslavia
deepened Pyongyang’s sense of vulnerability. In fact, many of North Korea’s hard-line
statements ended on less bombastic note, urging restraint and discretion.
From December 1998, North Korean media
carried a barrage of threats: “We will answer all-out war with all-out war.”
(December 4, Rodong Sinmun); “A second Korean War cannot be avoided” (December
7, Korea Central Broadcast Station); “Washington, Seoul and Tokyo will be
reduced to a sea of fire” (December 11, Korea Central Broadcast Station); and
“There is no limit to our army’s striking power and no place on this planet to
escape it” (December 24, Rodong Sinmun). The December 19 Rodong Sinmun carried
a cartoon of three missiles aimed at aircraft labeled “Washington, Tokyo,
Seoul.” The Korean Peninsula seemed on the eve of war. North Korea’s rigid,
bellicose tone increased anxiety in Japan, triggering a debate on crisis
management.
Let us compare these circumstances with
1994, when the situation was so grave that former Secretary of Defense William
Perry has said the United States almost went to war in Korea.
Then, too, North Korea relentlessly
criticized Japan, the United States, and South Korea, accompanying the harsh
rhetoric with provocative actions. In May 1994, the North withdrew its members
from the Korea Military Armistice Commission and, ignoring warnings from the
International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), removed fuel rods from the Yongbyon
reactor. It also test fired a Silkworm anti-submarine missile into the Sea of
Japan. In June, North Korea declared its immediate withdrawal from the IAEA.
The tirades and defiant steps continued until just before the arrival of former
U.S. President Jimmy Carter on June 15.
What about this time around? Since the
hard-line statements in December 1998, North Korea has not committed
provocative acts similar to those in 1994. In contrast, the DPRK has maintained
discussions with the United States about missiles, visits to the underground
facilities and other matters, participated in the Four Party Talks, allowed the
Hyundai Group to proceed with its Mt. Kumgang tourist project, and took part in
the North-South Economic Cooperation Project.
This gap between tough talk and actual
conduct indicates how extremely cautious, perhaps even fearful, the North
Koreans are.
North Korea repeatedly insists on its
sovereign right to launch satellites and test missiles. For example, on August
3, 1999, the DPRK Foreign Ministry spokesman asserted: “Whether we test-fire a
satellite or a missile is a legitimate independent right to be exercised by a
sovereign state because it in no way runs counter to the DPRK-U.S. Agreed
Framework or international conventions.” This North Korean posturing—claiming
that missile tests have not been suspended because of pressure from Japan, the
United States, and South Korea—may also be interpreted as a trial balloon to
test reactions in the three countries.
The
DPRK-U.S. Berlin Agreement was reached on September 12, 1999, and the Perry
Report was released in October. North Korea gives high marks to both. On
December 18, 1999, the Korean Central News Agency (KCNA) commented that the
improved atmosphere since the Berlin talks was conducive to ending the
“long-standing hostile relations between the two countries.” Kim Jong Il’s
favorite section in the Perry Report must be: “The DPRK’s evident problems
would ultimately lead its regime to change, there is no evidence that change is
imminent. United States policy must, therefore, deal with the North Korean
government as it is, not as we might wish it to be.”5 In negotiations with Washington, North Korea has
consistently sought assurances of regime survival.
On March 16, 1999, North Korea and the
United States issued a Joint Press Statement announcing that agreement had been
reached on measures to remove U.S. concerns about the underground site at
Kumchang-ni. This Statement is noteworthy not only because both sides
reaffirmed their commitment to the Agreed Framework but also to the principles
of bilateral relations expressed in the U.S.-DPRK Joint Statement of June 11,
1994. The concepts of “mutual respect for each other’s sovereignty” and
“non-interference in each other’s internal affairs” are not in the Agreed
Framework. Pyongyang reportedly insisted on a confirmation at this time.
In 1994, North Korea temporarily halted
its railing against the United States after Joint Statement and the Agreed
Framework were signed. This time, however, Pyongyang is still doing it. For
example: “The United States is talking about the DPRK-U.S. dialogue and
improved relations , but has not made any switch over in its hostile policy
towards the DPRK. It used the ‘nuclear issue,’ and ‘missile issue’ as a pretext
to stifle the DPRK.”6
Aside from lingering uncertainties about
what can be gained from talks with Washington, North Korea show its anxiety over
a Republican victory in the November 2000 presidential election. On December 8,
1999, the DPRK Foreign Ministry spokesman, pointing out that Republican
Congressmen were calling for tougher measures toward North Korea, said it was
hard to guess the true U.S. policy towards the DPRK with a presidential
election at hand. He lamented that North Korea had to make a momentous decision
on its missile program when the present U.S. administration which has only one
year left.
Nevertheless, North Korea will probably
conclude that it must improve relations with the United States – reach a level
irreversible by a Republican administration – while Bill Clinton is in the
White House. Thus it is highly likely that Pyongyang and Washington will
establish liaison offices this year. But North Korea is already hedging its
bets against a Republican victory; foreign policy initiatives to drive a wedge
into the Japan-South Korea-U.S. alliance, restore good relations with China,
and multilateral diplomacy.
Since
the Perry process began, the DPRK media have denounced military cooperation
among Japan, South Korea and the United States. Threatened by the enhanced
trilateral collaboration, North Korea is taking steps to undermine it.
In late 1999, North Korea moved to resume
negotiations, suspended since 1992, to normalize diplomatic relations with
Japan. The ultimate goal is to obtain the compensation from Japan for “the
immeasurable misfortunes and disasters it inflicted on the Korean people in the
past” and “its hostile policy toward the DPRK.” The more immediate aims
include: 1) separate Japan from South Korea and the United States; 2) secure
food aid from Tokyo; 3) improve North Korea’s image in Japan and counter
containment; and 4) remove Japan’s economic sanctions against the DPRK.
On point one, North Korean policy makers
may think that talks with Tokyo will allow them to take a somewhat tougher line
with the United States. They were well aware that Japan had no choice but to
seek a dialogue within the framework of the Perry process. North Korea timed
acceptance of a Japanese multi-party delegation, headed by former Prime
Minister Tomiichi Murayama, to gain the upper hand in bilateral talks. In fact,
the Murayama delegation made no progress on Japan’s two biggest concerns –
missile tests and abductions of Japanese nationals by North Korean agents.
These crucial issues were left to future negotiations.
On the abduction issue, the North Korean
side agreed to “recommend that [national] Red Cross organizations cooperate”7 on a “humanitarian issue.” But the North
Koreans insist that as long as Japan brings up this “inappropriate” matter,
relations may deteriorate.8 The outlook for talks is unpromising: If held, progress
will be at a snail’s pace.
Meanwhile, North Korea is trying to fuel
South Korea impatience by playing up progress in its talks with Washington and
Tokyo, totally disregarding South Korea’s role in the Perry process. According
to KCNA, “The South Korean authorities’ claim moves to improve relations
between the DPRK and the United States and between the DPRK and Japan as a
‘success’ for their ‘engagement policy’ is ridiculous .” The South Koreans,
KCNA said, “would be well-advised not to poke their nose into other people’s
business.”9
On October 8, 1999, the central committee
of the Democratic Front for the Reunification of the Fatherland and the
Committee for the Peaceful Reunification of the Fatherland of the DPRK issued a
joint statement denouncing the “massacre committed by the U.S. aggressor troops
in Rogun-ri (No Gun Ri) during the Korean War” and urging the people of South
Korea to wage an anti-America struggle. Subsequently “mass meetings to support
the South Korean people in their struggle against GIs’ massacres” were
reportedly held across North Korea. This campaign aims to inflame South Korean
sentiment against the United States and drive a wedge between Seoul and
Washington.
The North Korean government approved
economic arrangements with South Korean private businesses, but has refused to
hold official talks with the Seoul government since June 1999. On January 21,
2000, Radio Pyongyang reiterated its call for the ROK government to facilitate
economic contacts, while rejecting ROK President Kim Dae-jung’s proposal for an
“inter-Korean economic cooperation body.” North Korea seeks to reap benefits
from Kim’s Sunshine Policy without making political concessions.
North Korea strategy is to disrupt
tripartite cooperation and rattle South Korea through negotiations with
Washington and Tokyo. If the Kim Dae-jung administration offered large-scale
aid—fertilizer and food—Pyongyang might agree to limited North-South
negotiations, as it did in June 1999.
North
Korean diplomats were very active in 1999. According to an ROK National
Intelligence Service (NIS) report, DPRK officials made 222 overseas visits in
1999, compared to 134 in 1998 and 99 in 1997. Particularly noteworthy in this
flurry were efforts to restore friendly relations with China.
In June 1999, a delegation headed by Kim
Yong Nam, president of the presidium of the Supreme People’s Assembly (SPA),
made an official friendship visit to China. Kim Yong Nam is the titular head of
state in North Korea, and the visit was the first to China by a North Korean official
of this rank since Kim Il Sung went to Beijing in October 1991 and the highest
level contact between North Korea and China since Kim Jong Il came to power.
The visit was designed to fill the seven-year vacuum in bilateral relations
since China established diplomatic ties with South Korea in 1992. as well as to
obtain China’s pledge of continued support for the battered North Korean
economy. The two countries expressed understanding of each other’s domestic
circumstances. Kim Yong Nam said three times that North Korea “supports China’s
reform and liberalization policy.” Chinese President Jiang Zemin responded that
“both countries are building socialism according to their own circumstances.”10
To China and North Korea, the visit demonstrated their “traditional friendship.” However, the striking difference from the Cold War era was that neither sought to revive an anti-American united front; concerned as they both are about future relations with Washington. North Korea wants China as an ally in case negotiations with the United States collapse, while China wants to remind the Clinton administration that it wields considerable influence in Pyongyang.
Jiang Zemin reportedly gave China’s
blessing to the DPRK to improve relations with the United States, Japan and the
European Union (EU). Subsequently North Korea held dialogues with the United
States, Japan, and the EU.11 Of course, these developments were not dictated by China,
but the timing suggests Beijing retains a measure of influence in North Korea.
Since the visit, China and North Korea have increased personnel exchanges,
including those by military delegations.
North Korea has also improved relations
with Russia. The two countries signed a new friendship treaty on February 9,
2000. The pact replaced a Cold War treaty that obligated Moscow to provide
military support in case of war.
On January 4, 2000, North Korea
established diplomatic ties with Italy, the first Group of Seven country to
have official ties with Pyongyang. A statement by the DPRK Foreign Ministry
spokesman on January 9 underlined a policy shift to seeking contacts with the
West.12
North Korea is improving relations with
Australia, the Philippines, and Canada with an eye to full diplomatic ties.
North Korea has shown interest in participating in the 2000 Sydney Olympics,
and obtained Australian permission to station an Olympic attache in Sydney.13
DPRK Foreign Minister Paek Nam Sun
attended the U.N. General Assembly session right after the DPRK-U.S. Berlin
Agreement in September 1999, the first time a DPRK foreign minister has
appeared at the United Nations since 1992. Paek Nam Sun met with foreign
ministers or high foreign ministry officials from 22 countries, including the
Philippines, Italy, and Australia.14 Furthermore, North Korea held a
political dialogue with the EU in November 1999, following up on the first such
session a year earlier. The Berlin Agreement improved the climate for Western
countries to open dialogue with North Korea, a product of the Perry process.
North Korea’s multilateral diplomacy has
political as well as economic objectives. First, North Korea is taking out
political insurance against a rupture in negotiations with the United States or
a tougher U.S. policy in the event of a Republican administration in January
2001. The DPRK wants new sources of humanitarian assistance in case U.S. aid is
cut off.
Kim
Jong Il assumed the post of KWP general secretary in 1997 without being elected
at a plenary meeting of the party Central Committee, an act not provided for in
party rules, on the strength of recommendations from provincial conferences. A
special communique on his election by the KWP’s Central Committee and Central
Military Commission stated: “He was the first in history to propound the
original idea that a working-class Party should be the Party of the leader and
make it a reality.” Hagiography aside, Kim Jong Il turned the KWP into his
personal party. In officialese, “Comrade Kim Jong Il is the KWP and vice versa.”15
In September 1998, the 10th SPA, meeting
for the first time in almost four and a half years, elected Kim Jong Il
chairman of the National Defense Commission. According to the official
explanation, “the NDC chairmanship is the highest post of the state and
commands all the political, military and economic forces of the country.”16 The revised constitution, which was simultaneously adopted,
defines the post as imited to military matters. The circumstances under which Kim Jong Il attained these positions
indicates an attempt to stand above the law, beyond the party constitution or
the DPRK’s socialist constitution. Lacking the charisma of his father, Kim has
devised a way to dominate the state.
Beginning with a visit in January 1995 to
the Korean People’s Army unit No. 214, Kim Jong Il has frequently traveled to
army units, including those deployed near the demilitarized zone. Although a
man who inherited political power must control the generals, Kim Jong Il seems
to be going beyond that to make the military the linchpin of the state. In
April 1998, the North Korean media began using the phrase “a policy of giving
priority to the army.” A joint article in June 1999 said “priority to the army
is Kim Jong Il’s main mode of politics,” asserting that the military is the
party, the people, and the state.17
Since Kim Il Sung,’s death, almost all
roads, bridges, and important construction projects in North Korea have been
built by the armed forces; troops have also been mobilized to assist with
agriculture and mining production. With the military the only organization that
has both manpower and transportation, in part because it has first call on
petroleum and other resources, this may be inevitable. Still, it is no
exaggeration to say that North Korea has been turned into a militarized state.
Many official slogans have a martial tone. The three most frequently
repeated—”the spirit of devotedly defending the leader,” “the spirit of a human
bomb” and “the spirit of a suicide attack”—are used to inculcate patriotism and
loyalty to Kim Jong Il to the death.
The other phrase that symbolizes Kim Jong
Il-style politics is “building a powerful state,” the main theme in North Korea
in 1998. The Dear Leader is trying to inspire the populace with more positive
slogans than those used in the past such as “arduous march” or “forced march.”
North Korea described the launch of a “satellite” in August 1998 as “the
thunder of Juche Korea trumpeting the march toward a powerful state.”
October 10, 2000, will be the 55th anniversary
of the founding of the KWP. The New Year’s joint editorial called for it to be
a “great festival glorifying forever the immortal revolutionary cause of the
foundation of the Party.”18 Since July 1997, Kim Jong Il has steadily normalized the
regime; only the leadership of the KWP has not been revamped, which sugggests a
party congress may be held in October 2000. In fact, the fifth party congress
was in 1970 and the sixth in 1980. If one is convened in 2000 after a twenty
year hiatus, Kim Jong Il will form a Central Committee loyal to himself.
Several recent developments indicate which
way the wind is blowing. Since July 1996, the three honorary vice presidents of
the SPA presidium (all political bureau members of the KWP’s Central Committee)
– Ri Jong Ok, Pak Song Chol and Kim Yong Ju (the younger brother of Kim Il
Sung) – have disappeared from the political scene. This may indicate a change
of generations among the leadership. Another possibility is that an extensive
reevaluation of leaders may have started. The Rodong Sinmun, in a signed
article on January 18, 2000, identified class enemies as those who: 1)are
opposed to the socialist system; 2) introduce corrupt bourgeois ways of life
into society; 3) abandon socialist principles for money; 4) divulge state
secrets for money; or 5) try to undermine socialism. Very uncommon these days,
such a statement may portend a shakeup of the leadership.
Kim
Jong Il has spurned outside calls for “reform and openness” and denounced
Mikhail Gorbachev, convinced that the former Soviet Union and Eastern Europe
collapsed because of glasnost—disclosure of information, reform, and openness.
Indeed, North Korea’s system can function only in a closed environment. Kim
Jong Il is correct to warn that reform and opening to the outside world would
be suicide for North Korea.
A June 1999 joint article echoed Kim Jong
Il, attributing the demise of the former Soviet Union and East European
socialist countries to imperialist ideological and cultural poisoning.” North
Korea must reject resolutely openness and pluralism in ideology and politics;
“the capitalist way of business management,” “reform” and “opening” in the
economic field; and “creative freedom” in literature and the arts.19
The joint editorial on January 1, 2000,
voiced wariness about “the spread of imperialists’ idea and culture to our
society.”20 (In
1998, the word “Free” was eliminated from the name of the “Rajin-Sonbong Free
Economic and Trade Zone,” an example of tighter thought control.)
In April 1999, the 10th SPA adopted a law
on planning the national economy. The objective is to counteract developments
since 1995 when floods caused massive damage and loosened economic controls –
the rationing system was disrupted and black markets thrived. Rejecting
economic liberalization, the new law underscored a “planned economy based on
the socialist ownership of the means of production” and centralized and unified
guidance by the state.
In seeking economic recovery, Kim Jong Il
has chosen the good old path of a controlled economy, rather than foster
elements of capitalism that were sprouting up in North Korea. He stubbornly
refuses to open the door to the outside world, an attitude even more
conservative than his father that may reveal his lack of confidence in the
regime’s strength.
Since
1998, Kim Jong Il has personally led efforts to overcome economic difficulties,
frequently making on-the-spot guidance trips and issuing specific instructions.
For the troubled agricultural sector, he
came up with a “New Theory of Agriculture,” which features: 1) the principle of
the right crop on the right soil and the right crop at the right time, while
respecting the wishes of farmers; 2) revolutions in potato farming and seeds;
3) double-cropping; 4) land readjustment; and 5) raising of rabbits and goats.
Explained as an evolution of Juche-style farming, Kim Jong Il’s program pays
little regard to single cropping and corn, hitherto the key features of North
Korean agriculture. In effect, Kim Jong Il has abandoned his father’s
agricultural policy.
Double-cropping is mainly designed to
exploit suitable farmland from October to June to acquire additional food in
times of need. Double-cropping started on a trial basis in 1996 in cooperation
with U.N. agencies; full scale implementation began in 1998. The
double-cropping program for 1999-2000 calls for growing wheat and barley on
100,000 hectares of land in winter and 23,000 hectares in spring. That North
Korea actually formulated a new agricultural policy around advice from the
United Nations is a sign of flexibility.
Kim Jong Il proposed innovations in potato
farming on a visit to Taehongdan County in Ryanggang Province in October 1998.
Declaring that “potatoes are the same as rice,” he tried to ease the food
shortage by elevating potatoes to the nation’s staple food. Corn growing, a
hallmark of Kim Il Sung’s farm policy, will probably be gradually replaced by
potatoes.
North Korea’s agricultural plight seems to
have eased in 1999, after many reports of famine in recent years. While the
corn crop was below anticipations, thanks to good weather there was a bumper
rice crop, according to the North Korean cabinet. At the U.N. Food and
Agriculture Organization (FAO) conference held in Rome on Nov. 16, 1999, Vice
Agriculture Minister Kim Yong Suk said “ this year’s grain output is expected
to reach about 4.28 million tonnes of unhulled grain, approximately 1.4 times
the level of last year.”
The joint editorial of January 1, 2000, in
the section on the economy, took up the electric power and coal industries
first, and then addressed problems in the metal industry, railroad
transportation, light industry, agriculture and important construction projects
in that order. The New Year joint editorial has appeared annually since 1995
and this is the first time agriculture was not at the top of the economic
agenda. The editorial also dropped the phrase “solve the food problem,” used
since 1997, indicating that agriculture is a lessing pressing concern.
How much food does North Korea need to
feed its people? The FAO/WFP estimate the shortage at 1,293,000 tonnes.21 At the FAO conference, Kim Yong Suk
estimated the grain shortage in 2000 at just over 1.2 million tonnes, and
appealed for continued international support.
The worst of the food shortages may be
over, but food remains in short supply. Furthermore, U.N.-coordinated food aid
may be tapering off. According to the WFP: “Cereal contributions for WFP
emergency operations in DPRK are anticipated to run out in mid-May. If
additional donor pledges are not received in the course of January, the break
in food supply will have serious consequences for North Koreans during the lean
season, and may signal the end of the WFP programme in DPRK”22 The primary reason for North Korea’s overtures to Japan in
late 1999 may have been to get food aid.
North Korea also badly needs energy.
Insufficient electricity has severely affected all industries. North Korean
factories are believed to be operating at less than 20 percent of capacity. To
deal with the energy crunch, since 1997 Kim Jong Il has pushed construction of
small- and medium-sized hydropower stations, often citing Jagan Province as the
model.
But under this program, the central
government does not supply power to localities, instead requiring them to
provide their own. That regional power stations built to local needs and
specifications are of high quality is hard to imagine. Their average output is
very low; even a sharp increase in the number of such power plants offers
little prospect for a dramatic improvement in the electricity supply or benefit
to industry.
The 500,000 tons of heavy fuel oil
provided yearly by the United States under the Agreed Framework is crucially
important to the North Korean economy. That North Korea, without other sources
of energy, would jeopardize this supply is virtually unthinkable.
Kim
Jong Il’s policies are now clear: Brinkmanship diplomacy using the threat of a
nuclear weapons program and missile tests, dictatorial assumption of power,
militarization, a new agriculture policy, and requests for international
economic aid. These are his response to the changed external environment and
the deterioration of the domestic economy. North Korea has demonstrated
flexibility as well as volatility. Kim Jong Il is not bound by his father’s
legacy as much as outside observers once thought. On the contrary, he has
manipulated it to gain credibility and stature.
Behind North Korea’s brinkmanship is a
mindset: “The ultimate trump card in a fierce diplomatic war is one’s own firm
political and military power and the confidence in victory that stems from
them.”23
As long as the North Korean leadership believes that diplomacy must be backed
by resolve and military might, Pyongyang’s arms buildup and brinksmanship are
likely to continue.
The negotiations to dissuade North Korea
from launching another Taepodong missile, just as hapened in the talks on
suspected nuclear weapons, may have produced the unintended result of
convincing the DPRK that must bluster, threaten, and go to the brink to get a
good bargain from Washington.
On the other hand, strengthened
cooperation among the United States, South Korea, and Japan created by the
Perry process has begun to contain North Korea, with the tacit understanding of
China and Russia. North Korean attempts to split the three allies are not
likely to succeed. Clearly worried, Pyongyang perhaps will reassess its
brinkmanship policy.
In a bid too escape encirclement, and in
anticipation of a Republican administration in Washington, North Korea is
shifting from a U.S.-centered foreign policy, reestablishing cordial ties with
China, and exploring the opportunities offered by multilateral diplomacy.
However, unless Pyongyang improves relations with the United States, other
Western countries will be reluctant to establish better ties. North Korea has
no choice: relations with the United States are the key to everything .
Kim Jong Il, though burdened with the
negative legacy of this father’s rule, is creating his own solutions for North
Korea’s economic malaise. Both the agricultural and industrial sectors saw some
improvement in 1999. Yet the economy is a sinking ship whose crew frantically
try to plug the leaks. Without outside investment, it cannot stay afloat. Yet
reform and openness are a deadly shoal. And fearful of being crushed by the
West, North Korea cannot reduce military spending. This is Kim Jong Il’s
biggest dilemma.
1.
Kim Jong Il, “Let Us Carry out the Great
Leader Comrade Kim Il Sung’s Instructions for National Reunification,” August
4, 1997.
2.
Mike Chinoy, chief, CNN Hong Kong
Bureau, August 16, 1999.
3.
Korean Central News Agency (KCNA), June
29, 1994.
4.
“Nobody Can Slander the DPRK’s Missile
policy,” KCNA commentary, June 16, 1998.
5.
Review of United States Policy Toward
North Korea: Findings and Recommendations. Unclassified report by Dr. William
J. Perry, U.S. North Korea Policy Coordinator and Special Adviser to the
President and the Secretary of State, October 12, 1999.
6.
KCNA commentary, January 18, 2000.
7.
Joint press statement by Korean and
Japanese party delegations, December 3, 1999.
8.
Commentary, Korean Central
Broadcast Station, December 18, 1999.
9.
“S. Korean Rulers Hit for Trying to
Meddle in Efforts,” KCNA, December 18, 1999.
10.
The People’s Daily of China, June 5, 1999.
11.
Ibid.
12.
KCNA, January 10, 2000.
13.
Remark by Tony Hely, Austrailan Ambassador to South Korea, Yonhap News Agency,
January 15, 2000.
14.
Paek met with representatives from Cuba, Syria, Iran, Singapore, Denmark,
Algeria, Guyana, Malaysia, Philippines, Italy, China, Senegal, Mali, Belarussi,
Laos, Vietnam, Finland, Switzerland, Austria, Norway, Austraila, and the Congo.
15.
“Invincible is KWP with General Secretary Kim Jong Il at Head,” Rodong Sinmun,
October 10, 1997.
16.
The speech of Deputy Kim Yong Nam proposing to reelect General Secretary Kim
Jong Il as chairman of the National Defence Commission at the first session of
the 10th Supreme People’s Assembly, September 5, 1998.
17.
“Our Party’s Policy of Giving Priority to the Army is Invincible,” Joint article in Rodong Sinmun and Kulloja,
organs of the Central Committee, KWP, June 16, 1999.
18.
“Glorify This Year Greeting the 55th Anniversary of the Party Foundation as a
Year of Proud Victory in the Frame of Great Chollima Upsurge,” January 1, 2000.
19.
“Let Us Reject Imperialist Ideological and Cultural Poisoning,” joint article,
Rodong Sinmun and Kulloja, June 1, 1999.
20.
Same as note 18.
21.
Special Report, FAO/WFP Crop and Food Supply Assessment Mission to DPRK,
November 8, 1999.
22.
WFP Emergency Report No. 01 of the year 2000, January 6, 2000.
23.
Same as note 17.
Copyright March 2000