Domestic Politics and the Future of
North Korea Policy in South Korea

(Preliminary Draft)

Jongryn Mo
Graduate School of International Studies
Yonsei University

Paper presented at the conference
North Korea Policy After The Perry Report:
A Trilateral (Japan, the Republic of Korea, and the United States) Workshop

March 3-4, 2000

Introduction

The policy toward North Korea is complicated by the existence of different views and perspectives. Scholars and policy makers differ widely on many critical questions concerning North Korean behavior and motivation as well as the policy objective of South Korea: Should South Korea seek immediate unification or accept national division? How serious is North Korean military threat? Is North Korea preparing for the military takeover of the South or preoccupied with its own survival? How stable is the North Korean regime? Will North Korea be restrained by the need for economic interdependence?

              There are at least four schools of through on the North Korean question, accommodation, engagement, linkage, and containment. Although powerful political, economic and ideological interests underlie each school of thought and their political competition accounts for some of the difficulty with the resolution of policy conflict, I argue that uncertainty over North Korean preferences is the main cause of policy disagreement. What divides the two mainstream perspectives, the engagement and linkage schools, is their disagreement on whether North Korea is still intent upon the military takeover of the South.

Four Policy Perspectives on North Korea: Accommodation, Engagement, Linkage, and Containment

There are at least four schools of thought on North Korean policy, accommodation, engagement, linkage, and containment. The usual dichotomy of hard-liner versus soft-liner or engagement versus containment is not sophisticated enough to capture divergent views and perspectives that exist among North Korean specialists. Each school of thought, which is based on its own set of assumptions, offers different policy prescriptions. Table 1 summarizes the assumptions and policy prescriptions associated with each perspective.

Accommodation: The accommodation school supports unconditional economic aid for North Korea, lifting of South Korean restrictions on exchanges and political activities, and disarmament and the end of hostility on the part of South Korea. The ideological foundation of the accommodation school is Korean nationalism. According to their view, the protection and promotion of national interest and welfare and the independence from foreign interests should receive the highest priority from both North and South Korea. Naturally, Korean reunification should be the most urgent task for both Koreas. For the sake of nationalism, South Koreans should offer their impoverished brethren in North Korea unconditional economic aid. In the same vein, any barriers to the pursuit of national integration between the two Koreas should be dismantled, including South Korea’s national security laws and U.S. troops stationed in South Korea. South Korean supporters of accommodation believe that between the two Koreas, North Korea is a relatively more faithful follower of Korean nationalism and South Korea is more content with the status quo of national division.

Being strongly normative and ideological in orientation, the accommodation school is weak on analytical foundations. Some of the analytical questions are irrelevant to the accommodation school. Economic interdependence between the two Koreas is desirable by itself, and it does not matter whether it leads to change in North Korean behavior. The question of North Korean regime stability is also of marginal importance because whether or not the North Korean regime is stable, South Korea should be accommodative by offering aid and other gestures of good will. On other analytical questions, the accommodation views are strongly influenced by their normative beliefs. The primary objective of North Korea is believed to be survival. Being nationalist, the North Korean government would not use force against South Korea.

The policy of accommodation is supported mainly by liberal activists in academia, citizen, church, student, and labor groups, and dissident organizations. Some of them including radical student and labor groups are open supporters of North Korea. But most of them are not. The main outlet for the accommodation school is liberal publications such as Mal and Hankyerae Shinmun. Although the accommodation school has been anti-establishment and outside the mainstream, it has recently made inroads into the foreign policy establishment as some of its members such as Han Wan-Sang have been appointed to senior government positions by recent democratic governments.

Engagement: Another school of thought is the “engagement” school. Although there are many variants, the core assumption of the engagement school is that North Korea can and should be induced to change their behavior through engagement. In trade policy, engagement means expansion of trade and investment and separation of economic and political issues. In security and military areas, the engagement school emphasizes dialogue and cooperation over confrontation and use of force. According to their view, the political benefits of engagement come naturally as a result of the target state’s anxiety not to lose the benefits of engagement and there is no need for explicit demands or threats.

The engagement school has a long tradition and history in the academic debate on foreign policy. Between the two dominant perspectives on international relations, liberalism and realism, the engagement school is grounded on theories and assumptions of liberalism. The most relevant area of debate is over whether economic interdependence leads to more or less conflict. The liberals believe that economic interdependence contributes to peace and stability while the realists point to its conflictual aspects. In the United States, China was the most recent case in which liberal and realist perspectives clashed (Nye, 1995; Segal, 1996). The liberals advocated a policy of engagement, whereas the realists argued for containment. The main point of contention in that debate is whether China can be restrained by economic interdependence.

As in the case of China, the engagement school argues that South Korea and its allies can change North Korea by giving it incentives to join regional and global society. “There is no need to think in terms of a balance of power because stability will be provided by states anxious not to lose the benefits of economic interdependence” (Segal, 1996, pp. 107). Implicit in this line of thinking is an assumption that the primary objective of North Korea is regime survival, not the military takeover of South Korea. If North Korea pursues military takeover of South Korea, the latter will be reluctant to offer economic aid and expand trade in fear of strengthening North Korea’s military capabilities.

The engagement school also assumes that if South Korea does not actively engage or shows hostility toward North Korea, the latter will feel threatened and vulnerable and may turn to force out of desperation. In this situation, South Korea and its allies have no choice but to engineer a soft-landing in North Korea by giving it assurances for no attack as well as incentives for reform and cooperation. This logic, however, presumes that North Korea still possesses the military capability to inflict a heavy cost on South Korea and the willingness to use force. Otherwise, South Korea and its allies do not need to fear North Korea.

The stability of the North Korean regime is unimportant to the logic of engagement. If North Korea faces an imminent collapse, the engagement school believes that it is better to prop up the failing regime and avoid the consequences of chaos and instability in North Korea. If North Korea is stable instead, a policy of engagement is still called for because a stable North Korean regime poses a greater military threat. Therefore, for the policy of engagement to be internally consistent, the following two assumptions must hold:

1. North Korea will be restrained by the need for economic interdependence because it no longer considers the military takeover of the South as a realistic goal;
2. North Korea poses a significant military threat.

The engagement school is dominant in liberal-leaning academia. The business community, who wants to develop business opportunities in North Korea, is another supporting group. Among government agencies, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and National Unification Board tend to advocate a policy of engagement. They have institutional interests in maintaining some level of inter-Korean dialogue and contact, which is consistent with a policy of engagement. Although most mainstream newspapers do not support a particular policy on a consistent basis, they tend to be sympathetic to the engagement school.

              Linkage: The linkage school advocates a set of policies that are qualitatively different from the previous two schools. In general, the linkage policies are considered as more hard-line toward North Korean than the policies of accommodation and engagement. For example, the linkage school supports expansion of trade and investment with North Korea but under certain conditions. The conditions that South Korea linked to expansion of inter-Korean trade have varied since 1993 when the inter-Korean relationship soured over the North Korean nuclear program, but one condition that the South consistently demanded is the resumption of the government-to-government talks between the two Koreas. Pyongyang has refused direct talks with Seoul while showing willingness to talk to South Korean firms. The linkage school also opposes unconditional food aid to North Korea and specifies three conditions that have to be met before offering food aid, an official request for aid by the North Korean government, a government-to-government negotiation over the terms of aid, and the location of the negotiation site on the Korean peninsula. On security issues, a policy of linkage represents a hard-line position in that it asks for more, explicit or immediate North Korean concessions that a policy of engagement calls for. During the height of the North Korean nuclear crisis, the linkage school wanted to pressure North Korea to accept special inspections while the engagement school was content to freeze the North Korean nuclear program without probing into the past activities.

              The core assumption of the linkage school is that North Korea is basically an untrustworthy country with military ambitions. Given this type of preference, North Korea will not be restrained by the need for economic interdependence. Moreover, the North Korean military threat is credible in view of its significant military capabilities. Therefore, the two assumptions underlying the logic of linkage are:

1. North Korea poses a significant military threat;
2. North Korea’s primary objective is military takeover of the South.

The linkage school believes that the North Korean regime cannot sustain itself in the long run, but is likely to survive for the time being. Whether or not the North Korean regime is stable is of secondary importance to the logic of linkage because its threat does not diminish in either case.

              The linkage school is inevitably associated with conservative elements in Korean society. Its main supporters are the national security establishment including the military and the security agencies. It also draws support from some academics with a strong conservative reputation. Among the newspapers, the Chosun Ilbo stands out as a supporter of the linkage policy.

              Containment: Like the linkage school, the containment school supports policies designed to constrain North Korea. But between the two, a policy of containment represents a more hard-line position toward North Korea. The containment school would, for example, demand economic sanctions on North Korea and oppose food aid. Generally, the containment school would be skeptical on the utility of any negotiation with North Korea.

              Although the containment school espouses policies diametrically opposed to those supported by the accommodation school, the two schools are similar in two respects. First, both schools put high priority on national unification. Second, their views are strongly moralistic. The containment school considers the North Korean regime as immoral and illegitimate. It also believes that North Korea is still looking for an opportunity to use force against the South. Given that the North Korean regime faces an imminent collapse and does not pose a significant military threat, South Korea should wait until the North collapses or take measures to facilitate the disintegration of the North Korean regime. In this situation, a policy of engagement or linkage can actually backfire as it can sustain the life of the North Korean regime beyond what is possible on its own.

              Very few people in Korea openly support a policy of containment. They are afraid of being labeled as anti-unification or anti-humanitarian. But the containment school is influential as it is supported by powerful interests such as anti-communism groups and former North Korean residents who fled the North and came to the South during or before the Korean War.

In this section, we examined the assumptions and prescriptions of each of the four major perspectives on North Korean policy. Our focus was on explaining the main differences among those four perspectives. In the next section, we will explain why such wide differences exit.

Sources of Policy Disagreement

Why are there such divergent views on policy toward North Korea? There are three possibilities, ideology, interests and information. First, as I explained above, ideologies have had powerful effects on certain policy perspectives such as accommodation and containment. In the case of accommodation, the dominant ideology is nationalism while anti-communism is the foundation of the containment school. Albeit less significant, the other two schools of thought have also been shaped by influential ideas in international relations theory. Liberalism provides an intellectual foundation for the engagement school and realism forms the basis of the linkage school.

              The influence of ideologies has been powerful not only because of their intellectual strength but also because of the existence of supporting economic and political interests. Each school of thought is aligned with powerful domestic interests. Some groups such as the business community are motivated primarily by economic interests, whereas reform-oriented activists and anti-Communists are driven by their ideological convictions. Both the national security and the foreign policy establishment support a position that is consistent with their bureaucratic interests.

              What is interesting about the configuration of interests over North Korean policy is not the existence of divergent views but the strength of domestic interests aligned with each school of thought. Certainly, in terms of perspectives held by government policy makers, the engagement and linkage schools represent the mainstream views. But one cannot dismiss the accommodation and containment schools as fringe elements in the policy making process. The accommodation school has gained strength in recent years as Korean democratization brought former democracy activists to the positions of power. It also claims a moral high ground as the policies of the authoritarian governments are being discredited. With the election of Kim Dae Jung, a former dissident group leader, as president in December 1997, the accommodation school is likely to expand its power. The staying power of the containment school is based on a sizable voting bloc of former North Korean refugees. As members of the former elite class driven out by the communists, they are fervent anti-Communists and are politically active.

              In light of intense domestic rivalry over North Korean policy, it is straightforward to see why it is so hard to form a domestic policy consensus. Analysts of South Korea’s recent policy toward the North have been correct in pointing out an almost “irrational” level of inconsistency and fragmentation displayed by the Roh Tae Woo and Kim Young Sam governments, but have been simplistic in attributing it exclusively to lack of presidential leadership. Due to historical legacies and the evolving process of democratization and globalization, South Korean policy toward the North is unusually vulnerable to politicization.

              Having said all this, however, I argue that the fundamental source of policy disagreement over North Korea lies elsewhere in the unpredictable behavior of North Korea. While South Korean domestic politics provides a fertile ground for politicization and fragmentation, it is not solely responsible for the durability of policy conflict. If North Korea had been a “normal” state, divergent policies toward North Korea would have converged into some sort of consensus position over time.

              The root of the problem has been uncertainty over North Korean preferences. In the previous section, I characterized the key assumptions underlying each school of thought. What divided the two mainstream perspectives, the engagement and linkage schools, was their disagreement on whether North Korea is still intent upon the military takeover of the South. 

              In theory, we can resolve this dispute in two ways. One way is to gather intelligence information on North Korean positions. Alternatively, we can conduct an empirical test. From past North Korean behavior, we construct a pattern of North Korean behavior and see if it is compatible with any of the hypotheses put forth by different schools of thought. Neither of these two approaches hold much of a promise, however. North Korea is a notoriously difficult place for intelligence gathering. Empirical testing is also an inherently difficult exercise because it is hard to estimate North Korean intentions from their behavior. More often than not, a given pattern of behavior is compatible with two conflicting hypotheses.

              Elsewhere, I propose a different approach (Mo, 1999). We explore the possibility of structuring North and South Korean interactions to induce North Koreans to reveal their preferences. In game theory jargon, the inter-Korean relationship is characterized by a game of asymmetric information where one party has incomplete information on the preferences of the opposing party. Information in this setting is the target of strategic behavior and it is known that information is purposely revealed for strategic gains. If we can identify the conditions under which North Korea reveals its information and South Korea has some capacity to shape those conditions, it can effectively settle the on-going policy dispute over North Korea.

President Kim Dae Jung’s Engagement Policy

The guiding principle of Kim Dae Jung’s economic policy toward North Korea, so called engagement or “sunshine” policy, is the separation of economics and politics. The Kim Dae Jung government declared that it would not get in the way of private firms exploring and taking advantage of business opportunities in North Korea. The government would limit its role to ensuring fair competition and restraining excessive competition among Korean firms. This principle of non-interference would extend to all forms of non-financial economic exchanges including export/import, direct investment and trade in services.

              Specific economic engagement measures were soon followed. On April 30, 1998, the government announced more permissive rules on business trips to North Korea and relaxation of export and investment controls (fewer goods subject to export control, allowing “idle” facilities to be shipped to the North and larger investments in more industries).

The Kim Dae Jung government has also taken a more aggressive stance on humanitarian aid to North Korea. First, it does not insist on leading the coordination of international relief efforts. The Korean government encourages other countries and international organizations to help North Koreans and participates in their programs. Second, the government does not try to “gate-keep.” NGOs are now freer to organize their own aid projects. On March 18, 1998, the government allowed relief organizers to visit North Korea and expand their relief activities to include donations of fertilizers and technical assistance in farming. On September 18 of that year, civilian organizations were allowed to organize their own (individual) aid programs. Third, except when the government commits public funds, it does not insist on reciprocity. It no longer asks Pyongyang to give political concessions in return for humanitarian assistance. At the same time, the Kim Dae Jung government has displayed a strong commitment to the KEDO. On November 9, the KEDO passed a “burden-sharing” resolution in which Seoul agreed to pay 70 percent of the costs of building the light-water reactors.

The primary objective of the Kim Dae Jung government is to establish peaceful co-existence between the two Koreas; unification is relegated to a long-term goal. The government recognizes that peace and stability will not be secured without changes in North Korean behavior. The three main obstacles are (1) Pyongyang’s weapons of mass destruction (WMD) programs, (2) lack of transparency in its nuclear program and (3) its refusal to comply with the 1991 Basic Agreement. The government believes that engagement, not confrontation, is the best means to removing those obstacles. The logic of engagement is deceptively simple. Expansion of trade and investment is said to “promote openness and change in the North and bring all Koreans together” (Hong, 1999, 10).

This logic is based on certain assumptions about the intentions of North Korean leaders and their political and economic situations. The most important assumption underlining the policy of engagement is that the main objective of North Korean leaders is their survival and they have given up their stated goal of the military take-over of the South. Perceptions of external threats on the part of North Korean leaders explain why they develop WMDs (to deter outside and inside challenges), reject dialogue with the South (which poses the greatest threat to their survival), courts the United States (who can guarantee their survival) and refuses to carry out economic reforms (which can undermine their internal control). This evaluation of North Korean intentions is based on the government’s assessments of the North’s military capabilities and patterns of behavior. The solutions to the North Korea problem, therefore, lie in relieving Pyongyang’s sense of vulnerability.

The second assumption of the engagement policy is that incentives (or carrots) and assurances of non-aggression and peace will change North Koreans’ perceptions and thus, behavior. North Korean leaders are expected to come to realize that openness and reform are the only ways to achieving economic strength which, in turn, helps them to enhance their security (Hong, 1999). The third assumption is that there is enough demand in the market for inter-Korean economic exchanges and that it is the government restrictions that keeps goods and investments from flowing to North Korea.

Domestic Politics and the Future of the Engagement Policy in South Korea

The engagement policy of the Kim Dae Jung government is vulnerable to attack as long as uncertainty over North Korean intentions remains. Its opponents will continue to attack until they are convinced that North Korea ceases to be a significant threat to South Korea’s security. The Kim Dae Jung government would be wrong to think that a significant increase in inter-Korean contact or “engagement” will weaken domestic opposition to the engagement policy. In the presence of asymmetric information, people’s interpretations of North Korean behavior matter more than behavior itself. Herein lie the dilemmas of North Korea policy.

              North Koreans for their part have done little to alleviate the fears of South Korean hardliners. The hardliners ask whether North Korea has changed in any meaningful way after two years of engagement. Pyongyang has not given up its weapons of mass destruction (WMD) programs, has done little to enhance the transparency of its nuclear program, and still refuses to comply with the 1991 Basic Agreement with Seoul.

As President Kim Dae Jung enters the third year of his presidency, domestic opposition to his engagement policy is gaining strength. Opposition parties, in particular, are stepping up their attacks on the government’s North Korea policy in preparation for the April National Assembly elections. We can observe at least three lines of attack. First, the opposition parties are trying to take advantage of the public’s fear of war. Their basic message is that President Kim is weak on defense and that the engagement policy makes South Korea more vulnerable to North Korean aggression. South Korea is not only enhancing North Korea’s military capabilities by supplying much needed hard currency but also undermining the will of their own people to fight by downplaying the North Korean threat. The second line of attack is intended to arouse South Koreans’ strong sense of nationalism. The opposition parties argue that the Kim Dae Jung government has allowed the United States, China and Japan to determine North Korea policy at the expense of South Korean interests. The United Liberal Democrats are even calling for South Korea to develop independent nuclear capabilities. Lastly, the opposition parties believe that the Kim Dae Jung government is most vulnerable on the human right issue, especially, the handling of North Korean defectors in China and Russia. They have been pounding the government for failing to take more aggressive measures to protect the North Korean refugees. By doing so, they are trying to turn the table against President Kim Dae Jung who prides himself on his reputation as a human rights activist.

Despite the barrage of attacks by hard-line newspapers and politicians, the Kim Dae Jung government has, so far, been able to hold the public’s support for their engagement policy. But one has to be careful about interpreting the results of public opinion surveys. First, the public opinion is not steady or firm. For example, a couple of incidents in 1999 – the navy skirmishes in the western waters and the detainment of a South Korean tourist in Mt. Kumkang showed that the public is not unconditional in their support for the engagement policy. An overwhelming majority of respondents in the June 1999 survey believed that the government should alternate between the engagement and the hard-line policy, depending on North Korea’s “attitude.” It should also be noted that the public has not shown much willingness to increase “the level of engagement” beyond the status quo. Therefore, President Kim Dae Jung is likely to face public opposition if he attempts to broaden the scope of his engagement policy. It is not clear even whether he will be able to maintain the status quo, since the public support for the engagement policy has been declining.

How will the Kim Dae Jung government respond to growing domestic opposition? It is unlikely that the performance of his party will lead to the reversal of his engagement policy. Even if his party does poorly in the April elections, President Kim will still be able to count on the enormous powers of his office to sustain his policy. Because he has invested so much of his political capital in the building of the engagement policy, it will be difficult from him to concede failure even if it is obvious to others. Besides, the goals of the engagement policy are so open-ended that there is no way of measuring its success or failure and nothing short of North Korea’s attack on the South can prove it wrong. 

Another obstacle to policy adjustment is the ideological rigidity of his government. There appears to be little internal debate within the government over North Korea policy. And the traditional system of checks and balances among North Korea policy agencies weakened after President Kim filled important posts in the traditionally hard-line agencies such as National Information Service with supporters of the engagement policy. Therefore, I predict that the Kim Dae Jung government will try to maintain or even strengthen the engagement policy in spite of growing domestic opposition. Whether it will succeed, however, depends a lot on how North Korea responds or behaves, not so much on the domestic politics of South Korea.

References

Armitage, Richard L. 1999. “A Comprehensive Approach to North Korea.” Strategic Forum, number 159, Institute for National Strategic Studies. Washington, D.C.: National Defense University.

Bank of Korea. 1999. “The Korean Economic Crisis and Inter-Korean Economic Cooperation” (in Korean). Reference Research Material 99-3, Research Department.

Henriksen, Thomas. 1999. Using Power and Diplomacy to Deal with Rogue States. Essays in Public Policy, No. 94. Hoover Institution.

Hong, Soon-young. 1999. “Thawing Korea’s Cold War.” Foreign Affairs, 78 (May/June): 8-12.

Kim, Ki-Jung and Deok Ryong Yoon. 1999. “Beyond Mt. Kumkang: Social and Economic Implications.” Paper presented at the conference on Kim Dae Jung’s Sunshine Policy: Conceptual Promise and Challenges, Georgetown University, May 17, 1999.

Mastanduno. Micahel. 1992. Economic Containment: CoCom and the Politics of East-West Trade. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press.

Mo, Jongryn. 1997. “Implementing ‘Comprehensive Security’: Lessons from South Korea’s Economic Diplomacy.” In Comprehensive Security: No Other Choice, ed. David Dickens. 

------ 1999. “Uncertainty over North Korean Intentions and South Korea’s Policy toward the North” (in Korean). Strategic Studies.

Nye, Joseph S. 1995. “The Case for Deep Engagement.” Foreign Affairs, 74: 90-102.

Segal, Gerald. 1996. “East Asia and the Constrainment of China.” International Security, 20: 107-135.

 

Table 1. Four Schools of Thought on North Korea: Assumptions and Prescriptions

	accommodation	engagement	linkage	containment
Assumptions
primary South Korean objective	unification	peace	peace	unification
primary North Korean objective	survival	survival	unification by force	unification by force
North Korean military threat	insignificant	significant	significant	insignificant
stability of North Korean regime	stable	stable	eventual collapse, but stable in the short- to medium-term	imminent collapse
Will economic interdependence restrain North Korea?	no position	yes	no	no
guiding ideology	nationalism	liberalism	realism	anti-communism
Prescriptions
trade policy	trade expansion; separation of economics and politics	trade expansion; separation of economics and politics	trade expansion conditional on political concessions	sanctions
food aid	unconditional food aid	unconditional food aid	food aid with conditions such as no diversion to military consumption	no food aid
human rights in North Korea	low priority	low priority quiet diplomacy	high priority international pressure	high priority international pressure
framework for Inter-Korean negotiation	direct North-South Korean talks	four-party talks	direct North-South Korean talks based on the Basic Agreement	no negotiation or direct North-South Korean talks
Political bases
economic/social interests	progressive activists	business	veterans	former North Korea residents
institutional bases	left-wing media	MIFA MOU MOFE	NIS MOD conservative media

 

Table 2. Public Support for the Engagement Policy

 

* Support for the status quo is considered contingent support because the Kim Dae Jung government wants to enlarge the level of engagement.

Source: Korea Gallup