Potential Crises and Threats on the Korean Peninsula

DRAFT ONLY: DO NOT CITE

Chung Min Lee
Graduate School of International Studies, Yonsei University
Seoul, Korea

Paper presented at the conference
North Korea Policy After The Perry Report:
A Trilateral (Japan, the Republic of Korea, and the United States) Workshop

March 3-4, 2000

Introduction

For half a century, the prevention of major war on the Korean peninsula has remained as the bedrock of the Republic of Korea’s (ROK) national security policy. Technically still at war in the absence of a permanent peace treaty, a viable political resolution continues to elude the two Koreas. Therefore, thinking about future conflict and crisis scenarios continues to be dominated by maintaining effective deterrence and defense strategies. Nonetheless, changes which have occurred in and around the Korean peninsula since the global end of the cold war in 1990 have begun to transform the very nature of potential conflicts and crises on the peninsula.[1] Indeed, the requirements for maintaining effective deterrence and defense have become increasingly complex owing to North Korea’s robust nuclear, biological, and chemical (NBC) capabilities. Although the October 1994 U.S.-North Korean Agreed Framework has so far resulted in a suspension of North Korea’s nuclear weapons program, doubts remain on the long term efficacy of the agreement.

In essence, although the possibility of major war cannot be discounted, (until there is a significant diminution in the threat from the North or a fundamental rapprochement in South-North relations) the probability of a full-scale conventional conflict has decreased significantly over the last several years. More important, however, is the likelihood that concomitant with the decline in the threat of major war, the probability of unconventional conflict and complex crises may actually increase in the years ahead based on the potential acceleration of systemic decline in the North. Non-linear scenarios, however undesirable or potentially preventable, may well come to define and dominate the future Korean strategic landscape. This is not to suggest that a North Korean collapse is desirable, or that a North Korean collapse is inevitable. Nevertheless, the possibility of collapse cannot be discounted in thinking about future developments in North Korea.

If so, “hybrid conflict” or the combination of medium-intensity conflict, low-intensity conflict, operations other than war (OOTW), asymmetric threats such as the use of selective weapons of mass destruction (WMD), and variations of information warfare could emerge as the primary source of threat on the Korean peninsula over the next 10-15 years. Under which circumstances can hybrid conflict or complex crisis breakout? How accurate is such a prognosis? Can they be prevented through a “comprehensive and integrated” approach as noted by William Perry? And what are the major strategic and policy consequences? While this paper will attempt to answer these and other questions, the central premise presented below is twofold. First, notwithstanding the conceptual promises embedded in the strategy of comprehensive engagement, such a strategy is unlikely to lead to a “soft landing” in North Korea. And second, future conflicts and crises on the Korean peninsula are therefore likely to be characterized by variations of the “hard landing” scenario with accompanying implications for South Korean, American, and Japanese security. These two basic assumptions, however, continue to be hotly contested.

Potential Conflict Spectrums

Whether or not a hard landing is inevitable or whether a soft landing can be engineered are, in the final analysis, fairly moot points. Perhaps the more significant question is to examine and to isolate the fundamental sources of potential instability on the Korean peninsula. Seen from such a perspective, future conflicts and crises on the peninsula could be classified into three main categories. First, developments which may occur outside of the Korean peninsula but which could still disrupt stability on the peninsula. Second, a combination of developments within the two Koreas (but particularly in the North) which could lead to conflict or complex crises. Third, the outbreak of war through a North Korean invasion, an eruption of civil war in North Korea following a collapse and eventual spill-over into the South, and the rapid escalation of “limited incursions” into a major conflict between the South and the North. And fourth, sustained disruptions short of war including variations of low-intensity conflict.

Within the foreseeable future, a major conflict on the Korean peninsula is unlikely to breakout based on events and developments which occur outside of the Korean peninsula. From a purely conceptual point of view, however, it is not inconceivable that the peninsula could be affected by a range of crises or conflicts in its immediate environment. However improbable, one could list a number of potential crises which could spill-over into the Korean peninsula: the dissolution of the People’s Republic of China (PRC) and attendant consequences for Korea; massive influx of refugees from mainland China into Korea; a major Chinese military offensive against Taiwan coupled with U.S. intervention and parallel outbreak of hostilities on the Korean peninsula; fallout from a possible Sino-Japanese or even Sino-Russian conflict. Nevertheless, such outcomes are, in all likelihood, highly improbable.[2]

In order to illustrate the range of potential factors which could result in conflict or disruptions on the Korean peninsula, Table I lists a range of potential conflicts and crises which could occur outside of the peninsula with repercussions for the peninsula, events which could breakout within the two Koreas that may lead to conflict or crises, major war scenarios, and mixed-conflict dynamics.

Table I: Potential Sources of Conflict on the Korean Peninsula

External Developments	Internal Developments	Major Conflict	Hybrid Conflict
PRC-Taiwan conflict U.S.-China conflict Global economic depression Disruptions within China Chinese collapse Resurgence of Russian forces in the Far East Russo-Japanese clash Sino-Japanese clash	North Korea: Prolonged economic dislocation Widening famine Regime, System or state Collapse Military coup Civil war South Korea: Second financial meltdown Economic depression Sustained Political and social unrest	North Korean invasion Use of North Korean NBCs Collapse in the North and spill-over into the South Verification of North Korean nuclear weapons and preemptive attack by the ROK and or the U.S. Chinese intervention in North Korea Russian intervention in North Korea	Incursions into the South Rear-area infiltrations by North Korean special forces Civil unrest in North Korea and massive inflow of refugees into the South Information warfare attacks Disruption and destruction of South Korea’s Information Technology, energy, and transportation infrastructure

Note: The developments or events noted in Table I are purely illustrative in nature and do not represent probability scores.

 

              Within the spectrum of possibilities, one could also envision the outbreak of war on the peninsula. If North Korea sees no choice but to initiate war in order to prevent a collapse, Pyongyang could launch a suicidal attack which would most likely result in the demise of the DPRK but also with unimaginable damage to the ROK. As William Perry noted in his North Korean policy review report, “we are confident that allied forces could and would successfully defend ROK territory. We believe the DPRK’s military leaders know this and thus are deterred from launching an attack…. Under present circumstances, therefore, deterrence of war on the Korean peninsula is stable on both sides.”[3] Or as a U.S. National Defense University reported stated in 1998, “although North Korea remains able to wreak great havoc on its adversary to the south…. Pyongyang cannot reunify the peninsula on its own terms militarily.”[4]

              Finally, one can conceptualize possible conflict and crisis scenarios based on future developments within North Korea. While there are diverse views and opinions on evolving evolutionary paths in the North, the fundamental source of future conflict on the peninsula lies in the future direction of North Korea. In particular, a North Korean collapse or implosion could unleash centrifugal forces within North Korea. Although a more detailed assessment is provided for below, one could also distinguish between various degradations of collapse including regime collapse, system collapse, and state collapse. A regime collapse precipitated by a military coup and the removal of Kim Jong Il could either accelerate into a system collapse, i.e., inability of the party, the army, and the bureaucracy to maintain effective control, or a successor regime headed by or supported by the armed forces could retain control for a fairly prolonged period of time. A total state collapse along the lines of the dissolution of the former Soviet Union or Eastern Europe is also possible albeit under very different circumstances.

              One final point should be emphasized. If North Korea embarks on a path of comprehensive reform akin to post-Mao China, what are the likely strategic and political consequences? Proponents of engagement have placed significant capital on the desirability of inducing reforms within North Korea but have paid only limited attention to the logical consequences of a reforming North Korea. If the DPRK chooses to implement a series of economic reforms including the adaptation of market economic principles, it follows that the regime will have sufficient confidence in its ability to contain a spectrum of social, political, and economic spill-overs. At present, so long as Kim Jong Il remains in power, he is highly unlikely to emulate Deng Xiaoping. In addition, if North Korea is able to revive its failing economy through a combination of adroit diplomacy, influx of foreign aid (including significant assistance from the South), compensation from Japan, and limited economic reforms, what incentive would the DPRK have to soften its posture toward the ROK, the United States, and Japan? If regime survival remains as the primordial objective of the Kim Jong Il regime, and assuming that North Korea’s economic capabilities can be significantly strengthened, on what grounds will he choose to engage with the South?

              In sum, while the danger of a full-fledged conflict on the Korean peninsula has decreased significantly with the end of the cold war, the very nature of the “Korean Question” has been transformed based on the gradual erosion within North Korea. Despite numerous options Pyongyang could pursue (as noted below), the choice boils down essentially to two major paths: reform or sustained stagnation and eventual collapse. But if North Korea chooses the reform path and introduces increasingly intrusive economic reforms, the Kim Jong Il regime (or even a successor leadership) has to satisfy three key conditions: (1) implementing economic reforms without endangering the legitimacy or coercive powers of the regime; (2) convincing and retaining key support from the nomenklatura (particularly from the armed forces); and (3) opening up North Korea to the forces of globalization, democratization, and digitilization while retaining its core ideological features. All three conditions entail fundamental challenges to the continuing survival and sanctity of the Kim Jong Il regime. It is this entrenched dilemma more than any other factor which inhibits the DPRK from emulating China or even Vietnam.

In essence, the North Korean regime has five basic policy options. First, it can maintain the status quo without undertaking any reforms together with even more centralized political control. Second, introduce partial economic reforms while retaining central planning mechanisms although the party would retain its Leninist structure. Third, adopting a bold economic program along the lines of Deng’s Four Modernizations or Vietnam’s doi-moi. Fourth, decentralization of party authority in parallel with adoption of a “market economy with socialist characteristics.” And finally, a fundamental restructuring of the Korean Worker’s Party (KWP) along the lines of the reformed communist parties in Central Europe concomitant with political reforms and downsizing of the armed forces. Other steps could also be considered such as a military coup as alluded to above. An army leadership committed to real economic reform akin to General Park Chung Hee’s push for rapid industrialization under successive five year plans could also be considered. Nevertheless, an extremely weak if not virtually nonexistent civil society, limited market for North Korean goods and foreign direct investment opportunities, and the high political costs associated with such moves rules it out as a credible option.

              Therefore, political inertia, entrenched resistance, and potentially critical loss of political authority are the key barriers to any realistic economic reforms in North Korea. For the moment, Pyongyang’s preferred strategy is to “wait out the storm” in the hopes that food and other assistance will enable the regime to weather the most severe food shortage in decades. Politically, however, North Korea is likely to continue its diplomatic offensive designed to de-couple South Korea from the United States while attempting to upgrade its ties with Moscow and Beijing. But even if Pyongyang succeeds in establishing official relations with Washington and Tokyo and the U.S. relaxes its economic embargo against North Korea, such moves, at best, can be seen as necessary but not as sufficient conditions for real reforms. The key question, therefore, is not whether North Korea can embark on a “soft landing” with the right mix of internal policy shifts and external support, but rather, what may transpire if atrophy persists in the North leading at some point to some type of collapse.

Evolving Inter-Korean Dynamics: 2000-2005

Such a prognosis, however, contravenes prevailing conventional wisdom. In large part, this is due to the wide-spread belief that engineering a soft landing is the only viable option for handling the overall North Korean conundrum. Particularly since the advent of the Kim Dae Jung government, preventing a North Korean collapse and ruling out the absorption option along the German model have received highest political support. In such an environment, sustained engagement with the North has emerged as the nucleus of Seoul’s overall strategy vis-à-vis the North. And as one core supporter has noted, “[t]he sunshine policy is often accused of being a fragile appeasement policy or the policy of the weak. In actuality, however, it is an extremely offensive and proactive policy.”[5] (Emphasis added).

Whether the sunshine policy is a proactive policy, however, is not the most important point. The more relevant question is whether engagement will ultimately lead to a fundamental reorientation of Pyongyang’s policy toward South Korea, the United States and Japan. In order for North Korea to drastically alter the status quo, it has to be willing to give up its WMD arsenal, embark on a comprehensive economic reform program, and foster more normal relations with South Korea, the United States, and Japan. At present, chances remain slim that Pyongyang will actually go down the path of significant policy adjustments and economic reforms given the potentially far-reaching political and social consequences of such action. As the Perry Report noted, “however much we might wish such an outcome [a reforming North Korea], success of the policy clearly would require DPRK cooperation. But, the policy team believed that the North Korean regime would strongly resist such reform, viewing it as indistinguishable from a policy of undermining.”[6]

For most of the cold war era, stability on the Korean peninsula was maintained through a combination of three key factors. First, the maintenance of tight political-military alliances; second, the presence of strong domestic political regimes; and third, relative military parity. Since the early 1990s, however, changes have occurred in all three dimensions. The dissolution of the former Soviet Union in 1991 and the establishment of South Korean-Chinese diplomatic relations in 1992 have led to significant changes in Moscow’s and Beijing’s military ties with Pyongyang. While China continues to provide critical economic and partial military assistance to North Korea, Beijing does so in most likelihood to prevent a possible North Korean collapse, rather than any wholesale effort to significantly restrengthen the North.[7] While the ROK-U.S. alliance remains unchanged a decade after the end of the cold war, important changes have also occurred in Washington’s and Seoul’s approach to Pyongyang.

While the two allies continue to emphasize the importance of maintaining a credible deterrence and defense posture, they have also stressed the importance of engaging the North through a series of political, diplomatic, and economic incentives. Thus, while the military dimension of the alliance has remained unchanged, the political and diplomatic compass has shifted under the rubric of South Korea’s so-called “sunshine policy” or comprehensive engagement.[8]

Domestically, the death of Kim Il Sung in July 1994 and the formal rise to power of his son and anointed heir Kim Jong Il has also resulted in political change within the North. To be sure, the Kim dynasty itself remains intact. Kim Jong Il was groomed to succeed his father since the early 1970s and from all appearances the political structure has not been transformed. Four years after the death of Kim Il Sung, Kim Jong Il was elevated formally as a “Great Leader” and chairman of an expanded National Defense Commission on September 5, 1998.[9] Nonetheless, Kim Jong Il confronts widely divergent challenges compared to Kim Il Sung. For example, although economic decay began in the late 1980s, it did not intensify until the early 1990s—coincident with Kim Jong Il’s rise to power. In the South, decades of authoritarian rule ended with gradual democratization resulting in a much more fluid and complex decision-making process.

Finally, as noted in the introduction, while deterrence has been successfully maintained, the context in which it has been sustained has also been transformed. Since the early 1990s, North Korea’s weapons of mass destruction (WMD) program have complicated significantly the deterrence calculus on the Korean peninsula. To be sure, supporters of engagement have argued that despite the threat posed by North Korea’s WMD, it is critical to bear in mind that Pyongyang’s nuclear weapons program has been frozen since 1994 under the U.S.-North Korean Agreed Framework. In addition, notwithstanding the challenge posed by the test firing of the Taepodong-1 missile in August 1998, proponents of engagement have maintained that North Korea’s promise not to test fire another Taepodong so long as U.S.-North Korean talks continue is a major step forward. Indeed, some analysts have suggested that the August 1998 launch should not be seen as a major military threat. Leon Sigal, for example, has noted that North Korea has shown that it is willing to bargain away its missiles for a price such as the lifting of economic sanctions by the United States. Moreover, he writes that:

North Korea’s launch of a new missile has set off alarms in Japan. The alarm is warranted insofar as the new missile, called the Taepodong-1 by U.S. intelligence, is capable of reaching Japan. Yet the launch was more likely an unsuccessful attempt to mark Kim Jong Il’s formal accession to power by boosting a small satellite into space than a brazen act of intimidation aimed at Japan. Over reaction to the test will impede diplomacy, which is the most promising way to curb Pyongyang’s missile program.[10] (Emphasis added).

              If North Korea’s principal objective behind its WMD program including its ballistic missile component is to ultimately negotiate them away at an acceptable price, North Korea’s WMD assets should not pose any fundamental security concern to the ROK, Japan, or the United States. If so, the viable and logical choice for South Korea and the United States is to pursue a strategy of sustained negotiations including the provision of incentives including appropriate security guarantees such as mutually verifiable force reductions. Within the spectrum of negotiations, one could even conceive of gradual reduction of U.S. forces stationed in South Korea given that North Korea continues to perceive the presence of 37,000 U.S. troops as the principal security threat. So long as South Korea and the United States believes that North Korea’s principal motivation lies in acquiring a better deal through its WMD and ballistic missile arsenal, there is every incentive on the part of Washington and Seoul to continue to pursue the negotiation path.

Nevertheless, quite apart from the fact that the United States or the ROK has repeatedly stated that the presence of U.S. troops in the South is essentially non-negotiable, it is critical to understand that the fundamental security quagmire on the Korean peninsula has been caused and perpetuated by the North rather than the presence of U.S. forces in South Korea. In addition, to argue that North Korea has shown flexibility over the nuclear and ballistic missile issues misses a key point: namely, that it was the DPRK which precipitated these crises. Without a viable military threat, only limited attention would be paid to North Korea. Thus, the perpetuation of crises followed by parallel “compromises” cannot be construed as fundamental improvements in North Korea’s behavior. More important, there is little reason to believe “that the North Korean state would ever voluntarily abandon its quest for nuclear weaponry under any circumstances.”[11]

Revisiting Traditional Conflict Scenarios

On balance, if the North Koreans were to launch a conventional attack without the threat of nuclear weapons and in a non-chemical environment, South Korean and U.S. forces would be able to thwart a North Korean offensive but only after sustaining very high collatoral damage. But outcomes can vary substantially if an actual conflict “breaks out” of notional scenarios because most armed forces (including the U.S.-ROK Combined Forces Command) operate on the basis of “requirements analysis,” e.g., beginning with the characterization of threat, the positing of a worse-than-expected scenario, and the derivation of associated “requirements.”

              Linear defense planning, however, can be disrupted significantly by unexpected operational dynamics and this is clearly the case in a Korean context. Notwithstanding the success of the coalition forces during Desert Shield and Desert Storm during the Gulf War including extensive use of electronic warfare, precision guided munitions (PGMs), stealth technologies, and new target acquisition systems, the key to a successful military campaign was the significant lead time the coalition forces enjoyed prior to a combined arms counterattack. Of the many lessons which have been derived from the Gulf War, the increasing need for planning offensive operations, political-military constraints (affecting enroute and transit access), the importance of a nonlinear battlefield, and new complications arising from WMD use (or the threats to employ WMD) are some of the more salient ones which could have direct applications in the Korean peninsula.[12]

              In an effort to better understand the range of potential conflict scenarios as well as major implications for both ROK and U.S. forces, attention now is turned to examining some alternative scenarios beginning with the canonical, full-scale offensive. (It should be noted that the scenarios depicted below have not been listed in a hypothetical probability order but as illustrations of an enlarged scenario space).

              Scenario One: Conventional War. Quite apart from whether the North Koreans would actually launch a conventional war (by design, accident, or default), the fact remains that a major conventional offensive is taken as the base line for ROK-U.S. defense plans. Indeed, a Korean peninsula war scenario is one of two MRCs (major regional contingencies) stipulated in U.S. military contingency plans such as the 1993 Bottom-Up Review (the other being a Persian Gulf scenario).[13] As noted above, a full-scale conventional war precipitated by a North Korean invasion is highly unlikely based on the very likely destruction of the North. Nevertheless, a major war on the Korean peninsula cannot be totally ruled out so long as North Korea has the potential to launch such an attack, however irrational such an option would be from the perspective of the ROK or the United States.

              In such an instance, what would be the central strategy North Korea would employ and what would be Pyongyang’s major political-military objectives? North Korea’s key operational goals would include the following. First, achieving strategic surprise to maximize breakthrough operations before the U.S. begins to commit key reinforcements. Prior to the main attack, special operations forces will be inserted into the ROK’s rear to create a “second front” and target airfields, air defense cites, C³I facilities, and energy/industrial cites. Second, at H-Hour of the main attack and before commitment of ground forces, the North will commit the full range of its fire power against CFC forces through its artillery, multiple rocket launchers (MRLs), and surface-to-surface missiles (SSMs) such as the short-range Frog and medium-range Scud and Rodong missiles. Third, upon achieving a breakthrough, armored and mechanized forces with self-propelled artillery will isolate Seoul and rush to capture all air and naval facilities capable of supporting U.S. reinforcement and resupply efforts. Fourth, neutralizing CFC air assets given that they could effectively destroy advancing KPA echelons and also enable the CFC to initiate counterattacks (the so-called deep battle) into North Korea’s own territory.[14]

              Scenario Two: Introduction of WMD Capabilities. Substantial deviations from this base line scenario could occur if North Korea were to threaten or actually use nuclear, biological, or chemical (NBC) weapons. For Pyongyang, the key operational imperative once a breakthrough has been achieved is to deter, deny or neutralize the arrival of U.S. reinforcements. Indeed, contrary to conventional wisdom, a strong argument can be made that “for the North, the strategic center of gravity is not the Seoul region as is the conventional wisdom but rather the airports and seaports in the Korean peninsula below Seoul.”[15] By threatening the use of NBC’s or actually using them, the KPA can achieve a number of strategic objectives. A ballistic missile attack in Seoul, Inchon, and Pusan, for instance, may not have an immediate military impact but it will effective result in mass panic and potentially severe disruptions in reserve force mobilization efforts. Moreover, since the KPA has to deny ROK and U.S. air operations, it may well use chemical weapons against key ROK air and port facilities.

              In such an instance, how would the CFC respond? Bound by international treaties not to use biological or chemical weapons, the CFC would be hard pressed to effectively respond to a North Korean chemical weapons attack. It could consider denial or punishment alternatives such as preemptive strikes or in the event that the North uses nuclear weapons against South Korean forces, consider a proportional tactical nuclear response. But if the North used nuclear weapons against South Korean forces after achieving a conventional breakthrough, it would make little operational sense for the U.S. to retaliate with nuclear weapons against rapidly advancing North Korean forces since it would have the unintended impact of contaminating ROK population centers as well as military forces. The U.S. could also opt to launch a comprehensive nuclear strike against key C³I and WMD storage areas but serious doubts remain on the operational value of such a strike and in any case, it would result in severe political repercussions, if not military responses from the regional powers. If North Korea successfully convinces the United States and the ROK that a nuclear retaliatory strike is not a viable military option, it could pressure the South into ending hostilities in the North’s favor.

              Since the conclusion of the 1994 Agreed Framework, North Korea’s nuclear weapons program have been put on hold. However, if North Korea chooses to “de-freeze” its nuclear program or if it continues to undertake a robust ballistic missile development and deployment program, such developments would severely complicate ROK-U.S. deterrence and defense options.[16]

              Scenario Three: Incursions and Destabilization Operations. Contrary to the previous scenarios, North Korea could also consider destablization campaigns against the South without resorting to war. This could be implemented through psychological operations (PSYOP) tailored to specific targets within South Korea and perhaps even in a third country such as Japan. Support for radical student movements through discreet financial support, polarization of public attitudes on unification and security (such as the status of U.S. forces), disinformation campaigns through the media, etc., could be considered. Active terrorist campaigns could also be utilized by the North as evinced by the Rangoon bombing of 1983 and the downing of a Korean Air passenger jet in 1987. Notwithstanding the greater opportunities rendered by a democratic and more open South Korea, it remains doubtful whether North Korea could ultimately succeed given the ROK’s fundamentally conservative political outlook and wide-spread animosity towards the North.

              A more relevant strategy is for the North to engage in executing a carefully planned series of incursions. North Korea has repeatedly tested the limits of the 1953 Armistice Agreement including incursions into the Joint Security Area (JCA) at Panmunjom. Submarine incursions occurred in 1995 and 1996 and in June 1999, South and North Korean naval vessels clashed for the first time since the Korean War. North Korean incursions into South Korean territory or adjacent waters (not to mention the March 1999 incursion into the Sea of Japan by two suspected North Korean spy vessels) may have been instigated to achieve a range of objectives.[17] For example, brinkmanship is a key feature of North Korea’s negotiating strategy since Pyongyang realizes that while it could incur short-term costs for instigating a particular crisis, it stands to gain the in the long run since damage limitation, rather than accelerated escalation, is the modus operandi of the ROK and the United States. Further, North Korea may have been motivated by a desire to test South Korean, American, or Japanese resolve in the process of adjusting its political-military strategy.

However, as the economic situation continues to worsen in the North, Pyongyang may feel that destabilization operations against the South could deflect attention from its internal situation by demonstrating to the outside world of the “tenuous situation” on the Korean peninsula, and by extension, exposing South Korea’s vulnerabilities to such attacks.

              Scenario Four: Limited War Aims. After Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait in August 1990, the central strategic concern on the part of the U.S. was that Saddam Hussein may launch a limited ballistic missile strike against Saudi Arabia and after ensuring that its economic interests were satisfied, would ultimately “withdraw” back to its border. If Iraq withdrew its forces from Kuwait just before the expiration of the U.N. Security Council’s deadline for a peaceful resolution, it is highly unlikely that coalition forces would have still launched an attack against Iraq. Moreover if the coalition forces undertook any significant military action against Iraq inspite of its decision to pull back its forces from Kuwait, Arab support within the coalition would have evaporated almost immediately, not to mention French or even British opposition. Not only would Saddam have avoided costly economic sanctions, he would have achieved three strategic aims: convinced Kuwait and Saudi Arabia (and by extension, other Gulf states) that Iraq could always exercise a military option if diplomacy failed, retain significant economic leverage by forcing concessions from Kuwait and Saudi Arabia, and break the coalition’s political and military unity without any military cost.

Concluding Remarks

Deterrence failed in June 1950 based on three main factors: (1) North Korea was convinced that with Soviet and Chinese support, blitzkrieg would result in unification on its own terms; (2) the then infant South Korea did not have any adequate defense capabilities; and (3) the withdrawal of U.S. forces in 1949 created a security vacuum which the ROK could not possibly replace. Fifty years after the outbreak of the Korean War, however, deterrence has been successfully maintained owing to South Korea’s enhanced defense capabilities, the sustained presence of U.S. forces in the ROK and a robust ROK-U.S. alliance, and a “correlation of forces” increasingly in favor of the South.

Despite the emergence of new security challenges on the Korean peninsula such as North Korea’s NBC capabilities and the uncertainties associated with North Korea’s future evolution, it is difficult to foresee a scenario whereby North Korea would launch a major military assault on the South. The strategic environment around the peninsula has also improved. The normalization of relations between South Korea and China as well as Russia has resulted in expanded linkages between the ROK and its two former adversaries, particularly with China. For its part, the United States has also engaged in a series of discussions with North Korea ranging from the MIA issue, controlling North Korea’s ballistic missile program as part of Washington’s global counter-proliferation strategy, and a partial lifting of economic sanctions. Although Japanese concerns have been heightened in recent years based on Pyongyang’s nuclear ambitions, ballistic missile tests, and limited incursions, the Japanese government has restarted normalization talks.

In assessing the current and emerging strategic environment on the Korean peninsula, one of the most dramatic shifts has occurred in South Korea’s approaches to the North. How successful the sunshine policy will be in prodding North Korea toward the reform path remains uncertain. Notwithstanding the promises inherent in the engagement strategy in the absence of a viable alternative strategy, i.e., an approach that is acceptable not only to the ROK but also with respect to the United States and Japan, the fundamental question is whether engagement can be seen as a sufficient condition for North Korean reforms. While conventional wisdom insists that engagement can and will ultimately bear fruit, such optimism places unrealistic expectations on the ability of the Kim Jong Il regime to undertake reforms without political costs.

Throughout the cold war, stability on the peninsula was maintained on the basis of rigid political and military dynamics. In sharp contrast to the cold war era, however, future shifts on the Korean peninsula are likely to occur increasingly on the basis of internal change within North Korea. Indeed, the crucial shortcoming of engagement is not based on its normative underpinnings but its ultimate insufficiency, i.e., fostering incremental and managed change in the North followed by a substantial reduction in threat and resulting ultimately in a fundamental breakthrough in South-North relations. Once again, it is important to bear in mind the logical consequences of a reforming North Korea, assuming that it is able to do so while retaining all of the core characteristics of the DPRK.

Future conflicts and complex crises on the Korean peninsula are likely to be shaped by fall-out from internal developments in North Korea. As noted elsewhere, North Korea’s increasing vulnerabilities coupled with systemic erosion is likely to have profound repercussions for the ROK and the United States as well as Japan.[18] If so, then the ROK has to consider a range of crisis management responses well before the outbreak of major change within North Korea. While deterrence and defense continues to be focused primarily on the prevention of major war (as it should), hybrid conflict may well become the dominant security threat on the peninsula over the next 10-15 years time spectrum although such a prognosis contravenes prevailing wisdom in South Korea.