Excerpts from White House E-Mail
President Reagan and
his National Security Advisers (Oliver North at far left)
in the Oval Office 4-4-85
MSG FROM: NSOLN --CPUA TO: NSWGH --CPUA 04/21/86 10:03:55 To: NSWGH --CPUA
*** Reply to note of 04/21/86 12:57
-- SECRET --
NOTE FROM: OLIVER NORTH Subject: Special Mtg: Central America Will, please pass to Don: This weekend's trip to Honduras and El Salvador was the most depressing venture in my four years of working the Centam issue. There is great anxiety that the Congress will not act in time to stave off a major defeat for the resistance. This sense exists in the Govts. of Honduras and El Salvador but most alarmingly is now evident in the resistance itself. The lack of a reliable source of resupply has not only affected combat operations, it is now beginning to affect the political viabllity of the UNO leadership. Bermudez, in front of the Southern Front commander, El Negro Chammoro questioned the need for UNO and the drain of scarce resources to support the Atlantic and Southern fronts. While he committed to send in 6-8000 troops in the next few days, he openly admitted in front of Bustillio that they wd have to come back out in 15-20 days if there is no resupply. As known, their most pressing need is for anti-air, but other things are now running short as well. The entire force is back to 1 meal per day and no more boots, uniforms, packs, ponchos or weapons are available for tbe new recruits. All new trainees will be turned away effective today. All hospitalization for WIAs will cease at the end of the week. Troops returning to Nicaragua this week will carry only70-100 rounds of ammo instead of the 500 they had been carrying. No new radio batteries are available so there is no way to pass commands or intelligence.
Tbe picture is, in short, very dismal unless
a new source of "bridge" funding can be identified. While we should not
raise specific sources with Fred et al, we need to explore this problem
urgently or there won't be a force to help when the Congress finally acts.
Warm regards, North
Weinberger and Reagan 1-10-83
MSG FROM: NSRCM --CPUA TO: NSJMP --CPUA 11/07/86 20:30:32 To: NSJMP --CPUA JOHN M. POINDEXTER
-- SECRET --
NOTE FROM: ROBERT MCFARLANE SUBJECT: Current Events Having been out of town for two days and maintaining the no comment line, I returned today to find that Don Regan has backgrounded the weeklies and laid the entire problem at my feet; my idea, my management, a strict arms for hostages deal, no larger agenda in mind, etc. I was told this not by a journalist but by my closest friend who had been getting calls all day to the effect that "Bud is being hung out to dry by Don Regan." I stillhave not commented to anyone.
But I must tell you that if this is true, I will be quite mad. This will be the second lie Don Regan has sowed against my character and I won't stand for it.
It might be useful to review just what the truth is.
You will recall that when the Israelis first approached us in June '85, I presented the idea of engaging in a dialogue with the Iranians--no mention at all of any arms exchanges at all--and he approved it.
We then heard nothing until August when the Israelis introduced the requirement for TOWs. I told Kimche no.
They went ahead on their own but then asked that we replace the TOWS and after checking with the President, we agreed. Weir was released as a consequence of their action.
My next involvement was to go to London where I presented our willingness to open a political dialogue but that we could not participate in an arms transfer for hostages. Gorbanifar ranted and raved but we did not change our position.
I returned to the States and debriefed the President (with Cap present, and Regan) that we had taken the position of being open to a political dialogue once our hostages were released but not before and ruled out an arms transfer. I also said that Gorbanifar was not to be trusted and recomended that we no longer carry on business with him. You were present John. I then left the government.
Some dialogue must have continued with Gorbanifar between New Year's and April, notwithstanding my recommendation. In April you contacted me to go to Iran to open the political dialogue. I did so. Once there, faced with bad faith on their part (not having released our people and without meetings with the decision makers) I aborted the mission. Ollie can verify all this.
Upon my return, I debriefed the trip and once more recommended against carrying on the arms connection but waiting them out on the political dialogue.
Now this is a far cry from the way Regan is supposed to be reporting it John. I have supported the idea of the political dialogue but time and again, have registered my opposition to the arms deal. You know that.
If any of these reports of what Regan is saying are true--they are supposed to be in Time and Newsweek on Monday--it will be cause for a libel suit by me.
I am perfectly willing to carry on the no comment approach; that seems to me to best serve the hope of preserving the position of Rafsanjani et al. But I won't tolerate lies from Don Regan. John,itmight be useful for you to try to find out from Don or by asking the mags directly, just what are they running with. I have made no comment (other than the "fanciful and fictitious" line in my Cleveland Q&A) and will not.
Take care ) Current Events
FROM: NSWRP --CPUA TO: NSPBT --CPUA 02/28/86 19:17:38 To: NSJMP --CPUA JOHN M. POINDEXTER NSDRF --CPUA DONALD FORTIER
NOTE FROM: BOB PEARSON Subject: Saudi arms From Stark.
*** Forwarding note from NSJRS --CPUA 02/28/86 19:02 *** To: NSRBM --CPUA JOHN M. POINDEXTER NSWRP --CPUA JOHN M. POINDEXTER NSRBM --CPUA DONALD FORTIER NSWRP --CPUA DONALD FORTIER NOTE FROM: JAMES R. STARK
SUBJECT: Saudi arms Lynn Sachs is checking with Lugar's staff on the basis of his optimistic assessment. Hope to have an answer shortly. Again, I suspect Lugar made a seat of the pants judgement. If he had taken a head count, he would have gone to Dole at some point, and he obviously did not. On the idea of notifying the whole package, then dropping MSIP, ALQ-171, and Blackhawks, I am pessimistic because: - the pressure wd be to drop out the missiles. - whatever was dropped out would be next to impossible to notify later this year. - it makes the President look weak and would be interpreted exactly that way in the Mideast. Have checked with Dick Murphy who also agrees we should not withdraw part of the package for the above reasons. cc: NSJC --CPUA NSRKS --CPUA NSLSS --CPUA cc: NSJRS --CPUA NSPBT --CPUA NSKKS --CPUA
FROM: NSJMP --CPUA TO: NSHRT --CPUA 06/26/86 15:57:17 To: NSRBM --CPUA ROD MCDANIEL
-- SECRET --
NOTE FROM: JOHN POINDEXTER SUBJECT: Iraq Financial Situation Al Haig yesterday expressed his concerns with Iraq's ability to hang on in the war. He agrees with our impartiality policy, but feels as we do that we can not permit Iraq to fall. He wondered if there was anyway we could help their financial situation through the multi-laterals. Let's take a look at that.
cc: NSHRT --CPUA HOWARD TEICHER NSPWR --CPUA PETER RODMAN NSDBR --CPUA NSSID --CPUA STEVE DANZANSKY NSPBT --CPUA PAUL THOMPSON
MSG FROM: NSOLN --CPUA TO: NSJMP --CPUA 06/03/86 11:42:43 To: NSJMP --CPUA
*** Reply to note of 05/31/86 10:21
-- TOP SECRET --
NOTE FROM: TRIP XXXX Subject: HOSTAGES Fully agree that if the current effort fails to achieve release then such a mission should be considered. You will recall that we have not had much sucess with this kind of endeavor in the past, however. After CIA took so long to organize and then botched the Kilburn effort. Copp undertook to see what could be done thru one of the earlier DEA developed Druze contacts. Dick has been working with Nir on this and now has three people in Beirut and a 40 man Druze force working "for" us. Dick rates the possibility of success on this operation as 30%, but that's better than nothing.
In regard to U.S. military rescue ops,
JCS has steadfastly refused to go beyond the initial thinking stage unless
we can develop some hard intelligence on their whereabouts. We already
have [Deleted, (b)(1)(s) exemption] one ISA officer in Beirut but no effort
has been made to insert personnel since we withdrew the military mission
to the LAF?. If we are really serious, we should start by getting CIA to
put a full time analyst on the HLTF and then organizing a planning cell-
preferably not in the pentagon, but at CIA, to put the operation together.
Dick, who has been in Beirut, and who organized the second Hcan? mission,
is convinced that such an operation could indeed be conducted. My concern
in this regard is that JCS wd insist on using most of the tier 2 and 3
forces in such an undertaking. If you want me to task this thru the OSG
we will do so, but urge that we start by you having Casey staff the HLTF
as directed.
To: NSPSS --CPUA 12/21/87 18:52:48
*** Reply to note of 12/21/87 14:48
NOTE FROM: Colin L. Powell
Subject: General Powell's Schedule CONFIDENTIAL
Thanks for your concerns. I feel quite
safe on post and in quarters. I will vary the route; that's easy to do
because there are multiple routes off Ft yer. My days in Frankfurt made
me quite security conscious. I feel safe on post because I doubt terrorists
would risk targetting the house. They don't have a good opportunity to
recon it and the constant MP patrolling makes it silly for them to do so.
My vulnerability is just after leaving post in the morning.) It's too hard
to vary the time much in the morning but varying the route covers that
threat. I had an alarmed house when I lived at Ft McNair earlier this year.
Pain in the neck. Scared hell out of the family initially and then became
amusing when the MPs assaulted the house every time the alarm misfired.
Regan, Reagan, Bush, McFarlane
(daily national security briefing) 6-20-85