ATTACHMENT 11 AFSC HISTORICAL PUBLICATION SERIES 61-142-1 HISTORY OF AIR FORCE ATOMIC CLOUD SAMPLING NARRATIVE JANUARY 1963 DECLASSIFIED BY: ILLEGIBLE SIGNATURE: ILLEGIBLE EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC REGRADING. DOD DIR 5200.10 DOES NOT APPLY SWEH-2-0034 AUTHORIZATION This material contains information affecting the national defense of the United States within the meaning of the Espionage Laws, Title 18, any manner to an unauthorized person is prohibited by law. This document is classified SECRET-RESTRICTED DATA inasmuch as the contents are derived from document of which the highest classification is SECRET-RESTRICTED DATA. This document has been prepared in accordance with provisions of AFR 210-3, AFM 210-1, Editorial Style Sheet for Air Force Military History, and AFR 205-1. SPECIAL HANDLING REQUIRED NOT RELEASABLE TO FOREIGN NATIONALS The information contained in this document will not be disclosed to foreign nationals or their representatives. SWEH-2-0034 CONTENTS VOLUME I FORWARD . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .i INTRODUCTION. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ii LIST OF CHARTS AND ILLUSTRATIONS. . . . . . . . . . . . . .v CHRONOLOGY. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . viii I.TESTS PRECEDING MANNED SAMPLING. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .1 Operation TRINITY. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .1 Operation CROSSROADS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .3 Sampling CROSSROADS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .4 Evaluation of CROSSROADS Sampling . . . . . . . 13 Operation SANDSTONE. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13 Sampling for SANDSTONE. . . . . . . . . . . . . 15 Operation SANDSTONE Conclusions . . . . . . . . 24 Notes. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25 II.EARLY MANNED SAMPLING ACTIVITIES. . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29 Sampling Operation RANGER . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29 Operation GREENHOUSE. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34 Operation BUSTER/JANGLE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38 Operation TUMBLER/SNAPPER . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 47 Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 58 III.OPERATION IVY. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 63 Aircraft for Sampling . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 63 Training for Sampler Pilots . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 66 Sampling Operation IVY shots. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 69 MIKE Shot. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 69 Sampler Aircraft Accident on MIKE Shot . . . . . . . 72 KING Shot. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 75 Radiological Safety During Operation IVY. . . . . . . . . 76 Roll-Up of Operation IVY. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 76 Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 77 IV.SAMPLING OPERATION UPSHOT/KNOTHOLE. . . . . . . . . . . . . 80 Sampling Planning . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 80 Sampling the Shots. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 84 Conclusions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 90 Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 91 SWEH-2-0034 OPERATION CASTLE ALL THERMONUCLEAR Cloud Sampling Requirements for CASTLE. . . . . . . . . . 93 Unmanned Sampler Aircraft for CASTLE. . . . . . . . . . . 94 Modifying Sampler Aircraft for CASTLE . . . . . . . . . . 95 Sampling CASTLE Shots . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .103 Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .118 VI.OPERATION TEAPOT: CONTINENTAL SAMPLING . . . . . . . . . .121 Sampling Highlights . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .122 The High Altitude Nuclear Shot. . . . . . . . . . . . . .130 Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .137 VII.OVERSEAS FOR OPERATION REDWING . . . . . . . . . . . . . .139 Plans and Operations. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .139 Shots and Aircraft Participation. . . . . . . . . . . . .145 Radiation Safety and Monitoring . . . . . . . . . . . . .150 Flight Safety Test Area . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .151 Determining Aircraft Positioning Responsibility . . . . .152 Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .155 VIII. OPERATION PLUMBBOB, A NEW ORGANIZATION . . . . . . . . .158 Mission of the 4950th Test Group (Nuclear). . . . . . . .158 Manning the 4950th Test Group (Nuclear) . . . . . . . . .159 Operation Planning. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .161 Aircraft Requirements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .165 Sampling Plans. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .167 Shots and Aircraft Participation. . . . . . . . . . . . .168 Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .173 IX.OPERATION HARDTASK AND DUAL SHOTS . . . . . . . . . . . . .174 Shot and Aircraft Participation: Phase I. . . . . . . . .182 Shot and Aircraft Participation: Phase II . . . . . . . .186 Advantages of Experience. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .191 Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .196 X.NUCLEAR CLOUD SAMPLING . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .198 Quantitative Consideration. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .200 Characteristics of Clouds . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .201 Cloud Heights and Sampling Altitude . . . . . . . . . . .203 Radiation Characteristics of Primary Clouds . . . . . . .205 Estimation of the In-Cloud Radiation Exposure Required. .206 Radiation Exposure Received During Return to Base . . . .211 Some Observations on Techniques . . . . . . . . . . . . .212 Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .227 XI.RADIATION PRECAUTION. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .229 Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .240 SWEH-2-0034 XII.SUITABLE SAMPLING AIRCRAFT . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .242 Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .257 XIII. THE 4926TH TEST SQUADRON (SAMPLING). . . . . . . . . . .261 The Test Aircraft Unit (TAU). . . . . . . . . . . . . . .267 Recent Special Assignments. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .280 KIWI . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .288 SUNDAY PUNCH . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .290 MUSIC MAN. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .291 GOLF BALL. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .292 Squadron Transferred to Military Air Transport Service. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .292 Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .296 APPENDIX I: A LIST OF AIR FORCE SAMPLING PERSONNEL . . . . . .300 APPENDIX II: LIST OF SAMPLES TAKEN FOR EACH SHOT . . . . . . .303 GLOSSARY OF ABBREVIATIONS. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .306 GAZETTEER. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .316 GLOSSARY OF TERMS. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .319 INDEX. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .330 SWEH-2-0034 FOREWORD Aircraft sampling of atomic clouds became one of the great flying adventures of all time. Scientific analyses of cloud debris required retrieval of this material from every feasible continental and overseas test shot and represented in the fantastic activity were not only the 4976th Test Squadron (Sampling) but also many flyers, scientists, and support groups, both military and civilian. In this respect, the subdued style of this history obscures a multitude of personalities and experiences which if included would have overdrawn resources at hand and delayed the publication of the sampling story indefinitely. It is intended, on the other hand, that this volume will serve both as a history and a guide. There is included certain instructions in graphic detail, general problems are examined carefully, such as scheduling, requisitioning material, and aircraft and personnel under conditions of radiation, so that newcomers might not be totally unfamiliar with sampling as it was done in the past. On 16 August 1961, the 4926th Test Squadron (Sampling) transferred from the Air Force Weapons Center, to become a part of Air Weather Service, Military Air Transport Service. Along with the transfer went many years of experience and profitable relationships among the Center and agencies of the Department of Defense. A part of that story is also brought up-to-date as a tribute to the people who participated in this invaluable service toward developing the nuclear genie. WARD ALAN MINGE Center Historian ILLEGIBLE Undertaken at a time when atmospheric testing of nuclear weapons or devices had been discontinued for more than two years, this ILLEGIBLE was to the record of nuclear cloud sampling. Prior to completion of the compilation of documents, interviews, and the writing of the narratives, the Russians had started atmospheric testing and the United States had resorted to underground testing. As this history was concluded, ILLEGIBLE was underway and the sampling story continued. From the opening charters the transition is toward a "problem- solving" attitude. The problems which appear in the early tests are not the problems of later tests; the solutions to the problems of the later tests appear to have potential future use, therefore they are discussed in detail. Emphasis has been placed on presenting the solutions to problems unique to the sampling effort. Nevertheless, the chronicling of the aloud sampling effort cannot be completely diverted from the entire nuclear testing activities. Basically, the text contains information which all of those directly associated with nuclear cloud sampling or with decontamination of aircraft should have knowledge. It is hoped that a study such as this will result in an increase in the understanding of the need for nuclear cloud sampling; that in turn, will result in an increase in the "motivation" level of those called upon for participation in future sampling efforts. Except in such sections as are inherently technical in nature, a concerted effort has been made to reduce technical terms and phraseology ii ILLEGIBLE-2-0034 to understandable levels. Those readers who may be required to engage in direct efforts associated with the sampling of clouds will gain an understanding of the over-all complexity of the sampling mission and will realize the importance of their specific tasks or missions. Preparation of the charter HARDTACK was made extremely difficult because so many of the documents were in use at Johnston Island by those implementing Operation DOMINIC. It is regrettable that this work could not have been completed and published soon after the conclusion of HARDTACK. It could then have been used as a primary reference source in planning DOMINIC, with due regard to the technical contents of the referenced specialized documents available from the Historical Division files. Fortunately, many of the documents used in compiling this special study were assembled by a former member of the Air Force Special Weapons Center historical staff, Mr. Warren Greene. Had Mr. Greene not secured these documents when he did, much of the story would have been lost. Unless designated as being physically located elsewhere, all documents referred to are in the files of the Air Force Special Weapons Center Historical Division. They are available to authorized individuals wishing to study their contents; it is possible that copies may be loaned when requested through proper procedures. The informality and approved direct-communication rules which were in effect during the earlier nuclear tests enhances the value and interest of the documentation used. The corespondents, protagonists and antagonists, in the rare disagreements which arose, regardless of the symbols of rank worn on shoulders or the scientific status held, were iii all human beings. It is doubtful that a serious student could peruse those communications without becoming infected with some degree of hero worship as concerned many of the principals who engaged in the awesome task of nuclear testing. It is regretted that insufficient credit is given to the pilots who gathered the nuclear debris. Nor do the primary or secondary sources give sufficient information concerning those rare individuals. The scientists from the "The Hill" (Los Alamos Scientific Laboratory) who gave me such valuable assistance in compiling this work, emphatically expressed their opinions of the high and unusual calibers of the sampling pilots. From Los Alamos, I am particularly grateful to Paul Guthals and Philip Moore who read the manuscript with a critical eye. Valuable assistance was given by Colonel Paul H. Fackler who has had a guiding hand in sampling from the early days and Captain Gordon E. Staloup, historian for the 4926th Test Squadron (Sampling); many members of the staff of the Air Force Special Weapons Center Technical Library, and by Ward Alan Minge, Air Force Special Weapons Center Historian. Mr. Minge was particularly helpful and patient in the guidance necessary for converting journalistic habits of writing into historical form. LELAND B. TAYLOR Master Sergeant, USAF iv SWEH-2-0034 I On 15 May 1948, ZEBRA Shot was detonated and Colonel Fackler took off in his WB-29. The mission was about three hours old when the plane approached the radioactive cloud, then made a climbing turn to the left. The sides of the cloud were irregular and, in the turn, the WB-29 inadvertently penetrated a small "finger" projection of the cloud. "No one keeled over dead and no one got sick," Colonel Fackler commented. "In fact, there seemed to be no undue alarm among the crew members." The WB-29 continued its mission for approximately 40 more minutes before the Rad-Safe monitor in the nose of the aircraft suggested that the aircraft return. On the way back to Eniwetok, Colonel Fackler flew the aircraft through several rain squalls as a precautionary device. This decreased the radiation readings on the exterior of the aircraft and, apparently reduced the sample gathered on the filter papers. Following the mission, Colonel Fackler discussed the experiment with Colonel Cody, assistant rad-safe officer for the operation. This incident, plus the film badge experiments he had conducted, gave Colonel Cody the idea that manned sampler aircraft, operating several hours after a nuclear detonation, might possibly obtain samples much more efficiently than measures used heretofore. With drones, the "beeper" pilot aimed the aircraft toward the atomic cloud and the sample was obtained by pot-luck. A manned sampler could be maneuvered while approaching the cloud, and during penetration so that the most likely parts of the cloud could be sampled. In this way a greater precision in sample size and location was rendered, allowing study of fractionation in greater detail among various portions of the cloud. 23 SWEH-2-0034 III the sampling unit was flight testing the aircraft and turned up a multitude of minor discrepancies but these were hunted down and corrected. The prototype sampler cost $22,760 to modify while each of the other 15 aircraft cost $19,260. Concurrently, the control aircraft were modified and sent to Wright Air Development Center for flight testing and from there to Walker Air Force Base, New Mexico, early in August 1952.7 Training For Sampler Pilots On 2 March 1952, Dr. Plank visited the Special Weapons Command when plans were drawn up for training the F-84G pilots to sample atomic clouds. Also, a letter from Los Alamos Scientific Laboratory formally requested that the Task Group 132.4 sampler pilots be allowed to participate in TUMBLER/SNAPPER and the Center approved the program on 26 March 1952.8 During one of his visits, Dr. Plank explained the reasons and theories behind cloud sampling. The Strategic Air Command pilots picked to fly the F-84G sampler aircraft were pleased to learn that they were doing something useful, ". . .not serving as guinea-pigs as they seriously believed when first called upon to do the sampling. In late March and early April 1952, the F-84G pilots passed through Kirtland for a short period of training in theory of radiation and in the use of radiac instruments. Afterwards, in groups of five, they took additional training in Indian Springs Air Force Base where, as noted previously, they penetrated atomic clouds during the TUMBLER/SNAPPER detonations. To avoid excessive radiation which might inhibit sampling 66 SWEN-2-0034 during Operation IVY, they were restricted to 0.1 roentgen exposure. Each group of five pilots remained at Indian Springs for one week in all and continued their studies on radiation and radiac instruments. In addition, ten maintenance personnel accompanied the pilots. 10 After completing this training, the 8th Air Force outlined sixteen training missions for the sampler pilots, emphasizing navigational flights of about 2,000 miles distance, rendezvous with tanker aircraft both by day and by night, weather penetration flights and flight formation drills.11 Finally, on 13 August 1952, the sampler aircraft took off from Bergstrom Air force Base and ran through a complete simulated mission. It flew to the control B-29 aircraft, then to the B-36 sampler controller, simulated sampling missions, then returned to the B-29. Pilots would complete the in-flight refueling exercise twice during a mission. All the F-84G samplers participated in the drill, along with three control aircraft, and ten KB-29 tankers.12 Training ended early in September and on 4 September, the 16 sampler aircraft took off from Bergstrom Air Force Base and flew to the Naval Air Station at San Diego, California. Enroute they rendezvoused with tanker aircraft and refueled. On the West Coast, the samplers received protective spray, were loaded aboard the aircraft carrier USS Rendova, and sailed for the Pacific Proving Grounds, arriving at ILLEGIBLE on 30 September 1952.13 The Pacific Command had turned down proposals for flying to the test site, because it would cost too much to station picket ships along the route to rescue pilots should any of the jets be forced down.14 III F-84G SAMPLER AIRCRAFT INSTRUMENTATION INSTRUMENT PANEL F-84G SAMPLER AIRCRAFT GRAPHIC FOR REFERENCE SEE (6bb04) Aircraft Pattern for Collecting Cloud Sample, Operation IVY III Unloading the F-84G aircraft from the USS Rendova posed further problems. Because the water in the Kwajalein lagoon was not deep enough to allow the ship to tie up to the pier, the aircraft were moved to a barge. Unloading was complicated in that the aircraft were lifted off the decks of the carrier by the ship's crane and lowered over the side. With two aircraft, the barge moved to the beach where a crane then lifted them to the beach. Two hundred yards away was the taxi strip. After tugs parked the aircraft, maintenance crews of the unit began preparing the aircraft and within two days of being set ashore, they were checked over and test flown.15 Sampling Operation IVY Shots The pilots of the sampling unit made familiarization flights and rehearsals over the Pacific Test Site while waiting. It was soon discovered that clouds and rain might cause them to land at Eniwetok. During the actual sampling mission the aircraft would have landed to Eniwetok if Kwajalein was having rain because the water destroyed the filter papers. 16 MIKE Shot. The first thermonuclear device ever fired, occurred on the morning of 1 November 1952. Two F-84G aircraft "sniffers" climbed to 40,000 feet altitude and met the primary B-29 control aircraft about 50 miles southeast of ground zero, ten minutes before the event. They refueled and proceeded under control of the B-29 VI strips, were exposed to contaminated surfaces. Also, to register radiation intensities received by the hands, personnel wore gloves with film strips inside and out. Yet another test, in which individuals rubbed their bare hands over contaminated areas, produced readings 30 per cent of the intensity found on the contaminated surfaces.15 Altogether, the Center survey group studied 17 airplanes with contamination readings that ranged from a density of 1 roentgen up to 14 roentgens. Five members of the survey team took part in all of the 17 surveys and no team member absorbed more radiation than the Atomic Energy Commission's tolerance limit of 3.9 roentgens. One phase of this study caught the attention of newspapers. to get information from an atomic cloud more quickly than that obtained by sampler aircraft, Research Directorate officers used several T-33 jet trainers and flew into the cloud much earlier.17 One newspaper reported, "A group of dare devil Air force scientists are making flights through the boiling reddish-brown atomic cloud in the interest of radiation research..."18 An Albuquerque, New Mexico, newspaper ran the following headlines: "Inside of A-Cloud Colored Brick Red, Kirtland Scientists, Pilots Report."19 However, the film badge experiments fascinated reporters. The Las Vegas, Nevada, Review-Journal headlined a long story about the project: "Culp Film Badges to Check Radiation." The newspaper reported that Captain Charles S. Oldfield, Development Directorate, and Colonel Pinson swallowed some film badges and attached others to their clothing while flying through a nuclear cloud. After the mission the internal FOR REFERENCE SEE (6bb05) GRAPHIC Captain Charles S. Oldfield, Biophysics Division, Research Directorate, Air Force Special Weapons Center, removing film from stomach after penetration of atomic cloud, Operation TEAPOT VI film badges were pulled by strings and examined. A comparison of the radiation on the internal badge with that on the external badge gave an indication of the amount of radiation penetrating the body. However, the pilots and the two observers were not concerned about their exploits. "We know what we are doing and there is nothing to get excited about."20 Drawing conclusions from its project, the Center's survey group pointed out that the contamination density readings occurred when instruments and film were placed in direct contact with the contaminated skin of an airplane for extended periods of time. Airmen servicing an aircraft, however, would probably keep their hands in more or less constant motion during the operation and would not receive as much radiation as was recorded on the meters and film badges. For a person to receive radiation of the same values as those collected during the survey, the project officers reported that an individual would have to come into direct contact with the nose of the airplane or the leading edge of a wing. In addition, the direct contact with the surface would have to be somewhat prolonged, depending upon the intensity of the particles touched to achieve a radiation burn.21 The High Altitude Nuclear Shot When the high altitude explosion was detonated on the morning of 6 April 1955, it represented the culmination of about 18 months of intensive preparation at the Air Force Special Weapons Center. Early in October 1953, the Armed Forces Special Weapons Project was interested in a nuclear warhead for antiaircraft rockets. That agency, therefore, 130 ILLEGIBLE-2-0034