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DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY

EXERCISE 3-99
DOE COMMAND POST
EXERCISE (u)
AFTER ACTION REPORT

Classified By: William McNally,
ORISE Plans and Exercises
Derived From: CG-WN-4, and CJCSI 5113.01a October 1, 1996
Declassify On: X4

DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY

EXERCISE 3-99
DOE COMMAND POST
EXERCISE (a)
AFTER ACTION REPORT

Classified By: William McNally,
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March 23, 1999

Commander John Weidner, USN
Acting Director
Defense Programs Office of Emergency Response (DP-23)
U.S. Department of Energy
19901 Germantown Road
Germantown, MD 20875-1290

Dear Commander Weidner:

This Quicklook Report for DOE Exercise 03-99, a Command Post Exercise (CPX) conducted March 16 and 17, 1999 provides a preliminary summary of observations made during the execution of CPX 3-99. The report also identifies issues within 72 hours of the event. ORISE will forward a detailed exercise report within 60 days.

This was the first time DP-23 exercised the Nuclear Incident Team (NIT) as a staff in support of a DOE response to nuclear/radiological WMD terrorism. The exercise scenario presented required an interagency emergency response to an international nuclear/radiological WMD terrorist incident. The NIT, for the first time, conducted command and control coordination from the DOE Headquarters Emergency Operations Center (EOC). The DOE emergency response asset team leaders, coordinating from their home station, simulated field conditions and provided the vehicle by which the NIT staff maintained situational awareness and operational command and control coordination of DOE emergency response assets. This CPX highlighted the ability of the NIT to adapt quickly to rapidly escalating operational and coordination requirements. CPX 3-99 also identified several issues with NIT procedures that will require follow-up action.

The stated CPX 3-99 exercise objectives are outlined below:

- Establish NIT at Forrestal EOC.
- Validate NIT Handbook.
- Confirm communications connectivity with DOE Emergency Response Assets, including video conferences.
- Validate Alert, Mobilization, Deployment and Employment procedures.

- Evaluate Emergency Response Command and Control METL.
- Validate KAFB Operations Facility (if available)

The following issues were identified by ORISE controllers, DOE emergency response element leaders and NIT members throughout the exercise and at a NIT hot-wash conducted immediately following the end of the exercise:

Administrative issues:

- Security clearances: Security clearances for participants and controllers must be maintained and properly passed to the appropriate DOE offices. Clearance data was not properly passed for three Department of Defense exercise control group participants causing a delay in their gaining access to the DOE HQ EOC. Additionally, the lack of a compartmented access clearance in the case of an exercise controller required JTOT II participants to change the site of their participation at LANL.
- Flow of information: Limited secure fax capability between the NIT and its subordinates caused delays in field elements understanding and fulfilling exercise requirements.
- Time compression: The scenario times were compressed into several four-hour blocks for the CPX. This often caused confusion. When compressing time for an exercise all participants, controllers and players alike, must understand the process of the compression.

Operational issues:

- Communications: Communication between all emergency response elements is essential to situational awareness and the decision process necessary to resolve the incident. The NIT needs to improve the flow of information to the field.
- Terminology: The terminology used for DOE CT emergency response alert and notification is now standardized and understood by all participants.
- Communications: Training with the technical communications infrastructure is a necessary priority.

In summary, CPX 3-99 was successfully executed the majority of its stated objectives. The NIT, especially for the first time, demonstrated its ability to successfully coordinate DOE's response to a nuclear/radiological WMD terrorist incident. Short of technical communications, DOE elements accomplished their exercise objectives. The event proved useful in assessing the NIT Handbook for future operational requirements.

Please do not hesitate to contact me should you have questions about this preliminary report on CPX 3-99.

Sincerely,

James F. McDonnell
Director
National Security Operations

JFM:LPP:llb

cc: Managers
File

May 10, 1999

Commander John Weidner
Acting Director
Office of Emergency Response
U.S. Department of Energy
19901 Germantown Road
Germantown, MD 20874-1290

Subject: Department of Energy (DOE) Exercise 3-99 Command Post Exercise (CPX) After-Action Report (AAR)

Dear Commander Weidner:

Enclosed is the draft DOE 3-99 AAR. It documents DOE emergency response element participation in the exercise conducted in Washington D.C., Los Alamos National Laboratory and Nevada Operations Office, March 16 and 17, 1999.

This exercise evaluated DOE emergency response leadership and staff ability to respond to an international terrorist incident involving nuclear weapons of mass destruction. Throughout fiscal year 1998, DOE emergency response elements steadily improved their operational effectiveness. This event focused on FY 98 lessons-learned as a vehicle to validate the emergency response program with a focus on command and control functions.

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DOE 3-99 highlighted operational issues and exercise planning and management issues, which require follow-up action.

(U) Please contact me or any of the exercise staff should you have questions regarding this report.

Sincerely,

James F. McDonnell
Director
National Security Operations

JFM:GWH:lls

cc: File

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DOE 3-99
COMMAND POST EXERCISE
AFTER-ACTION REPORT
June 11, 1999

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INTRODUCTION

(U) Exercise DOE 3-99 was a Command Post Exercise (CPX) conducted March 16 and 17, 1999. The CPX involved the leadership and staff of the Office of Emergency Response (DP-23) and various emergency response assets. This CPX served to validate current operational response procedures for DOE's Nuclear Incident Team (NIT) and its command and control relationships with the leadership of various Department of Energy (DOE) emergency responders.

(U) This After-Action Report (AAR) documents the operational performance observed during the CPX. In particular, the report presents key issues the NIT and other DOE emergency response assets raised in the course of implementing operational procedures. The AAR provides DP-23 with information to assess the readiness of operational assets responding to international weapons of mass destruction (WMD) terrorist incidents.

(U) The report also addresses DOE exercise planning and management issues to ensure the exercise program properly evaluates DOE emergency response assets capabilities and procedures. Results of this event indicate the readiness of DOE's emergency response assets and help identify training required to enhance mission capabilities.

(U) The After-Action Report is organized as follows:

- **(U) BACKGROUND** -- outlines the scenario, scope and specific DP-23 objectives for the exercise. Also, it describes DOE exercise participation and the exercise control structure.

- **(U) EXERCISE FLOW** -- presents the nature of the exercise weapons of mass destruction terrorist situation that confronted U.S. authorities. It briefly traces the general response to the situation presented.

- **(U) SUMMARY EVALUATION** -- presents a subjective judgment regarding the success of the exercise and assesses the overall performance of DOE emergency response elements in meeting their operational requirements. This section also highlights key findings during the exercise.

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- **(U) FINDINGS** -- provides the basis for the overall evaluation of DOE operational asset performance. Issues that emerged during the course of the exercise are summarized. Exercise planning and management issues are discussed, followed by operational issues. It organizes the highlighted operational issues into operations, administrative and communications categories.

(U) A Reference Book with the supporting documents associated with the planning and execution of the exercise is on file at the ORISE National Security Operations Directorate. The index of this Reference Book is at Tab D.

(U) BACKGROUND

(S)
(b)(1)

Additional U.S. assets were put on alert and DP-23 emergency response assets deployed as follow-on support to the FEST and Department of Defense (DoD) elements. During alert and deployment of DP-23 assets, the NIT served as DOE's command and control element. As such, the NIT briefed members of the Secretary of Energy staff, alerted and deployed required assets, and coordinated interagency support. The Nuclear/Radiological Advisory Team (NRAT) and the Consequence Management Official (CMO) deployed as members of the FEST and provided nuclear subject matter expertise to the Country Team. As these deployments were ongoing, the LINCOLN GOLD Augmentation Team (LGAT) and the Commander in Chief (CINC) liaison deployed to support their respective elements. Joint Technical Operation Teams (JTOT) Phase II and III were alerted and mobilized. Ultimately, JTOT II deployed to provide technical support to DoD. Consequence management planners were alerted, mobilized and deployed to assist the Joint Task Force for Consequence Management. Search assets were also alerted and mobilized, but were not deployed because the location of the device was already confirmed.

(U) DOE exercise planning included a review of FY 98 exercise lessons learned. Additionally, the scope included validation of lines of communication and the decision processes involved in alert, mobilization, deployment and employment of DOE emergency response assets.

(U) The DOE exercise objectives were as follows:

- Employ NIT at the Forrestal Emergency Operations Center (EOC)

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- Validate NIT Handbook
- Confirm communications connectivity with DOE Emergency Response Assets, including video conferences
- Validate Alert, Mobilization, Deployment and Employment procedures
- METL Based evaluation of Emergency Response Command and Control procedures

(U) Participants included the NIT at the Forrestal Building EOC, NRAT leadership at Andrews Air Force Base, and JTOT II and III leaders at Los Alamos, NM. Also, consequence management, LGAT and search team leaders participated at Las Vegas, NV. The mobilization, deployment and employment of assets were simulated, no actual movement of assets took place. A description of DOE's emergency response capabilities is at TAB A. The DOE Exercise Force List is at TAB B.

(U) An Exercise Control Group (ECG) functioned as representatives of agencies outside DOE and DP-23. Finally, controllers and participants recorded observations that serve as the basis for evaluation of the overall performance of DOE emergency response assets.

(U) EXERCISE FLOW

(U) The execution of DOE Exercise 3-99 revolved around four phases of an operation--alert, mobilization, deployment, and employment. Two eight-hour days provided four four-hour shifts, one shift per operational phase. Master scenario event list injects were tracked by an index number instead of date-time-groups. Exercise design required regular NIT and asset shift changes. A detailed description of activities and the responses by NIT and other DOE response assets are included in TAB C of this report.

(U) Shift 1 – 16 March 1999 (16 MARCH-AM)

(S) At the exercise start, the teams administratively took their places; no real time call-out was conducted. After a briefing from the DOE Counterterrorism and Security Group (CSG) member outlining the situation, the decision was made to alert DP-23 emergency response assets. LINCOLN GOLD, at DoD's request, deployed forward for incident planning. Additionally, the NIT Leader contacted the Consequence Management Officer (CMO) in Las Vegas, NV and put all Consequence Management (CM) assets on alert. Liaison Officers (LNOs) deployed to Departments of State and Defense at the Emergency Response Official's direction.

(U) The Office of the Secretary of Energy requested a situational update for the Secretary. This briefing included a status of activities, assets alerted and deployed, device description and consequence effects modeling. At the end of the first shift, the NIT Leader conducted a turnover briefing that reviewed the operational situation and the status of DP-23 assets.

(U) Shift 2 – 16 March 1999 (16 MARCH-PM)

(U) Actions during Shift 2 were based upon an increased intelligence flow, and interagency and DOE assets requests of the NIT staff. Following a NIT policy discussion pertaining to deploying the CMO, that official was directed to travel by commercial air to join the FEST in-theater.

(S) (U) (b)(1) Oral and written orders directed a JTOT II deployment. (b)(1)

(U) Shift 3 – 17 March 1999 (17 MARCH-AM)

(S) (U) A controller briefing to the NIT recapped the previous day's events. (b)(1)

(S) The DOE CSG member tasked NIT personnel to reconstitute DP-23 emergency response assets. This requirement was worked throughout the shift. (b)(1)

The SRT and FRMAC did not deploy, but maintained a high alert posture at Las Vegas.

(S) The NIT Assistant Team Leader briefed the NIT on the status of assets. The NIT staff provided the Secretary with an update on the deployment status of JTOT III, including JTOT III load requirements and NRAT's concurrence with JTOT III's deployment to (b)(1)

(U) A report from NRAT indicated a Senior NRAT Science Advisor was ill and in the hospital. The NIT discussed this and decided that since other scientific expertise was available in theater, the advisor would not be replaced.

(S) (b)(1)

The NIT staff immediately communicated this information to NRAT and JTOT II.

(S) (b)(1)

A discussion on the request by DoD to divide the consequence management capability into two components took place. Following communications with the NRAT, the NIT Team Leader directed that DOE

would not provide a separate consequence management planning team to (b)(1) and that JTOT III would provide this capability as needed.

(U) The NIT Science Advisor provided weather and effects data to the NRAT. This information enabled the NRAT to estimate the consequences from a potential weapon detonation.

(S) (b)(1)

(U) Shift 4 – 17 March 1999 (17 MARCH-PM)

(U) The NIT discussed consequence management concerns regarding the potential impact of a detonation on local populations. Since the closest population center was sixty miles from a potential blast, NIT members determined that fallout would cause the greatest impact.

(S)
(U) (b)(1)

This was discussed with the SEO, who indicated that NRAT scientists could provide this capability. (b)(1) He also pointed out that JTOT II and JTOT III were working with DoD on render safe procedures.

(U) The NIT Leader provided a briefing to the Secretary of Energy. This included an update on the operational situation including the nature and status of the device, assets alerted and deployed (including liaisons), location of the ship containing the device, and the consequence assessment. During the briefing, the Secretary of Energy role-player and staff asked questions on the consequences of a nuclear detonation and the possible necessity of intervention by the President to resolve the device transportation issue.

(U) Following this briefing, the exercise ended.

(U) SUMMARY EVALUATION

(U) DOE Exercise 3-99 demonstrated that DP-23 could conduct NIT functions from the DOE Forrestal EOC. Weakness in NIT structure and procedures are articulated in the Findings Section for future organizational planning and training. The NIT, however, demonstrated its ability to effectively manage a DOE response to a WMD terrorist incident.

(U) Particularly noteworthy:

1. (U) The NIT staff developed and presented to Secretary of Energy several briefings, which provided status updates and operational options for the senior staff. This

serious of operational briefings forced the DOE NIT staff to maintain their situational awareness, stay informed of asset status, and anticipate issues for resolution.

2. (U) Several injects were developed which presented unusual situations for the NIT staff to resolve. Among these are the following:
   - Where to send the CMO
   - How to deal with an ill deployed operational team member
   - Reconstitution of DP-23 assets

(U) FINDINGS

(U) DOE Exercise 3-99 highlighted several important operational issues. For the first time since the reorganization of DP-23 emergency response assets, the NIT executed a response to a WMD terrorist event from the Forrestal EOC. Emergency response leadership teams performed their duties from normal operational sites. No actual asset deployments occurred.

(U) Asset participants and controllers provided written after-action comments to identify issues for discussion and follow-up actions. Based on those comments the following paragraphs address exercise planning and management as well as operational lessons learned. The operational issues are presented and organized under the headings of operations, administrative, and communications activities of DOE emergency response elements.

(U) Exercise Planning and Management Issues:

(U) Time Management. An event of this type, i.e., a CPX, involves compressing many operational events into the time allocated to conduct the exercise. Rather than focus on specific timelines for the events, it was decided to use sequence event numbers to manage the exercise. When using this method, or any other technique, all participants must be aware of the process. Controllers must preview all message traffic to ensure the script supports controller plans and player actions.

(U) Situational Awareness. The NIT assembled administratively. As such, they were not informed of the scenario, intelligence build-up or previous pre-staged events. Exercise management must ensure a briefing is provided to the staff enabling conduct of operations with awareness of the operational situation and environment.

(U) Operations Issues:

(U) DP-23 Emergency Response Asset Status. NIT members should know the status of emergency response assets at all times. This awareness includes, but is not limited to, understanding capabilities and limitations, contact telephone numbers, mobilization locations, and default load plans for any potential transport aircraft. While participants understood the majority of the assets, JTOT III's potential locations, statements of requirements, and activities were not fully appreciated.

(U) Relations Among Federal Agency Liaisons and the Nuclear Incident Team Must Be Exercised. Other commitments prevented presence of other standing liaison officers during the event. This situation caused exercise planners to simulate liaison functions with personnel having limited experience in fulfilling those tasks. Consequently, the NIT staff did not have an opportunity during the CPX to work with liaison officers from other Federal agencies. This is an important aspect of NIT operations that still needs to be exercised.

(U) Administrative Issues:

(U) Nuclear Incident Team Composition Requires Clarification. The NIT start-up was confusing due to a lack of understanding of individual responsibilities. These responsibilities should be defined in the NIT handbook. The NIT mission and concept of operations are not defined. Again, these definitions must be outlined in the handbook. IN and NN roles must be outlined to describe their functions as NIT supporting members.

(U) Refinement of Nuclear Incident Team Procedures. The NIT handbook does not outline administrative procedures for tracking asset status or a method for maintaining operational data. No procedures exist (checklists) to ensure dissemination of facsimiles or other documentation. There is no protocol available to develop required briefings. Identification of a single point of contact to work with DP-23 personnel to update the current NIT handbook will remedy this situation. The NIT should develop standard formats and procedures for briefings, log sheets, historical logs and asset tracking. Specific recommendations will be passed to DP-23 for inclusion in the NIT handbook. The NIT, however, made significant strides throughout the CPX toward developing effective procedures.

(U) All Emergency Response Officers Are Not at the Same Experience Level. NIT members have differing degrees of familiarization with DP-23 emergency response assets. Placing each DP-23 Emergency Response Official in a position to participate annually (at a minimum) in a counterterrorist training event would enhance overall team understanding and readiness. Exercises of this magnitude will assist the NIT in developing policy and procedures to deal with an actual terrorist event.

(U) Access Coordination into the Emergency Operations Center. Team room nine has been designated within the DOE HQ EOC as the NIT primary room. DP-23 needs to coordinate the appropriate Q, SPECAT and SCI access to the EOC and SCIF for DP-23 assets and supporting interagency liaison officers with NN.

(U) **Suggested Inclusions to the NIT Handbook.** The NIT handbook provides vital checklists for NIT operations during the conduct of a malevolent terrorist WMD event. As AAR comments, the following items were provided to the NIT staff as controller and participant recommendations for inclusion:

- Standard formats (briefing materials, log sheets, chronology, route sheets, asset-tracking forms) should be developed and maintained with the computer equipment.
- Standardized asset briefings should be available.
- A standard status board layout (an example is located in the Reference Book).
- Asset call-out rosters.

(U) Communications Issues:

(U) **Slow Documents Transmittal.** The NIT sent Special Category message traffic through the DOE Message Center. Two problems were the apparent lack of urgency on part of the message center (since they were not exercise participants), and tardiness of message arrival to assets. A classified facsimile machine in the NIT team room (team room nine) would eliminate the requirement to use the message center for transmittal of such message traffic during future exercises or operations of this nature.

(U) **Limited Training on Communications Equipment.** Most NIT members had limited exposure to advanced radio communications. Not all members had received training on the INMARSAT system. Many NIT members do not understand data transfer techniques.

(U) **Use of Secure Communications and Teleconferencing (SCAT).** Employing the capability was a stated exercise objective. The DOE video teleconference system was not yet certified for classified discussion and the SCAT was not yet certified for handling Special Category information. DP-23 needs to acquire a portable SCAT terminal and IMMARSAT B terminal for NIT use within the EOC.

(U) **Passing of Information.** The NIT coordinates with other federal agencies and must pass this information on to DOE field assets. The NIT needs to improve both the timeliness and methods of communications connectivity with other governmental agencies and DOE emergency response assets.

TAB A- DOE Emergency Response Capabilities (U)

(U) Nuclear Incident Team (NIT)

(S) Mission: Responsible for preparing courses-of-action briefings for senior DOE officials – CSG member/Secretary of Energy – and coordinating interagency actions for alerted and deploying DOE elements.

(U) Capability: Coordination with interagency counterparts, anticipating and acting on requirements of DOE emergency response elements.

(S) Deployment Trigger: The NIT will assemble in the DOE HQ Emergency Operations Center upon notification of the CSG member following the initial round of interagency meetings.

(U) Team Size: 8-12 personnel per shift

(U) Nuclear/Radiological Advisory Team (NRAT)

(U) Mission: To provide expert advice to the responsible US Government Lead Federal Agency during acts of terrorism that may include the use of nuclear or radiological material. The Lead Federal Agency responsibility rests with the Chief of Mission for and overseas response and the Federal Bureau Investigation (FBI) Special Agent-in-Charge for a domestic response to terrorism. The NRAT Leader is the senior Department of Energy official deployed and is responsible for command and control of all DOE assets in the field.

(U) Capability: Limited search; identification of materials through Gamma Spectroscopy; technical analysis of intelligence and data collected through technical means; communicating with DOE laboratories and deployed DOE assets.

(U) Deployment Trigger: The NRAT will deploy within 4 hours of notification as part of the Domestic Emergency Support Team (DEST) or Foreign Emergency Support Team (FEST). The Lead Federal Agency (DOS or FBI) should request NRAT as a result of an interagency meeting.

(U) Team Size: 5 – 8 personnel.

(U) LINCOLN GOLD (LG)

(U) Mission: To provide expert technical advice to the Department of Defense (DoD) special mission unit commander responding to nuclear or radiological terrorism. A LINCOLN GOLD Augmentation Team deploys in support of DoD and a LINCOLN GOLD Home Team provides data to DoD personnel while the LINCOLN GOLD Augmentation Team is en-route.

(U) Capability: Rapid and continual weapons intelligence, diagnostics, disablement and render safe advice.

(U) Deployment Trigger: The LINCOLN GOLD Home Team will provide support within 2 hours of notification and the LINCOLN GOLD Augmentation Team will deploy within 4 hours of a DoD request for assistance or unilaterally deployed by DP-23 upon notification of a nuclear WMD terrorist incident.

(U) Team Size: 5 (Scientists) personnel.

(U) Joint Technical Operations Team (JTOT)(Phase II)

(U) Mission: To provide advanced technical advice and assistance to DoD EOD in render safe procedures and to package the device or weapon for movement to a final disposition site.

(U) Capability: Assists DoD in rendering a device safe through advanced techniques of diagnostics, design analysis, access, and packaging.

(U) Deployment Trigger: JTOT II maintains a 6-hour alert posture to respond at the request of DoD or unilateral deployment by DP-23.

(U) Team Size: 21 DOE personal, augmented by 10-12 DoD Explosive Ordnance Disposal technicians.

(U) Joint Technical Operations Team-Phase III (JTOT III)

(U) Mission: To maintain custody of the recovered device and conduct technical operations at the final disposition site.

(U) Capability: Conducts demilitarization of the device by segregating the fire set, high explosives and physics package.

(U) Deployment Trigger: JTOT III maintains a 12-hour alert posture to respond to the request of the lead federal agency or unilateral deployment by DP-23.

(U) Team Size: 1 Federal official, 21 DOE scientific personnel, and additional DOE support personnel as needed.

(U) Consequence Management Official (CMO)

(U) Mission: To assist the US Chief-of-Mission and Host Nation officials in the long-term mitigation of consequences resulting from the functioning of a nuclear device.

(U) Capability: Provides briefings relevant to Other Government and Non-Government agencies' abilities to provide long-term care and site restoration.

(U) Deployment Trigger: The CMO deploys as a component of the NRAT.

(U) Consequence Management Planning Team

(U) Mission: To provide the DoD regional US Commander-in-Chief (CINC) immediate consequence models and plots and to assist in the development of consequence management plans.

(U) Capability: Enables connectivity between DoD and DOE large-scale response capabilities of the ARG/RAP/REAC/TS/ARAC/FRMAC.

(U) Deployment Trigger: The Consequence Management Planning Team deploys within 6 hours of a request by the DoD regional CINC to provide consequence management planning.

(U) Team Size: 2 Federal officials, 10 scientists.

(U) Search Response Team (SRT)
Search Augmentation Team (SAT)

(U) Mission: To provide a limited search support augmentation to the Nuclear Radiological Advisory Team and Domestic and Foreign Emergency Support Team.

(U) Capability: The Search Augmentation Team provides the capability of rapidly instructing local emergency searchers as well as limited unilateral search capability. The Search Augmentation Team provides a Nuclear Emergency Search Team augmentation to the Search Response Team.

(U) Deployment Trigger: The SRT and/or SAT deploy at the request of the Lead Federal Agency as a follow-on element of the Domestic or Foreign Emergency Support Teams.

(U) Team Size: The Search Response Team: 7 personnel. The Search Augmentation Team: 27 Personnel.

TAB B – DOE Exercise 3-99 Force List (U)

(U) NUCLEAR INCIDENT TEAM
(b)(2)

(U) NUCLEAR RADIOLOGICAL ADVISORY TEAM
(b)(2)

(U) LINCOLN GOLD AUGMENTATION TEAM
(b)(2)

(U) LINCOLN GOLD HOME TEAM
Not played.

(U) JOINT TECHNICAL OPERATIONS TEAM II
(b)(2)

(U) JOINT TECHNICAL OPERATIONS TEAM III
(b)(2) JTOT III
provided no formal participants.

(U) CONSEQUENCE MANAGEMENT OFFICIAL
(b)(2)

(U) CONSEQUENCE MANAGEMENT PLANNING TEAM
(b)(2)

(U) SEARCH RESPONSE AND AUGMENTATION TEAMS
(b)(2)

(S) MOBILIZATION STRUCTURE



TAB C- Exercise Major Events (U)

(U) The detailed events are presented on the following pages:

(U) Shift 1 – 16 March 1999 (16 MARCH-a.m.)

(S) The DOE member of the Counterterrorism and Security Group (CSG) attended an emergency interagency meeting. (b)(1)

The NIT assembled and received a briefing by the CSG member regarding the situation. NIT was initially tasked to alert DOE emergency response assets and direct asset leadership to stand-by for further direction. The following intelligence and information was provided to the NIT during Shift 1:
(S)
(b)(1)

Concurrently, the U.S. intelligence community provided background information and analytic assessment supporting the acquisition and location of the device. While the malicious intent of the group was believed to be U.S. interests, the eventual target was not yet known.

(U) Anticipating a DoD request, NIT directed the pre-positioning of LGAT to support DoD. Upon receipt of the DoD request, NIT notified LG to report to their DoD counterparts. Following their arrival, operational planning among LG and DoD personnel commenced. The NIT alerted the NRAT, JTOT II and III, and the Search Response Team (SRT). Additionally, the NIT Team Leader contacted the Consequence Management Official (CMO) in Las Vegas, NV and put all CM assets on alert. Liaison Officers (LNOs) were deployed to the Departments of State and Defense at the direction of the Emergency Response Official.

(U) A briefing was provided by the NIT Team Leader and Assistant Team Leader regarding the status of pre-staging LGAT, the alert status of the assets, the potential for a FEST deployment and the need to provide updated intelligence to both JTOT and LGAT.

(U) The NIT Team Leader also briefed that NRAT had completed assembly at Andrews Air Force Base and Department of State would decide within one to two hours regarding deployment of the FEST. As the NIT briefing terminated, a requirement to brief the Secretary of Energy in 30 minutes was received.

(U) NIT requested of Energy and received a consequence effects model from the Consequence Management Official (CMO). This data, in conjunction with asset status and an intelligence update were used in preparing the Secretary's briefing.

(U) The NIT Team Leader provided the requested briefing to the Secretary. (b)(3)

(U) As the Secretary was departing to attend a principals meeting, he requested talking points on DOE's posture. The NIT Team Leader at the end of Shift 1 conducted a turnover briefing. This briefing served to inform the incoming shift of events to date and the status of DP-23 response assets.

(U) Shift 2 – 16 March 1999

(U) The NIT Team Leader briefed the NIT staff that the FEST deployment had been approved and Mobilization (M)-hour established. Additionally, the NIT Assistant Team Leader directed the staff to call DoD and offer a CM planner. (b)(3)

DoD requested a statement of requirements (number of personnel, equipment load…) from NIT in order to establish airlift plans for JTOT II. The NIT forwarded these requirements to JTOT II and authorized direct laision with Pentagon planners. A discussion was held within the NIT regarding the link-up location of the CMO and FEST. (b)(1)

Midway into the shift, DoD established a Notification (N)-

hour for military deployment of a crisis response force. NIT passed this data to JTOT II and the other response assets.

(U) Deployment of the Consequence Management Planning Team (CMPT) to Camp Pendleton, California was directed. DoD transmitted flight itinerary data to JTOT II and the team conducted final preparation for deployment. The NIT Assistant Team Leader provided a second status briefing to the NIT. This briefing ensured the staff was fully aware of operational steps taken since the previous Secretary briefing. Notification provided the NIT indicated LGAT had joined with the DoD crisis response force and was staged to deploy.

(U) Shift 3 – 17 March 1999

(S)
(U) At the outset of Shift 3, the NIT Leader led a discussion on techniques needed to improve the flow, tracking and logging of information. Also, the needs to improve the structure of the Secretary's briefing and to better anticipate questions. The NIT Leader determined the requirement to control in-coming and out-going facsimile message traffic.
(b)(1)

(S)
(U) (b)(1)

(U) At the beginning of Shift 3 the NIT Leader directed the staff to obtain information on the status of DOE assets. Also, he requested assistance in assembling a briefing for the Secretary of Energy. Additionally, the NIT Leader requested the NIT Science Advisor closely monitor incoming intelligence information and to provide the NIT Leader or his assistant any critical information.

(U) As the assets deployed, the CSG member directed reconstitution of DP-23 Emergency Response Assets. The NIT staffed this requirement during their shift. An equipment shortfall was identified for JTOT II but was resolved by the staff within 24 hours. NRAT reported the arrival of JTOT II and that LGAT and CMO were enroute. Location and contact telephone and fax numbers were provided to the NIT Assistant Team Leader. Since the vessel was moving, a discussion took place as to the requirement to deploy SRT and FRMAC. A determination was made to maintain their alert status and not deploy those assets.

(U) The NIT Assistant Team Leader briefed the NIT Leader and staff on the status of the assets as directed. He indicated a requirement to request a C-141 for deployment of

JTOT III. A follow up briefing was provided by NIT staff on deployment status of JTOT III including load requirements and that the NRAT had recommended deployment to Wake Island.

(U) The NIT Assistant Team Leader indicated that the NRAT Senior Science Advisor was ill and in the hospital. The NIT discussed this and decided that since other assets were available, the Senior Science Advisor would not be replaced.

(U) (b)(3)

This information was immediately communicated to NRAT and JTOT II by the NIT staff.

(U) The NIT discussed the use of a ship to move the device to (b)(1) vice transporting the device by airplane (C-141). The concern was that if the device were moved, there would be an added risk of detonation. The Senior Science Advisor indicated that he had faxed CM information to NRAT.

(U) The NIT Assistant Team Leader provided a second briefing to the NIT. He indicated the departure of JTOT III and directed the staff to inform the NRAT and DOS (through LNO) on JTOT III's deployment itinerary.

(U) There was some discussion on a DoD request to divide DOE's consequence management capability into two components. (b)(1) After discussions with the NRAT, the NIT Leader communicated that DOE would not provide a separate CM element to (b)(1) but JTOT III would provide this capability.

(U) The NIT Science Advisor provided weather and effects data to the NRAT. This information was needed to estimate consequences of a potential device detonation. The Science Advisor indicated NRAT requested geographic information they could use to determine where it would be safe to conduct render safe operations aboard the ship. The NIT Leader indicated that NRAT scientists could do this but asked the Science Advisor to work the issue.

(U) A turnover briefing was provided to Shift 4, which included status of the ship, deployed and non-deployed assets and the issue of transportation of the device to (b)(1)

(U) Shift 4 – 19 March 1999

(U) (b)(3)

(U) (b)(1) This was discussed with the SEO and he indicated NRAT scientists could provide this capability. (b)(1) He also discussed that JTOT II and JTOT III should be working with DoD on the render safe procedures.

(U) The NIT Team Leader provided a requested briefing to the Secretary of Energy. The briefing included an update on the device, assets alerted and deployed, location of the vessel containing the device, and ongoing consequence assessment. (b)(3)

(U) After completing the Secretary of Energy briefing, the exercise ended.

TAB D - Reference Book

A. QUICKLOOK REPORT

B. LETTER OF INSTRUCTION

C. CONTROLLER GUIDANCE

D. PRE-EXERCISE MASTER SCENARIO EVENTS LIST

E. EXERCISE MASTER SCENARIO EVENTS LIST

F. NUCLEAR RADIOLOGICAL ADVISORY TEAM SITUATION REPORTS

G. NUCLEAR INCIDENT TEAM POWER POINT BRIEFINGS

H. CONSEQUENCE MANAGEMENT RESPONSE TEAM SITUATION REPORT

I. CONSEQUENCE MANAGEMENT BRIEFING

J. CONSEQUENCE MANAGEMENT PLANNING TEAM SITUATION REPORT

K. JOINT EXERCISE CONTROL GROUP TELEPHONE LOG

L. JOINT EXERCISE CONTROL GROUP HARD COPY MESSAGES

M. JTOT II / JTOT III RECEIPT TRANSFER CHECK FORM

N. JOINT EXERCISE CONTROL GROUP DAILY EVENT LOG

O. AFTER ACTION TRACKING SYSTEM (AATS) INPUTS

P. DOE PARTICIPANT AFTER-ACTION COMMENTS

Appendix I Nuclear Radiological Advisory Team
Appendix 2 LINCOLN GOLD AUGMENTATION TEAM
Appendix 3 Joint Technical Operations Team, Phase II
Appendix 4 Consequence Management Planning Support Team