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SIOP 131

B 83668

Introduction to SIOP-63

(Vice Admiral Johnson)

Copy 5

(00:05)

General Lemnitzer, Gentlemen:

The Director of Strategic Target Planning and his staff have completed the preparation of the Single Integrated Operational Plan, 1963. SIOP-63 has been developed using the guidance furnished by you last October.

Very briefly, I would like to review the most significant planning actions which took place during the preparation of this plan.

(1) Immediately following the receipt of the new guidance, this staff undertook the development of the force employment concept to satisfy the requirements for increased flexibility and selectivity of response. This has not been achieved without cost. As will be pointed out in the following presentations; complexity of execution is the price that will be paid. Your attention is now invited to the Task and Attack Option Chart (location). The information on this chart has been fundamental to the SIOP-63 development. This visual aid will be available for your reference through the next day and a half.

The NSTL has been realigned in consonance with the three tasks.

Planning factors and definitions used in SIOP-62 were again reviewed, updated and modified as necessary. New factors and definitions were added as required. This and other basic planning was completed in January preliminary to the actual force application. In our opinion there is no instance where these planning factors or definitions limit or restrain SIOP forces in any manner.

(2) Participating commanders identified their forces to be committed and coordinated in the plan at approximately the same time.

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(3) [REDACTED] commenced on 10 January 1962 and the last preplanned non-alert weapon was assigned on 19 April 1962 (a total period of more than three months); however, the new [REDACTED] DGZs which were added to the NSTL after 3 May have necessitated a change in the force application completed earlier. This change was not completed until 25 May 1962.

(4) The written SIOP-63 plan was published in late May and is ready for distribution except for those portions which go out under separate cover.

(5) Distribution of appendices to Annex F (Force Timing and Strike Assignment Sheets) and Annex C (NSTL) is programmed for 13 July 1962. Annex F (Countermeasures Application) will follow about 23 July 1962.

The presentation of SIOP-63 today and tomorrow will cover all salient portions of the plan. This chart presents the sequence of topics to be presented, the briefing officers and the time scheduled for each portion of the briefing. (Brief run through of schedule if not previously covered.)

Gentlemen, may I present the first speaker, Colonel Philpott, who will discuss the National Strategic Target List.

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
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~~SIOP ESI~~

SIOP-63 Force Structure
(Col McDonald)

(00:15)

(1) Force Disposition.

This presentation will review the SIOP-63 force structure. The



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SAC ICBM bases in the U.S. [REDACTED]

The black line represents the [REDACTED]

This line is

[REDACTED]

The colored arrows represent the approximate routing of the SIOP forces to the target system. The color codes of the arrows are identical to the launch base coding for each command.

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

EUR forces in large part are within the "H" hour control line. A major portion of this effort is against those targets located [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

As previously mentioned the wide geographic dispersion of [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

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
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
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(2) Committed Forces.




The SAC bomber force is shown on this page. As earlier shown on



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
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The delivery vehicle summary of the committed forces is broken down on this chart by

(DISCUSS)


August 62			December 62		
<u>Alert</u>	<u>Non-Alert</u>	<u>Total</u>	<u>Alert</u>	<u>Non-Alert</u>	<u>Total</u>



The weapons delivered by the committed forces are shown here by command

(DISCUSS)

August 62			December 62		
<u>Alert</u>	<u>Non-Alert</u>	<u>Total</u>	<u>Alert</u>	<u>Non-Alert</u>	<u>Total</u>




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(3) Coordinated Forces.



presentation, if necessary)

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The [REDACTED] shown here are included in the computation of cumulative damage expectancies in recognition of their inherent capability toward achievement of the common objective.

[REDACTED]

The [REDACTED] planned force for August is shown here to portray the total remaining Free World nuclear capability. This force is not included for computation of SIOP damage expectancies but the coordination achieved by SAC does recognize the capability.

The Total Force Delivery Vehicle Summary includes [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

(DISCUSS)

DELIVERY VEHICLE SUMMARY

<u>Total</u>		<u>August 62</u>			<u>December 62</u>		
<u>Force</u>	<u>Alert</u>	<u>Non-Alert</u>	<u>Total</u>	<u>Alert</u>	<u>Non-Alert</u>	<u>Total</u>	

[REDACTED]

The weapons delivered by the total SIOP forces are shown here by command.

(DISCUSS)

	<u>August 62</u>				<u>December 62</u>		
<u>Total Force</u>	<u>Alert</u>	<u>Non-Alert</u>	<u>Total</u>	<u>Alert</u>	<u>Non-Alert</u>	<u>Total</u>	

[REDACTED]

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(4) Planning Factors

This chart shows the planning factors that were applied to the weapons delivery systems during the force applications. These factors vary for each weapons delivery system.

The first, [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] are provided primarily by the guidance for SIOP-63. In a few instances, additional factors were developed by the Staff and CINCREPs. The factors shown here under the [REDACTED] column are applied to attack options 1 and 2, and those listed in the tactical column are applied to attack options 3, 4 and 5.]

These are only a few typical examples which indicate the many variations as functions of location, posture and condition of warning. For instance, [REDACTED] are assigned a factor of 1.0 under a [REDACTED] but under a tactical warning condition these forces are assigned a factor of .5 in recognition of their vulnerability to enemy attack.] *This is an example of a factor not provided in the guidance.

The second of these factors, Weapon System Reliability, is the probability of a delivery vehicle delivering a weapon which detonates as planned, excluding effects of enemy action. Weapon System Reliability is the product of (Launch Reliability) x (Inflight Reliability) x (Weapon Reliability). Reliability data and CEPs for aircraft and missiles has been compiled and supplied by the CINCs committing the forces. A few examples of the aircraft reliability and CEP factors.

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are shown here. [REDACTED]

The JSTPS planning manual contains all of these factors, however, a few are shown here for your understanding. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] The asterisks show the highest and lowest factors for each of the areas. [REDACTED]

The last factor to be considered in the development of the Weapon Delivery Probability is the Penetration Probability. This probability is obtained by applying the attrition value of the enemy's defensive system. This factor will be discussed in detail in the following briefing, Defense Analysis.

Recapping the 4 factors just discussed, we find that the product of (Pre-Launch Survivability) x (Weapon System Reliability) x (Weather/Darkness Factor) x (Penetration Probability) is Weapon Delivery Probability.

These factors and this total computation is completed for each weapon scheduled for delivery by SIOP forces.

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
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Thus far, we have discussed target categories, Tasks, and commitment of forces -- we will now consider the operational concepts and considerations under which SIOP-63 has been prepared.


Shortly after receipt of the National Targeting and Attack Policy, we found it necessary to expand and/or redefine some terms in the Joint Dictionary to permit specific applicability in SIOP-63. Some of these more important terms are on this chart.

(TURN CHART PAGE)

KEY DEFINITIONS



This is a new definition in which Unified and Specified Commanders determine and designate those of



There is no change in this next definition other than the term

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
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itself -- changing from follow-on to [REDACTED]


[REDACTED] being used in the National Targeting and Attack Policy.

Otherwise - the definition of Non-Alert remains the same.



Otherwise the definition remains the same.

In accordance with guidance received in the National Targeting and Attack Policy and subsequently the Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan, SIOP Forces were to be applied against the designated Tasks [REDACTED]



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
RELATIONSHIP OF ATTACK OPTIONS AND TASKS

Attack Option

Condition

Execute

Withhold



[*Remote - program as last priority]

[(Resolve all conflicts in favor of AO-5)]

We will have this large chart available during subsequent presentations so that we can refer to it as we go on.

(TURN CHART PAGE)

GUIDANCE

Targets by Task



Protected Reserve

Broadened Withhold Capability



Constraints and Restraints


Damage Expectancy

We have listed on this chart some of the basic conceptual factors which were included in our guidance - - and represent the key and in some cases the limiting factors upon which the plan was prepared.

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


Damage expectancy is a new term in the SIOP. It is a composite of weapon delivery probability, which was discussed earlier, and damage criteria.

In addition to the concepts shown on this chart and included in the guidance.

(TURN CHART PAGE)

NEW CONCEPT



(TURN CHART PAGE)

ROLE OF FORCES



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
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Another major item included in the guidance is the role of forces and weapon systems committed to the SIOP. (POINT TO CHART)

Under all circumstances, forces of the [REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

As far as theater forces are concerned -- they are also committed to the SIOP as first priority unless they are directed to other missions by the Joint Chiefs of Staff.
[REDACTED]

(TURN CHART PAGE)



(READ CHART)

That covers the major operational concepts contained in our guidance. Now let's discuss the manner in which we applied SIOP Forces against the various target systems.

(TURN CHART PAGE)

SEQUENCE OF FORCE APPLICATION

PHASE ONE



PHASE TWO



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
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It must be realized that this was the basic sequence of force application during planning, but it does not mean that timewise, the weapons will be delivered on target in this order. [REDACTED]
[REDACTED] applied in Step 3 will be some of the [REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

Next, we'll discuss the application of our delivery vehicles in more detail.


On this chart we have the [REDACTED]




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


I want to explain here that

 - since we must have the capability of executing this Task
---itself. Consequently, the weapons aboard multiple weapons carriers

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
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sorties and weapons which must be shifted to optimize Task I targeting.



I believe a look at weapon system

employment will provide the answer.

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
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WEAPON SYSTEM EMPLOYMENT

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* MISSILES




* AIRCRAFT

First, we'll take a look at our



as directed by the guidance, Task I is primary.



But what about



The Staff con-

siders



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[REDACTED]

Additionally, if the USSR attacks only U. S. military strength and
retains a reserve for city attacks [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

The JSTPS staff believes that there are sufficient [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

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For the above reasons it is valid to give the [REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

Note also that this procedure reduces complications in the execution of the plan. It makes for simplicity which is something to consider in a basically complex plan.

[REDACTED]

With regard to aircraft --

[REDACTED]

While we recognize that missiles provide [REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

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
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Once again, we cross-target between missiles and manned aircraft to the maximum extent possible to cover the strengths and weaknesses of both systems.

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ATTACK OPTION RECAP





Having discussed the sequential steps of force application and weapon systems employment, let's recap the manner in which our forces are laid.



targets -- at the same time retaining sufficient forces to attack

Task III targets.

In [redacted] we have optimized [redacted]



We believe that this concept provides a great deal of flexibility in SIOP-63.

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While we are discussing the manner in which our forces are programmed

under [REDACTED]

the pre-emptive options -- Attack Options One and Two do not require

[REDACTED]

We have previously discussed the relationship of [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] -- the next significant operational consideration is Force Generation Levels. While this term is new to the SIOP, it actually fulfills the same purposes as [REDACTED] which were used in SIOP-62 and with which you are familiar. We adopted this new designation to preclude any mix-up between [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] The purposes of Force Generation Levels are:

(READ CHART)

PURPOSES OF FORCE GENERATION LEVELS

1. [REDACTED]

2. [REDACTED]

Here is the way these force generation levels are broken down:

(TURN PAGE OF CHART)

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

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FORCE GENERATION LEVELS

PREPARATION TIME



Thus far I have described the procedures employed by our force application teams in laying SIOP-63 forces against the various target

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systems. [REDACTED]

(TURN CHART PAGE)

OPERATIONAL FACTORS

[REDACTED]

As each sortie is considered by the Force Application Team at least one of the team members is cognizant of the characteristics and capabilities of the delivery vehicle under consideration. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

Another critical operational factor is the [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

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Considerable consideration is given [REDACTED]

In targeting the force, it is essential that we [REDACTED]
[REDACTED] for the reasons shown on the chart. Naturally, every effort is
made to destroy the [REDACTED] with our fast reacting weapon
systems and those systems launching from bases closest to the DGZs.

It is also necessary to provide for mass in order to insure successful
penetration of enemy defenses with the least losses to our own forces.

In timing the force, weapon separation must be used to provide safe
operating margins for weapon systems.

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
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OPERATIONAL FACTORS (Cont'd) SIOP ESI

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* TACTICS



In addition to the foregoing the force application teams must consider tactics. In the penetration phase considerable emphasis is given to [REDACTED] In SIOP-63, [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] Every effort is made to avoid defenses where possible and finally we have corridor development, roll back, mutual and ECM support.

I will present a graphic display of several of these points with emphasis on the last two.


First, in regard to corridor development and roll back.

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CORRIDOR DEVELOPMENT

- Roll Back

GRAPHIC
DISPLAY




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MUTUAL SUPPORT

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GRAPHIC

This chart graphically depicts several friendly aircraft which have been massed so as to provide mutual support in penetrating a fighter control area. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] In SIOP-62 we have

had more than --- [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] An objective of SIOP-63 [REDACTED]

(BRING DOWN OVERLAY)

The overlay shows how the [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

(BRING DOWN OVERLAY)

[REDACTED] effectiveness is further reduced by the [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

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In summary, gentlemen--our tactics are designed to [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

(TURN CHART PAGE)

OPERATIONAL FACTORS

TACTICS

- Delivery

The diversified techniques developed
by the individual commands

Finally, we have delivery tactics. I won't go into any detail
concerning the individual techniques utilized to deliver the weapons.

However, there are [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

This completes the briefing on Concepts and Operational Considerations -- are there any questions?

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SIOP FSI
FLEXIBILITY IN SIOP-63

Flexibility has been covered in the detailed briefings that you have heard earlier. ----- I would like to recap this flexibility.


(Chart #1) SIOP-63




(Chart #2)



(Chart #3)




(Chart #4) In planning for SIOP-63 the



The asterisks on

indicate

across which "Corridor F" is laid. The attack of



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[REDACTED]

(Chart #5)

[REDACTED]

the high DBL factor

[REDACTED]

against Task III

and has [REDACTED] weapons.

The remaining capability in this area consists of the [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

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[REDACTED]

(Chart #6) We recognize our limitations in the area of [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

In the future when the survivability of hardened and mobile weapons permits complete coverage of the immediate threat [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

(Chart #7) [REDACTED]


[REDACTED]

(Chart #8) [REDACTED]

Now I would like to discuss [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

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


clarify these misconceptions.

(UNCOVER THE FIRST CHART)

On this chart you see the interaction of all forces affected by

(describe each line). This line represents the



Now let's look at the signi-

ficant items on this chart. This first point represents the




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
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Now let's look at the effective sortie data on another chart.

(PUT UP BAR CHART - SORTIES)

This chart more clearly portrays the composition of each level of forces at significant periods of time.




Now let's look at a chart which converts this data to weapons

(COVER FIRST CHART WITH LAST CHART, LEAVE SECOND BAR CHART VISIBLE).

We have constructed this chart based on actual weapon count, or where there was not feasible, on an average weapon load by type aircraft.

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


(Chart #9) I mentioned earlier under protected reserve, the capability of the airborne alert indoctrination force of



(Chart #10) Medium Force Dispersal. An additional factor in the flexibility of SIOP-63 is the capability of the

under a period of tension,



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[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

In addition each unit

[REDACTED]

Weather information is provided dispersed crews through the established communications media and will include, by sortie, entire route winds, refueling area weather, target bombing winds and "D" values,


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
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plus penetration and recovery weather. ~~TOP SECRET~~

This concept and plan for dispersal is concerned primarily with



(Chart #12) You will also recall that



(Chart #13) I wish to emphasize very strongly that



[REDACTED] (Task I only, [REDACTED])
[REDACTED]

Also under the [REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

(Charts #13 and 14) Recap the force, DGZs and average DEs achieved by the alert force for attack options 1, 3, 5 against Tasks I, II and III.

Repeat for the total SIOP force.

Gentlemen, this concludes the resume of the flexibility contained in SIOP-63.

DIFFERENCES RESOLVED

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~~SECRET~~

DSTP - SIOP'63

SECRET

DIFFERENCES

Definitions*

ALERT FORCES

RESERVE FORCES

WARHEAD RELIABILITY

BOMB RELIABILITY

CEP'S FOR CERTAIN A/W ACF

UNKNOWN DEFENSES

CLOBBER

Planning
Factors

APPLICATION OF DBL

APPLICATION OF WX/D

Methodology


DEFINITIONS

~~SECRET~~

TOPIC

EV

ALERT
FORCE



DEFINITIONS (CONTD)

TOPIC

DSTP PICK

Other VIEW



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PLANNING FACTORS


TOPIC

VAR HEAD REL

BOMB REL

LOBBER

UNKNOWN DEF





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PLANNING FACTORS

TOPIC

DSTP

SEP's for
CERTAIN
ALL WX
ACFT



*(PAC LANT, N, A, MC)

~~SECRET~~

METHODOLOGY

TE

VIEW

SEQUENCE
OF FORCE
LAY DOWN

TARGET SAC/POL FIRST
INTEGRATE OTHER
FORCES (INCLUDING
TIMING) ACCORD/W
PARA VII NTAP.

(APPROVED BY
47TH POL COM)

TARGET ALL FORCE
IN ORDER of ARRIV
RATHER *then* BY COM
(CINCPAC MSG)

~~SECRET~~

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METHODOLOGY


TOPIC

DSF

FW

APPL OF
DBL

APPL OF
NX/D F



SECRET

DIFFERENCES RESOLVED BY DSTP

THE NATIONAL TARGETING AND ATTACK POLICY IN PARAGRAPH 9, TITLED RESPONSIBILITIES, REQUIRES THE DIRECTOR OF STRATEGIC TARGET PLANNING TO RESOLVE DIFFERENCES AS THEY OCCUR, AND TO HIGHLIGHT THOSE DIFFERENCES WHEN PRESENTING THE NSTL/SIOP-63 TO THE JCS. DURING THE DEVELOPMENT OF SIOP-63, TEN DIFFERENCES OF OPINION WERE HIGHLIGHTED EITHER AT POLICY COMMITTEE MEETINGS BY THE MEMBERS INVOLVED OR BY TWXs FROM COMMANDERS WHO HAD COMMITTED FORCES.

CHART #1

ON THIS CHART WE HAVE CATEGORIZED THE TEN DIFFERENCES OF OPINION INTO THREE MAJOR AREAS, NAMELY:

DEFINITIONS

PLANNING FACTORS

METHODOLOGY

AS SHOWN ON THE CHART, THE TWO DIFFERENCES UNDER THE CATEGORY OF DEFINITIONS WERE THAT OF ALERT FORCE AND RESERVE FORCE.

FIVE DIFFERENCES ARE SHOWN UNDER THE HEADING OF PLANNING FACTORS. THESE CONSIST OF: WARHEAD RELIABILITY, BOMB RELIABILITY, CEPS FOR CERTAIN ALL WEATHER, UNKNOWN DEFENSES, CLOBBER FACTOR.

SECRET

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THE NEXT THREE ARE CATEGORIZED UNDER THE TITLE OF
METHODOLOGY. THESE ARE: APPLICATION OF DBL, APPLICATION
WEATHER/DARKNESS FACTOR, AND THE SEQUENCE OF FORCE
LAYDOWN. YOU WILL NOTE THE TWO ASTERISKS APPEARING ON
THIS CHART. ONE IS OPPOSITE OF RESERVE FORCE AND THE
OTHER OPPOSITE OF SEQUENCE OF FORCE LAYDOWN. IN THESE TWO
CASES, THE POLICY COMMITTEE HAD AGREED; HOWEVER, THE
JCPAC MADE KNOWN HIS RECOMMENDATIONS WITH REGARD TO
THESE ITEMS IN A MESSAGE IN EARLY JANUARY OF THIS YEAR.

CHART #2

BEFORE GETTING INTO THE DETAILS OF THIS PARTICULAR CHART,
WE WOULD LIKE TO CALL YOUR ATTENTION TO THE FORMAT WHICH
WILL BE THE SAME FOR THE NEXT SIX CHARTS. ON THE LEFT HAND
COLUMN WE HAVE INDICATED TOPICAL HEADINGS OF THE
DIFFERENCES CONCERNED. THE CENTER COLUMN SHOWS THE
JCPAC DECISION, WHILE THE RIGHT COLUMN REFLECTS THE OTHER
VIEW OR VIEWS, AS THE CASE MAY BE.

THE NEXT TWO CHARTS WILL DEAL WITH DEFINITIONS. CHARTS
3 AND 4 WILL COVER THOSE DIFFERENCES CATEGORIZED UNDER
PLANNING FACTORS AND THE NEXT TWO CHARTS SUMMARIZE THE

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SECRET

DIFFERENCES CATEGORIZED UNDER THE TITLE METHODOLOGY.

ON ALL CHARTS WE HAVE REFLECTED THE OPINIONS OF THE
POLICY COMMITTEE MEMBERS AS SHOWN IN PARENTHESIS.

NOW LET US TAKE A LOOK AT THE FIRST DIFFERENCE, TITLED,
ALERT FORCE. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED] THE OTHER
VIEW PROPOSED BY CINCSAC, CINCAL AND THE AIR FORCE REPRESENTATIVES IS SHOWN ON THE RIGHT. THIS VIEW WOULD HAVE

[REDACTED]

CHART #3

ON THIS CHART THE DEFINITION OF [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

AS SHOWN ON THIS CHART.

THE REST OF THIS CHART IS SELF EXPLANATORY

SECRET

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CHART #4

NOW LET US TAKE A LOOK AT THE PLANNING FACTORS SHOWN
ON THIS CHART. THESE CONSIST OF THE DUD FACTOR OR WARHEAD
RELIABILITY IN THE CASE OF THE MISSILE AND BOMB RELIABILITY
IN THE CASE OF MANNED AIRCRAFT, THE CLOBBER FACTOR AND
UNKNOWN DEFENSES. IN THE CASE OF WARHEAD RELIABILITY

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

ON THE OTHER HAND, BOMB RELIABILITY [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

THE CLOBBER FACTOR IS A FACTOR WHICH WAS USED IN

SIOP-62 [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

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NOW FOR UNKNOWN DEFENSES. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

THIS RECOMMENDATION IS REFLECTED UNDER THE COLUMN TITLED
DSTP'S DECISION. OTHER⁵ PROPOSED THAT NO FACTOR BE USED
AS SHOWN ON THE CHART.

CHART #5

LET US NOW CONSIDER THE NEXT CHART PERTAINING TO PLANNING
FACTORS. IT CONCERNS ITSELF WITH CEPS FOR CERTAIN ALL WEATHER
AIRCRAFT. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

IN THIS CASE THE DSTP

SECRET
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ED WITH THE CEP'S PROPOSED BY THE COMMITTEE. YOU
NOTE IN THE RIGHT HAND COLUMN THAT THE OTHER VIEW
N BY [REDACTED]

CHART #6

HE NEXT TWO CHARTS CONCERN THEMSELVES WITH QUESTIONS
METHODOLOGY IN THE LAYDOWN OF SIOP-63. THE FIRST ITEM
OWN ON THE LEFT IS THE SEQUENCE OF FORCE LAYDOWN.
DSTP DECISION WHICH WAS APPROVED BY THE 47th POLICY
MITTEE MEETING IS AS SHOWN.
THE OTHER VIEW IS AS REFLECTED IN THE RIGHT HAND COLUMN
REFLECTS THE CINCPAC POSITION.

CHART #7

THE LAST CHART OF THIS PRESENTATION COVERS THE APPLICATION
THE DBL FACTOR (PRE-LAUNCH SURVIVABILITY) AND APPLICATION
THE WEATHER/DARKNESS FACTOR.

FIRST, DBL. THIS PARTICULAR TOPIC COULD HAVE BEEN TITLED
APPLICATION OF VARIABLE FACTORS IN SIOP-63, BECAUSE IT
LUDES A PACKAGE RECOMMENDATION AS BRIEFED TO THE POLICY
AMITTEE BY THE CINCPAC REPRESENTATIVE. YOU WILL NOTE
AT THE DIRECTOR, IN VIEW OF THE GUIDANCE, SUPPORTED THE
SITION TAKEN BY THE ARMY AND AIR FORCE REPRESENTATIVES
THAT HE ELECTED TO USE ALL FACTORS IN THE LAYDOWN OF

~~SECRET~~

~~NO CHANGE~~

THE PLAN.

THE OTHER VIEWS ARE AS SHOWN ON THE RIGHT.

AND THE APPLICATION OF A

WEATHER/DARKNESS FACTOR.

MESSAGE TO JSTP, AND STATED HIS BELIEF
THAT DBL SHOULD BE APPLIED IN ASSESSMENT ONLY.


NOW FOR THE APPLICATION OF THE WEATHER/DARKNESS FACTOR
FOR NON ALL WEATHER AIRCRAFT.

THE DIRECTOR SUPPORTED THE POSITION TAKEN BY THE SAC, AL,
AND AF REPRESENTATIVES WHICH WAS TO APPLY AS IN SIOP-62 FOR ALL
ALERT AND NON ALERT NON ALL WEATHER SORTIES. THE PROPONENTS
OF TWO OTHER VIEWS WITH REGARD TO THIS QUESTION ARE SHOWN IN
THE RIGHT COLUMN.

~~SECRET~~

~~NO CHANGE~~

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THROUGH A MATHEMATICAL
ALCULATION HE BELIEVED A DETERMINATION COULD BE MADE
OMBINING BOTH FACTORS WHICH WOULD MORE REALISTICALLY
ROVIDE US WITH THE ANSWER WE SOUGHT.

HIS CONCLUDES THE PRESENTATION ON THE DIFFERENCES OF
PINION AND THE DECISIONS MADE BY THE DIRECTOR IN CONSIDERATION
F THESE DIFFERENCES FOR SIOP-63.

~~WORKING PAPERS~~
~~SECRET~~