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JCS SIOP 62

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TOP SECRET CONTROL
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Explanation of Panels Showing Pre-Target Force Disposition and Sino-Soviet Target System - - - - - - - - - - - - -	Major R.T. Carrington
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NOTE: This brochure contains only that portion of the briefing on the JCS SIOP-62 that was presented by the SIOP Division on 1 December 1960.

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PURPOSE, OBJECTIVES, CONCEPTS AND FORCES

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PURPOSE

- DEVELOP [redacted]

[redacted] D

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CHART #3. COMPOSITION.

Annex G - REPORTS - has been omitted due to pertinent JCS directives.

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COMPOSITION

THE PLAN IS A BASIC FIVE PARAGRAPH FORMAT WITH NINE ADDITIONAL ANNEXES

ANNEX A	INTELLIGENCE
ANNEX B	RESPONSIBILITIES & COMMAND RELATIONSHIP
ANNEX C	ATOMIC
ANNEX D	CONCEPT OF OPERATIONS
ANNEX E	COORDINATING INSTRUCTIONS
ANNEX F	[redacted]
ANNEX G	REPORTS
ANNEX H	COMMUNICATIONS
ANNEX I	ADMINISTRATION

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OBJECTIVES

- THE BASIC OBJECTIVE OF THIS POLICY IS TO ESTABLISH AN ESSENTIAL NATIONAL TASK TO BE ACCOMPLISHED UNDER THE SEVERAL CONDITIONS WHICH HOSTILITIES MAY BE INITIATED – SPECIFIC OBJECTIVES ARE :

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[redacted]

[redacted]

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CONSIDERATIONS

- THE SEVERAL WAYS IN WHICH HOSTILITIES MAY BE INITIATED
- TARGETS TO BE ATTACKED
- FORCES COMMITTED

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CHART #6.

The nonconcurrence by command representatives are as indicated here: (U)

CINCLANT: Use the daylight and good visibility factor for all forces. Only penalize visual systems when the weather is below minimums in the daytime. (U)

CINCPAC: Use this factor for our alert forces only; and the daylight above minimums for follow-on forces, or develop a planning factor closer to the daylight visibility conditions. (U)

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OPERATIONAL CONCEPTS

[redacted]

CHART #7.

Operational Concepts. The Targeting and Attack policy prescribed that the SIOP provide for the initial attack only; therefore, the foremost objective in developing our concepts for the employment of these forces was to [redacted] We feel we have accomplished this by - - (S)

[redacted]

Time Over Target Resolution is being effected. Target times are controlled to avoid target conflicts and insure that we do not destroy our own delivery vehicles prior to weapons release. (U)

Economical Weight of Effort has been applied throughout the integration of all forces toward a common objective. This weight of effort has been consistent with the worth of the target and the assurance desired on each target. This has eliminated unplanned duplication.(U)

OPERATIONAL CONCEPTS Cont'd.

[redacted]

CHART #8.

[redacted] Colonel Goade will discuss Execution and the application of these options later in the briefings. These planning concepts and operational factors will apply throughout our detailed discussion of the plan here today; however, before Colonel Mahl discusses the Development of the NSTL, we will look at the aircraft and weapons committed to this plan. (S)

FORCES

DELIVERY SYSTEMS

	ALERT	FOLLOW-ON
[redacted]		
TOTAL	[redacted]	

FORCES

WEAPONS

	ALERT	FOLLOW-ON
[redacted]		
TOTAL	[redacted]	

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RECAP OF FORCES

DELIVERY SYSTEMS WEAPONS OGZ's

[redacted]

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FORCE APPLICATION

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FORCE APPLICATION

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CHART #1.

This briefing will explain the manner in which the objectives, operational concepts, and forces, briefed by General Eisenhart were employed against the target system and within the defensive environment shown by previous speakers. (U)

PRINCIPAL ELEMENTS

- EMPLOYMENT FACTORS
- OPERATIONAL CONSIDERATIONS
- TACTICS
- TIMING

CHART #2. PRINCIPLE ELEMENTS. The principle elements that make up application of the committed forces to the target system are shown here. (U)

1. The many employment factors or ground rules on which the plan was built. (U)

2. The operational considerations that were identified and satisfactorily resolved for this plan. (U)

3. The tactics programmed for penetration and weapons delivery. (U)

4. The many elements of timing that were considered and established as part of the plan. I will now consider each of these elements in more detail. (U)

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EMPLOYMENT FACTORS

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- CAPABILITY BASED ON PLAN END POSITION OF DECEMBER '61
  - PLANNED FORCE CHANGES
- FORCES APPLIED AGAINST OPTIMUM-MIX TARGET SYSTEM
  - SINGLE TARGET ASSIGNMENT FOR EACH ACFT WEAPON
  - DUAL TARGET ASSIGNMENT FOR ALL BALLISTIC MISSILES

CHART #4. EMPLOYMENT FACTORS.

The first factor to be established was a plan capability to be based on an end position of December 1961. While it is recognized that this plan, if approved, will extend well into 1962, it was generally agreed that, in view of the many force changes to take place within the coming year to 18 months, the identification of forces and capabilities beyond December 1961 was unrealistic for this first plan. At the appropriate time this plan will be updated and extended as necessary. (S)

[redacted]

(S)

- FORCES TARGETED IN ORDER OF ARRIVAL IN TARGET AREA
- [redacted]
- [redacted]

CHART #5.

Targeting Sequence.

[redacted] (S)

The first force group to be targeted was that force identified and maintained as the Alert Force, applied under conditions of tactical warning against highest priority targets. (U)

- FOLLOW-ON FORCE
  - EXPLOIT ALERT STRIKE
  - IMPROVES PROBABILITIES on TARGETS STRUCK BY ALERT FORCE
  - EXPANDS NSTL COVERAGE

CHART #6. [redacted] (S)

- [redacted]
- [redacted]
- MAXIMUM EXPLOITATION OF: [redacted]

CHART #7. PENETRATION AND DELIVERY CAPABILITIES.

[redacted] (S)

The final factor established was that of maximum exploitation of these factors within each force: reaction capability, launch locations, range capability, weapon and system variety. I will now discuss each of these items in greater detail. (U)

REACTION CAPABILITY

[redacted]

CHART #8. REACTION CAPABILITY.

Primary consideration is given to the [redacted] (TS)

That force requiring preparation time which I have previously identified as the follow-on forces, will be assigned launch timing based upon the generation rate of aircraft and missile systems. (U)

LAUNCH LOCATIONS

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[redacted]

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CHART #9.

Launch Locations. General Eisenhart has pointed out how the selection of [redacted] Shown on this chart are the various locations by commands, both land and sea. [redacted]

[redacted]

(S)

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SAC

[redacted]

[redacted]

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CHART #10.

SAC. SAC forces launch from [redacted] and 49 within the Zone of Interior. (S)

[redacted]

TOTAL LAUNCH LOCATIONS [redacted]

CHART #11.

EUR. Launching from [redacted] (S)

Total launch locations for all forces are [redacted] distinct geographical points. (S)

RANGE CAPABILITY

- CRITICAL FOR ALL FORCES
- COMPUTED FOR TACTICS, WIND, ALERT FACTORS & RECOVERY REQUIREMENTS
- REQUIRED TACTICS COST RANGE
- EXTENDED THROUGH AIR REFUELING
  - POINT RENDEZVOUS
  - BUDDY REFUELING

CHART #12.

Range Capability. This has been a critical factor for all forces. [redacted] (S)

[redacted] (S)

Air refueling has been used to extend the range of the bomber when available, with all commands participating in this type of employment. Two types of air refueling tactics are programmed: (U)

- Point refueling, with the bomber and tanker rendezvousing at a pre-planned point. (U)

- Buddy refueling, where the bomber and tanker launch from the same base, proceeding out along the outbound track of the bomber, off-loading fuel at the optimum range point. (U)

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REFUELING SCHEDULE

ALERT		FOLLOW-ON	
REF	UNREF	REF	UNREF

[redacted]

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WEAPON & DELIVERY VARIETY

- WEAPONS

AIRCRAFT DELIVERY

TYPE	YIELD
[redacted]	

MISSILES

[redacted] WORKING PAPERS

TYPE	YIELD
TITAN	[redacted]
SNARK	
ATLAS	
JUPITER	
REGULUS	
HOUND DOG	
POLARIS	
MACE	
MATADOR	

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CHART #16.

General Eisenhart has identified total force commitments. The next few charts will show the make-up of these forces by type equipment. (U)

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LANT FORCES

AIRCRAFT

MISSILES

[redacted]

PAC FORCES

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ACFT

MISSILE

[redacted]

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SAC FORCES

~~TOP SECRET~~

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AIRCRAFT

MISSILES

[redacted]

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EUR FORCES

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AIRCRAFT

[redacted]

MISSILES

[redacted]

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OPERATIONAL CONSIDERATIONS

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- FORCE CHANGES
  - INITIAL TGTG PROVIDES FOR LATER PROG CHANGES
    - COMPUTATION OF DELIVERY PROBABILITIES
    - SELECTIVE APPLICATION
- FORCE COMMITMENTS
  - [redacted]

CHART #21. FORCES.

[redacted] (S)

In order to provide a degree of stability to the plan, yet effectively provide for the employment of all forces, systems scheduled for operational readiness at any time during the plan life have been assigned a target. The difference is in the targeting application. Units programmed for operational readiness during the major part of the plan are assigned to targets and assigned a probability of delivery. Weapon systems programmed to be ready during only a small portion of the plan are assigned targets but probabilities are not assigned and weight of effort is not computed. As these units attain operational readiness the necessary adjustments are made. (S)

[redacted] The weight of effort of these forces, both U.S. and non-U.S., has been included in the plan. (S)

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[redacted]

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CHART #22.

[redacted] (S)

[redacted] (S)

[redacted] (S)

- CONSTRAINTS
  - LEVELS ESTABLISHED BY JCS HAVE BEEN CAREFULLY OBSERVED
  - [redacted]
  - SWP COMPLIANCE WITH ESTABLISHED CONSTRAINTS

CHART #23.

Constraints. Constraint levels established by the JCS have been carefully observed. This has been a significant operational consideration. [redacted] (S)

Force application, under this plan, is in full compliance with established constraints. (U)

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- NON-ALL WEATHER FORCES
  - PLANNING FACTOR NEEDED FOR PROBABILITY OF TARGET AQUISITION DURING CONDITIONS OF BAD VISIBILITY & DARKNESS
  - PROBABILITY AT BRL A FACTOR IN PROGRAMMED WEIGHT OF EFFORT
  - A WEATHER/DARKNESS PLANNING FACTOR WAS ASSIGNED

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[redacted]

CHART #24.

[redacted] (S)

After careful study by a group of knowledgable officers from all concerned commands a factor was assigned these forces based upon weather/darkness conditions in their operating area. (U)

- WEAPON SYSTEM RELIABILITY
  - AIRCRAFT
    - VARIES [redacted]
  - MISSILES
    - VARIES FROM [redacted]
- CIRCULAR ERROR PROBABLE
  - AIRCRAFT
    - FROM [redacted]
  - MISSILES
    - FROM [redacted]

[redacted]

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CHART #25.

Variances in Capability. The wide variances of committed forces in terms of system reliability and circular error probable, of both aircraft and missiles, is shown on this chart. (U)

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~~WORKING PAPERS~~

TACTICS

~~WORKING PAPERS~~

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[redacted] PHASE

[redacted]

~~TS~~ ~~WORKING PAPERS~~

[redacted]

CHART #27.

[redacted] (TS)

Roll-back of the target system in this manner within a selected geographical area is called a "corridor". These corridors vary in width from [redacted] with defenses degraded within and for a [redacted] distance on either side. This distance represents potential GCI coverage within the corridor. (TS)

[redacted] (TS)

(Chart used to show corridors and crossing tracks.)

[redacted] (TS)

- DELIVERY PHASE
  - RELEASE TACTIC A FUNCTION OF
    - SYSTEM CAPABILITY
    - DEFENSE ENVIRONMENT
    - ASSIGNED WEAPON

[redacted]

CHART #28.

Delivery Phase. In the delivery phase, the scheduled tactic is a function of the capability of the delivery system, the defense environment within which it will deliver, and the assigned weapon. (U)

[redacted] (S)

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[redacted]

[redacted] WORKING PAPERS

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LOFT DELIVERY



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CHART #36.

Force Generation. This chart illustrates the option assignment based upon preparation time and the increase in available delivery systems under each successive option. (U)

[redacted]

(TS)

[redacted]

(TS)

[redacted]

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TANKER SUPPORT

1 ST CYCLE 2 ND CYCLE 3 RD CYCLE

[redacted]

[redacted]

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[redacted]

CHART #37.

[redacted] (TS)

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[redacted]

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[redacted]

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CHART #38.

[redacted] (S)

[redacted] (S)

[redacted]

WEAPONS [redacted] CRITERIA

YIELD	DISTANCE		TIME	
	MIN	MAX	MIN	MAX
[redacted]			10 MIN	14 MIN
			10 MIN	14 MIN
			10 MIN	20 MIN
			10 MIN	21 MIN
			11 MIN	30 MIN

CHART #39.

Weapons [redacted] Criteria. [redacted] (S)

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[redacted]

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CHART #40.

Resolution. This chart illustrates T.O.T. resolution and safe separation in both routing and timing. (U)

[redacted] (S)

[redacted] (S)

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SCHEDULED DELIVERY TIME

[redacted]

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[redacted]

CHART #41.

Scheduled Delivery Time. The schedule for delivery of the first and last Alert Force weapon, in both Europe and the Far East, is shown on this chart. (U)

A.

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EXPLANATION OF PANELS SHOWING PRE-TARGET FORCE

DISPOSITION AND SINO-SOVIET TARGET SYSTEM

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FORCE APPLICATION

(ALERT FORCE DISPOSITION PANELS IN VIEW)

OPERATIONS. Portrayed on these two panels are SIOP Alert Force launch bases, bomber routes to the target system, refueling areas and the points of penetration used by this Force. (U)

6-1

[redacted] (TS) [redacted] (TS)

The two aircraft carrier symbols represent the approximate station positions maintained by the 7th Fleet Alert Force. From these carriers are launched [redacted] bomber sorties consisting of AD, A3D and A4D type aircraft. A portion of the Force is refueled prior to strike. In addition to the alert sorties launched from the aircraft carriers, the 7th Fleet has programmed a submarine to be on station, [redacted] This submarine will [illegible] type missiles on alert. (TS)

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Proceeding now to [redacted] we find 2 red dots which identify the SAC reflex bases of [redacted] Each base has 6 B-47 bombers on alert. (TS)

The red dots within the borders of the United States and Puerto Rico identify SAC bomber and tanker bases. [redacted] and as indicated by the red dots in [redacted] (TS)

Geographical locations of air refueling areas are shown by the black rectangles. The 7 large rectangles are air refueling areas supported by KC-135 jet tankers. The 10 medium size rectangles identify the location of refueling areas supported by KC-97 tankers. The thin rectangle represents the location of Buddy air refueling areas utilized by B-52 bombers and supported by KC-135 tankers, both taking off from the same launch base. (TS)

Routes not passing through air refueling areas indicate tracks of bombers who attack the target system without benefit of air refueling. (U)

These 5 yellow dots show the launch location of our 42 Atlas and 18 Titan Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles. [redacted] (TS)

[redacted] Four Snark Intercontinental cruise missiles are on alert here at [redacted] These missiles are not hardened. (TS)

[redacted] (TS)

The red dots in the [redacted] reflex bases. Each base maintains 6 B-47 bombers on alert. In addition, 2 of the bases [redacted] maintain 4 ECM alert aircraft each. Their role is to support aircraft striking through this area (C-D) by intense electronic countermeasures actions. (TS)

The green dots in the [redacted] Air Force forces. [redacted] from the [redacted] are air refueled subsequent to striking their targets. In addition to the aircraft sorties, [redacted] (TS)

[redacted] (TS)

I would like the alert targeting panels now please. (U)

On the previous display panels the US was located at the bottom of the display. On these panels, if it were shown, the US would be at the top. For orientation purposes, Turkey is located here. The UK here and Alaska here. (U)

The Sino Soviet Bloc, including the Satellites and North Korea are outlined in red. Soviet-Satellite and Soviet China borders are indicated in brown. The HHCL is shown in black; penetration points are indicated by the blue alphabetical designators. (U)

Here we see the 3 corridors A, C and F, through which, [redacted] we will schedule [redacted] (TS)

Corridor F you will note crosses the [redacted] targets are situated in these countries and must be degraded to allow our force to use this corridor. [redacted] (TS)

"Commander Cornell" (Intelligence briefs the [redacted] (U)

FLIP CHART

BALLISTIC MISSILE

WEAPONS	DGZ
[redacted]	

(TS)

[redacted] (TS)

[redacted] (S)

[redacted] (S)

As explained to you by Commander Cornell, the black squares represent the [redacted] (TS)

[redacted] (TS)

[redacted]

[redacted] Each Polaris submarine has [redacted] (TS)

[redacted] (TS)

As mentioned previously, each yellow dot represents 1 or more weapons striking a DGZ. Number of weapons/DGZs will vary dependent upon the importance of the target and the degree of difficulty in reaching the target with other forces. For example, [redacted] (TS)

In the [redacted] (TS)

May I have the next overlay please. (U)

FLIP CHART

[redacted] (TS)

[redacted] (TS)

As shown on the flip chart, this combined [redacted] consists of [redacted] delivery vehicles. Numbers of weapons being delivered and the DGZs scheduled for strike by both forces are broken out by areas. [redacted] (TS)

I will describe force application starting here and proceed clockwise around the HHCL to the Far East. (U)

As briefed by Colonel Naylor, the entire border area from [redacted] is defended by surface to air missile sites. All aircraft penetrating this area do so at low level. (TS)

[redacted] maintains 4 F-100s on alert at [redacted] Penetration from the GCI line is at low level and weapon delivery is from low level. (TS)

Our next penetrations are made into this area. Here you see the first steps in the development of a Corridor. There are [redacted] targets within the confines of F corridor. These targets consist of [redacted] (TS)

Alert sorties from the [redacted] are scheduled against [redacted] (TS)

Twelve additional defenses astraddle this corridor are scheduled for strike by alert aircraft of the [redacted] The two remaining defenses located here are scheduled by [redacted] sorties launched from [redacted] All penetrations and weapon delivery against these targets are from low level. [redacted] who acts as a pathfinder for him. (TS) [redacted] (TS)

Strikes indicated by the dots which are not superimposed over a black DGZ square are weapons that are scheduled either against defense DGZs or a theater threat target which is not within the 1st [redacted] priority NSTL targets.

The remaining [redacted] (TS)

Sixty-two aircraft, [redacted] launch from bases inside the HHCL. Launch bases are located in [redacted] These aircraft do not possess an all weather or night capability. However, those assigned targets west of 15° are scheduled for an alternate all weather method of bombing - Misque - a ground guidance system, in case of night attack or IFR conditions over the target. [redacted] (TS)

[redacted] (TS) [redacted] (TS)

Proceeding now to the Far East and referring back to the flip chart, we see that of the [redacted] Of the [redacted] alert sorties, [redacted] are launched by PACAF forces and [redacted] by the 7th Fleet. (TS)

Again, DGZs struck as indicated by the dots which are not superimposed over a black square, indicate defenses being attack or theater threat targets whose priority is not within the first [redacted] DGZs. (TS)

The Regulus submarine stationed [redacted] will strike [redacted] located here, and 2 high priority targets in the [redacted] (TS)

The 6 Matador missiles launching from [redacted] are scheduled against defenses, theater threat and priority targets in [redacted] (TS)

The 2 Matadors who strike from [redacted] are shown here. (TS)

The Matador is an all weather system and penetrates to his targets at high level. (S)

The remaining [redacted] are not all weather; launching from [redacted] Their targets range from the [redacted] (TS)

[redacted] (TS)

[redacted] (TS)

Cross targeting between PACAF Forces and the 7th Fleet has been accomplished where possible and desirable (U)

May I have the next overlay please (U)

FLIP CHART

REFLEX - AIR MAIL

[redacted]

(TS)

This overlay depicts the additional high priority DGZs brought under attack by the SAC Reflex and Airmail alert forces. Again, weight of effort is applied to previously scheduled DGZs in an effort to obtain the damage or destruction assurance desired. Referring to the flip chart, of the [redacted] delivery vehicles, all B-47 medium bombers, [redacted] (TS)

The [redacted] penetrate through F corridor, I to J entry points. Low level penetrations of the enemy GCI and low level delivery are tactics utilized by sorties penetrating this area (I & J). (TS)

Sorties from the [redacted] stationed at [redacted] are the first SAC aircraft to penetrate F corridor. These aircraft carry [redacted] each. Fo of the sorties are scheduled against the 16 defensive targets astraddle F corridor. [redacted] (TS)

By this [redacted] forces we have scheduled 2 weapons per defense DGZ in this corridor and have at least 1 all weather sortie scheduled against each target. (TS)

This completes the Roll Back of the corridor within [redacted] Subsequent sorties can now penetrate to this point [redacted] at high level without suffering undue attrition. (TS)

The [redacted] supported by 8 alert ECM aircraf cover a broad spectrum of the target system. Their job is 3-fold: (TS)

1 - To strike as quickly as possible the Soviet [redacted] (S)

2 - To strike [redacted] (

3 - To strike [redacted] targets in A corridor. (S)

Proceeding now to the [redacted] All attacks and weapon deliveries are at low level. (TS)

Fourteen Airmail sorties from [redacted] carrying [redacted] weapons attack targets in this area of China. Their purpose is two fold: (TS) [redacted] (TS

2nd to attack the high priority China [redacted] targets. (S)

In many cases they are cross targeted with PACOM forces. The majority of penetrations and weapons are from low level. (S)

Corridors as such are not developed in [redacted] However, defenses are scheduled for destruction wherever necessary to reduce attrition to aircraft that must attack at high level (TS)

May I have the next overlay please. (U)

FLIP CHART

ZT ALERT

[redacted] (TS)

You will note a very significant increase in the numbers of new DGZs being attacked and the depth of penetration into the target system that is attained with this force. (U)

[redacted] (S)

[redacted] (TS)

B-52s from [redacted] attack [illegible] priority targets in the [redacted] This force penetrates and delivers it internal weapons at low level. Hound Dog missiles carried by sorties from [redacted] are launched in this area and proceed to their targets at high level at

[redacted]

M.2. Additional weight of effort is programmed through I entry point [redacted] (TS)

[redacted] (S)

F corridor established through the [redacted] as deep as [redacted] In addition, these early arriving sorties attack [redacted] targets in this area so that subsequent sorties will be able to penetrate to the Russian border at high level. (TS)

As briefed by Colonel Naylor the coastal area between [redacted] (TS)

[redacted] (TS)

[redacted] (TS)

"A" corridor defenses are degraded by 1st arriving B-52 bombers from [redacted] Both internal weapons and Hound Dog missiles are utilized to accomplish this. In addition, 40 Quail are available for launch in this area to create mass and confuse the defensive radar operators. (TS) [redacted] before it is necessary to proceed at low level. (TS) [redacted] (TS)

B-47 cross the HHCL in the vicinity of U & I points striking defenses as necessary to proceed on through this area to targets in [redacted] (TS) [redacted] (S)

This completes the Force Application of the SIOP Alert Force. (U)

Shown on the flip chart is a recap of the forces applied [redacted] (TS)

Commander Cornell:

(Intelligence recaps the DGZs - weapons, wpns/DGZ defenses; DGZs and weapons scheduled; briefs additional follow-on force and then total SIOP force under strategic warning; then calls for the total SIOP force disposition panels.) (U)

Provided sufficient strategic warning is available in which to generate, configure and, in some cases, position SIOP forces, these panels would then depict that force posture. The disposition of forces is similar to that of the alert disposition boards. I will point out the major differences. (U)

In the [redacted] n addition sorties would be prepared to launch at these bases (4) [redacted] Additional sorties would be deployed [redacted] (TS)

In 7th Fleet you see the addition of one aircraft carrier in the South. Additional sorties would be generated by the 2 alert carriers. (TS)

[redacted] Other SAC overseas forces do not increase under strategic warning. (TS)

[redacted] (TS)

Two additional Polaris submarines would be on station. (TS)

(TS)

May I have the target map please. (U)

The legend used for this presentation is similar to that used in previous displays. The alphabetical designators for entry areas. The red dot the center point of that area. Here is shown the high level early warning capability of the enemy's defensive radars. (S)

The display points out the vast areas that contain the Sino Soviet target system. Distance from A corridor to The distance from Y entry point to (TS)

Posted on this map, as indicated by the black dots, are Although base loss is an undetermined factor, its effect as far as target coverage is concerned would be minimized by the cross targeting scheduled between units at different bases and from widely separated launch locations. (TS)

Shown next to the entry point designators are the numbers of sorties that are scheduled through the various areas. (U)

RECAP BY PENETRATION AREA/METHOD

[redacted]

Western USSR		Far East	
A Corridor	155	M Entry Area	31
B Entry Area	27	N Entry Area	84
C Corridor/Entry Area	511	O Entry Area	71
D Entry Area	137	P Entry Area	65
E Entry Area	88	S Entry Area	9
F Corridor	178	U Entry Area	97
I Entry Area	63	V Entry Area	11
J Entry Area	14	W Entry Area	1
K Entry Area	1	X Entry Area	85
		Y Entry Area	21
		Z Entry Area	17

[redacted]

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WEATHER/DARKNESS DISAGREEMENT

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WX FACTOR DISAGREEMENT

- PLANNING FACTOR ONLY
- APPLIED TO NON-ALL-WEATHER AIRCRAFT IN EQUATION

$$P_S = REL \times SURV \times P_{TI}$$

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CHART #1.

In discussion of the disagreement on the application and use of the weather, darkness and visibility factor in the SIOP, I want to point out, first of all, that it is only a planning factor. The factor is applied to all non-all-weather aircraft in the probability of success equation: Probability of success is equal to the reliability of the weapon system times the enroute and target area survivability of the weapon system times the probability of correct target identification for non-all-weather aircraft. (U)

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WHY WEATHER PLANNING FACTOR

- TIME OF DAY, WX OR VISIBILITY CONDITIONS FOR "E" HOUR NOT KNOWN
- MUST TAKE ADVANTAGE OF FORWARD LOCATION OF NON-ALL WEATHER FORCES
- OPTIMIZE & INTEGRATE ALL FORCES TO INCREASE DELIVERY ASSURANCE
- PLAN FOR NOMINAL WORST CONDITIONS
- CALCULATED ASSURANCE COMPARED WITH DESIRED ASSURANCE

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CHART #2.

We would like to cover why a weather planning factor was necessary for the SIOP. First, the time of day or the weather and visibility conditions for "E" hour cannot be predetermined. Second, we must take advantage of the forward location of the non-all-weather aircraft. Third, it is imperative that we optimize and integrate all committed forces to increase weapon delivery assurance. Fourth, generally speaking, we should plan for the nominal worst conditions that may exist when the war starts. Fifth, we need a method of calculating probability of reaching the bomb release line to compare with desired assurance so that we can program the weight of effort consistent with the requirements of a DOZ. (U)

~~[illegible]~~

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COMMITTEE FOR WEATHER FACTOR

COL SWANCUTT	SAC	CDR BANEY	JSTPS
CAPT RUEHLOW	JSTPS	LCOL ELMENDORF	PACAF
COL PARKER	SAC	MAJ McGREW	WEATHER
CAPT DRUM	PAC	MAJ AUSTIN	SAC
CDR VITO	CNO	CAPT ARCHULETA	PACAF

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CHART #3.

How did the JSTPS arrive at this method of handling the weather and visibility factor? (U)

A working level committee was formed of these individuals representing the various commands involved to determine the minimum delivery conditions for non-all-weather aircraft. (U)

MINIMUMS ~~WORKING PAPERS~~

- DELIVERY MINIMUMS ESTABLISHED BY COMMAND REPRESENTATIVES, CLIMATOLOGICAL STUDY BY WEATHER CENTRAL, & APPROVED BY POLICY COMMITTEE 29 SEP 60
  - DAY - 1000 FOOT CEILING & 3 MILES VIS
  - NITE - 3/10 CLOUDS OR LESS, 1/2 MOON OR MORE OR CLEAR & 3 MILES VIS OR MORE

CHART #4.

The delivery minimums established by this committee and the climatological study conducted by SAC Weather Central taken from records of 10 year history of areas concerned was approved by the Policy Committee 29 September 1960, with two dissenting opinions. The minimums are as indicated here: (U)

Day - 1000 ft and 3 miles. (U)

Night - Conditions such that there are 3/10 clouds or less with no ceiling, half moon or more, clear and no moon, and 3 miles or better visibility. (U)

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THIS MEANS – FOR A STRIKE TIME SELECTED AT RANDOM, THIS PERCENTAGE FIGURE REPRESENTS THE PROBABILITY THAT WEATHER AND VISIBILITY CONDITIONS IN EACH AREA WILL BE SUCH AS TO PERMIT TARGET IDENTIFICATION BY A NON ALL WEATHER AIRCRAFT



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CHART #5.

This chart indicates the percentage figures in our various areas of interest. These percentages mean; that for a strike time selected at random, each percentage figure represents the probability that weather and visibility conditions in that area will be such as to permit correct target identification by non-all-weather aircraft. (C)

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NONCONCURRENCE BY REP'S

- CINCLANT - USE DAYLIGHT GOOD VISIBILITY FACTOR
- CINCPAC - USE FOR ALERT FORCES
  - USE DAYLIGHT GOOD VISIBILITY FACTOR FOR FOLLOW-ON, OR
  - DEVELOP FACTOR NEARER DAY GOOD VISIBILITY

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CHART #6.

The nonconcurrence by command representatives are as indicated here: (U)

CINCLANT: Use the daylight and good visibility factor for all forces. Only penalize visual systems when the weather is below minimums in the daytime. (U)

CINCPAC: Use this factor for our alert forces only; and the daylight above minimums for follow-on forces, or develop a planning factor closer to the daylight visibility conditions. (U)

DIRECTOR'S DECISION

- USE FACTOR RECOMMENDED BY WORKING COMMITTEE
- IF ACTUAL WEATHER CONDITIONS ON EXECUTION ARE FAVORABLE, NON-ALL-WEATHER AIRCRAFT WILL GO AS SCHEDULED
- IF WEATHER IS NOT FAVORABLE, INDIVIDUAL CINC MUST USE ALTERNATE LAUNCH TIME

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CHART #7.

The Director of the JSTPS made this decision; that we would use the weather planning factor recommended by the Working Committee and approved by the majority of the Policy Committee, to determine the probability of reaching the bomb release line for all sorties. During actual execution of this plan, if weather conditions were favorable, non-all-weather aircraft will go as scheduled. If the weather conditions are not favorable, individual CINCs will have to use an alternate launch schedule. (U)

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EXECUTION

[redacted]

- CINCS

[redacted]

- CONFLICT FREE LAUNCH OF EXCESS GENERATED AIRCRAFT

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EXECUTION

~~WORKING PAPERS~~

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CHART #1. EXECUTION PROCEDURES.

JCS will designate A and E hours, select the option, provide withholding instructions, [redacted] (S)

[redacted] (S)

[redacted] (TS)

[redacted] (S)

[redacted] (S)

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THE RESULT

AN OPERATIONS STRIKE PLAN — INTEGRATED, CURRENT, AND RESPONSIVE TO NATIONAL POLICY.

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