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PAGE 01 THE HA 03680 071222Z

65 R 41
ACTION EA-06

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 EUR-08 OES-02 L-01 EB-03 INR-05 SP-02

SS-14 /042 W

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R 071056Z JUL 76
FM AMEMBASSY THE HAGUE
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 8502
INFO AMEMBASSY BRUSSELS
AMEMBASSY TAIPEI
USMISSION EC BRUSSELS
USMISSION IAEA VIENNA

STATE DEPT. DECLASSIFICATION REVIEW
 Retain Class'n Change to _____
 Declassify in part and excise as shown
EO 12958, 25X() () () _____
 Declassify Alter _____
 With concurrence _____ (not)(obtained)
IPS by [Signature] Date 3/24/04

S E C R E T THE HAGUE 3680

LIMDIS

E.O. 11652: GDS
TAGS: TECH, MNUC, EC, TW, CH, NL, BE
SUBJECT: NUCLEAR FUEL REPROCESSING PLANT

REF: THE HAGUE 3506

1. SUMMARY: AFTER LOOKING INTO THE MATTER, FOREIGN MINISTRY HAS BEEN UNABLE TO VERIFY ANY IMMEDIATE INTENTIONS ON THE PART OF THE DUTCH FIRM COMPRIMO TO ASSIST ROC IN OBTAINING KNOW-HOW TO HELP ESTABLISH CHEMICAL REPROCESSING FACILITY. END SUMMARY.

2. FOLLOWING UP ON CONVERSATION REFTTEL, KRUYT, IN CHARGE OF COUNCIL OF EUROPE AND SCIENTIFIC COOPERATION IN MFA, PROVIDED JULY 6 BY TELEPHONE DETAILED READ-OUT OF TWO DISCUSSIONS WITH BARENDRECHT, ONE OF WHICH WAS ATTENDED BY STATE SECRETARY KOOIJMANS. MFA HAD CAREFULLY DISCUSSED MATTER WITH BARENDRECHT FROM ALL ANGLES AND HAD MADE SURE BARENDRECHT GAINED A GOOD UNDERSTANDING OF DUTCH OBLIGATIONS AS A MEMBER OF NUCLEAR SUPPLIERS GROUP. IT HAD BEEN MADE CLEAR TO BARENDRECHT THAT DUTCH GOVERNMENT WOULD UNDER NO CIRCUMSTANCES APPROVE EXPORT OR ANY MATERIALS IN CONNECTION WITH POSSIBLE CONSTRUCTION OF CHEMICAL REPROCESSING INSTALLATION TO TAIWAN OR ELSEWHERE.

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Reason

Dept of State, RPS/IPS, Margaret P. Grately, Dir.
Date 4/15/04 Exemption
 Releasable
 Excise
 Deny
 Declassify

Page: 1

Case Number: 199902647

PAGE 02 THE HA 03680 071222Z

3. BARENDRECHT HAD MENTIONED ON-GOING CONTACTS WITH TAIWAN OFFICIALS IN CONNECTION WITH OIL REFINERY ENGINEERING WORK PERFORMED BY COMPRIMO AND HAD LIMITED HIS COMMENTS MOSTLY TO THAT ASPECT OF COMPRIMO'S ACTIVITIES. HE HAD TOLD MFA HE HAD THE IMPRESSION THERE WAS A REAL EFFORT IN THE ROC TO GAIN KNOWLEDGE AND UNDERSTANDING OF THE ENTIRE NUCLEAR CYCLE. BARENDRECHT DID NOT, HOWEVER, BELIEVE THAT THE ROC INTENDED TO BECOME SELF-SUPPORTING SOON THOUGH IT WAS CLEAR THEY HAD A LIVELY INTEREST IN THE SUBJECT.

4. ACCORDING TO KRUYT, BARENDRECHT WENT ON TO SAY THAT THERE WERE NO IMMEDIATE PROSPECTS OF CONTRACTS WITH THE ROC IN THE SHORT RUN THOUGH HE DID NOT EXCLUDE FOR THE LONGER TERM THE POSSIBILITY OF ARRANGEMENTS UNDER WHICH COMPRIMO WOULD PROVIDE KNOW-HOW TO ROC. THINGS HAD NOT, HOWEVER, PROGRESSED THAT FAR NOR WERE THEY LIKELY TO VERY SOON. WHEN WE ASKED KRUYT WHAT THE MFA REACTION HAD BEEN TO THIS STATEMENT OF BARENDRECHT'S, HE RESPONDED THAT THEY HAD CITED THE GON OBLIGATION, PURSUANT TO THE LONDON GUIDELINES, TO PRESERVE THE GREATEST RESTRAINT. BARENDRECHT HAD THEN COMMENTED THAT IT WAS HIS UNDERSTANDING THAT AS YET THERE WAS NO PROHIBITION OF THE TRANSMISSION OF KNOW-HOW, TO WHICH MINISTRY REPRESENTATIVES HAD RESPONDED BY SAYING THEY WOULD LOOK WITH DISFAVOR EVEN ON THE PASSING ABROAD OF TECHNICAL KNOW-HOW. IN RESPONSE TO FURTHER QUESTIONS BY US, KRUYT REVEALED THAT MFA WAS LOOKING INTO THE ADEQUACY OF DUTCH LEGISLATION TO IMPLEMENT LONDON GUIDELINES.

5. WHEN WE ASKED WHETHER MFA HAD THE IMPRESSION BARENDRECHT HAD BEEN FRANK, KRUYT INDICATED THAT BARENDRECHT MIGHT HAVE NOT BEEN TOTALLY FRANK, BUT SAID HE THOUGHT THIS WAS NOT LIKELY. HE COMMENTED THAT IT WOULD NOT BE UNNATURAL FOR A BUSINESSMAN TO WANT TO PLAY SUCH A SITUATION IN A WAY TO KEEP ALL COMMERCIAL OPTIONS OPEN.

6. WE EXPRESSED OUR APPRECIATION TO KRUYT, ADDING THAT WE DID NOT EXCLUDE THE POSSIBILITY WE WOULD COME BACK TO THIS ISSUE, PARTICULARLY IF IT APPEARED COMPRIMO MIGHT GO AHEAD WITH ROC INFURNISHING KNOW-HOW FOR A CHEMICAL PROCESSING PLANT.

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PAGE 03 THE HA 03680 071222Z

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