NEVADA, YUCCA FLAT--Members of the 11th Airborne Division kneel on the ground as they watch the mushroom cloud of an atomic bomb test. Photo by USASC, November 1951.

Scope of the Collection

The Nuclear Non-Proliferation database provides access to the documentary record of the nuclear activities and policy process of the U.S. government from the bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki through the IAEA inspections of the Iraqi nuclear program. The collection consists of 2,651 catalogued primary source documents totaling approximately 14,000 pages. The documents cover four aspects of policy over three policy making periods.

The first period covers the years 1945-1953 when the initial focus was primarily on U.S. efforts to promote international controls over atomic energy. When that approach proved ineffective, Washington attempted to maintain its monopoly over nuclear information through secrecy, declining to share technology or data even with its closest allies. This period ends with President Eisenhower's "Atoms for Peace" speech in December 1953.

The second period, which covers the years 1954-1974, was fundamentally different from the first due to the Atoms for Peace program, which aided in the nearly unrestricted development of nuclear energy by other nations. There was a naïve belief at this time that a nuclear weapons capability could not be obtained solely through a peaceful nuclear power program. The period abruptly ends with India's "peaceful" explosion of an atomic device in May 1974 and the subsequent realization that the United States had probably supplied some of the material necessary to conduct the test.

The third period, covering 1974 to the present, has been termed a post-Atoms for Peace era. It has largely been dominated by the competing interests of pursuing an export-led non-proliferation policy and honoring the obligations established by the Non-Proliferation Treaty of 1968, particularly for the reliable supply of nuclear fuel. This period is still evolving, although one could argue that the discovery of the Iraqi nuclear weapons program in 1991 may mark its conclusion and open a radically different fourth era. A question that appears on the eve of this new era is whether policy changes limited to more stringent export controls or more frequent and intensive on-site inspections by the IAEA will significantly curb nuclear proliferation.

Throughout the three policy making periods, the collection highlights four subject areas:

At every stage of the post-war period, non-proliferation policy must be understood against the backdrop of the Cold War as U.S. policy was significantly affected by the strategic implications of U.S.-Soviet relations.

It should be noted that the document set focuses almost exclusively on the states that are known to possess nuclear arms, including the de facto nuclear weapons states--Israel, India, Pakistan, and South Africa. The main reason for this decision was the sheer volume of important materials that the Archive was able to acquire on those nations. On the other hand, informative records on the threshold states of Argentina, Brazil, Iraq, Iran, Libya, North Korea, South Korea, and Taiwan are more tightly held by the U.S. government. Assuming scholars will one day gain adequate access to those files, it will require a separate collection to deal comprehensively with those states.

The majority of the collection consists of documents obtained through the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) or donated to the National Security Archive. The project began with a basic collection of documents gathered by the Nuclear History Program at the University of Maryland. Additional documents were obtained through the Mandatory Declassification Review process from the Presidential Libraries and the National Archives. FOIA requests were filed with the National Security Council, the Departments of State, Energy, Defense, and Commerce, the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, the Nuclear Regulatory Commission, the Defense Intelligence Agency, the Central Intelligence Agency, and the International Atomic Energy Agency. Included are a wide variety of document types, including memoranda of conversation, reports, briefing books, histories, cables personal notes, and letters.

Excluded Materials

The Non-Proliferation Policy staff acquired a large number of documents through the FOIA and other means that have not been included with this set. As often happens, a number of FOIA requests produced records with little or no substantive information. The staff has culled those materials from the collection. Also, documents that are widely available in the public domain have generally been omitted unless they were considered crucial to an understanding of non-proliferation policy. For example, the text of the Non-Proliferation Treaty is included in the collection while most other international agreements are not.

Congressional reports and hearings have also been excluded from the set as a general rule. Exceptions occur when no other documentation on a particular topic was available, or when an event was so significant as to warrant inclusion.

Since the publication of the collection, a large number of documents have been obtained by the Archive from outstanding FOIA requests and documents released after the publication of the set. These materials, as well as those not included in the original set, are available for inspection at the National Security Archive in Washington, D.C.



Ronald Reagan and Mikhail Gorbachev exchange the INF Treaty instruments of ratification.
White House photo, 1 June 1988

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Last Change: September 16 1996 / by Reza Rafie/ rafie@seas.gwu.edu