

To the CC CPSU

...Difficulties in the coming-into-being of the DRA have a primarily objective character. They are related to the economic backwardness, the small size of the working class, the weakness of the People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan (PDPA). These difficulties are becoming more intense, however, as the result of subjective reasons: in the Party and the government a collegial leadership is lacking, all power in fact is concentrated in the hands of N.M. Taraki and H. Amin, who none too rarely make mistakes and commit violations of legality...

The main support of the Afghan government in the struggle with counter-revolution continues to be the army. Recently, security forces, border troops, an newly-created self defense forces have begun to take a more active part in this struggle. However, broad strata of the population ~~have~~ are involved in the struggle with reaction only insufficiently, the consequence of which is that the measures which the DRA government has taken to stabilize the situation have been not very effective...

Regarding this information, the MFA USSR, KGB USSR, Ministry of Defense and International Department of the CC CPSU consider it expedient to:

...3. To assist the main military advisor, send to Afghanistan an experienced general and a group of officers to work directly among the troops (in the divisions and regiments)...

4. To provide security and defense for the Soviet air squadrons at the Bagram airfield, send to the DRA, with the agreement of the Afghan side, a parachute battalion disguised in the uniform (overalls) of an aviation-technical maintenance team.

For the defense of the Soviet Embassy, send to Kabul a special detachment of the KGB USSR (125-150 men), disguised as Embassy service personnel. At the beginning of August, after preparations have been completed, send to the DRA (to the Bagram airfield) a special detachment of the GRU of the General Staff to be used in the event of a sharp aggravation of the situation for the security and defense of particularly important government installations.

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*As cited in Liakhovskii, A.A. The Tragedy and Valor of the Afghani. (Moscow: GPI "Iskon", 1995), p. 85.*

Liakhovskii notes that the recommendations made in this document were approved during the CC CPSU Politburo meeting of June 28, 1979, in Resolution No. P. 156/XI.