

# ***Global Competition and the Deterioration of U.S.-Soviet Relations, 1977-1980***

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## March 24, Session 1—Africa: Shaba I and II

**ROBERT LEGVOLD:** If I can have your attention, I would like to call the meeting to order. I want to welcome all of you, especially those of you who are joining us for the first time—as well as all who were at the Musgrove meeting—as we continue this important exercise. First, a technical matter: English is on channel number 1, and Russian is on channel number 2. The channels are marked on the button slightly to the right. Secondly, as before, in Musgrove, when you speak, you need to push the right button—that is, the far right button marked “microphone on and off.” After you have spoken, remember to turn that button off.

Let me make three points at the beginning of our conference to introduce the morning meeting. I think that all of us are here as a part of this undertaking because we believe that there is meaning in history. I don’t mean this in a metaphysical or philosophical sense; I mean it in a practical sense. When I say that history has meaning in a practical sense, I mean more than in a narrow sense of enabling us to learn from our mistakes. It is not only a matter of people being condemned to repeat their mistakes if they haven’t studied them in an earlier period. I think the stake that we have in this examination of the Carter-Brezhnev period is that we all want to know why things happened the way they did. And the reason why we want to know why things happened the way they did is because ultimately we want to know why things happen the way they do more generally—why they are happening even now as they do. So it’s not just a

question of lessons in the narrow sense. There is something much more basic at stake. And this is the primary means that we have for gaining perspective on foreign policy, and on international relations.

In that sense I want to applaud several people. First of all, I want to start by congratulating Jim Blight, and expressing gratitude to him, not merely because he and Janet [Lang]—and Mark and Betty [Garrison]—are magnificent, gracious, and witty hosts who have made all of this possible, but because Jim is one of those very few people who believes deeply in trying to reconstruct history to understand it, and he is willing to lead all of us in doing it. He has done it in the Cuban missile crisis project, he is doing it now. It is an enormously valuable thing that he is doing for everyone.

Secondly, I want to applaud Malcolm Byrne, Jim Hershberg, Vlad Zubok, and all of the people around them. They are truly remarkable. These young people are the ones who are in the process now of helping us to reconsider a very broad period of history. The Carter-Brezhnev project—although the most important because of the scale, or the importance, of the people who are involved—is only one piece of what they are doing. If you look at what Jim Hershberg has underway at the Wilson Center in the History of the Cold War—everything from the immediate post-war years through the Korean War, up through (eventually, I hope) even the Gorbachev years—it is an enormously important project. And again, these young people are the ones who are doing it. They are doing it, frankly, without an enormous contribution from people of my generation, either in the scholarly community or on the outside.

Third, I also want to applaud you people—you, the participants; you, the policy-



makers—who are at this meeting. Again, with gratitude, because, as Jim said last night, what Cy Vance, Zbig Brzezinski and their colleagues—Marshall [Shulman], Herbert [Okun], Bob Pastor, and others—have done on the American side to get documents for this meeting is truly heroic; it is really quite remarkable that they would do it. The effort on the Soviet side is also heroic; doing it on the Soviet side is very hard still in the Russian context.

That leads me to the second point I would make—my gratitude to the participants in the meeting is not just for having pitched in this way, not just for having done what you've done in getting the documents, but especially for being here. This meeting, like as the one at Musgrove, is of and by you, for all the rest of us, including a great number of people who are not in this room—maybe even a good number of people who are not yet born. I think that, in the spirit of what I've already said, your presence here, and this exchange among the participants, is to help all the rest of us understand what this history from 1977 through 1980 means, and to understand what it means by explaining to us what it meant to you at the time. Many of you are doing this or have already done this individually with very important memoirs and books. But it seems to me that your collective effort—that is, doing it in the room together, exchanging ideas—is a kind of rare added blessing in the effort of understanding the meaning of this history. If you permit me a comment, I think, the blessing will be all the greater if, in carrying out this collective effort, in conducting the conversation, you are willing to suspend the convictions that you brought into the room this morning in looking at the history. But there is only so much that we can ask of you humanly, and maybe that is asking too much in this context. As I

said, this meeting is of and by policy-makers, and they will be privileged throughout. There are people at the table who are scholars and observers, but the privilege will be to policy-makers for the reasons that I have just said.

As a result, the following rules from Musgrove will apply, with one addition. I will keep a speaker's list, and when I call on you, you may say what you want. But when you are particularly eager to comment on a point that has just been made, I want you to indicate it to me by raising two fingers, and then I will allow you to speak immediately.

**ANATOLY DOBRYNIN:** One finger is not enough?

**LEGVOLD:** One is not enough if you want to jump the queue. If you want to jump the queue, you have to raise two fingers.

Now, the reason for that is because we are also going to have three fingers [laughter], which we have never used at a conference before. The three-finger signal is for the non-policy-makers. Three fingers mean that you have a question that draws directly on something in the documents. If you have a question that you pose that leads back to the documents, raise three fingers. Otherwise, you have to play by the one-finger and two-finger rule as well. I will keep that in mind, because what we want to do at this meeting more effectively than we did at Musgrove is to make good use of the documents. In important respects, we want to keep ourselves to the documents. Here, the scholars can help us.

The third (and last) point that I would make before we begin the conversation this morning is that will be ranging over many aspects of the relationship. This meeting is not only about the Third World problems in U.S.-Soviet relations: it is also about the military situation on the Central Front; it is about Poland; and it is about the role of China in the U.S.-Soviet relationship. This is not just a meeting about the Third World and regional instability. As a general focus, we are interested in areas of misunderstanding—not just the nature of the misunderstandings that occurred, but also whether the misunderstandings mattered, and if so, why or why not.

There is an alternative way to think about our focus and our purpose: knowing what you know now—both from subsequent events and from the documents from the two sides—do you think that things could reasonably have been different, with results that would have mattered? And when I say “reasonably,” I mean taking into account the constraints of the day—whether domestic politics in the United States, or the condition of the regime in Moscow, or what have you. Talking about ways in which things could have been different in ways that matter is only useful if we keep that reality in mind.

Well, that leads, then, to the morning topic, which in the first session will be the Shaba incident in the context of Angola. We will meet until 10:15. We will then have a coffee break, and we will come back and talk about the events in the conflicts between Ethiopia and Somalia. Then, this afternoon, we turn to the Middle East, and we would like to get to China before the end of the day, so that we have the benefit of Cy’s input; but we will see how we are doing, and how we are holding up.

Let me introduce this morning’s sessions by putting to you a question that Karen

Brutents submitted. Many of you have submitted questions, and we will try to introduce those in the course of the conversation, and try to get them answered if we can. This is Karen Brutents's question: Do the Americans believe that there could have been, during this period, détente in the Third World? Could there have been a U.S.-Soviet détente in the Third World in this period of time? Did the Americans keep that possibility open? And if so, what would have been the essence of the concept? What would it have been in the Third World at that point? So we turn now to Shaba II.

The last thing that I would like to do is to raise the following issue, by way of setting an example. In thinking about Shaba II—that is, the events in the spring of 1978, not in the spring of 1977—there are two extraordinarily interesting documents. One is dated May 27, 1978, when Foreign Minister [Andrei] Gromyko met with President Carter. They talked about many issues, but one of the issues was Shaba. At that meeting, the president described the American concern about the possible Soviet and Cuban role in facilitating the action by the Katangese *gendarmes* in Zaire. He laid it out. Gromyko responded by denying most of the assumptions and the facts as the president had provided them. It also, by the way, includes the denial that there had been any Soviet military commanders in the Horn of Africa in the incident. The president was clearly not satisfied with that explanation. If you look at the documents, the president came back and rather emphatically repeated the American position on the issue of Shaba. I think a historian can read those documents, as I do, and infer that something very substantial was happening in that context. I think Jimmy Carter was persuading himself that the Soviet foreign minister was lying to him. And I think, quite apart from the scale of Shaba itself, that mere fact, in

the broad context in which it was happening at the time, was extraordinarily significant.

The second document relates to an event that occurred three days later, when Gromyko met with our secretary of state, Cy Vance, in New York. Here Cy can help to correct what may be my misimpression. I think, in that meeting, Gromyko was very, very angry when the issue of Shaba came up again. The language that he used—and here I would like to quote from the document—is significant. After Cy shared with Gromyko the kind of evidence that we had for saying that the Cubans and the Soviets were involved—that evidence was a statement by one of the Katangese so-called generals, [first name?] Mumba, and from Cuban sources in the GDR—Gromyko responded, “But who on Earth knows what kind of a general this is? Who does he serve? Is he the only one to tell the truth, like Jesus Christ in the Bible legend? You have information from us, accept it. Your sources of information had it as if they present lies as truth. You yourself know from experience that you must not believe every report.” And then he says to Cy, “Man was given his brain to analyze information, to think, to make realistic conclusions.” Now, maybe I am dramatizing the language; maybe, Cy, the way in which Gromyko was speaking to you was in a very different tone. But I think, again, it represented a deep indignation and a conviction on the part of Gromyko that something very wrong was being done on the American side when they raised the issue of Shaba in this fashion. It seems to me that these two exchanges demonstrate that something which in retrospect seems so unimportant may have been far more important than either side realized at the time.

Well, I’ve already talked too long, and I’ve set a bad example for the rest of you, and I ask you to make your interventions brief; but the floor is now open.

**DOBRYNIN:** I would like rather to expand a little bit more on what Karen asked before the conference. Before we going into all of these details about the very colorful discussion between Cy and Gromyko—and I think we should do it—the basic question really was, were we—I mean both of us: the Soviet Union and the United States—prepared to find accommodation, to find solutions to many of these conflicts, or we were not prepared to do so? Take the situation in Somalia and Ethiopia. In August and January 1978, we said to the Americans, “Let’s sit down together and find a way out of this conflict.” We were told, in effect, “No.” The Americans said that by joining us in such discussions, they would be legitimizing our presence in Africa. This was their answer to us. It was nothing new. It was the same situation in Kissinger’s time, which I know a little bit better than Carter’s. Kissinger was prepared to discuss the Middle East situation with us hundred times. But once we came to the concrete discussions, his purpose was very clear. It was especially clear in the war of 1973: he was against anything that would legitimize the Soviet presence in the Middle East. This was his credo. It was clear from the very beginning to the very end.

So, the United States seemed unwilling to seek solutions with us out of fear that this would legitimize our presence and our role. What we managed to do with Cy at the very beginning—preventing Ethiopia from crossing the Ogaden border—was a real achievement. We were also working together on Yemen. But these are the only two examples when we were really working together. On all of the other issues, we were on opposite sides. It seemed to us—maybe I am exaggerating a bit here—but it seemed to us that you were always thinking that the Third World was yours after the Second World War;

that it was the Western countries' domain. You felt that we had no business there. You did not say so directly, but that was the impression we had. So when we tried to find an accommodation—when we tried to work together—you always told us bluntly, or not so bluntly, "We really don't want to deal with you." When we wanted to find a collective way of preventing the conflict between Ethiopia and Somalia from escalating, Zbig's reaction was very simple: "We don't want to legitimize the Soviet presence in the Horn of Africa." Only when the United States got into a very difficult situation in some area of Third World would you come to us and say, "Look here, let's do something, otherwise there will be a conflict." When the situation developed favorably, from your perspective, you never asked us to do anything. But when something went wrong, you would say, "Let's do something."

I am not criticizing you here; there are plenty of things about our own behavior to criticize, of course. I am merely stating my impression of your attitude. My personal opinion is that the Soviet-American relationship suffered greatly over the long run because of the Third World. The game was really not worthwhile. But we should address this particular issue when we discuss the question you just put on agenda, Mr. Chairman. It would be very interesting, at least for us Russian participants, to know how really you approached it. Did you really *want* to be more cooperative, to work together?

I could give another example. It is unfortunate that Zbig is not here; I can give you an interesting piece of information. During the Afghanistan conflict, you expressed an interest in guaranteeing together the safety of Pakistan and Iran, but with one condition: there would be no written agreement, because you didn't want to legitimize our role in the

Middle East. Again it was the same song. Always. So, I am saying this not by way of criticism, but simply by way of inviting American participants to clarify this issue, at least for me. How was it really at that time? Was true cooperation really in the mind of leading American officials? Thank you.

**LEGVOLD:** Thank you, Anatoly. Marshall, and then Oleg.

**MARSHALL SHULMAN:** In answer to Anatoly's question, it seems to me it is useful to have in mind three considerations. The first was the time factor, because from the 1960s into the 1980s, the Soviets' logistical capability for reaching Africa and other Third World areas was growing. For example, at the time of the Congo crisis in 1960—the fight of Lumumba and Kasububu, and so on—the Soviet Union had an interest, but not the capability, of reaching the Congo and intervening in an effective way. By the 1970s—and, *a fortiori*, in the 1980s—the Soviet Union had begun to acquire that capability. This was a new factor.

The second consideration is how the United States would react to this. There were some who were beginning to explore the possibility of cooperative action. There were others who still held, essentially, the geopolitical view that we should not allow a Soviet encroachment. The relative weight of these two schools of thought shifted over time.

The third element goes back to Bob's original question about the conversation between President Carter and Foreign Minister Gromyko. Essentially, there were



unarticulated differences about degrees of intervention. The presence of General [Vasely] Petrov was taken by the president as a sign of active Soviet involvement in the military operations. In Gromyko's mind, that was not the case. But that was not articulated in those terms. So, there was a misunderstanding about the level of Soviet involvement.

**LEGVOLD:** Thank you, Marshall. Oleg?

**OLEG TROYANOVSKY:** I would like to follow up on two aspects of what Anatoly said, first of all about the United States not being in favor—to put it very mildly—of the Soviet Union getting into Africa in any form, as if this were an extension of the Monroe Doctrine from America to Africa. In principle, that was unacceptable to us. But second is the question of what the Soviet Union was trying to do there. And this, I think, is a big question. As far as I was concerned personally, I thought we were pushing too hard. We were overextending ourselves, as far as our world interests were concerned. But the question remains: what was the reason for that? Was it ideological? Was it to help these countries gain their freedom, or to help some of them who had already gained their independence to stand on their feet? Or was it just a part of the Cold War—as Khrushchev used to say, “When you get into a fight, any stick is good enough”? Was that the reason? Or was it a mixture of these reasons? I think that is an important question to answer.

**LEGVOLD:** Oleg, do you have an answer?

**TROYANOVSKY:** I do not. Perhaps our friends from the former Central Committee might have more insight on that. I recall once talking to Andropov about it. By that time he was already in the KGB, and I asked him, "Why are we getting involved in Africa?" His answer was, "We are being dragged into it." He did not elaborate on this, but my feeling was that he was not very much in favor of that. But in the context of the Cold War, it was often enough for some warlord to say that he was going to build socialism in his country, and the Soviet Union would start helping him. Or, on the other hand, it was enough for some warlord to say he was against communism for the United States to start helping him. Take the case of Siad Barre. First he turned to the Soviet Union, saying he was going to build socialism in Somalia, which was absurd—this was a very, very underdeveloped country. And we started helping him. Then he said to us, "I want to get the Ogaden back." We were completely against that; you can see from the documents that there several attempts to dissuade him from doing that. But then he broke with the Soviet Union—on that issue, mainly. I might be simplifying it a little bit, but that is the way I see it. And as soon as he broke off his association with the Soviet Union, the Americans picked him up and started helping him. I don't think there is any documentation to substantiate it, but I believe the Americans started first by supplying him with arms indirectly, via Saudi Arabia and other countries. And then when he started the war against Ethiopia, I don't think there is any evidence to show that the United States tried to dissuade him from that. Perhaps there is, I haven't seen it. And then we started helping Ethiopia with arms, and Cubans, and what not. And then when the Ethiopians started the counteroffensive, and the Somalis were retreating—in disarray, I would say—I recall a conversation with [U.S.] Ambassador

[Andrew] Young at the U.N. He came to me and said, "We want to raise this question in the Security Council." Perhaps he did not want to raise it directly—that is, by the United States—but by some other nation.

**DOBRYNIN:** What question?

**TROYANOVSKY:** The question of stopping the war there. I said, "Look, Andy, I think you will be in a difficult position, because while the Somalis were advancing, you did not do anything, and now that they are retreating, you want to raise the question in the Security Council. So you will find yourself in a very difficult position." And I think the State Department dropped that idea.

One can find other examples when the Soviet Union would start helping some country thinking that country might build socialism—well, Afghanistan is the greatest case of that thought. I was in Afghanistan some years before that, and I thought this was Europe in the twelfth century. It was like trying to build socialism in Europe in the twelfth century, or the thirteenth century, or something like that. There is another example. I recall that at one conference at the Foreign Ministry, our Ambassador in Iraq was reporting on his work there, and he emphasized that they were introducing socialist reforms. Gromyko asked him, "Could you cite one example, please?" [Laughter.] And the Ambassador could not. But I think it remains a fact that very often it was enough for some warlord to say that he was against communism, or against the Soviet Union, for the United States to start to help

him, too. Thank you.

**LEGVOLD:** Thank you. These are all very helpful comments. We will, of course, be looking in detail at the sequence of events in the Ethiopian-Somali conflict. My only request is that as we ease our way into the conversation, we struggle now to make our interventions compact and cover as much ground as we can very quickly. Les Gelb is next, and then I am going to turn to Phil Brenner, who has the first three-finger intervention. Les Gelb?

**LESLIE GELB:** I am grateful to Anatoly for taking us away from the particular and bringing us to the general, because I think in these matters it is the general that is of the greatest consequence. What we are talking about here is not Shaba 7, or Horn of Africa 3; it is context, and it is the strategic competition. And it is a perception on our side of what the Soviet side was up to. Anatoly's interpretation of what Foreign Minister Gromyko was saying was, if I reduce it to its most elemental terms, that we would not let the Soviet Union play in our superpower sandbox. We would not legitimize them. We would not say, "You can come and play in this sandbox." And they wanted to play in that sandbox. I do not know if that was the impression you wanted to convey, but that is how I heard what you have said—that it was somehow a matter of national pride.

On our side, there was a strongly held view—and a view with great political power—that it was more than a sandbox game, as you know: it was a serious struggle for

power; and, some believed, beyond that, it was a struggle against the Soviet goal of destroying American influence around the world and undermining the United States. It is very hard to discuss these things given our personal relations, and given the evolution of the relations between our two countries, without going back and understanding how strongly held those views were. And I think what we are asking from you at this point is precisely what you introduced: a sense of what your strategy was—what you really thought you were trying to accomplish in getting involved—however you were involved—in Shaba 7 or Horn of Africa 3, etc. What were you doing?

**DOBRYNIN:** May I speak to that?

**LEGVOLD:** If it's very brief, Anatoly, because I think we will be back and forth on this all morning.

**DOBRYNIN:** Before I answer you, I have one very brief additional question, which I would like to throw to everyone for discussion. Don't you—all of you—think that during the Carter administration, all of these African things were blown out of all proportion? I feel, personally, that they were. I am not saying who was guilty, you or we. We were playing our own games. But I think to a certain extent, really, the situation in Africa was blown out of proportion in Soviet-American relations, and in world affairs generally.

Now, coming back to your question. Quite frankly, as far as I know—Oleg or

Karen may correct me—we did not have any African doctrine at that time. There was no doctrine in the Soviet Union. We had no plans. I do not recall any discussion about how to behave in Africa on a real big scale. The policy was like a mosaic: it developed in bits and pieces. Something would happen here, so we went there, because you were there, or vice versa. It was never the case that we were somewhere that you were not. There was always that kind of interaction. I do not say that it was clever game; but nevertheless, it was a game. We did not have a well-thought-out policy in Africa. We did not have an African doctrine at all. What we had were just ideological rules of thumb. We were going to support colonial people, people who were under colonialism. The only over-arching policy was this ideological rule of thumb. Karen knows it quite well, better than I do. These were the major considerations.

But I never heard strategic considerations. Many times I sat in on Politburo meetings where strategic matters were discussed, and I never heard anyone say anything about the strategic importance of Africa for the Soviet Union. You may believe it or not, but there was unanimity. I never heard from Gromyko, or from Andropov, anything about the strategic importance of Africa for the Soviet Union. I never heard anything about the importance of Africa as a place for us to cut off your oil supplies—that was a favorite theme of yours.

So, coming back to my point: unfortunately, as far as our side is concerned, it was not a very well-thought policy. We did not have any doctrine except an ideological doctrine. We were certainly not trying to build an empire in Africa. We had no guiding conception of our policy in Africa. We had a guiding conception of our policy in Europe,

rightly or wrongly; we had one in the disarmament negotiations—the SALT talks, and so on. But in Africa, we did not.

Before coming to this conference, I looked at the agenda and I saw the phrases “Shaba I” and “Shaba II.” I did not know what these meant. I was an ambassador for 25 years, and I did not know what we were talking about. I thought maybe I had missed something when I was ill, or in the hospital. [Laughter.] Really, I did not know. I had to go to the Foreign Ministry and look at all of my telegrams to try to find out what these meant. I did not find a single telegram referring to these things. There was not a single telegram from the Washington Embassy to Moscow about any Shaba incident. There was no record of anybody in your country referring to Shaba I or Shaba II. There were telegrams about Zbig’s trip to China, and about many other things. But there was nothing on Shaba I or Shaba II. And here is it on the agenda of our meeting.

At the last conference, I protested all the attention we were paying to the Horn of Africa. My view was that it was unimportant. Rightly or wrongly, nobody in Moscow or in the Washington embassy paid much attention to it. Maybe people in Karen’s department did. Maybe they talked about Shaba in the International Department. But it was not a significant political issue for us. I don’t believe there was really a competition for Africa. But there was clearly a growing misunderstanding. The Carter administration was most unfortunate: it began with a great hope for improved U.S.-Soviet relations, and finished with—you know—a fiasco. That’s all.

**LEGVOLD:** We’ve obviously got some very intelligent scholars around the table, because

they learn quickly: there are now several three-finger interventions, and I will get to them. The first of those is Phil Brenner. But I am going to move immediately to Cy, since he is on this point. But Cy, before I turn the floor over to you, let me put to you—and then perhaps to Bill Odom—Karen Brutents's question in the context of Les's comment. Les provided a very good summary of what was involved here, a contrast between Soviet and American thinking on this issue. On the American side, what role was there for détente, if any? If so, what would it have been in that context?

**CYRUS VANCE:** I want to be very brief on this. I want to make sure I understand what you were saying, Anatoly. As I understand it, you were saying that, during the period of the Carter administration, the United States was overreacting. I thought I heard you saying also that, during that same period, the Soviet Union was overreacting. Do I correctly understand what you said?

**DOBRYNIN:** Both were overreacting. Both.

**VANCE:** Okay. That's all I wanted to put in at this point

**LEGVOLD:** Would you be willing to respond to some of the larger questions?

**WILLIAM ODOM:** I would be.



**VANCE:** Let's hear your intervention here, Bill.

**ODOM:** I wanted to respond to Karen Brutents's question by emphasizing the ideological factor. Anatoly Dobrynin pushes it aside as if it was not very significant, and he seemed to draw a distinction between the two-camp struggle—the struggle between the socialist camp and the imperialist camp—and what was *really* important: the strategic implementation of it. I will accept that division. But it seems to me that the assumptions—the ideological assumptions on both sides—are terribly, terribly important factors in answering Brutents's question. As long as the Soviet Union took the position it did ideologically, there was no meeting ground. And as long as we took the position we did about the nature of interstate relations, there was really no meeting ground. Now, you can say that we played the game stupidly in Africa. But I think if the assumptions I am making about the ideology are right in the answer to Brutents's question, it would be extremely difficult to overcome these problems.

Now, let me point out the parallel example of American relations with France: these have not always been the best, but we do share enough ideologically about the nature of interstate relations to enable the United States and France to cooperate and to have influence in different countries in Africa without competing over whose influence is greater or less. In fact, we were quite prepared to say, "Yes, France, you handle this; Belgium, you handle that"—because we knew that we shared with these countries certain values, certain interests in interstate commerce, and an understanding of interstate

relations, that would permit the kind of civilization and growth that we supported to go forward. The fundamental issue was whether the Soviet Union could come to accept the terms of interstate relations that would allow that kind of cooperation.

Now, that is one point. The next point that I want to make is this. Anatoly, I think you waved your hand too quickly over Africa and said that it had no importance. Let me give you the viewpoint of someone who at that time had no particular expertise in the Middle East or in Africa. In fact, I was deadly bored with the whole subject of Africa at the time. But I remember sitting in the spring of 1977—and all through the Fall of 1977 and into 1978—watching the intelligence come in from countries that we had reasonably good relations with: Pakistan, and Egypt, and so on. You may not have thought that events in the Horn of Africa made much difference; but if you look at what the U.S. was doing—Secretary Vance was very much part of this—we launched a series of initiatives, such as the Indian Ocean arms talks, and the talks on conventional arms transfers, which, as we implemented them, invited you to play a bigger role in the Indian Ocean on a footing of equivalence that you had not had before. It was an opening—an offering to you to stop competing by transferring arms into some of those areas. Now, that greatly disturbed a number of countries whom I would not call allies, but with which the United States had reasonably good relations: the Yemenis, the Saudis, the Egyptians, the Pakistanis, and others. They took the view that your actions in Ethiopia and Yemen—and then later in Afghanistan—were very serious strategic moves to destabilize this entire region. You may not have had a master plan; but you were certainly taking opportunities to create potential upheavals and instabilities in a very large region. And the Horn of Africa relates

strategically much more to the Middle East region than it does to Shaba, or to Southern Africa, or the others.

So I would not underrate the importance of the ideological dimension. Until the changes of the kind that Gorbachev introduced in his book *Perestroika*—I remember reading that and thinking that we were really in a new world with this—the ideological difference mattered a great deal. And then there is the strategic factor, Anatoly. What you were doing really did have strategic significance, in the minds of many countries in the region which were fairly important to the Western economies. It really did have strategic significance, and it was disturbing.

**DOBRYNIN:** If we want to speak of the strategic advantages and disadvantages, I should say that in that particular period, in that area, you got more, quite frankly, than did we. I am not speaking of who was good or bad; merely of the facts. We had, so to speak, Ethiopia. We lost—if I may say—Egypt, Yemen, Somalia, and Pakistan. We only had Ethiopia. So we had no grounds for boasting that we gained something in Africa during the Carter period. Not at all. Thank you.

**LEGVOLD:** Thank you, Anatoly. Karen?

**KAREN BRUTENTS:** I would like to start by thanking the organizers of the conference for the invitation to take part in such an interesting discussion, and for the hospitality which

surrounds us, even though we have not worked enough to earn it yet. I sent my question to the organizers because, as this discussion has already shown, it is very hard, even impossible, to adequately and objectively answer specific questions without a discussion of the general issues first. It is impossible to give a correct evaluation of the two sides' behavior without discussing the general issues. If I have an opportunity, I am ready to talk specifically about Shaba—about the so-called Shaba I and Shaba II. But for now I would also like to touch on the questions that have been already raised here, and which, in my opinion, need a wider and a more comprehensive discussion.

Oleg Alexandrovich spoke about what attracted the Soviet Union in the Third World. By the way, Shaba is an excellent example of how the contradictions in the concept of détente itself—in the approaches to détente—on the one hand, and both sides' "boxer reflex" on the other, led to an insignificant local event becoming a serious international conflict. And here we can see the influence of those more general factors. What attracted the Soviet Union to the Third World? And why did such situations could emerge? Unfortunately, I cannot, unlike Oleg Alexandrovich, attempt to give you any sort of complete answer, because there were a lot of irrational elements involved. Anatoly Fedorovich is absolutely right when he says that, thanks to the efforts of our politicians—or our scholars—both sides have a somewhat exaggerated perception of our strategic capabilities. I would even add that our intellectual talents in approaching such issues were exaggerated by both sides. At least on the Soviet side, as far as I know, there was no strategy on those issues whatsoever. All we had was the logic of superpower competition. And also, on the Soviet side, there was a struggle for an equal place under the sun. What

else was détente, from this point of view? We had reached military parity, and we wanted a comprehensive equal status. Take, for instance, the Vienna summit of Brezhnev and Carter. Brezhnev constantly asked, "Are you ready to deal with us as with equals?" And you will find this same formula in Gromyko's conversations also. But the United States was not ready to give us the status of an equal partner. And they had valid grounds for that. If there was parity in military terms, there was no such parity in political and economic terms. So, what attracted us? I have to repeat myself: first, the logic of superpower competition, which was often turned into a goal in itself. We could not pass up an opportunity that would have come up—an opportunity to move forward, to take a new position. Ideological considerations also played a role, even though I think that Oleg Alexandrovich treated that question too superficially. The people in the Kremlin were not so naïve as to rush to embrace and provide assistance to anybody who would proclaim that he was in favor of socialism. No, it was not like that. There were always considerations of state, or power considerations. Ideological considerations gradually declined in importance. Beginning in 1969 or 1970, they played a smaller and smaller role. I can prove this with facts, but I don't want to waste our time on this. Sometimes it was, like Yury Vladimirovich [Andropov] correctly said, the force of circumstances. I think that, for example, in Angola, we were pulled in by the force of the circumstances.

**DOBRYNIN:** Against our own will.

**BRUTENTS:** Well, not quite against our own will—

**DOBRYNIN:** In the beginning.

**BRUTENTS:** —But maybe not completely *by* our own will; I would put it this way.

Now, the second factor. Here Oleg Alexandrovich has just said that certain things should not have been done, etc. Of course, from the standpoint of the national interest, certain things were done very incorrectly, if not in a suicidal way. Unfortunately, on our side we did not have such smart people, or such institutions that would, like Senator Clark in the U.S., prevent us from doing that on a full scale. That is why we got more and more involved there. But from the standpoint of the logic of the superpower struggle, it seems to me, it was completely natural. Take the United States, for instance. I can give a dozen examples where things were done incomprehensibly from any kind of rational, reasonable point of view. Take even these documents. It really is amusing to read the transcripts of the Special Coordination Committee meetings, and to see the position of the Secretary of State, the honorable Cyrus Vance, and the position of some other participants of those meetings, who were clearly driven by some kind of ideological gambling motive—by the fighting spirit—not by a desire to understand the other side. This is what I wanted to say now. If I can have some time to speak about Shaba, I am ready to talk about it.

**LEGVOLD:** Phil Brenner?

**PHILIP BRENNER:** Thank you, Bob. Some of what I was going to ask has already been

discussed. I think I would like us to focus on the Presidential Memorandum NSC-21, the first document in the book, because it lays out some of the central thinking on the part of the United States vis-à-vis what we are just discussing. The Memorandum articulates what the United States's interests are, and what the Soviets' interests are. You can all read it, but I will just briefly note for you that it says, with respect to the Soviet Union, that the Soviets are "hopeful that such a move [in Ethiopia] would be generally perceived as representing a trend of Soviet gains in Africa at U.S. expense." And then, later, it talks about this "providing a geostrategic opportunity for the Soviet Union." And then with respect to the United States, it talks about U.S. goals as "keeping the Soviet Union out" of this region, and also extending U.S. influence.

And now let me put it in a little bit of context. Most scholars have assumed that the ideological component in Soviet interests in Africa diminished after the coup against Mandela and Nkrume in 1965, and that after that point the Soviet interests became geostrategic. That was reflected in this Presidential Review Memorandum. You are telling us something very different. You are saying that the ideological component still existed in the late 1970s. There seems to be a disagreement about that. I would ask the American side if, on reflection now, you think that the analysis that you had in April 1977 was accurate? Did you correctly identify the Soviets' interests? And can you also just briefly tell us how important that Presidential Memorandum was in shaping U.S. policy?

**LEGVOLD:** Does anyone on the American side want to respond to those questions now?

**HERBERT OKUN:** I can give a technical response on what a Presidential Memorandum is.

It is not a directive. It is a directive only in the sense that it asks the State Department, the Defense Department, and others to go study and answer a set of questions and come back to the National Security Council—or one of the committees—and make policy recommendations. This PRM is a bit unusual in essaying so long on our thinking about the subject. Many PRMs were only about a page, or less than a page, in length.

**BRENNER:** That's right. The importance of this one is that it articulates both our vision of the Soviet interests, and our vision of our own interests.

**TROYANOVSKY:** What does "PRM" mean?

**BRENNER:** "Presidential Review Memorandum." It's the first document in the briefing book.

**LEGVOLD:** Let me summarize what I hear people saying up to this point, and suggest that it does not yet carry us far enough. Together, what the Americans and those of you from the Soviet Union at the time are saying is that, yes, this was a competitive relationship; secondly, this competitive relationship was made more difficult because of the ideological component. The ideological component was not unimportant. The Soviet side is saying: but we did not have a strategic design; we did not have a clear-cut notion of how to



exploit strategic advantage in Africa. The American side is saying: we agree; we do not think you had a strategic design. But in the context of a competitive relationship with a basic difference in ideological values, that made it very difficult for us to find ground for cooperation with you in Africa—or in any other part of the world—where the competition became reflected. It did not matter whether it was Africa, or whether it was Central America, the competition was a function of this very basic problem. Is that the end of the issue? Or were there not things that could have been done at the time that indeed would have controlled this phenomenon, or maybe even reversed its effects? Was there not a basis for détente in the Third World? Bill has answered this question. Bill has said, given these facts, probably not. But is that the end of the issue?

**BRUTENTS:** I think that it is simply impossible to answer this question, because it is impossible to replay the history. But I, for one, have this impression: that there was a certain contradiction in the concept of détente from the very beginning. Very often you would find a statement that détente put an end to the Cold War. I think it is not entirely correct. You cannot say that détente was squeezed into the Procrustean bed of the Cold War, but at the same time the most serious, the basic elements of the Cold War remained intact. And this is the objective basis of what had happened.

But there is also the second element: politics, and politicians, who could, by their policy—by their position—soften that basic contradiction, smooth it over gradually, and at some point, I would say, even converge. This is the question I am asking myself. Or alternatively, they could, I repeat, like boxers, deepen that contradiction, sharpen that

contradiction, and ruin détente as a result. It seems to me, the latter happened. And it happened because of the short-sightedness, and the excessive fighting spirit, on both sides. This is my impression. I might be mistaken.

**LEGVOLD:** Cy Vance?

**VANCE:** I would like to call your attention to the document which is entitled "Record of the main content of the conversation between A.A. Gromyko and U.S. Secretary of State Vance." It is dated May 31, 1978. I want to get to that eventually, but not right now. I said there in the conversation that I think we all recognize that elements of rivalry will remain between us in the future, but at the same time there will be areas where we will be able to achieve mutual understanding and find a common language. I referred to Africa, and I ended up saying, "In conclusion, I must point out that, relating to the fact that détente should be a two-way street, and in the context of the situation in Africa, we must determine how we should act so that all these questions do not continue to be a constant source of confrontation between us." I can tell you that, as far as I was concerned, I was continuing to try to push to find a way that we could talk to each other, and to deal with the problem of Africa. And we tried very hard. As early as the first trip that we made in connection with SALT in March—right after the Carter administration had come into being, when we could not reach an agreement with respect to how to proceed on SALT—we came up with a laundry list of issues relating to the Third World issues, where we

hoped that we could find ways to work together with the Soviet Union to establish a more peaceful atmosphere for the future. So, I just want to stress that that was certainly one of the major objectives of the Carter administration, right from the beginning.

**LEGVOLD:** Cy, a crucial question, then: What, in your judgment, is the reason why it did not happen?

**VANCE:** I do not think there is any one simple answer to that. There is no magic bullet to it. As time went on, various factors came into play and had their impact. I think, from time to time, such things as happened in Shaba, and in the Horn, tended to exacerbate the situation; and I think, as Anatoly says, there was some fault on both sides. But I don't think it strange that, despite the fact that we were basically trying to achieve a better relationship with respect to the Third World, there were times that these rivalries did rise up and cause problems. We were able to solve some of those cooperatively: take the Ogaden. That was also true, I think, in Shaba.

**LEGVOLD:** Jim Hershberg?

**JAMES HERSHBERG:** One theory of the enduring relevance of Shaba 7, and Horn 3 is that big powers can still get sucked into poorly understood local conflicts by local leaders acting in their own interests, and clothing those interests in the language of power—or

superpower—patrons. Let me address one document-based question to each side. In the April 11, 1977 Policy Review Committee meeting section on Somalia, there is the following passage: "The discussion highlighted some of the problems in rushing into too close a relationship with Somalia too soon, including the possibility that Siad may be trying to play both us and the Soviets at the same time. More specific is the danger of frightening Kenya and of encouraging Somali territorial ambitions toward Ethiopia and Djibouti." And one thing that emerges very clearly from the Russian documents that we have seen is precisely that Siad was trying to play both sides: he did have his own agenda. This document, and others, shows that the U.S. perceived that danger, and yet somehow during the spring and summer of 1977 Siad, evidently, read U.S. intentions in such a way that went ahead with the invasion of the Ogaden, and in the spring and summer, the U.S. was not able to effectively convey their desire that Siad should not invade Ethiopia if he wanted a cooperative relationship with the United States. And then, in late 1977, the U.S. was not able to convince him to withdraw prior to the Ethiopian-Cuban-Soviet counteroffensive.

My question for the Americans is: Why did that happen? Was it poor signals? Were there disagreements in the U.S. government? Did some in the U.S. favor the Somalis putting pressure on Mengistu? How did that happen? Clearly, that was the precondition for everything that followed.

My question for the Russians goes back to Ambassador Dobrynin's very first comment about Gromyko's proposal in January 1978 for joint action to stop the crisis on the Horn. The relevant document here is President Carter's December 21, 1977 letter to

Brezhnev, in which—in language inserted by Brzezinski—he specifically says, “I would also hope that the United States and the Soviet Union could collaborate in making certain that regional African disputes do not escalate into major international conflicts.” He then goes on to mention the conflict between Ethiopia and Somalia specifically. I would like to know how serious Gromyko was in raising this proposal. Was this more or less pro forma, or did this extend to the level of having arranged that if the U.S. responded favorably, the major Ethiopian-Cuban counteroffensive, which was about to begin in late January, would have actually been held off? Was there actually a chance to prevent the major counteroffensive that was about to take place? And how seriously did the Americans take this proposal, which was not disclosed publicly until Brzezinski’s memoirs appeared six years later?

**LEGVOLD:** Thank you, Jim, those are very good questions. Marshall?

**SHULMAN:** First just a general point. There is always the problem of the analyst making events of the past seem tidier than they were in real life. Things are always more complex than they appear in retrospect. Diplomatic historians often fall into the error of making events seem more coordinated, clearer, and tidier than they really were. All of us who have been involved in policy know that things are not that way. There is a lot of confusion, and people have different purposes and different perspectives. We should make allowance for general trends, which we can identify, but we must be careful not to

oversimplify.

Second, I think the point that Karen Brutents made is important to keep in mind: The notion of détente was imprecise from the very beginning—going all the way back to the Nixon period, really. There was a certain amount of confusion about what it meant: whether it meant the cessation of the competition, or whether it meant establishing certain rules of the game for conducting the competition.

Third, we must bear in mind the historical period that we were living through. This was a part of the period of decolonization, and of all the fragmentation that came with the collapse of the colonial world—the succession of events from the collapse of the Portuguese positions in Africa that made the Angolan issue a free-floating issue; subsequently the collapse of relations in the Horn. All of that meant that there was a certain wanton quality of mobility in the area. The result of that was—as Karen Brutents properly said—that Moscow was presented with a series of opportunities by the fluidity of the situation, in Angola, and Ethiopia, and so on. Soviet policy was not necessarily a matter of design.

Then there is the question of what to do about it—how to respond to it. And there, I think, there was a range of views on both sides. There was not a uniform view. In the Soviet view—in the minds of some—it was simply the matter of responding to the opportunities represented in some degree: responding to some with minimal assistance, to others more energetically. It is true, as Bill Odom said, that the ideological factor—the desire to build socialism—created a framework for doing things, and that this had important consequences. The Soviets regarded the people who favored them as building

socialism, we regarded the people who favored the United States as building democracy. In both cases, this essentially obscured what was a competitive relationship, which we described in ideological terms, but which was primarily significant as an opportunity for gain, for increased influence.

On the American side—to respond to Jim Hershberg’s comment—there were complications stemming from the fact that all of this related to an area about which we did not have a great deal of knowledge. One common thread throughout this whole period—from Vietnam on into Africa, and Iran—was that, for the most part, we on the American side were operating on the basis of relatively little knowledge and insight into the areas involved. We knew little of their politics, their political culture, and the rest of it. We were operating on the basis of a kind of a black box analysis of game theory. We only asked questions such as, “Who is ahead?”, and so on. I suspect that this was also true to some extent on the Soviet side, too.

But it was true that there was an impulse on the American side, as Cy has suggested, to develop rules of the game to manage the competition, and to cultivate a certain level of cooperation. There were some on the American side who did not concur with that. There were some who still approached the issues strictly as a strategic competition, and who were, therefore, inclined to attribute the most malign motivation to the other side on the basis of their limited knowledge. I suspect the same thing may have been true on the other side as well.

So part of what I am suggesting is that, in our retrospective analysis, we have to allow both for the main trends, but also for the operational confusion of the time, and for

the fact that there was no uniform view: there were differences of views on both sides. On the Soviet side, I suspect, there was a difference of opinion between those who sought, in the name of finding the place in the sun, to convert military parity at the strategic level into political gains, and who thought that this meant the Soviet Union deserved a bigger global position in the world. On the American side, there were those who saw that as part of a strategic design for world-wide development of what was called "building socialism," but which really meant an expansion of Soviet influence. We should therefore be careful of making an overly simple analysis of the conflict.

**LEGVOLD:** I now have Oleg, who had wanted to speak earlier, then Les.

**TROYANOVSKY:** Cy read out the statement he made to Gromyko, and I don't think there is anyone who can deny or doubt that the Secretary of State held to that position; but the trouble, as far as our perception in Moscow or the U.N. was concerned, was that American policy seemed to speak with two voices. At one time one voice would be stronger, and at another, the other voice was stronger. And since politicians usually proceed on the basis of worst-case assumptions, the harsher voice very often guided our actions. That's my feeling, at any rate.

**LEGVOLD:** Les Gelb?



**GELB:** I am struck in having read through the documents—the documents are terrific, by the way—by how much they hide as well as by how much they reveal. They reveal the kinds of tactical judgments that were made at meetings. That’s important to understand. They recreate some of the sense of why you opted for the specific option that you chose. But the documents also hide an awful lot. First of all, they hide the gut thinking—the ideological gut thinking—behind what you were doing. And the fact is, I cannot recall a single instance at any interagency meeting where those kinds of issues were discussed. We never talked to each other about the secret handshake or the mantra. And I suspect that you did not talk to each other about the secret handshake or the mantra, either. I believe you when you say that you were not that smart; we were not that smart, either. We did not have grand strategies cleverly worked out. But there were many on our side who thought that you did—who thought that you had the secret handshake and the mantra—and who even thought that they knew what it was.

On our side, we could not have agreed on the secret handshake and the mantra. We could not have agreed on it in the State Department. If we had sat down to discuss this, there would have been significant disagreements among ourselves. I think the only time you discuss these kinds of very basic feelings is with people with whom you essentially share those feelings, and about whom you are very confident that they do share those feelings. None of that is revealed in these documents, and yet this is what determines where you begin to think, and how you approach a problem.

All that said, I would say that, on the American side during these years—during the Carter administration—most people pretty much agreed on two things. They left these

unspoken, but they agreed on two things. One was that if we left our wallet on the table, you would steal it. [Laughter.] Namely, if we did not respond to what was going on in Shaba, or the Horn, or Cuba, or wherever, you, in your meeting, would sit down and say, "Hey, these guys are getting weak; let's take another step ourselves." I think most of us would have agreed on that. For us to step back would be to invite you in. At a minimum, you saw it as a competitive relationship, and so you would take advantage of it; you would not show restraint in response to our restraint.

The second unspoken assumption was that it was politically very difficult for any of us on our side to advocate restraint—very difficult. Because if we did so, we would be called soft-headed, weak-minded, and the rest. Very quickly, one's effectiveness within the government, and in Washington in general, would be seriously undermined. So any time one thought to argue for restraint, you thought twice, because of the effects on your own political position.

**LEGVOLD:** Cy Vance.

**VANCE:** I would just like to make a very brief intervention to the effect that I agree in part with what Les has said. But I think he has exaggerated it to quite a considerable degree. I think all one has to do now is to take a look at the dialogue that took place at the time of the Ogaden, and see what we were doing. Anybody who reads the dialogue there could see that there were some very sharp differences. There was a real debate—not just

between Zbig and me, but also involving Harold Brown, and General David Jones, and so on. These differences were not just simply swept aside.

**LEGVOLD:** I am going to allow Georgy to jump the queue, and then I will come back to Anatoly. Georgy, please.

**GEORGY SHAKHNAZAROV:** First of all, I would like to congratulate the organizers of the conference for their success in gathering at this table those of us who were in the Carter and Brezhnev administrations. Before this conference, practically the same American colleagues succeeded in gathering together and recording the views of the members of Kennedy and Khrushchev administrations. I am hoping that at the next stage we will have a chance to gather together members of the Gorbachev, Reagan, and Bush administrations, and maybe the time will come soon when members of the Yeltsin and Clinton administrations will gather at the same table. It is a good thing to do: it leaves very credible sources for history; you don't have to die to get the documents, you can just gather the veterans and listen to what they have to say about how they behaved at the time.

Secondly, I wanted to answer the question that Troyanovsky put so succinctly—what was the main influence: ideology, or the struggle for power? I think those are inseparable things. All empires have always found some justification for themselves in some kind of idea—I mean the great empires. For the Roman empire it was the idea of

bringing Roman law to the barbarians. For us it was the idea of liberation, labor, the idea of socialism, the idea of independence. For the Americans, it is the idea that their democratic order is the highest achievement, and human rights. Therefore, all of us, always, covered our real interests with some ideas. And which was prevalent—the interests or the idea—it is a very difficult question. This is my second comment.

From this point of view, both sides were right, in way, in this great competition. And it impossible to find one right position. Only God can judge who acted more or less rightly. We need to accept that as a fact. And when each side has its own right, as Hegel has said, force decides the issue. And force was on the American side—on the side of the West as a whole—and that, eventually, had consequences.

But we also need to say that the situation in 1977-1979 was very concrete. How was it different from the previous years? It was different because the Soviet Union entered that period at the peak of its military might. Never before did we have such a powerful military force. And it had to fire, it was seeking to find a use for itself. I can tell you about one meeting in 1965 when Andropov invited me along with other young people, scientists, and journalists, to a consulting group. We had a very interesting conversation. I asked him, "Yury Vladimirovich, why do we need to get involved in Africa, Latin America, and so on? We might break our backs. Why do we need to build dozens, even hundreds of nuclear submarines? Why do we need this wild number of tanks? Sooner or later, this will break our back." He said to me, "You do not understand. The future competition with the United States will take place not in Europe, and not in the Atlantic Ocean directly. It will take place in Africa, and in Latin America. We will compete for every

piece of land, for every country. We need bases there, and then we will be able to enjoy an equal status with the Americans. We will not let them command there." This is what that the conversation was like.

I think that, over the years, that strategy resulted in a very concrete struggle with the Americans on the entire field. You know, in soccer, there is the strategy known as man-to-man coverage: every player follows one player from the opposing team. If a player from the other side moves, then one of our players must move with him. So it was with the United States: where they moved their forces, we had to move ours. It was a mistaken strategy, because even though, as I have just said, we were at the peak of our power in 1979, it was the period when the country's back began breaking. In addition to that, we had a gerontological leadership who did not take the general situation in the world into account, and who could not understand that new times were coming, with an information revolution, advanced communications, and so on. This explains the fact that at that moment our back had already begun breaking.

I have only one question, and then I will finish. It is a question for the Americans. I believe that Carter was himself a bit of idealist—like Gorbachev, by the way. He had a desire to establish cooperation, and not necessarily to step on the Soviet Union's toes everywhere where it got involved. But did happen also to have a feeling that the moment had come when, with one major offensive against the Soviet Union, you could successfully destroy its empire? Because our leadership was getting old, and, frankly, it was not very intelligent—let's put it this way. Brzezinski helped [Karol] Wojtyla to become the Pope; you organized a substantial campaign to help the Solidarity movement.

The facts suggest the existence of some kind of strategy for destroying the Soviet Union as an empire—not, of course, as a country, and not as a people, but as an empire. This is my question: was there in the ruling American political circles, in the intelligence community, and in the parties an idea that the moment had come when you could successfully destroy the power of the Soviet Union? Thank you.

**LEGVOLD:** Let me tell you where we are now, because a number of you have asked for the floor. Among the scholars who have said they would like to go back to the documents and ask questions I have Arne, and I have Ilya, and then I have Mark Garrison. Bob Pastor wanted to comment substantively on the issue at hand. I am going to turn to Bob on that basis, and then Anatoly.

What Georgy just said is very helpful, and in a way he has answered my question to you, Cy, much the same way in which Bill answered the question about détente. And if his description of both the Soviet Union as at the peak of its military power with a sense of global competition was at work, combined with suspicions that the Americans were determined to bring the empire down at the same time, one can understand why you and Gromyko did not get very far. And in a sense, that is what Bill was saying was at stake. Now, I do not know if everyone around the table agrees with that proposition.

Bob Pastor is next.

**ROBERT PASTOR:** I am sure that Zbig Brzezinski would be very pleased and appreciative

that somebody would give him the credit for installing Pope John Paul II. Actually, there was a joke in the White house at the time as to how the Pope was chosen, and the answer was that the Cardinals could not make up their minds, so they took a poll. [Laughter.] That works better in English than in translation.

I would like to use the last comment by Mr. Shakhnazarov as a point of departure, because I think we seem to be torn between theories of historical determinism and the possibilities of free will. Mr. Brutents put it very well: there is a certain logic to the superpower competition that compelled each side to exaggerate the other side's actions, and to see them as provocative while seeing oneself as defensive. And this "security dilemma" is certainly evident in the documents. The most powerful documents for me to read are the inner debates within the Politburo, where people are really saying, "We are being pushed around by the United States." That comes as a surprise to me, because in the White House at the time, we felt that we were exercising great restraint and encouraging cooperation, and we attributed Soviet statements that we were provocative and aggressive as simply propaganda. The documents demonstrate that Kremlin leaders really believed that the U.S. was pushing them around.

Bob Legvold made an excellent point when he drew our attention to the broader historical context. The United States had been on the offensive in the Third World through the 1960s, and perhaps because of Vietnam, we had learned some lessons that it took the Soviet Union the 1970s and the 1980s to learn about the extent of influence you can have on these Third World conflicts. By the late 1970s, the Soviet Union was eager to catch up. That occurred at a moment in which there was an administration in Washington that was

interested in a cooperative relationship to define the rules of détente. It is easy to define the rules in the abstract; but in practice, it is very difficult. Still, there are some ways to do it.

The different kinds of interventions by the Soviet Union in Africa did have differential impacts. In Ethiopia, the fact that there was a large number of Cuban troops working with a Soviet general made an important difference to the United States. This was different from Cuban troops acting alone. It suggested a degree of coordinated extension of military influence that went beyond Angola, where the Cubans were clearly out in front, and it elicited the need on the part of the United States to think through ways to respond. Cy Vance just pointed out that the SCC struggled hard with ways to respond to the combined Soviet-Cuban intervention in the Horn, and never really came up with a satisfactory answer.

That brings me to a comment that Ambassador Troyanovsky made. He was saying that he heard two voices from the United States; these were voices in a debate. One voice asked, "Do we exercise restraint in the hope of eliciting a more cooperative approach?" The other asked, "Are we not more likely to elicit cooperation, or at least non-aggressiveness on the part of the Soviet Union, if we demonstrate a certain toughness?" The question that I have for your side is, what were the two voices in the Soviet Union? It would be very interesting to hear the nature of the debate within the Kremlin on these issues—and in particular, how the U.S. perspective was incorporated into that debate. In short, did the more aggressive approach on the part of the United States make the Kremlin more aggressive? Was there ever a serious enough debate in the Soviet Union on what to



do in the Horn—or what to do elsewhere in Africa, or Afghanistan, or wherever—that could have in fact elicited and encouraged a more cooperative voice in the United States?

**LEGVOLD:** Thank you, Bob. Anatoly is next. But before Anatoly, Mark Garrison has a specific question that makes Bob's point even more concrete.

**MARK GARRISON:** Let me bring it down for the Soviet side to the document that Jim Hershberg referred to earlier: the December 1977 letter from Carter to Brezhnev, in which the offer of collaboration in trying to hold down the military conflict in Africa was raised. If you could suspend judgment for a moment, and assume that there was just one voice on the American side, and that that voice was speaking in that letter offering collaboration, was it actually possible from the Soviet side to envisage the possibility of real cooperation in Africa or elsewhere in the Middle East? Or was the combination of the influence of Ustinov that Karen Brutents described in the Oslo meeting, the ideological objectives of the International Department of the Central Committee (Ponomarev, and so on), Gromyko's passivity with regard to Third World questions, and the Cuban anxiety to do things in Africa, all too much? Did all of those things work together to make it really impossible for the Soviet side to undertake the kind of collaboration that would have made a difference on the American side?

**LEGVOLD:** Anatoly?

**DOBRYNIN:** I will try to answer your question. At that particular moment, the Soviet government was quite prepared—together with the United States—to have a joint effort to stop the conflict between Somalia and Ethiopia. There was no disagreement among the military people or the ideologists. Ponomarev said this; you can find it in your own papers. We were really interested in stopping the fighting. We were quite prepared to work together in Ethiopia and Somalia. If you look at the materials that you have here, you can see that in five or six meetings of Politburo, the one question that they discussed—for over six months—was how to stop the fighting. They were very seriously thinking about how to do it. At the very beginning we said that we did not like the fighting, because, after all they were allies, and it would have been better to keep them together. [Nikolai] Podgorny visited; then there Castro. There were many efforts to try to keep Barre and Mengistu together. We had some concern about Barre, but we were talking amongst ourselves about how to stop this. So in this particular case, the prospects for a cooperative solution were quite good. We definitely wanted to stop the fighting, and this could have been achieved if there had been an effort on your side. This may not have been true of all situations in the world; but on this particular issue—Somalia-Ethiopia—there was a very good possibility that we could both would work together. We were quite prepared to deal with you.

Why did we fail? It was a matter of perception: what you were thinking about us, and what we were thinking about you. Maybe Cy or somebody else would like to comment on the psychological state of mind of your president; we could discuss our top officials as well. From the very beginning—after Carter was elected, but before he

officially became president—we had the feeling that he worried that the Soviet Union would test his will, his strength, and his convictions. We thought he worried that we would try to find out whether he could be pushed around, and that we would try to show him that we really were a force worldwide. We got this impression from many sources: intelligence sources; people in the Embassy; even people in the White House, and people who were very close to the president. I could give their names, but I don't want to. This was the situation. There was a meeting of the Politburo, and Brezhnev said, "Look, here's someone who comes from a different background. The president is a little bit concerned, or a little bit uneasy, that we are going to test his will." Then Harriman came. He was a self-appointed ambassador, as I understand, because nobody sent him. But he went to Moscow before the president was officially inaugurated. And he, too, expressed this worry. So Brezhnev himself told him, "Please tell Mr. Carter that we are not going to test his will." It sounds ridiculous now, but Brezhnev explained to Harriman that he was not going to test the will of the president.

Let's go further. When the situation in Africa developed in 1977 and 1978, I suspect that the president made up his mind that we were testing his resolve. It seems to me that he was determined not to be pushed around in Africa. He was torn between his desire for cooperation and his fear of confrontation. He made many speeches in which he was torn between cooperation and confrontation. One was the speech in Annapolis. He was speaking about cooperation, then suddenly he faced us with the question: are you for cooperation or for confrontation? This showed that the president became more combative, little by little. Without saying who is right and who is wrong, I would suggest that he

became more and more combative.

Cy is right; when he went to Moscow in March, he brought with him a lot of suggestions. Aside from SALT, our feeling was that it was possible to do certain kinds of things. Someone mentioned the Indian Ocean; I forget who mentioned it. We were prepared to cooperate on the Indian Ocean. But what happened with Indian Ocean? You canceled the negotiations. Until the very last moment, we were eager to continue. I realize that this happened in connection with Afghanistan; but still, you canceled it.

**[UNIDENTIFIED VOICE]:** That was before Afghanistan.

**DOBRYNIN:** Before, that's right; even before Afghanistan. It is not a major point.

So we really were prepared to cooperate. And we had the impression that you were, too. At the outset, we had a good impression of the administration's willingness to cooperate. When I spoke with the president personally, or when he wrote letters, he would appeal for joint action to avoid confrontation, and to pursue a new era of cooperation. But then, little by little, you know, tension grew.

One reason for that, I think, was our mistake: there was no summit meeting until 1979. I think it was the biggest mistake that we made in our government, because we were just dragging our feet instead of sitting down and discussing all these issues frankly with Cy, with the president, and with Zbig. Several times during 1977 and 1978 I suggested to Moscow that we should sit down with the president and discuss these issues.

Unfortunately, on our side, it was Gromyko who prevailed. He convinced Brezhnev to bring pressure on the Americans to sign a SALT treaty. He felt that if we held off a summit, the Americans would try as soon as possible to prepare a treaty and to sign it. But ultimately, we spent three years on the treaty, and by that time Brezhnev was really in another world. The whole relationship could have been completely different. It was a mistake that we did not really try to explain ourselves to each other. It was both sides' fault; but I think it was much more our fault.

The last remark I would like to make is in the connection with Georgy's comment. He made an interesting remark. There is only one thing I disagree with him about. I do not think we reached the point in 1978 where we thought that we had reached a point of such military strength that, for us, the Third World was the most important area of concern. I never heard anyone in my country suggest that the Third World was the number one problem for Russia. Never.

**TROYANOVSKY:** Never. That is true.

**DOBRYNIN:** So, please don't be misled. Maybe he spoke with Andropov; he was not at that time the Secretary General, but he was a reasonable fellow. But the Third World was never the number one problem. The number one problem was the United States. I just wanted to make that clear.

**LEGVOLD:** Thank you very much. All of that was very helpful. It is now time for a coffee break. Let me tell you the situation with the speaker's list before we do that. Arne, I have not forgotten you; you are still on the list. Ilya, I have not forgotten you, either. Marshall wanted to respond to Georgy earlier on, and now General Gribkov wants to speak. We are going to have coffee, and I will come back and make some order out of that list afterwards. We will reassemble at five minutes to 11:00.

## March 24, Session 2—Africa: The Horn

**LEGVOLD:** Let us resume. I am going to change things a little bit from the list that I said we had. Arne has a three-finger intervention. Ilya, I am going to hold you off, even a little bit longer; I apologize.

We want in this session now to begin getting much more specific about the dynamic between the two countries around two issues. Before we leave the Shaba incident entirely and turn to the conflict between Ethiopia and Somalia, and the effect that had on the relationship, Karen Brutents has offered to explain the background of Shaba, and what it meant for the Soviet side. The Americans would like to hear that very much. Then Cy has a point that he wants to make, and then I am going to ask Marshall whether, at that juncture, he still wants to comment on Shakhnazarov's earlier intervention. But we

will come to that. So, first, Karen, if you are willing, would you say a word about what Shaba was all about? And Anatoly Gribkov will speak on the same subject.

**BRUTENTS:** Well, first of all, I would like to repeat what my colleagues have already said during our first session—that the significance of Shaba was exaggerated to a very large degree. Anatoly Fedorovich said he did not know what Shaba was; I can almost join him in this. First of all, of course, Shaba emerged out of the siege in which the MPLA government practically found itself. I know we have no time now to cite all the facts from 1975, to describe the development of the situation—how they were under fire from Zaire, from the South, Operation Zulu, and all that. I hope the people present here know about all that. We supported the MPLA; but we supported them for purely pragmatic reasons, not from the ideological point of view. Maybe not all of you know that, initially, we made a decision when the split occurred between [first name?] Chependa [spelling?] and [Agostinho] Neto, we made a decision to recognize Holden Roberto as the representative of the fighting people of Angola. On the one hand, we just had not had time to carry out that decision officially. But we had a Politburo decision on that. We had no time to do it because we immediately began receiving protests from prominent African leaders, statesmen, and also from the Portuguese left. Then we based our considerations on the fact that MPLA, due to its tribal structure and other specific characteristics, was representative of the majority of the Angolans. Time confirmed our calculations; they won the elections that the international community considered free and fair.

But the United States and the West in general could not accept the MPLA victory. I

would like to remind you that the Walvis Bay agreement on the transitional government in Luanda was undermined primarily by the Americans, who were actively helping UNITA and the FNLA. Eventually, even North Korea, in their stupidity, gave support to the FNLA. So when the MPLA government faced a real threat, only then did some Cuban officers first appear first in Luanda, and then the Cuban contingent arrived in large numbers, as you know. Fidel Castro pointed out at your meeting in 1992 that the Cubans did that on their own initiative. I just wanted to confirm it.

In Oslo, Georgy Markovich Kornienko told us how they in the Foreign Ministry found out that the Cubans had already begun landing in Angola. We had the same situation and the same reaction. I do not exclude the possibility that somebody knew about those developments in our intelligence community—in the KGB—and this is reflected in the documents here, the American documents. It is hard for me to imagine that nobody had known. But I am convinced—and everything I know allows me to claim—that the Soviet leadership as a whole was not informed about it. Furthermore, many members of the Soviet leadership were unhappy with what they regarded as the Cuban drive to show independent action, without any consultations or anything like that. Maybe jealousy was a part of it. But soon they had adjusted to the circumstances, and even supported it. It was convenient in many respects: it was the Cubans, not us, who were involved, you understand; I do not need to go further into explanations.

But the efforts of the United States and of the West as a whole to destabilize the situation continued. In 1976, as far as I remember, Neto and Mobutu had a meeting. They decided that the assistance should stop; the assistance to FNLA, to FLEC [??] for



Cabinda, and the assistance to UNITA in regards to Zaire. I am not speaking about South Africa. Nonetheless, nothing stopped at all. The border incursions continued; the attempts to destabilize the situation in Angola continued also. And only then, I think—I can tell you for sure that we did not have any reliable information—only then, I think, did the Angolans use the former Katangese *gendarmérie*. They were stationed along the border. They were in military training. I have heard that the Cubans were involved; I can neither confirm nor disconfirm that. But I would like to stress that the Angolans used them as a border militia. You need to take this element into account when speaking about military training. They were used to protect this part of the border.

In March 1977, they crossed the border—I suspect with the blessing of the Angolans. A transfer of Moroccan troops by the French and the Belgians followed, and then they retreated.

**DOBRYNIN:** Aboard the American planes.

**BRUTENTS:** No, those were not American planes; that was later. The second time involved American planes, but not this time. But President Carter openly stated that the United States had nothing against such actions by their allies, and you can see it in the documents here.

I do not want to take more time. I would like to stop here, and to repeat once more what my colleagues had already said: we are not speaking in terms of condemning or

justifying anybody; we are stating the facts as they were. And when a year later President Carter—and not only Carter—said, in regards to the Ethiopia-Somalia crisis, that they were trying to avoid military involvement in Africa—that they had no military presence in Africa—I could have asked him an impolite question: Why would the U.S. need any American military presence in Africa when they had the French, the Belgians, the Moroccans and others there? Weren't those typical proxies? They assumed the function that the Americans would have had there.

So Shaba I came to an end at that point. Our American colleagues know quite well that those events, as far as I remember, did not inspire much interest on the American side. Nobody was talking about them. I even happen to recall that there was a statement made by President Carter—or maybe by yourself, Secretary Vance—to the effect that that was a local question, and that it should not be turned into a big question in our relations. For almost a year after that, or maybe less—maybe for six months—everything was very quiet. And then the whole thing started again from the Zairian side. And here I can even cite a very concrete conversation. In November 1977, the MPLA held its organizational congress. Our delegation was visiting at the congress. [Andrei] Kirilenko led the delegation. During the congress, he had a conversation with Neto. I was the only one present at that meeting, besides the interpreter. The conversation was rather frank. We expected the conversation to be about the creation of the party, how it was being formed, about its character, about how to increase the combat readiness of the Angolan Army, and maybe some other smaller questions.

By the way, I would like to make one additional comment. In your literature—in

the American literature, and in the Western literature in general: in Fukuyama, and Garthoff, for example—and in the official circles, there were two main theses. One of them was that those years represented the peak of Soviet activity in the Third World. This could be debated. The second was that the Soviet Union was at that time changing its orientation and focusing now on the Marxist-Leninist parties, and also trying to encourage and even impose the creation of such parties in the Third World countries. This is very far from reality. The position was just the opposite. Yes, we stimulated the creation of the parties; we advised them to create parties; but we insisted that they should keep the broad national movement as the main foundation for the party structure. We had many arguments, discussions, efforts to persuade, for instance, Neto, and Mengistu. But neither of them listened to us. If anybody is interested, I can tell you exactly what we proposed.

The first issue that Kirilenko had to discuss, according to his instructions from Moscow, was exactly this. He said, "You announced that you were creating a party of the working class. That is fine; but, please, in your practical work, make sure that the MPLA remains a national movement like it has always been, but with a strong party structure, and with strong party discipline." This was our position. And then, unexpectedly, the issue of border incursions from Zaire came up. There was one other curious moment. When the South Africans and UNITA moved close to Luanda—it was in the earlier period; not in November, but maybe even in July or August—the Angolans did not turn to us; they turned to the Cubans, and to Yugoslavia, for help. Yugoslavia sent them a big ship with weapons. During our conversation, Neto said reproachfully that they did not turn to us at that point because they felt that we would not have helped them. He said this in regards

to the role some of our military played in the coup. Suddenly he raised that question about the border incursions from Zaire, and how much they were concerned about it. He was very nervous talking about it. He said that those incursions, combined with the offensive from the South, created a very difficult situation for them. I want to reiterate that that was a very painful issue for them. By the way, that same issue was raised in passing in Kirilenko's conversation with Raúl Castro, which took place on the next day during a boat trip; but the theme was not developed further—they just mentioned it.

I believe there were incursions from both sides, from Angola into Zaire, and from Zaire into Angola. I think so. Then in March, I think, there was a large-scale incursion by the FNLA forces, an increase in UNITA activity in the South, bombardment of the Angolan territory by Mirages from Zaire, and bombardment from South African territory. All of this accumulated gradually. And then, I think, the Angolans gave the go-ahead to the Katangese. And then it happened in May. Of course, I do not remember the exact date when it happened.

And one more thing, now; I just recalled it. There was a large incursion from Zaire into Angola. They even took a big city: [city name?]. So, as I can see, the Angolans had probably pushed them a little bit, and the incursion was very successful. They took [city name?]; you probably know, it was already a threat to the copper mines, and everything started all over again. This time, American planes were used to transfer 2,500 Belgian and French paratroopers; then came the Senegalese, and the Moroccan troops, etc. All those forces were presented as all-African forces. This is how the process developed.

By the way, I would like to mention one more significant detail. Stansfield Turner is

with us today. I remember reading in one of the American magazines at the time that you went with David Aaron to Clark even before the Shaba incursion, trying to get his agreement to strengthen assistance to UNITA, circumventing the Clark amendment. Here in the documents we have an exchange of opinions when Brzezinski asks you whether, if you began to provide assistance through a third party, it would have strengthened UNITA. I am not blaming anyone for anything; I am just trying to say that the policy of destabilizing the Angolan regime continued at that time. Only with that in mind you can understand Shaba.

What happened next you all probably know. With the landing of the paratroopers, of course those four thousand people retreated. And the result was that Mobutu and Neto met in July 1978, and this time they signed a real, genuine agreement, and the incursions from Zaire stopped. So the Angolans achieved the goal they were pursuing. Concerning the American reaction to that process, I can only say one thing. There were accusations by president Carter—I think he formulated them on May 25, 1978, in his statement. He said it was the Cubans who were responsible. Somewhere in his conversation with Gromyko he mentioned that the Soviets might be responsible also. I can tell you about this, even though I am not excited by the way Gromyko carried on the conversation—it had, as we used to say, an “assertive character”, you know; it seems to me simply to be rude; still, you have to keep in mind the fact that those memoranda of conversations were usually sent to one’s colleagues, and one had to present himself as assertive against the imperialists. I am not excited either by the tone or the content of the conversation. But he was probably right when he said that the Soviet leadership did not know anything about

Shaba. He was right in saying that, because it was a very insignificant, routine issue for the Soviet leadership. Our services which were dealing with such cases professionally knew about Shaba, of course.

And the last thing, to put it all behind us: I think it is very significant that in Brzezinski's and in Vance's memoirs—and in memoirs of other leaders—Shaba looked very different from how it actually looked at the time. There are no direct accusations. Even Brzezinski says, "Probably with the Cuban involvement." Probably! At that time, in May 1978, there was a clear accusation, formulated in a very blunt form. A lot of tension was created as a result. Cyrus Vance wrote that the information was not very reliable, and not very precise, and so on.

I would like to finish with two phrases. I would like to repeat what Anatoly Fedorovich has said: that the importance of the Shaba episodes was greatly exaggerated. The American side interpreted the Shaba II episode in the light of the Somali-Ethiopian conflict. There was no Soviet plan—you can believe me or not—but there was no plan to invade Zaire and to cut off the West's mineral resources. We had no such plan. I would like to stress this now, in order not to come back to it later. Judging from the literature, that issue was raised many times, and very insistently so. During the Vienna talks, Carter specifically made a point that we should not be trying to cut each other off from our vitally important mineral resources in the framework of détente. In this I hear echoes of the theory developed by Brzezinski that we were preparing to encircle Saudi Arabia, and to cut you off from your oil supplies. This is very, very far from the truth. And I will tell you why: the Soviet leaders, as gerontocratic as they were—as Georgy has just said—

comprehended the limits of their capabilities. They were very cautious, even timid, where the vital interests of the West were concerned. That is why there was no such idea. Not then, not now. I do not know what will happen in 25 years; that might be different. Thank you for your attention. I have finished.

**LEGVOLD:** I want to thank Karen Brutents for that intervention, and I did not interrupt him myself because I thought it was important to get that level of historical detail on the record. For the rest of you, if you are prepared to provide that same level of historical detail, and demonstrate that level of knowledge of everyone else's writing as has Karen, you will be allowed a little more time. Otherwise, you need to be brief.

I want to welcome Tom Pickering, our Ambassador to Moscow. We are delighted to have you here, Tom.

I am going to turn next to Cy Vance, and then I will come back to Anatoly Gribkov, after Cy Vance.

**VANCE:** I want to thank Karen Brutents for giving us the detail in such an important way. I think it was very helpful to hear what you had to say on this. I want to make a comment about a document that we have received from the Russian Foreign Ministry Archives. It details—

**LEGVOLD:** Where do we find this document?

**VANCE:** It says "Source: Russian Foreign Ministry Archives, Moscow, translated by Mark Doktoroff."

**SHULMAN:** Why don't you give the date?

**VANCE:** It is dated September 23, 1977, Washington, excerpts dealing with Africa. And it is record of the main content of Gromyko's conversation with U.S. President Carter.

Turning now specifically to Angola, it says this. Carter is speaking: "Angola, with the presence of several thousand Cuban troops there, creates a problem for us. I think it would have been useful if you, or we together, had convinced the Cubans to withdraw their troops from Angola, although I understand that we have a difference of opinions on this question." Then Gromyko responds, "As for the Cuban troops in Angola, it is the business of Angola and Cuba, and I am not authorized to discuss this question. It would be right, however, to ask in this regard: whose personnel supports the anti-Angolan movement, the troops that are based in Zaire and invade Angola? Whose foreign troops acted in Angola even before the arrival there of the Cuban troops? The answers to these questions are clear."

Quite frankly, the president took that pretty much as a finger in the eye from Gromyko, and I think this was one of many things that really raised questions about whether the Soviets had any serious desire to try to find a way to sit down with us and deal with these issues together.



**LEGVOLD:** Thank you, Cy. Anatoly Gribkov?

**ANATOLY GRIBKOV:** Diplomats here have spoken about the topic in detail. I would like to say a couple of words as a professional military officer. Did the Soviet Union have a strategic conception of its interests in Africa, or for Africa? I was a First Deputy of the Chief of General Staff of the Soviet Union, and at the same time I was a Chief of Staff of the united forces of the Warsaw Treaty. The participants here have been speaking about the ideological issues: whether Soviet ideology was present in Africa or not. Ideology was present, and not only in Africa; it was present everywhere where there emerged states which announced that they had chosen the socialist way of development. This was exactly the mistake that the Soviet leadership was making. As soon as a leader in Mozambique, Angola, Ethiopia, or Somalia mentioned the word “socialism,” our leaders immediately picked up on it up and decided that this particular country would become socialist. It was very primitive. They wanted that country to instantaneously exchange their donkeys for Mercedes or Fords. That is quite a leap in terms of development. That is why I think that the Soviet leadership made mistakes, and that it was misled.

Even though we had already achieved parity by that time—both in nuclear and in conventional weapons—I do not think that excess amounts of those weapons were forcing us to move and to conquer new territories and spheres. There was nothing like that in the policy of the Soviet Union, at least as the military leadership saw the situation. The Soviet representatives in those countries—the Soviet military specialists—went there not by their

own will. I do not remember who, but one of the participants here mentioned the name of General of the Army Petrov, who was in Ethiopia, and who was responsible for all our activities in Northern Africa, in that region. General of the Army [Ivan] Pavlovsky, the Chief of the Army, was there before General Petrov. Petrov then became the Chief of the Army, and he became responsible for Africa. He went there on visits very often. He provided assistance there, especially on Mengistu's requests, in planning operations against their enemies with a group of officers. Every time he came to Moscow, we discussed all the pros and cons in the General Staff, and made the conclusion that we got pulled in there and that there might be no end to that involvement. We presented our conclusions at the Collegium of the Defense Ministry. Ustinov was the Defense Minister at the time. Ustinov listened, and, as the Russian saying goes, "Vaska listens and eats"—he did not take it seriously. He would go to the Politburo, and you have to keep in mind that he exercised a great influence in the Politburo up until the last days of his life. Gromyko would present his report, Andropov would present his, Ustinov would present his, and our old leadership—you knew about it as well as we knew about it—could not exercise any thinking at that time already, so they would make decisions on the basis of what that "troika" told them.

Of course, a certain market for weapons had emerged at that time in the African countries. But the Soviet Union has not gained anything from the market.

**SHAKHNAZAROV:** It was no market. There was free distribution.

**GRIBKOV:** It turned out that the weapons were given for free. The situation resembles Iraq now. They owe us \$7 billion, but with the help of the U.S., we just cannot get them to pay it. [Laughter.]

What kind of mistake did the Soviet leadership make when Ethiopia and Somalia began their conflict? Let me speak as a professional military man. Our leadership exchanged kisses with one side, and then with the other side, but then, when the military conflict emerged between Ethiopia and Somalia, instead of trying to pacify them—to invite them to a negotiating table—we sided with one of them: Ethiopia. And Somalia left us then. Immediately, it was picked up by the American side, like a piece of cake.

**SHAKHNAZAROV:** Not too much of a cake.

**GRIBKOV:** Yes, maybe not much. [Laughter.] Here I would come back to my starting point: the Soviet Union did not have any clearly formulated strategy in Africa. Thank you for your attention.

**LEGVOLD:** Thank you very much, Anatoly. I have a specific question now for you and for your colleagues. You've now given us quite a lot of helpful information on Petrov's role, and even on Pavlovsky's; on your conversations in the General Staff; and on Ustinov's role in the Politburo. The transcript of the April 28, 1978 meeting between Gromyko and Carter, which Karen said was very unsatisfactory from his point of view, says: "Gromyko

continued his response to the president on African matters. He called the presence of a Soviet general in Ethiopia a myth. Had the Soviet Union been invited to send a general there, it would have refused," and so on. Was he lying? And if so, why? [Laughter.]

**BRUTENTS:** I am not sure that that is a correct question. [Laughter.] Excuse me, Mr. President.

**DOBRYNIN:** Yes; I agree with him.

**LEGVOLD:** The question is: why would Gromyko be this firm when he would have reason to assume that American intelligence would have known?

**DOBRYNIN:** I think it is better to drop the issue and not to answer your question.

**BRUTENTS:** Can I answer?

**DOBRYNIN:** We do not know, really.

**BRUTENTS:** When an American representative was asked about the weapons given to Somali through other countries, partners, not American weapon, he answered that there were none. Was he lying?

**DOBRYNIN:** Was it a lack of knowledge?

**LEGVOLD:** Okay; do you want to put this question? [Laughter.]

**BRUTENTS:** No, no; I do not want to put that question, because I do not consider it to be correct. Policy is policy. Politics is politics.

**LEGVOLD:** Okay; as I said at the beginning, this conference is of and by you, the policy makers. So in the end you will decide what is a correct or an incorrect question. But the outside world has a different notion of what is a correct and an incorrect question.

**BRUTENTS:** I did not put the question; it was your question.

**LEGVOLD:** Bob Pastor is on this point; but what we want to do now is to begin moving toward the specific issue of Somali-Ethiopian conflict, and I think it would be useful in this context—especially for the American side—for someone to respond to Jim Hershberg's earlier question. There was a process by which it looked as though Barre, in fact, would be willing to commit aggression against Ethiopia over the Ogaden. The American side was aware that there was a shifting of alignments—that the Soviets were likely to end up on Mengistu's side. There would be an opportunity for the United States in this context. Was there any thought in the summer of 1977 on the American side that if this now began to

happen, it would be in the American interest to discourage the Somalis from going against the Ethiopians in the Ogaden, with all its consequences?

Cy, one of the things that interested me about the conversation that you referred to a moment ago was Carter's perception that Gromyko was sticking a finger in his eye. In my own notes here I have written—mildly—that Gromyko's answer was not very helpful in response to a reasonable position by the president. But the other note that I have on this is that in September 1977, the two men did not talk about the Horn. Now, why weren't we at that point raising the problem, because we were so close to October, or begin moving in that direction?

Bob, you wanted to comment on what is correct and not correct.

**PASTOR:** You have just posed a lot of very important questions, and we all understand why the first question that you have posed to our Russian friends is an embarrassing question. But it is an important question. The purpose of this dialogue is to ask embarrassing questions. We are dealing with history in an effort to understand it. Karen came back with a potentially embarrassing question, which our side, I hope, will explain.

But I would like to get back to your first question. The fact is, as Cy Vance said, that he heard Gromyko's answer as a finger in the eye of the president. But, I think, President Carter heard it much more seriously; I mean, President Carter is a person who placed a lot of faith in truth. You will recall that he was elected in 1976 saying that he would never lie to the American people, and for the first year the American press looked for opportunities to show that he was not telling the truth. They did not find them, and

they went on to other issues, and found other problems. But the point is that, from his perspective, the honesty of his interlocutor was very, very important. So the answer had serious consequences. And the question, to go back to it, is this: can you give us your best judgment about the answer to Bob Legvold's question. Why would the Foreign Minister respond like that? Obviously, none of you can speak for him; but if you could give us your judgment, it would be better than our own.

**LEGVOLD:** Ilya, I was holding you for a long time, so before I will take another three-finger, could it be made related to what we were talking about?

**ILYA GAIDUK:** I think that when we discuss any questions dealing with the situation in Africa, or the policies of the Soviet Union and the United States in Africa, we constantly face problems that have a deeper meaning. We are talking about the absence of some Third World strategy on both sides. Oftentimes both sides acted in reaction. They reacted to a certain development of events, and often that reaction was not thought through.

Unfortunately, I have been waiting for my turn. My comments are really a reaction to some of the interventions at the beginning of our session. But I think that indeed Soviet policy in the Third World at the end of the 1970s could be explained by the new status the Soviet Union had acquired at the end of the 1960s. As a result of the parity between the Soviet Union and the United States—the nuclear, military parity between the Soviet Union and the United States—for the first time, at the end of the 1960s, Soviet leaders could

regard their country as a great power not only in name, but in real terms, as Karen Nersesovich has pointed out. They had a military basis to support their claims. They had the military power. Therefore, in their eyes, the status of the great power assumed a new meaning. Now they could act more decisively, and more assertively. At the same time, they had to prove to themselves, and to the outside world, that now they could, as a consequence of that military parity, influence developments in the world.

Probably they had two options—two ways, it seems to me—to do that: one option was to increase its own influence, and the other option was to undermine the influence of their opponent—the United States, in this case. But because, as had been said here, the Soviet leaders in the late 1970s were very cautious—because they were not willing to start any confrontation—these options were pursued in an indirect way: through the creation of pro-Soviet parties, for example, under the cover of the national liberation movements. Even the attitude towards détente was very different on each side. In the case of Ethiopia and Somalia, I am reminded of revolving doors: as the Soviet influence decreased in Somalia, it immediately increased in Ethiopia. In this case the U.S. policy resembled the Soviet policy, or at least was going in the same direction, possibly on a different basis. What that basis was, I would like to know from the American side. Thank you.

**LEGVOLD:** Marshall, I have been holding you. The question I am still putting to the American side, though, is to try to understand what the steps were in 1977 that led us so long to ignore this potential issue, and maybe in the process of ignoring it—or maybe not ignoring it—to end up in effect, allying with the Somali aggression, which is the way the



Soviet side would see it. That is overstating it. I would ask you to think about this with respect to the 1977 period. Perhaps someone else on the U.S. side would care to address this; maybe Bill Odom?

There is a question now, however, that flows from what you—and, earlier, Georgy—said, and that is a question to the Soviet side from Bill Odom: precisely what changed in the East-West balance that made Soviet leaders think that projecting Cuban troops and Soviet weapons into Ethiopia would be accepted by the United States? Marshall?

**SHULMAN:** When I asked for the floor, it was for a different purpose. So I will postpone that part of it and answer Georgy's question.

On this question of Somalia, and of relations with Siad Barre, one fact that needs to be emphasized is Siad Barre's erratic character. He was a wild man. Anyone who dealt with him found it very difficult to do so in any coherent and responsible way.

**VANCE:** I agree. [Laughter.]

**SHULMAN:** And one general factor, I think, in dealing with the conflicts in the Third World—and especially in Africa—was that each of these people—each of these countries—had motivations of their own, and agendas of their own, and were coming out of tribal politics. In the case of Somalia, they were coming out of a period of great tumult.

It is a mistake to attribute some kind of a consistent rational motivation on their part.

There was not really a coherent response to the potential conflict.

Now, Siad Barre said on various occasions that he was *not* going to attack the Ogaden; but it was clear from everything he was doing that he was building up to that. There could be no doubt about it. My impression is that there was not quite a coherent, fully developed strategic sense that there was an important set of issues involved here—including, especially, the naval bases at Berbera and elsewhere. There was merely a feeling that here was an opportunity, perhaps, to get the Russians out of their naval bases. On the other hand, from the Soviet point of view—like in Æsop's fable about reaching the proximate grapes—there was a feeling that Ethiopia represented a more serious opportunity in Africa than did Somalia. But it was an unformed strategic competition, I think. Apart from what Karen said, there was no strategic doctrine; there was merely a primitive sense of strategic maneuver, really. It was not coherent, nor well-designed. As far as the United States is concerned, my own impression was that Siad Barre was a very uncertain instrument who was not subject to control, and that he represented an embarrassment, in many ways. He appealed for more weapons; it was clear—everyone had a sense—that it would be quite dangerous to give him all that he asked for. He was still operating with a very considerable stock of Soviet weapons from the earlier period, which he was operating on for the most part. And so, it was an incomplete game, as I see it in retrospect.

**LEGVOLD:** Marshall, do you have some sense of why? Bill Odom is next, maybe he could

answer as well. Do you have some sense of why, at that September 1977 meeting that Cy referred to between the president and Gromyko, Angola was talked about, but it appears that the Horn was not? Now, maybe it was talked about, but did not appear in the minutes. Was it talked about?

VANCE: No, no.

LEGVOLD: Do you have some sense of why we did not raise it with them in September of 1977?

ODOM: It wasn't then a big issue. It became a big issue later; but at that point, it was not. It was too early. Shaba was recent history. But as I recall it—and maybe Marshall can correct me on this—I do not remember Ethiopia becoming a big issue. There were talks about what was going on there in all sorts of intelligence reports, and periodically we would circulate memos among ourselves on that issue. But I do not remember that becoming a real policy focus before November. That is just an answer to your question.

May I proceed now with a few short comments on Somalia?

LEGVOLD: Les, are you right on this? Okay; and then back to Bill.

ODOM: Okay, sure.

**GELB:** I think you are barking up the wrong tree looking for the Horn of Africa at this point. In fact, it was so much in the background that in September, when Cy met with Gromyko at the U.N. in New York, they agreed on resuming the Indian Ocean talks that were in a state of hiatus. Later, when the issue flared up, those talks were suspended. But at that time, the situation was quiet enough that they agreed to resume them.

**LEGVOLD:** Bill Odom, please continue.

**ODOM:** Bob, as I understood your point, it was to try to throw some more light on the U.S. view of Somalia. My impression was that Brzezinski did not know anything about Somalia. I sure did not know anything about Somalia. We watched what was going on; but Paul Henze on the NSC staff knew a lot about Somalia, and he had very strong views. He felt we ought to stay out of Somalia. He wrote great tracts against anybody on the staff who as much as suggested that we ought to take advantage of Soviet difficulties in Somalia. He said, "If you think Northern Ireland is difficult, insert yourself into the quarrels over the Ogaden." I think the whole attitude on the U.S. side about dealing with Somalia was one of caution and fear. It was not just that we saw that man as crazy; we saw the country as strategically not that important. It would be delightful to see the Soviets lose their base in Berbera; but beyond that, the Somali option was highly unattractive, as I recall it. In fact, it never really became attractive, although eventually we did do something in the Fall of 1979—two years later.

**LEGVOLD:** Vlad Zubok?

**VLAD ZUBOK:** I would like to use my intervention to raise another aspect of the Somali-Ethiopian question: namely, the role of the Cubans. As we get more evidence from the Eastern side of the Cold war, the more we historians are struck by the fact that, sometimes, the tail wagged the dog—not in a direct sense; in a very indirect sense, sometimes. But those countries that were treated as proxies by the NSC and the State Department were trying to gain some room for independent autonomous action wherever they could. I am personally struck to find in these documents many indications how Erich Honecker—and, even moreso, Fidel Castro—tried to use Africa as this huge ground where they could get some autonomy in international relations. We, perhaps, can be convinced that the Soviet leaders did not have any ambitious plans for Africa; but when we read the briefing that Fidel Castro gave to the East Germans on April 3, 1977, we read him saying, “In Africa, we can inflict a severe defeat on the entire reactionary imperialist policy. We can free Africa from the influence of the USA, and of the Chinese.” There are many fascinating tidbits demonstrating the autonomous and very important role of the Cubans, both politically and militarily. I would say politically even more than militarily.

What comments can the Soviet veterans and the American veterans make on this? How did they see the role of the Cubans between 1975 and 1979? I am especially interested in the comments on the Soviet side on this.

I found one fascinating remark in the transcript of the Oslo conference, where

Karen Brutents, I believe, said that after 1972 we simply could not turn down Castro's requests. Was this because of a sense of guilt that the Soviet leadership had for letting him down during the Cuban missile crisis? Was it because they had an inferiority complex over the fact that Castro was more of a revolutionary, and more of a visionary, than all of them put together?

**LEGVOLD:** While all of you decide who is going to respond to that question, Marshall wants to comment.

**SHULMAN:** Just three quick points in response to Vlad's question. First, it is important to remember that the Cubans were present in Angola a long time before. They were active in support against Portugal. So they had a presence there to start with; it did not just begin in this later period.

Secondly, they had a functional role to play which, I think, reinforced the Russian acceptance of their presence: and that was that the materiel that had been supplied to Neto for the Angolans was technologically advanced, and they did not have the capability to use it—anti-aircraft weapons and other materiel that was beyond the capabilities of the Angolans at that time. So the Cubans had a very important role, both as instructors, and in operations. Functionally, they had an important role to play as intermediaries between the Soviet-supplied weapons, and the Angolans' use of them.

Thirdly, what WAS expressed very well in that interview between Fidel and

Honecker was that, however ambiguous the Soviets may have been at that time about ideology and the socialist mission, there was no doubt that Fidel was a true believer. Fidel saw this as a part of an ideological crusade, and he was in the forefront of it. He really believed it. I think, from the Soviet point of view, the problem was figuring out how to support him without having him carry things too far.

**LEGVOLD:** My slate is now clean. Are some people on the Russian side prepared to respond to either of the two questions? There are two questions that have really been put on the floor for you. One is Vlad's very good question: what kinds of issues did Castro's commitments and impulses in Africa create for you? What kind of a difficulty did you have in coping with that relationship in the African context, for whatever set of reasons? The other one is Bill Odom's question: what would have made you think that you could intervene in Ethiopia without precipitating consequences for your relationship with the United States? Did you assume that the consequences would be manageable? Negligible? Put another way: you have been saying to us from the beginning that these things in the Horn of Africa, and in Angola, developed because opportunities emerged, and for whatever set of reasons, you were sort of drawn into them. That is fair enough, and Marshall echoed the same point in commenting. But seizing those opportunities involved costs in the U.S. relationship. I am wondering how those costs were assessed? Or was that simply not a consideration?

Phil Brenner.

**BRENNER:** I was going to follow up on that. In some ways, it is too bad that we do not have the Cuban participants fully sitting at the table, because I think they would speak in a slightly different voice than Vlad Zubok suggests. In reading the transcript with Honecker, we have to take into account the fact, as Les Gelb said earlier, that you cannot always read transcripts literally. When he was talking to Honecker, Fidel Castro was trying, in some sense, to pander to what he thought Soviet interests were. In effect, he was conveying a message to the Soviets through Honecker. There is a very great difference between his actually having had this vision of an anti-imperialist struggle in Africa, and his attempting to seize the opportunity to promote Cuban influence for his own strategic purposes—effectively freeing Cuba from Soviet dependency.

In the American documents, we find no sense that Cuba might, in fact, be interested in freeing itself from the Soviet Union. All of them represent Cuba as a puppet, and a troublemaker, whose primary target was us. It does not appear that there was any willingness to consider Cuba as a country that might have interests that would be compatible with U.S. interests.

**LEGVOLD:** Les Gelb?

**GELB:** Again, this is an attempt to answer your question about what the strategic thinking was on our side about dealing with the Horn. First, I do not think there was any strategic thinking. It is much like the Russian representation of their situation. The U.S. was in a



difficult position with the Horn in 1977 because of Mengistu. Mengistu caused all sorts of serious human rights problems with the Carter administration, and one of the first decisions in the administration was to cut back on military assistance to Ethiopia. So our relations with Ethiopia became very tense very quickly. When this situation began to evolve with Somalia, the only interest the United States had in Somalia was Berbera. The only time that Somalia was even discussed was in respect to Berbera. We had made a floating dry dock at a missile handling facility you had in Berbera into a Soviet strategic paradise. And this was the Soviets' strategic entrée into that part of the world. Remember, we talked about Berbera every time that part of the world came up. But we talked about almost nothing else. And when you switched sides, leaving your great ally Siad Barre for the other great ally in the area, Mengistu, our choice, really, was between having no ally in the area, or picking up your bad guy, Siad Barre. And we almost fell into it. And we fell into it in a grand way, because we did begin to supply Siad Barre with arms—far less than he asked for, of course; but we did supply him with arms.

**[UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER]:** Indirectly.

**GELB:** Yes, indirectly. And we directly started to supply Kenya. That is how seriously the situation was taken at the time. We sold jets and other arms to Kenya in the wake of all that. And Kenya could not well afford \$150 million worth of arms at that point. So, it evolved not by choice, but by default, because if we were to have a role in the area, our

only choice would to support Siad Barre, and to strengthen military ties with Kenya.

**LEGVOLD:** Before coming back to Oleg on this and leaving the issue on the American side, I want to pose to you a question that Georgy Markovich Kornienko put on his list that bears on it. You've already answered the question; but the fact that he has the question, it seems to me, is interesting, and of some significance. The question is the following: In the spring of 1977, the personal physician of President Carter arrived in Somalia for a consultation with Siad Barre. He delivered a personal letter from President Carter to the Somali leader. Shortly after that visit, Somalia began to curtail its ties with the Soviet Union, and Somali troops invaded Ethiopia. What was the content of the letter? What was the rationale behind the American policy of essentially encouraging the Soviet Union to increase their involvement?

I'm not sure I understand the rationale. On the first part, just as a historical matter, was there no such visit and no letter?

**VANCE:** I can take that.

**LEGVOLD:** Cy.

**VANCE:** When I read that, I determined to find out what it was, because it did not ring any bells with me. So I dug into it, and I found something respect to the personal physician.

Dr. Kevin Cahill, who is one of the two great tropical medical experts in the United States, spent much of his earlier days in that part of the world. So I called Kevin the other day, and I said, "Kevin, by any chance, were you the personal physician of President Carter who arrived in Somalia for a consultation?" He said, "No; let me tell you about Siad Barre." He said, "Siad Barre has been a patient of mine, and his family has been, for some twenty years or more, and it started when I was a young man out in that part of the world." And then I read him Kornienko's question. He said the answer to the questions is as follows. He did not come to deliver any personal letter from President Carter to the Somali leader. Indeed, he did not talk to Carter at all about this; but he did go over at that time. He was over there paying a visit in Somalia, and called on the family of Siad Barre in connection with some medical matter that was involved. So the answer to the question of whether he delivered a personal letter from Carter to the Somali leader is no. He had not even talked to Carter about it. But he did, of course, know Siad Barre, and he knew him extremely well.

What was the content of the letter? The answer is: there was no letter; therefore, it had no content.

**GELB:** Can I have five minutes on this?

**LEGVOLD:** Sure.

**GELB:** Cy, my recollection is that the only emissary you sent over was Dick Moss [name?], about nine months later.

**VANCE:** Yes, that's right.

**GELB:** And you sent him over with a message to tell Siad Barre not to mess around in the Ogaden at all.

**LEGVOLD:** Jim, very briefly.

**HERSHBERG:** I'd like to clarify this story, if I may. This is briefly covered in *Détente and Confrontation*, the revised edition, page 700, paragraph 2. [Laughter.] The story was disclosed in *Newsweek* on September 26, 1977. Allegedly, the story was that Cahill was told by a U.S. government official to tell Siad Barre in June 1977 that the U.S. government was "not averse to further guerrilla pressure in the Ogaden." The official, Garthoff determined, was Matthew Nimetz, the Councilor of the State Department. And Nimetz denied passing on that particular comment, though he said he had told Cahill to pass on to Siad Barre the U.S. government's interest in improving relations with Somalia. So, that's clearly the episode in question, and in some garbled form, the story reached Moscow. But it does raise, I think, something that the U.S. side might wish to address: Siad Barre, obviously, was a bad guy, and a weak reed to rely on. To what extent was Carter's clear

interest in pressuring Mengistu in the spring and summer of 1977 such a consideration that you would not look too adversely on Siad putting pressure on Mengistu in the Ogaden in hope that this might lead to the downfall of the Mengistu regime?

**LEGVOLD:** Oleg Troyanovsky?

**TROYANOVSKY:** Two small points. Les mentioned that the United states had difficulties with Mengistu and Ethiopia because of the human rights situation. Certainly Ethiopia was no human rights paradise; but neither was Zaire, for instance, or South Africa, or just about any other African country at that time. So, there is a discrepancy there.

**GELB:** There was not. One of the first decisions that President Carter made was to cut back on military assistance to both Ethiopia and Zaire.

**TROYANOVSKY:** Well, yes. [Laughter.] There is another factor to take into account when speaking of the Soviet Union's activity in Africa. Perhaps it was far from being decisive, but still it existed. At that time, the Soviet Union was under a constant fire from the Chinese side for not being active in the fight against imperialism. We were charged with appeasing the United States, and things like that. And sometimes this may have led to decisions which would not have been made under other circumstances. I do not think this was a decisive factor; but it existed.

**LEGVOLD:** Bill Odom?

**ODOM:** To raise another dimension of the Soviet involvement in Ethiopia, I think it worth noting that at this time Sadat was making very strong gestures toward reaching a settlement with the Israelis. Sadat was extremely disturbed by the Soviet presence in Ethiopia. Now, I do not remember thinking about this at the time; but I would ask Marshall, I guess—Cy has left now—or Les, or anyone else: To what degree, do you think, were Sadat's concerns with this a factor in our own calculations?

**DOBRYNIN:** One question: was *Sadat* disturbed by our presence in Ethiopia? Or did he want *you* to be disturbed?

**ODOM:** I have no way of knowing the answer to that question. [Laughter.] But I recall Sadat being paranoid about your involvement in Ethiopia, in view of his having thrown out your advisers in 1972, and in view of his very bad relations with you.

**LEGVOLD:** Les Gelb?

**GELB:** To show how decisions done for one set of reasons affect you in a totally different way than you intended. Let me go back to this case of human rights and Ethiopia. I will tell you exactly what happened. I just checked my memory with Cy before he left. About

three or four months into the Clinton administration—excuse me, the *Carter* administration [laughter]—Oh, boy! They all merge in my mind—President Carter was very upset that we had not taken action against any nation with whom we had arms sales, or an arms grant arrangement, on human rights grounds. He was upset that we were not being serious about human rights. So, we were directed by President Carter to come up with several punishments for arms recipients to demonstrate that we were serious about human rights. We met in Cy's office, and went through the list of all aid recipients—all military grant aid recipients. And out of that meeting we decided to punish three nations to set an example. One, I think, was Argentina; we would punish them by cutting back grant aid by \$10 million. One was Zaire—we had an enormous argument because the whole program was rather small; but we were going to punish them by cutting back another \$10 million. And then we felt that was not enough, so we got into an argument about this list of about 20 countries: who else we would pick out? [Laughter.] We picked out Ethiopia, and had this huge argument about it because other people said we could not do that, given the Soviet position in Berbera. But we went ahead and did it anyway. But these were demonstration cases that had nothing to do with thinking about the Soviet position in the Horn, let alone Africa as a whole. It was done for internal political and ideological reasons.

**LEGVOLD:** Georgy, I was going to turn to you and ask you the question that comes from Vlad Zubok about the impact of Cuba in Africa, and the relationship with the Soviet Union. Was it very difficult, as Karen Brutents evidently once said, to say “no” to the Cubans?

**SHAKHNAZAROV:** With respect to the actions in Africa? First of all, I would like to mention that in my long experience of work with the Cubans, and in my many personal meetings with Fidel and Raúl, I had an impression that they were very independent policy makers. Therefore, we should not exaggerate the degree of our influence on the Cubans. Very often we had situations where the Cuban leaders acted on their own initiative. Fidel has never been anything like a pupil of the Soviet leaders. Several times certain tensions emerged in Soviet-Cuban relations for different reasons. It happened in connection with the Caribbean crisis, which is no secret; it also happened for other reasons.

With regard to African affairs, I can only reiterate that Cuba's active involvement in Africa was unexpected for us. I think the American participants here correctly understood the causes of it, because Fidel has always been—and is now, even though now he has reconsidered some of his views—a truly convinced revolutionary. And he believed that Cuba, where possible, should help the African peoples: in particular, to gain their freedom. At the initial stage, it was an independent decision by Cuba to help the Africans—to help the Angolans. Later, when we had joined them, we had a dual position. On the one hand, it was simply a necessity; we were inadvertently involved in this situation. We needed to pay for some parts of that operation, including the transfer of Cuban troops to Africa—and, of course, the deliveries of weapons. I remember very well that we were getting requests concerning this, one after another. We tried to bargain with them, but every time they asked, we gave them some help.

**GRIBKOV:** We even helped them with military uniforms.



**SHAKHNAZAROV:** Even the military uniforms.

On the other hand, there were more than ideological considerations on our side. What I just has said was characteristic of our entire policy. If there was a liberation struggle going on anywhere, we had an interest there, and we needed to help. But also—I think the General will support me on this—for our military, it was very important to acquire bases for ships, and for naval aviation, to station our forces in that region of the globe. Some generals were saying openly that had we lost those bases, then it would be very difficult for our navy to operate there.

The third (and last) thing I wanted to say is this: You have to keep in mind that we had no personal, economic interests or calculations. The fact remains that during the entire Angolan crisis, when we were investing enormous resources in supporting the Cubans and assisting Angola, the Soviet Union had never attempted to exploit the natural resources of Angola—including the Angolan oil—which at the time was still extracted and sold by American oil companies. That is all I can say now.

**LEGVOLD:** Arne?

**ODD ARNE WESTAD:** I would like to follow up on the discussion concerning Ethiopia and the development of relations both between the Soviet Union and the Ethiopian leadership, and between the United States and the Ethiopian leadership, in 1977. Now, we see from the Soviet documents that the process which led up to an alliance with Mengistu and the

substantial deliveries of arms was very gradual. There was a lot of hesitancy on the Soviet side in terms of how far one should go in getting involved. A lot of questions were asked in Moscow. It is interesting to know that the Soviet ambassador in Addis Ababa, [Anatoly] Ratanov, seemed to have played a very important role in convincing the Soviet leadership that this was something that the Soviet Union ought to do for ideological reasons and for strategic reasons. Now, I wonder if somebody from the Soviet side would like to respond a little bit to this. It seems to be a pattern that repeats itself in Soviet foreign relations: there is a very strong weight put on the advice coming from local representatives, and that played a very significant role in the development of Soviet foreign policy.

Secondly, a question for the American side: We see in some of the Soviet documents that the Soviets were very concerned that the United States had not given up its contacts with high ranking members of the Ethiopian leadership. In some of the conversations I have had with people in Moscow who were involved in African affairs during this period, this was stated very clearly. They felt—or the KGB felt—that the United States was involved throughout 1977 in trying to support groups, factions, and individuals within the country who could challenge Mengistu and change the contents of Ethiopian foreign policy. Was there any basis to this fear whatsoever? What was your role in the development of the Ethiopian revolution?

**LEGVOLD:** Bill?

**ODOM:** I do not know specific cases where there were efforts made to go to particular

groups or others, but I do know from Paul Henze's activities that we wanted to stay in Ethiopia, and we struggled very much. The idea of swapping Ethiopia for Somalia was a highly unattractive matter. And I think you see in the documents that we were not about to break relations. The notion was that we should stay there even if the Soviets did have the upper hand, and try to rescue whatever relationship with Ethiopia was possible. The KGB may have attributed to us more capability for doing that than we probably had; they may not have exaggerated our aspirations, though.

**LEGVOLD:** Very briefly, Jim.

**HERSHBERG:** This is an appropriate time to put a question to Stan Turner on this subject. There is a document—a record of a meeting with Mengistu on September 10—where he is explicitly claiming to the Soviet Ambassador that there is a CIA plot to topple and assassinate him. And there is another, more lengthy, document that is not included [in the briefing book], which essentially details what is claimed to be a CIA plot. Now, I spoke to one of the former Soviet officials in the break who said, "Oh, we did not take that kind of stuff seriously; Third World leaders were saying that to both sides to try to get support." But on the other hand, clearly there must have been some consideration within the CIA of taking some action to weaken Mengistu's position in Ethiopia, and this seems like an appropriate moment to ask Stan Turner to respond to at least the allegation—an internal allegation, as well as a public allegation—of covert U.S. effort against Mengistu.

**LEGVOLD:** Stan, do you want to respond?

**STANSFIELD TURNER:** Yes. I have no recollection of specific covert action planning against Mengistu. I cannot imagine we did not look at it, but I do not recall any details of what we may have thought about it. I know that there was no plan ever approved, or any action ever taken, to try to destabilize Mengistu.

**LEGVOLD:** Thank you, Stan. We are now at the lunch break. Geir, do you have a quick question?

**GEIR LUNDESTAD:** Just another quick question to Stan Turner. How did you, in the CIA, view the Soviet-Cuban relationship? What degree of independence did you see for the Cubans in this relationship?

**TURNER:** How did we see the Soviet-Cuban relationship?

**LEGVOLD:** Yes. And how independent were the Cubans in the relationship, from your point of view?

**TURNER:** My recollection was that we took the standard view that the Cubans were pretty much on the string of the Soviets—that they were not operating independently in this.

**LEGVOLD:** Bob Pastor.

**PASTOR:** I remember a good many discussions with my boss, Dr. Brzezinski, on this subject. And I think, frankly, that what Mr. Shakhnazarov explained is essentially what we understood: that is to say, we believed that there was a high degree of independence on the part of the Cubans, but that they were not able to play the kind of role that they were playing in either Angola or in Ethiopia without the agreement and strong support of the Soviet Union. Indeed, the distinction that we drew between Angola and Ethiopia was that whatever had happened with regard to the origin of Cuban involvement in Angola—and I think at that moment it was not as clear as it is today—it was clear in the case of Ethiopia that there was very close coordination between the Soviet Union and Cuba. Indeed, it was perceived as a joint operation. I think that there was obviously a good deal of propaganda that was put out about whether Cuba was a proxy or a surrogate: we were all searching for the right term to explain this relationship. But the underlying point was actually made by President Carter during his conversation with Gromyko, in which he said that it was clear they were working together. And as such it was an important issue for us with the Soviet Union. It was a question that we raised with Cuba, too.

**LEGVOLD:** So, in short, the assumption was not that the Soviet side controlled the Cubans, but the expectation was that the Soviets did have some influence in the relationship?

**PASTOR:** Yes. At a minimum, the Soviet Union was in a position to have prevented it, and indeed was in a continuing position of support. Different people interpreted the degree of Soviet control and direction differently.

**LEGVOLD:** We have to break now. I apologize to those of you who wanted to comment, and I want to make an observation on the way to the afternoon, because I can see that what is happening on the Soviet side is that the shadow of the "Goddamn Horn" has settled. [Laughter.] And yet, I would say to Anatoly and to the others, as we get ready to talk about the Middle East, and other Third World problems, that something extraordinary was happening in the relationship in the context of the Horn. Remember what Cy said about the relationship up through the fall of 1977; about Carter's exchanges with Gromyko; and about his willingness to cooperate on Third World issues. There was a joint statement on the Middle East on October 1, which we will talk about this afternoon. And yet, less than half a year later—in fact, only four months later; by the end of February—you have these two extraordinary SCC meetings in the U.S. government, on February 28 and March 2, where you see sharp disagreements emerging among the principals on the U.S. side over what all of this means in the U.S.-Soviet relationship. We all have a record of what Cy was saying in response to Zbig, and what Harold was saying in that context, and the most fundamental questions about where that relationship was supposed to go were being raised. This was four months after October 1. So the "Goddamn Horn" was having an enormous impact as we went through these increasingly difficult months into the spring

of 1978 that finally led to that Annapolis speech that you were talking about.

Now we will have lunch now. We will have lunch where we had breakfast, and will reassemble at 1:45. Thank you.

**JAMES BLIGHT:** Just a moment; one moment please. Last night I alluded to a certain ghostly presence with regard to the acquisition of documents on the Soviet side. The ghost has arrived: his name is Tom Pickering. And I would like to present him at this time with a memento of our appreciation, the "Documents or Death" tee-shirt. [Laughter and applause.]

### March 24, Session 3—The Middle East Peace Process

**LEGVOLD:** This afternoon we have two topics: one is the Middle East; the other is the China factor in the Soviet-U.S. relationship. That promises a long and tiring afternoon. I apologize for that, and we will try not to prolong the discussion when we do not need to. If we can move on to the China question sooner rather than later, we will do so.

There is one person left over from the morning session—Marshall Shulman—who wanted to make a 30-second intervention on the Soviet-Cuban factor and make one other

point, and then I have a comment about the Middle East. Then we will be off. Marshall?

**SHULMAN:** Do you want me to do the second part, or do you want me to skip it in view of your heavy program?

**LEGVOLD:** Why don't you skip the second part.

**SHULMAN:** All right. Then in this case I will limit myself to one very brief comment for the record, really. This is on the issue of Soviet-Cuban relations in Africa.

Stan, from the impression I had at the time, and which I still have, there was a difference between the character of the relationship between Cuba and the Soviet Union at the time of the Angola episode, and the time of the Ethiopian episode. The relationship evolved. In the beginning, at the time of Angola, it was largely being improvised. By the time of Ethiopia, however, it had become more or less institutionalized. It is important to note that for the record, I think, if that is true. By the time of Ethiopia, when the Soviets were transporting Cuban troops into the area, the Soviet-Cuban relationship had become more or less formalized.

The second comment I was going to make—and I will seek a later opportunity to do so—is by way of response to Georgy Shakhnazarov's earlier question about the two voices on the American side.



**LEGVOLD:** Thank you, Marshall.

Now, on the Middle East: I will not presume to say a great deal by way of introduction. Instead, I will ask a question of you that comes from questions that Mark Garrison raised for us before the meeting. I address it first to the American side, because in this instance, I think, our Soviet colleagues have a number of questions of the Americans with respect to the period from the joint statement of October 1 through Camp David. My question is this: in 1977, there seemed to be a consensus in the administration that it would be useful to work with the Soviets for a Middle East settlement. The key figures within the administration basically agreed in the first part of 1977 that it would be in our interest—the U.S. interest—to cooperate with the Soviet Union in the Middle East. The further question, as Mark puts it, is this: Was this primarily because Moscow was believed to have important influence in the region, and therefore could play a useful role? Or was this also—or alternatively—seen as an important item in U.S.-Soviet cooperation, and had important value for that reason? They are not mutually exclusive, obviously. When Sadat began his initiative, was thought given to ways to fold the Soviets into the process, or was it felt that in that new situation they were not needed, and indeed should be excluded? I believe that that is a fair question to the American side.

To the Soviet side, the other question, quite bluntly, is this: Once the Sadat initiative was launched, why was Gromyko so categorically negative about it?

There is one other point that I would make by way of introduction. At the Oslo meeting, there was an extensive discussion of the Middle East, and Georgy Kornienko shared his view on these many questions. Among the points that Georgy Markovich raised

at Oslo, and which he continues to wonder about, is this: Immediately after the joint statement of October 1 on the Middle East—immediately after it had been signed, and even before it was made public—there was an angry telephone call to the American delegation from Washington concerning the statement. Now, earlier, I think, Kornienko suggested that it may have been Zbig who made that call. Brzezinski was quite clear that he did not make it; that he fully supported what Cy was doing in New York; and that he was on board. Kornienko would like to know who made the call, and why did the statement elicit such a negative reaction from some?

Now, I do not know whether there was a call, or whether Kornienko is mistaken on this score. But I think a larger and a more important question is the one that I repeated from Mark Garrison. Any takers?

**VANCE:** I will be glad to talk to this. Let us review a couple of points, and I will take them in order. What are the points again?

**LEGVOLD:** The first point is that in the spring 1977 and into the summer 1977 there appeared to be a consensus within the U.S. administration that it would be a good idea to seek cooperation with the Soviets on the Middle East issue. First of all, is that true? Secondly, was that primarily because you thought you needed the Soviets in the Middle East, because you thought it would be very good for U.S.-Soviet relations, or both?

**VANCE:** The answer is that the Americans were seeking to get a much closer cooperative relationship with the Russians insofar as the Middle East is concerned. We felt that was both needed and, in addition, it could be very helpful. When I say "needed," I mean from the very start, to try to increase the number of issues with which we could seek a cooperative relationship. One of the most important was the Middle East because of its importance. So that was one of the major reasons that we felt that we must see if in this critical issue we could not bring the Soviets in and work together in a constructive way. And in addition to that, Gromyko did emphasize with me in the preceding months the importance of the Middle East to them, and the need to try and bring ourselves closer together. I certainly agreed with him.

Secondly, it was also possible, we thought, that they might be able to make a positive contribution, and then we could move back towards a Geneva conference which would be, I think, a very constructive thing, had we been able to pull it off. So, those were the two key issues that led us to sit down and talk over a period of weeks with Gromyko on how we might try to see if we could put together a joint statement, which would then be the basis for going forward on what we saw to be very important cooperative relationship between our two countries.

Now, what was the second question?

**LEGVOLD:** The second question is, once the Sadat initiative began, did you give consideration to finding ways of including the Soviets, or was it believed that in this new

environment it would be better if they were not included—indeed, that they be excluded?

**VANCE:** Sadat's decision to go to Israel was a surprise to the United States. Sadat had meditated during the period of Ramadan, and towards the very end of that period we suddenly received a message saying that he had already decided that he wanted to go to Israel, and had concluded that this was a very important thing that had to be done, which would be very much in the interest of Egypt, of the region, and of the search for peace. We were stunned when we got this, because we had not heard a thing about it. Not only did he come to that decision, he made public what he was planning to do. So, this was indeed a surprise for us.

What was the next part of the question?

**LEGVOLD:** Once it was under way, what was your thought about the role of the Soviets?

**VANCE:** We originally thought that we had Sadat very much on board. He changed his mind, and subsequently indicated that he wanted to do this without the Soviets; but this was after a period of time. It did not happen immediately afterwards, because once he made that announcement, we decided to go forward, and we negotiated, and agreed—I guess on the 29th of March—on this particular document. It took a great deal of thought and work. We felt that this was very concrete, positive step that we were making. I still believe it was. I think it was a great mistake for us to back off from that, and I hope some

day it will be changed.

**LEGVOLD:** Jim Hershberg?

**HERSHBERG:** I am just asking your third question that you forgot about, which was: is it true or not true that there was a telephone call on October 1 before the communiqué was made public?

**VANCE:** I think that there was one. I do not know who made it. I have no recollection myself of having participated in any such conversation; I am sure I did not. Marshall, do you want to comment on that? Zbig has communicated with me on that since then, but it rings no bell with me.

**SHULMAN:** Reluctantly, I will comment, simply because I have been ordered to do so by my former boss. [Laughter.]

My recollection is that while we were at the mission in New York—after the announcement was made of the communiqué, or the joint statement—there did, indeed, come a call, and I was the recipient of the call. But I want to talk about the general implications of it. My understanding of what happened was that there was a general concurrence within the administration about the advisability of moving toward a joint statement during a long period in which it was negotiated back and forth between

Moscow and Washington, and then in the meetings between Cy and Gromyko. When it was agreed to, and began to be publicized, opposition began to develop within the United States, among two groups: among the American Jewish community, and among those who favored a stronger line against the Soviet role in the Middle East. The latter group felt that the administration had committed a strategic error in allowing the Soviet Union to play a recognized role in that area. As that opposition began to manifest itself, we began to get pressure to back pedal on the statement. That is my memory of it.

**LEGVOLD:** But in terms of the telephone call: you said *you* received a telephone call?

[Laughter.]

**SHULMAN:** Well, that was simply a mechanism of communication on that issue I have described. [Long, loud laughter.]

**LEGVOLD:** Who said that Marshall was never a diplomat? [Laughter.]

**VANCE :** Let me say that I asked Zbig about this, and he did not know anything about it. He said, "I have read the material that you sent me, and from Jim [Blight], and some of it was quite interesting. I do have one comment. Kornienko keeps referring to some mysterious angry telephone call to Vance regarding the October 1, 1977 U.S.-Soviet statement. In subsequent comments I am identified as having made that angry telephone

call. This is a total fiction. Please see pages 108 and 110 of my memoirs, which provide a rather full account of my own attitude toward that statement. In fact, I favored it and fully supported Vance, as my memoirs make clear, and I have no special interest in appearing in them as having favored a U.S.-Soviet statement. The real reason for the change in the U.S. position was the domestic reaction, including from the president's own domestic political advisers. Vance and I stood together on that issue, and we were overruled."

**DOBRYNIN:** Who was that?

**VANCE:** Brzezinski.

**LEGVOLD:** It was Brzezinski. It may be a minor point, but right after that October statement Zbig came back to Columbia and we had a Tuesday luncheon there—a small luncheon that we always used to have on Tuesday when he ran one of the institutes. I can tell you that in the course of that presentation Zbig was very enthusiastic about the October 1 declaration. He was describing the potential of the U.S.-Soviet terms in quite an upbeat fashion at that point. I can even remember a phrase that he used at the time: he had believed for a long time that the essence of the Soviet policy in the Middle East was neither war nor peace. One of the comments he made on that Tuesday was that we had now moved beyond that circumstance, and it was very much in the U.S. interest. At least, that is what he was saying within days of the statement.

**DOBRYNIN:** But why did Zbig change his mind? He changed his position on the Middle East within one or two months—maybe two weeks.

**LEGVOLD:** Well, the first question is, did he? And then, if he did, can anyone explain it?

**HERSHBERG:** Brzezinski says in his memoirs that there was an angry public reaction, especially among supporters of Israel. Much of the U.S. press joined in the attack on the administration. It was portrayed as reinjecting Soviet influence in the Middle East. As a result, within days the administration appeared to be disassociating itself from the statement, thus finding itself tactically on the defensive. There were also objections from Foreign Minister [Moshe] Dayan of Israel on October 4th and 5th. Brzezinski writes, on page 110 of his memoirs, "Even though I was unfairly labeled by Israeli supporters as the initiator of the U.S.-Soviet statement, I did subsequently feel that I had erred in not consulting our domestic political advisers about its likely internal impact, and in not objecting more strenuously to the very notion of the U.S.-Soviet public statement. I do not know if my objections would have prevailed in view of Vance's strong support for such a statement, and the president's desire at the time to improve U.S.-Soviet relations. But the net result was to weaken our leverage with the Israelis, to undermine Arab confidence in our determination to obtain a genuine settlement in Geneva, and to increase Soviet unwillingness, if indeed any encouragement was needed to be helpful with the more radical Arab parties, notably Syria and the PLO."



**DOBRYNIN:** I think it is clear.

**LEGVOLD:** Bill Odom?

**ODOM:** You know, I do not know the details of this; I just remember it swirling around at the time. But I had the impression *ex post facto* that Stu Eisenstat got into this at some point, and played a fairly aggressive role. I think he really felt that he was ambushed.

**SHULMAN:** Brzezinski says that.

**PASTOR:** Was it not Bob Lipshutz?

**VANCE:** I accept the fact that Zbig was supportive of this. I do not think there is any question that he was. I cannot recall having any conversation with him on it, but I think he was very much in favor of this at that particular period of time. I think the problem was, as Zbig recounts it in the thing he sent to Jim Blight, that there were some people among the domestic staff in the White House who did not agree with the communiqué, and they leaked it. That is what caused a considerable uproar at that time. I know that when we were in New York, there were conversations, and the Israelis delivered the message that they objected to the memorandum. They hoped that changes would be made in it quickly. We took note; but I was asked subsequently if I still supported—or

rather, whether we still supported it—and the answer was: yes, we did.

Now, I talked to Moshe Dayan about it. I said, “Moshe, what do you think of this? Do you agree with it?” He said, “Basically, I agree with it. I do not know whether my government is going to agree with it; but I think it is the right thing to do.”

**LEGVOLD:** Oleg, and then Mark Garrison.

**TROYANOVSKY:** Obviously, the final decision was made by the president, I presume.

**VANCE:** That was true at the time. The decision was made, it was approved, it was announced. And then subsequent events on the Israeli side—and Sadat’s views—affected the ultimate fate of that decision.

**LEGVOLD:** Mark Garrison?

**GARRISON:** As long as we are quoting from Brzezinski’s memoirs, I want to add one further point that Zbig made in describing a memo that he gave the president in November of 1977, which is fairly soon after the events we are talking about. He was talking about how to capitalize on the Sadat initiative, and how to move forward, and he says, “In brief, I wanted the U.S. to regain the initiative, capitalizing on Sadat’s move while gradually squeezing the Soviets out of the game.” So it is clear that by that point the question of the

U.S.-Soviet aspect of the Middle East question—in Zbig's mind, at least—was settled.

**LEGVOLD:** I am going to turn to Anatoly next, but I am going to ask a question first:

Anatoly, in terms of what you have said a moment ago, and what has been the general position, was there a view at high levels in the Soviet Union—or among you professionals—that the October 1st joint statement had been a kind of deception? Did you feel that it was insincere on the part of the United States—apart from the Secretary's role in it?

**DOBRYNIN:** If you look back at the previous two decades of Soviet-American relations, you must understand that our impression was that practically all American presidents did not want us to participate in any Middle East conferences or settlement. So it was a relief for us when, in the very beginning of the Carter administration, we discovered through Cy Vance that you were very actively beginning to explore the possibility of some joint effort to reach a settlement. In this connection, there were several meetings between you and Gromyko. I can quote the decision of our Politburo from our archives: they specifically instructed Gromyko at that time to do his best to come to an agreement with Cy Vance, to find common ground for a Middle East settlement, through joint or parallel actions. This was our basic policy.

There were many meetings, I think, before the 1st of October, and there was an unusually good development in our relations on the Middle East. The agreement on the

1st of October was received in Moscow, I should say, with true satisfaction, because it was very unusual to have an agreement on the Middle East. We thought it was a good achievement with the new administration. Then Sadat's visit happened. Within the government, there was a division of opinion. A majority, I would say, looked back on the long history of Soviet-American relations, when the Soviet Union was excluded. They thought that this was not a deception, exactly, but rather that the administration retreating under the pressure from Israel and pro-Israeli forces in Washington. For us it was a rather bad sign. If you retreat on this one, what should we expect on the SALT talks? What should we expect on other things?

**LEGVOLD:** Anatoly, what was the minority view?

**DOBRYNIN:** Well, a minority were uncertain about what kind of game it was. A majority thought that you were yielding under the pressure from Israel and from the lobbyists in Congress. After several weeks—after three or four weeks—the administration continued to tell us very frankly—and we accepted it—that they were in favor of this October 1 statement. But then you know what happened. Our intelligence sources gave us the impression that President Carter appealed to Sadat to break the deadlock, and then Sadat came with his initiative. This is the version of events we had in our minds.

**LEGVOLD:** So you thought that Sadat's visit was instigated by the Americans?

**DOBRYNIN:** In a way. Not 100%; no, because I remember when Cy mentioned to me about—if you permit me to tell the story—

**VANCE:** Yes, yes.

**DOBRYNIN:** He told me how he spoke with Sadat before the statement—that they had friendly talks. Cy painted a very interesting picture. He said he spoke with Sadat, and Sadat told him, “Look here, the people of Egypt are so tired, we can no longer live in a state of war with Israel. I have no choice but to find a way out of this impasse.” Do you remember? [Vance nods.] This was off the record. So, I will not say that it was instigated by the United States; but perhaps the United States gave him a small push to help him make a final decision. Maybe Cy would say that there was not even a small push. I accept that, if that is what he says. But this, of course, is one of the major things which make a very bad impression in the Kremlin.

I, for one—I do not know about my colleagues; I have not tried to speak with them on this—but I always thought that the idea of us not having any relations with Israel, and at the same time pretending to be a peacemaker, or a co-chairman of something, was nonsense. It was nonsense. How could you negotiate, or be in a position to do anything, if you do not want to discuss matters with Israel? Once, when Gromyko and Suslov were on vacation, we tried to persuade Brezhnev to have consular relations with Israel, or at least some informal representation. He gave an order to the Foreign Ministry to work on

this problem. But then Gromyko came back, and Suslov came back, and they said, "Now, come on; until there is movement on the side of Israel, there should be no movement from our side." This put us in an all-or-nothing situation. We could not expect under this difficult situation to arrive at a comprehensive settlement of the Middle East problem. I am not an admirer of Henry Kissinger's Middle East policy, but to a certain extent, his step-by-step approach was the right one.

In any case, the course of events as it developed at that time had negative effects on our relationship. We really believed that you broke your promise—that you just went your own way without us. This is my reply to what you said.

**LEGVOLD:** Cy, I am going to turn to you, but I want to clarify one thing in particular, if I may.

**VANCE:** Yes, go ahead.

**LEGVOLD:** I heard you say initially that, after you heard of the Sadat initiative—which surprised you—you attempted to put the two together—that is, the Geneva initiative, and Sadat's initiative—but that at some point you could not do it any longer. If that is correct, was that in fact the decision of the administration, or was that your own initiative?

**VANCE:** It was a decision by the administration. The president knew about it fully, and

decided that it was a sensible way to try to move things forward. I think you will remember, if you take a look at the documents here, that we also had in mind trying to proceed with a second Geneva conference. You will remember that there had been an earlier Geneva conference, which the United States and the Soviet Union co-chaired. What we were talking about in this second phase was to do that again. Gromyko and I had been talking prior to the time of the joint statement about trying to move to get such an agreement.

**LEGVOLD:** You had another point.

**VANCE:** Another point is just what I have been talking to you about. [Laughter.]

**DOBRYNIN:** Cy, Sadat proposed to have a conference in Cairo.

**VANCE:** Yes.

**BRUTENTS:** There was an abortive conference.

**DOBRYNIN:** Yes, an abortive conference.

**BRUTENTS:** There were four participants.

**DOBRYNIN:** He did not want to go to the conference which you had agreed on with Gromyko. But he proposed his own conference, with our participation, in Cairo. And this was unacceptable to us.

**ODOM:** Why? Shall I conclude from what has been said here, Cy, that Sadat was really the problem in getting a Geneva conference?

**VANCE :** He was the biggest problem, yes.

**ODOM:** So that really was not acceptable to Egypt?

**BRUTENTS:** There is nothing worse than a former friend. [Laughter.]

**HERSHBERG:** A couple of brief questions and observations. First, I hate to put Marshall on the spot, but I suspect I am not the only person in the room who is wondering who was the consolidated voice of opposition on the other end of the telephone on October 1.

[Laughter.] Since we are not speaking about a matter of national security, it would be very interesting for the historians to know who was making that phone call on October 1.

Second, I do not think that we should lose sight of the fact that, just as in the Horn, the Israelis and the Egyptians—at least to a considerable extent—were independent actors, and all during October were independently making contacts—including Dayan and



Tukhami [??], and Rabbat [??]—and were moving forward. I am still not sure that the Soviet officials understand just how incredibly popular Sadat's visit to Jerusalem was in the United States. The idea of an American government forcing a Geneva conference and a comprehensive peace down the throats of the Israelis and the Egyptian against their will would have been utterly impossible in the American political context.

Finally, after putting Marshall on the spot, one question for the Russians. In Lysebu, in the Oslo meeting, Kornienko has a fascinating commentary on the whole process. At one point—on page 64 of the Lysebu transcript—he says, “On Camp David, I will say that if that had been handled in a more delicate way, I think there is not much there which we could not accept. Basically, we could build things around the same lines. But because it was a kind of challenge—it was a tactical move done outside of Soviet-American cooperation, awkward and insincere—we rejected it. On the substance, I think, well, we could have cooperated on that.” That, to me is a stunning admission that the entire Soviet opposition to the Camp David process and the Israeli-Egyptian peace treaty was not based on substance, but more or less on pique—injured pride—at not being treated as an equal. Was there a constituency in Moscow that said, essentially, “We can live with this”? Or, as Kornienko is saying, was there unanimity that no American effort could have received a positive answer from Moscow, if it was solely an American effort?

**DOBRYNIN:** No, there was no such a thinking in Moscow, as you just described—as Kornienko said it. We did not have a great interest in going to Camp David; or prestige was not at stake. I do not know what happened with Georgy Markovich. He is a rather

sound fellow; but in this case he got carried away. I do not agree with his statement.

**LEGVOLD:** On the broader point, though, there are two things. Mark quoted from Dr. Brzezinski's memoir, which suggests that, by November, he had decided that this was an opportunity to "squeeze the Soviets out." Was that the reason that there was such opposition to the Sadat initiative, and opposition to American policy? Did you believe that what Zbig is now saying was his view—that it was, in fact, the motivation of the U.S. government at that point?

**DOBRYNIN:** I will be rather blunt. We were under the impression that it was Cy's view—and the view of the State Department—to reach a certain kind of understanding, to find a way out for the Middle East. We knew—or at least we thought we knew—that there were some people opposing this view, saying that the Soviet Union should be squeezed out of the Middle East process. That we knew; we had a great deal of information on this. Not only from you, but from [Yitzhak] Rabin and others. Our experience with previous administrations showed this very clearly. So we were not very much surprised that suddenly something happened. There was a wild reaction in the United States, and Israel, and then there was a change in the balance of forces within your government. You know this better than I do; perhaps one of the other American participants could explain it to us. But in our view, there was a very delicate balance. Until October 1, the forces favoring cooperation were stronger; after this reaction—which was, in my view, rather unexpected,

even to Cy: maybe I am wrong; it is up to him to say—but after this big reaction in Israel, and all the negative press—all those kinds of things—the government begin to withdraw, little by little, and then more and more and more. Within a week or two, the president withdrew two or three sentences from this communiqué in oral conversation with the Israelis. Some of these were very important things, for example, touching on the Palestinian issue. He said to Dayan, “Okay, this particular sentence does not apply to you.” He made some concessions to them. The government began to retreat under the pressure. It was not that you wanted to deceive us; there was obviously good will present. We definitely counted on the good will of the president, and of Cy. But we felt that your government was retreating under the pressure.

So you retreated more and more and more. And then there was the Sadat trip; many angry statements from both sides; and other issues that began to cascade—going to China only two months before; the Shcharansky case, and other things. But as far as the Middle East itself is concerned, all of a sudden the joint process stopped. Through inertia, Cy and Gromyko continued to discuss a conference. But you know what happened afterwards.

**LEGVOLD:** Bob, Cy, and then I am coming back to Karen Brutents.

**VANCE:** In the aftermath of the joint statement and the hubbub that followed that for a bit of time, the president wrote a letter to Sadat, which is in the briefing book. Let me read

you the key portion of it: "The time has now come to move forward and your early public endorsement of an approach is extremely important, perhaps vital, in advancing all parties to Geneva." So, we still had in mind that the ultimate objective was going to Geneva, which was the thing we had been talking about with the Soviets. And I think that is important for all of you to keep in mind. The date of this was October 21.

**LEGVOLD:** Karen?

**BRUTENTS:** First, I would like to say a couple of words in regards to what Cyrus Vance has just said. The problem is that the invitation to the Soviet Union to go to Geneva after the communiqué had already been abandoned, and on the basis of a working agreement with Israel, already contained conditions which were unacceptable to the Soviet Union. These included aspects of the agreement with Israel regarding the Palestinian question, and issues dealing with the overall organization of the Geneva conference itself.

**DOBRYNIN:** I have already said that.

**BRUTENTS:** No, he said that we had still been invited to Geneva after the 1st. Those were the conditions against which the Soviet Union argued during the process of working out the joint communiqué of October 1.

Second, what did the Soviet Union not want in the Middle East at that time? The

Soviet Union did not want war, that is absolutely clear. It did not want to destroy Israel. And it also did not want an agreement in which it would not have taken an equal part with the United States. This is what the Soviet Union did not want. Therefore, any agreement which would put the Soviet Union in an unequal position with the United States, or any agreement which included conditions unacceptable to the Arab side which the Soviet Union was representing in its contacts with the United States, would have been unacceptable to the Soviet Union. We are calling on each other to make more use of the documents; I have a document here that I would like to refer to. It is an intelligence estimate of May 1979. "The Soviets are frustrated by the continuing United States' unwillingness to grant them an equal role in the negotiations process." This is an American document. And this was the American position, all the time. More than that, all those years the United States had been trying not only to put us in an unequal position, but to squeeze us out of the Middle East.

**DOBRYNIN:** And from the negotiations.

**BRUTENTS:** President Bush mentioned that to Gorbachev in September of 1990. He said that they were changing their policy, which they had followed for so many years. They had wanted to squeeze the Soviets out of the Middle East before. They had wanted to squeeze us out of the region, which is in our neighborhood. In the case of Angola, we accepted the American argument that we were an extra-African power. In the case of the

Middle East, it was completely different.

The only exception to that pattern was the beginning period of the Carter administration, when Cyrus Vance was Secretary of State. My personal impression—and our general impression—was that it was a genuine attempt to work together with us. It was not just a maneuver, or anything like that. But the effort failed. What were the causes of that failure? That is a different question. To my mind, the failure of that effort meant that we lost a historic chance. The settlement was delayed by almost two decades.

Now, the Soviet Union, it seemed to me, took it very painfully. It was a new blow against trust—although there was very little trust anyway; I suppose I should say that it strengthened the mistrust. I think it played a role in the further deterioration of détente.

Finally—I apologize for trying to return to the question which we discussed during the last session; I did not want to interrupt the discussion then—I would like to quote just one phrase by Cyrus Vance. I do so not to argue with him, but to cite him as a witness. At one of the SCC meetings—on March 2, 1978—he said, “A year ago the Soviets were in Somalia and in Ethiopia as well—now it has become a daily crisis. We are stirring it up ourselves.” That is all I wanted to say. Thank you for your attention.

**LEGVOLD:** Bill, and then Arne.

**ODOM:** In light of Karen Brutents’s last intervention—and the crucial and fascinating points he made—the following question arises in my mind. Suppose the historical

opportunity had not been lost; suppose you had joined in a genuinely cooperative effort with the U.S. in reaching a peace agreement there. What would that have done to your relations with the PLO, Iraq, and Syria? Could you really have delivered the Arabs, if not as a group, even one by one over a period of time? And would not that cooperation have greatly exacerbated Moscow's influence within the Middle East, and eventually have undercut it?

**LEGVOLD:** Karen Brutents?

**BRUTENTS:** It is not very easy to respond to this question. There was some danger of aggravating our relations with a number of the Arab countries: a danger that we would not have been able to attract every country to this approach. There was such a danger. It is very possible that the events could have developed unfavorably. But there was a real chance. And the Soviet Union was willing, as far as I understand, to take that risk.

**TROYANOVSKY:** May I add something to that?

**LEGVOLD:** Oleg Troyanovsky.

**TROYANOVSKY:** Don't you think that a great deal would have depended on the position taken by Israel at some such negotiations? If they were to take a position similar to the one

which they have taken now, and the PLO would have been able to respond, then there would have been a chance of success. So, it is a rather theoretical question, isn't it?

**LEGVOLD:** Arne?

**WESTAD:** I want to bring us back briefly to the points which Georgy Markovich Kornienko made at the Oslo conference concerning the approaches that were used in connection with the Middle East negotiations. Now, he placed a very significant degree of importance to the issue of how the Soviet Union was first invited into these negotiations, and then thrown out of the negotiations again—not just in the connection with the Middle East, but with what he saw as an overall Carter administration approach to its relationship with the Soviet Union. And in this context he underlined the need which he saw from the side of the political leadership in the Soviet Union to use the Middle East negotiations as one of many elements to show that the Soviet Union was, indeed, an equal partner with the United States on the global scene. The idea of equality—of reciprocity—was in his opinion—and he stated it several times—a very, very important element in the Soviet approach to the Middle East negotiations. If this had not been the case—if the Soviet Union had not been interested in cashing in on that kind of approach—what then was the strategic interest of the Soviet Union in this area? I forget who it was, but someone brought up the point that one can easily imagine that some people on the Soviet side could see a great deal of strategic interest in having the conflict continued, thereby



effectively shutting the United States off from developing its contacts with the Arab world. So I want to turn this question to the U.S. side: to what extent was it recognized, if we are to believe what Georgy Markovich is saying, that the Soviet Union was primarily after equality in its dealings with the Middle East? And did that play an important role in the discussions on the American side on how to proceed in these negotiations?

**LEGVOLD:** Cy Vance?

**VANCE:** Yes, indeed. That did play a role. And it played a very important role in the period that followed after October 1, because there was a genuine effort made to try to get the meeting in Geneva back on track again. And there again, the president's cable to Gromyko on December 21, 1977, is really very much worth reading. On page 2 of that cable, the president expresses his disappointment that he has with respect to the fact that there is reluctance on the part of the—can you bear with me if I read this to you?

**LEGVOLD:** Please read slowly for translation.

**VANCE:** I will.

At the same time, I would be less than candid if I did not register some concern in the recent developments in two important regions. I was disappointed to learn that

Minister Gromyko feels that the recent peace initiatives by President Sadat and Prime Minister Begin were somehow contrived by the United States, in part in order to move away from the principles to which we jointly subscribed earlier in this year. As Secretary Vance has already stated, these events were not initiated by the United States; nonetheless, we do welcome them as potentially positive steps toward peace, and we hope that both the United States and the Soviet Union can continue to encourage all of the parties to reach a comprehensive settlement. Such a settlement will have to be negotiated finally at Geneva, and we count on collaborating closely with you in making these negotiations as fruitful as possible. In our view, present trends in the Middle East do involve an increasing willingness on the part of the parties concerned to adopt positions that make a compromise solution more likely. We would hope that the Soviet Union would be a party to that process and would help to discourage the extremist position of some of the Arab parties. Without such Soviet help, it might prove difficult to reach the common goals of a comprehensive settlement negotiated in Geneva, as emphasized in your letter of December 16.

Also in your letter, you make the point that the representative of the Palestinian people is a necessary element in the Geneva conference, with which I agree; but I confess to a sense of disappointment that the leadership of the PLO has not been more helpful to our efforts to work out a formula for Palestinian representation at the conference acceptable to the parties.

Finally, In response to the questions you raise about the procedures to be

followed at the Geneva conference, I am inclined to feel that these matters can best be settled in consultations with the parties to the conference. I understand your concerns, and I am confident that these matters can be satisfactorily resolved when the conference is reconvened.

During the last several days, I have had conversations with Prime Minister Begin and by telephone and cable with President Sadat. I continue to find both of them committed to a comprehensive peace, and I have stressed that this is our goal as well. While Prime Minister Begin has developed tentative proposals on the Sinai and the West Bank and Gaza, I have not endorsed these proposals but have made clear that the ultimate judgment on their acceptability must be made by those who will sign the peace treaties. It is my belief, moreover, that they in no way preclude moving negotiations at an appropriate time to a broader forum or discussing other fronts.

**LEGVOLD:** Thank you, Cy. Malcolm, and then Bob Pastor.

**MALCOLM BYRNE:** I want to bring us just for one second to a possible explanation—or a partial explanation—for why the Soviets reacted as they did to Sadat's move: and that is a reference in the MemCon of the March 16, 1978 conversation between Secretary Vance and Dobrynin. On page 2, the notes say, "On the topic of the comprehensive Middle East settlement, Dobrynin explained why the Soviets reacted so strongly to the Sadat initiative.

He said they had just succeeded in obtaining the Syrian agreement to go to a Geneva conference when Sadat announced his trip.” The first question is: How big a role did that play in the Soviet response?

I wonder if I could broaden that into a question for Karen Brutents or anybody else on the Russian side: Would it be possible to go into a little more detail about how the Soviets dealt with their relations with the Arab states, particularly those that are called the radical Arab states? We have already talked about the influence of Israel on the U.S. What kind of influence did the Arab states—particularly Syria, and other groups like the PLO—have on Soviet decision making?

I would also like to refer in that connection to the next document in this collection, which is a Central Intelligence Agency coordinated assessment of Soviet goals and expectations in the global power arena. There, reference is made to the Soviet Union’s inability to secure the satisfaction of Arab aspirations in the conflict with Israel. How big an effect did that have on Soviet decision making?

**LEGVOLD:** Would you like to respond immediately, Karen?

**BRUTENTS:** It seems to me that at that time the Soviet Union was interested in a peaceful solution even more than ever before. It was interested in pursuing peace. Why? Because the situation where there was neither peace nor war had already begun to slowly undermine the Soviet position in the Arab world. The withdrawal of Sadat was only the

first, though a very important, step in that direction. So, the situation was practically dictated by the United States, together with Israel. Whether there would be peace or war depended on them in the first place. And the Arabs began to understand it gradually. Therefore, the condition of no-war-no-peace led to a gradual erosion of the Soviet position.

In some way, as paradoxical as it sounds, the separate Egyptian-Israeli treaty interrupted that process, because it produced a fury in the Arab world, and as a result, a significant part of the Arab states moved closer to us. I want to say that those developments made it even more in the Soviet Union's interest to pursue peace in the Middle East.

Secondly, one cannot say that the Arab position—in particular, the position of the states that you called radical—did not have an impact on the Soviet position. Of course it did. The Soviet Union could not disregard their position. But it never determined our position. I can give you a simple example. We are all happy now because the negotiating process is underway in the Middle East. They are talking to each other; they have recognized each other. But I think we made a great contribution to that. In the very beginning, when we had just established diplomatic relations with the Arabs, and when we received Arafat for the first time (Nasser brought him to the Soviet Union)—a man whom the West had been calling a terrorist for 25 years, and who has been received now on the White House Lawn—from that very first moment, we never conceded on one important point: that was the question of the existence of Israel. Never. It would have been very easy for us to make that concession, to earn prestige among the Arabs. But we

never did that. On the contrary, we urged a number of Arab countries, including the Palestinians, to speak of Israel as a state. So, of course they influenced our position; but *we* influenced *their* position to a much larger degree. It was not always easy. It required difficult negotiations—even side payments, sometimes—grants, transfers, and so on, especially in weapons and the like. But still, we were able to achieve it. That is why, when answering Mr. Odom's question, I mentioned that we were ready to take the risk. It was not a reckless risk; it was a thought-through risk. This is my answer to your question. Thank you.

**LEGVOLD:** Bob Pastor?

**PASTOR:** Let me just pursue this. I think Karen answered more than half of the question I was going to ask, because I did want to hear the Soviet leadership's perceptions after Camp David. In terms of your policy toward your closest allies in the region, was there ever an attempt to try to get some of the governments with which you had the closest relations to join a Camp David process at that time, or did you feel that it was impossible because of the point that you just made—that the agreement with Egypt, in effect, had forced them back from the process?

**BRUTENTS:** I think there was no possibility that other Arab states would have joined Camp David. Even had we taken a more flexible and more favorable position, there was no

chance at that moment. No chance. This is exactly the problem as I see it. Why do you think I am claiming that it was a lost chance, that it delayed the settlement? Yes, the U.S. and Israel made a breakthrough; but it was a breakthrough that had torn Sadat from the rest of the Arab world.

**LEGVOLD:** I want to thank everybody for this session. What I propose now is that we take a 15-minute break now, and return at 3:15 to talk about China. We will not go quite as long as scheduled, out of respect to those of you who have been traveling. So, let's take a 15-minute coffee break now.

### March 24, Session 4—China

**LEGVOLD:** It is now a little past 3:30. Let's see if we can cover a lot of ground in the next hour so that we can break at 4:30 rather than 5:30. If the conversation is excited—and exciting—then we will probably go beyond that. But let's see what we can do in the next hour.

Marshall had a quick postscript to the conversation on the Middle East, and then a comment about the China stuff. Marshall?

**SHULMAN:** I always have what the French call “thoughts on the stairway”—after the discussion is over, I begin to think of things that were not said. And there is one point I would like to make to be sure it is in the record.

From the U.S. point of view, what was important in moving towards the discussion of the Soviet Union’s involvement in the Middle East was the hope that Moscow could use its influence with the Syrians. I mean, it was not just a matter of good will, and not just a matter of improving the general relationship between the superpowers: there was also a specific necessity of trying, at least, to get the Soviet Union to lean on the Arab side, to bring them into the process. It was an important consideration, just as it is today. This is a point that has a contemporary relevance. And it was a valid consideration. I think there was uncertainty in our minds at that time as to how Assad would respond—whether he would assert his independence, or whether he would cooperate—but, nevertheless, it was an important substantive point.

I think one point that Karen Brutents made also probably needs to be underlined: namely, that in the successive crises that had occurred in the Middle East in 1967 and in 1973, there really was a sense—which I believe the Soviet Union strongly shared—of a risk of a larger war growing out of those episodes. Whether that risk was real or not, we felt that we came close to war in 1973. That was the time when we went on alert, and raised the DefCon. I think there was a general sense that in that area there was a possibility of a larger conflict. It added a genuine incentive, I think, on both sides, to try to assure that that did not happen. It seems to me worth getting that on the record.



**VANCE:** I would add one thing. I think you are quite right in emphasizing Syria, but some of the other Arab states also had to be reached in the aftermath of what Sadat had done. Therefore, it was essential to try and have the Soviets and Americans sitting at the table as co-chairmen in Geneva.

**LEGVOLD:** Let us move on now to the other topic. I want to introduce it in a flowing way that may surprise you. Normally, when we think about the China factor in U.S.-Soviet relations in the Carter-Brezhnev period, we think about it in terms of the “China card” being played strategically in a larger sense. But this morning, when we were talking about the conflict between Somalia and Ethiopia, one of the things that interested me was the March 2 SCC meeting concerning our lack of military options in the face of what appeared to be a Soviet success in backing Ethiopia. According to the documents we have here, the first senior figure within the Carter administration to suggest using the China angle in order to press the Soviet side was not Zbig Brzezinski, but Harold Brown. It is important to note that Harold did not agree with Zbig on the issue of linking SALT to the Ogaden, and it is clear that Harold also resisted Zbig’s interest in putting a task force into the region. But Harold did agree with Zbig that what the Soviet Union was doing—and its military presence and success—was important, and that we needed somehow to put pressure on the Soviets in this context.

Zbig’s solution was to cancel the agreement on the space shuttle, or the space shoot. Harold said, “It’s peanuts; it will not do anything. I have an idea regarding China.

The Chinese are less concerned about the aggressor"—that is, Somalia, the aggressor.

"Why don't we get together with the Chinese in Warsaw and issue a joint statement of concern about the Horn, and append to it a statement that we will consult on other areas with the Chinese where we have a joint interest? That would get the Soviets' attention."

That is Harold. Now, Cy says in response, "That would get their attention, but . . ." And this is significant: this is March 2, 1978; this is not on the eve of Annapolis, and this is not when Zbig had gone to China in May. This is March 2, 1978. Cy says, "That would get their attention, but we are at the point where we are at the brink of ending up with a real souring of relations between our two countries. And it has taken us a long time to get to this point. We should examine this step very carefully before we go down that road." And then there is more conversation on that score.

So, unless the issue had arisen even earlier than these documents show, it looks to me as though Harold was one of the first to think about the so-called China card.

The floor is open on the issue of China in our relationship. Anatoly?

**DOBRYNIN:** Did the "China card" appear as an option to the Carter administration for the first time after the Ethiopian affair?

**LEGVOLD:** That is a question to the American side. Was did the issue of using China first arise? Was it in the context of the Ethiopian conflict that the issue of using China strategically or tactically first arose? Marshall Shulman.

**SHULMAN:** I have three points. I will try to make them briefly. The first is that China issue had manifold forms. The sentiment for moving toward a normalization of relations with China was fairly widely shared in the American government. Then that overlapped with what came to be called "the China card"—that is, the use of movement toward normal relations with China in order to influence Soviet behavior. That was a somewhat separate issue, and some who favored moving towards normalization of relations did not necessarily favor the use of the development of relations with China in order to influence the Soviet Union, who feared the effect of it.

That relates to my second point: there was a general difference of opinion within the United States about how to influence Soviet behavior. The feeling was that the U.S. interest, broadly speaking, lay in bringing about a modification of Soviet behavior as we saw it. But there was a difference of opinion on how to do it between those who thought the way to do it was essentially by force—by mobilizing pressures on Russia—and those who thought that the way to do it was by offering the Soviets a choice, as we had done with the Marshall Plan, between cooperation and rejection. You will remember that there was one path open to the Soviet Union if they participated in the Marshall plan, and other consequences if they rejected it. That was a kind of a twin option model. So, there was a difference of opinion throughout our whole history on how to bring about a modification of Soviet behavior. And that was a part of the division of opinion on whether to use the China card in relations with the Soviets. There were those who thought it would have a useful effect on the Soviet Union, and those who thought it would not—that it would rather have the effect of making the Soviets feel beleaguered, and increasing hostility.

If I may take just a minute to respond to Georgy Shakhnazarov's earlier question about America speaking with two voices, I would like to do so, because it is relevant here, as it is on all the other issues we talked about. It is important to bear in mind that, throughout the whole period of the Cold War, there were unresolved differences in American attitudes—in public opinion, reflected in political movements—between those who started from the assumption that the Soviet Union was implacably hostile and concluded that American policy should therefore try to bring about a collapse of the Soviet Union, and those who felt that there could be an evolution in attitudes and in relations, and that even though ours was a competitive relationship, it could be managed in a way that would be less dangerous through arms control, through cooperation on various problems, and so on. Now, those issues were really never resolved. As a matter of fact, they still exist today in the background. I mean, there is still a debate about the nature of the Soviet Union and what followed from it for American policy. It touched every one of the issues on our agenda, including this question of the China card; including the Middle East; including cooperation; including arms control; and the rest of it. And it seems to me that it is important to bear in mind that what we see in this period, as in earlier and later administrations, is that American policy sometimes reflected the ascendancy of one set of views, and sometimes reflected the ascendancy of the other set of views. And that is why you seem to get what Georgy called "hearing two voices," or seemingly contradictory behavior. It was rooted, I think, in these unresolved differences in American public opinion. To some extent, they are still present.

**LEGVOLD:** Thank you very much, Marshall. Bill Odom, and then Les Gelb.

**ODOM:** I am going to pass right now, I think.

**LEGVOLD:** Les Gelb.

**GELB:** Just two historical footnotes that might jog Cy's memory or Stan Turner's memory: First, some time near the end of 1977—I do not remember the exact date—the president ordered an inter-agency study on U.S. relations with China, with a particularly sensitive military and intelligence annex on cooperation with China. The study went on for several months, but it was decided not to bring it to any conclusion, and no presidential decision memo was issued at the end of the inter-agency study. This was kind of unusual, because the whole issue then went into a very small sensitive group that began to discuss the possibility of full normalization with China. In the late spring of 1977, I believe, Cy held a meeting in his conference room to discuss U.S.-China relations and how that would affect the SALT negotiations.

**LEGVOLD:** In the spring of 1977?

**GELB:** 1978; excuse me, I meant to say the spring of 1978. I am not good on the dates, but I would say, roughly May 1978—somewhere in there.

**LEGVOLD:** That would be the month that Zbig would be going to Beijing.

**GELB:** Yes, I think it was at the same time. At any rate, the main topics were how quickly we should move to improve relations with China; what to do in the process; and how it would affect the arms control negotiations with Moscow. Cy did not make a judgment at the end of the meeting, but the strong consensus of the meeting was that we ought to move ahead as quickly as possible to normalize relations with China, and that while early normalization would cause complications in concluding the SALT II agreement, it would substantially improve our position domestically. It would show doubters in Congress that this was an administration that could play hard ball and do power politics, and when the time came to ratify the SALT II treaty, we would be in a better position to do so, having opened up this part of the triangle with China.

The issue came up again finally when we went out to Geneva in December of 1978, where there was some hope—particularly on Cy's part—that we could actually conclude the SALT II negotiations. But the China card had been played publicly at that point, and Cy and Marshall may want to talk about how they felt one aspect affected the other.

I say all of this to make the point that the China issue was raised toward the end of the first year, not just with respect to arms control, but generally, and as a factor in domestic politics as well as in relation to the Soviets.

**LEGVOLD:** Thank you, Les. Cy Vance?

**VANCE:** That does refresh my recollection. In an earlier period, we did decide to put together a study group to consider the China question. Obviously, from the very beginning, the question of recognizing China was an important issue that lay before us. You are quite right, Les, in recalling that we decided not to come to some final decision with respect to what to do on that, because it was such a complicated and delicate issue to deal with.

Moving on to the period of December, there was a sharp difference of opinion, because at that point in time we had just reached the agreement that there was to be a normalization of relations with China, as I recall it. Some of us were very, very strongly opposed to putting SALT aside to do this, and favored giving priority to trying to get SALT through. I had to come back to the United States from Geneva at that particular period of time because I felt so strongly that it was a mistake to try and turn that around. We were unable to do that, and as a result of that the situation moved forward and, as I recall it, Deng Xiaoping came to the United States at that time. After that, we could go and sit down at the table to try and deal with the SALT issue. Once we got there, not surprisingly, we faced a situation where there was real anguish—indeed, anger—with respect to the fact that concluding SALT had not been given priority over relations with China. To this day, I think that it was a mistake to have done that. I do not think it was necessary to move with that kind of excessive speed.

**LEGVOLD:** A question to our Russian guests—in fact, two questions: In your recollection, how early did you begin to think that the Carter administration was playing a China card against you? Did it happen before Brzezinski's trip to Beijing? Or was that the critical moment where you began to think that the administration was trying to use the China factor against you?

Second, once you began to focus on the American handling of the China issue, how serious was it for you? Was it simply an inconvenience? An annoyance? Or was it something that was seen as very serious, even strategically significant?

I have a third question: at those fall meetings in 1978 on SALT, some have argued, the Soviet Union for the first time established a linkage: they linked SALT momentarily to the normalization of relations with China, although they backed off in a few months. I do not know whether there is truth to that or not.

Does anyone want to comment on any of those questions? Anatoly?

**DOBRYNIN:** On the last one: I do not recall any connections in our mind between SALT and the China issue, as far as concluding the treaty was concerned. There were discussions—negotiations—and we did not try to link these two issues. You may have linked them, but we did not. So the answer is no.

As to how it influenced our relationship, I may put it this way: during November and December 1978, when there were very extensive, up-tempo negotiations between Cy and Gromyko to finish the SALT treaty, everybody was expecting that this was number one



priority for your administration, as it was for ours. We had an expectation that we would finish the treaty soon. Of course, we know that you had negotiations with the Chinese. This was not a secret. But in our mind, we still believed that SALT would be the number one issue for you, not the Chinese.

Cy just described how it happened really. It was on the 15th of December, if I remember. Zbig invited me—because you were at that time in Europe, or somewhere else—and, with great satisfaction, he announced your normalization of relations with China. He recalled that I became gray when I heard that. I do not know why I should become gray at this announcement; but he said, “Look here, now there is an agreement to normalize relations with China, and the Chinese Premier will come,” and on he went. Cy tried to reverse this sequences of priorities, as I understood it. But suddenly, as if something very urgent happened, China became your priority, not the SALT treaty.

The Politburo discussed this, and they were rather angry with this situation. When Cy returned for what were supposed to be the final discussions of SALT, he received additional instructions on SALT to take a stronger position on the encryption issue. Everything was already prepared; you were coming just to finish things off, and then suddenly, after this love affair with the Chinese, he received instructions to take a very tough position on encryption. So Gromyko was really angry. It was his expectation that we were going to sign within a few days, and that there would be a summit meeting in the spring. But then you raised another obstacle to the discussions.

Cy, you called Washington, and I understood it, you were told to hold firm. You called from our mission. As Zbig later explained—I do not know whether he was joking or

not—he was there with Brown, I guess, and somebody else, because the president was in Atlanta. He had a hemorrhoid attack, so, they did not want to bother him. And these three fellows decided to follow this tough line on encryption. Gromyko became very angry; he, in turn, decided to be tough, too, and for half a year the treaty was delayed after it was practically ready.

So the effect was psychological., We were not at that particular moment influenced by the implications of your having normal relations with China, but at this particular moment we were angry that you preferred China to Moscow. It was very clear.

There were other implications, of course. We were following your relations with China very closely. Cy will remember that several times we discussed arms delivery. While you continued your normalization of relations, we began to receive information that you arrived at some secret intelligence agreement with China to monitor our missiles. Then we received news that there was a discussion to sell China non-lethal military equipment, and then later some other military equipment. You were always consulting China. Zbig discussed our SALT talks with the Chinese ambassador, and discussed its implications—how America was going to get more out of the SALT talks than we would get, and it would benefit China, and so on. All this information, of course, made the geopolitical factor more and more important. We received information that the Chinese were really boasting to some of their friends in the Third World that they were going to encircle Russia now, with China, the United States, Japan, and I do not know who else. There would be an arc of crisis, to invoke Zbig's invention. They were going to encircle us. They said many of these grandiose things. But putting aside theses grandiose things, of

course, China was China. It was important. It was a big factor. We had major concerns.

**BRUTENTS:** We had less fear than irritation.

**DOBRYNIN:** Yes, at that moment it was more irritation than real fear. But still, of course, China is China. So this really created a situation which spoiled our negotiations in 1978. We went through with this meeting in Vienna, which was a good thing; but still, there were many other issues, and we regretted that this particular incident happened, and that everything got postponed. China at that time issue played a very bad role in our relationship.

**LEGVOLD:** The next person on the list is Georgy, and then Oleg. But in case it did not get on the record, Karen's side comment, I think, is important. He said normalization with China was more of an irritant than a source of real fear. Anatoly then repeated it. Georgy?

**SHAKHNAZAROV:** I would like to add to what Anatoly Fedorovich has just said. We need to take into account the situation that developed at that time. After Mao Zedong died, some of the causes of the sharp confrontation between the Soviet Union and China were gradually weakening or disappearing. In particular, one can say that the competition for the leading role in the world communist movement had relaxed. The Chinese no longer demanded so strongly that Mao be recognized as the number one communist. And we

had no concerns about it. Other problems emerged. Things turned in a different direction. Our competition in the Third World, I can say, was also diminishing at that time, because China was in such a difficult situation after the Cultural Revolution that they could not take any burden of responsibility for any serious assistance to the Third World, though, of course, they did some things in this regard.

That is why the main problem in our relationship with China shifted to the border conflicts. We always feared that the Chinese could have used their colossal superiority in number of soldiers. I even remember once we discussed with Andropov in the Central Committee what we would have done if the Chinese moved 500,000 or a million civilians across the border—just civilians. What could we do? How could we stop them? We had such concerns. And of course, after China had acquired nuclear weapons—

**WESTAD:** Civilians?

**SHAKHNAZAROV:** Yes, civilians. If they just crossed the border and began to occupy the disputed territory, what would we do?

**GRIBKOV:** Unarmed civilians.

**SHAKHNAZAROV:** What could we have done then? Should we have used nuclear weapons then? How could we stop them? And, of course, we had very sharp

disagreements over Southeast Asia, especially Vietnam and Kampuchea. Vietnam we considered to be an "organic" ally, one of our main allies in the East. Cam Ranh Bay was also very important to us. We had a naval base there; our ships were stationed there. And we considered Kampuchea, in a way, a socialist country. I can tell you that during those years we had created a special "Kampuchea sector" in the Central Committee. We proclaimed it to be a socialist country. But the strangest thing—and the funniest thing, maybe—was that China also remained in charge of the Department of Socialist Countries in the Central Committee. It was a hostile, but a socialist country.

In this situation what concerned us most was the possibility of Chinese compliance with the Americans against the Soviet Union. There is one page here in the documents, in the Carter-Gromyko negotiations, where it is said very clearly that we feared the China card being played by the Americans. It would have meant in practical terms a kind of encirclement of the Soviet Union from the Far East. That is why every time we met with the Americans, we asked them again and again to assure us that they were not going to get into any sort of complicity with the Chinese—to play the China card against the Soviet Union. Personally, I do not think that the Americans had such intentions. In any case, I would like to congratulate Admiral Turner for his memo. We have his memo here; I think it was him who had written this memo: his agency prepared it. It is a memo on the U.S. position on relations with China. Everything is correctly stated here, everything is very clear.

**LEGVOLD:** Georgy, which document are you referring to? What are you working with?

**SHAKHNAZAROV:** "Soviet Goals and Expectations in the Global Power Arena." There is a part on China. I think it is a very reasonable analysis of the problem. However, I do not exclude the possibility that the politicians always wanted—if not to use the China card, at least to scare the Soviet Union a little bit with the possibility of using that card at some time. No big power would refuse such a trump card in their political game. This all I wanted to add.

**LEGVOLD:** Thank you. Oleg?

**TROYANOVSKY:** Well, I would like to go a little back in history by saying that in our foreign policy, China has always been a major factor—I would even say *the* major factor, perhaps, roughly on par with our relationship with the United States. Khrushchev, for instance, was always maneuvering between these two. You will remember that, immediately after his visit to the United States in 1959—the next day—he went to Beijing to talk to the Chinese. That visit was—if not disastrous, it certainly did not go well.

So throughout this period, China has been a major factor. I would even say that it was even a factor in our internal policies, because there were people even who thought that if we had to choose between the United States and China, we should choose China, and not the United States. It still remains a major factor.

When the Nixon trip took place, that was a surprise, certainly, if not a shock. But later on, the normalization and Deng Xiaoping's visit to the United States were matters of

great irritation. I would go further, and say that it was more than irritation, because we did not know where this relationship would stop. Furthermore, there was the question of who was playing the card—the Americans playing the Chinese card, or the Chinese playing the American card.

**DOBRYNIN:** Are you speaking of the Carter administration, or the Nixon administration?

**TROYANOVSKY:** Now I am speaking about the Carter administration. It was not clear how far that relationship might go—particularly after Brzezinski's trip to China. It was unclear what was talked about there, and what promises the Americans might have given the Chinese. One question which remained unclear was whether the Americans, through some intelligence or other channels, were frightening the Chinese about a possible attack by the Soviet Union. Perhaps not. But that was in the minds of some of our people.

After Gorbachev came in, the three major objectives of our foreign policy were, first, to slow down the arms race, in order to improve our relations with the United States; to get out of Afghanistan; and third, to normalize our relations with China, for obvious reasons.

Of course, I never thought that the Chinese would go very far in their relationship with the United States. In fact, Deng Xiaoping said at one stage that they would never enter in a strategic relationship with any power—meaning neither the Soviet Union, nor the United States. Therefore, when we managed to normalize our relations after the

Gorbachev visit in 1989, we regarded that as a major breakthrough in our relationship with China. I think both sides thought that should improve their position vis-à-vis the United States.

That is about all I have to say really. If anyone can clarify what Brzezinski said to the Chinese during his trip there, that might be helpful. Thank you.

**LEGVOLD:** Bill Odom is next; maybe you would clarify what Zbig said in China? Then Marshall.

**ODOM:** I did not go along, so I am not in a position to do that, but I can add another dimension about some of the thinking, particularly in the Defense Department, and certainly in parts of the NSC staff.

If we looked at East Asia, we had had very bad relations with China, and that contributed rather significantly to our military commitments out there. It made the military burdens greater. We appreciated the military weakness of China. And the Chinese themselves were more and more aware of that, particularly after Damansky island, and all that period—and particularly after the sustained Soviet military buildup. You went from about 15 divisions in the 1960s to over 60 divisions later on. This was not ignored by the Chinese. When we normalized, it was the first time in this century that the U.S. had had reasonably good relations with both China and Japan. And that condition rather dramatically lowered the kinds of military contingencies the U.S. thought it would have to



face in the Pacific. It really boiled down to maintaining a balance on the Korean peninsula, dealing with Soviet SSBN fleet, and other naval affairs. So, from our purely detached objective viewpoint of trying to lower the U.S. defense burdens—I do not know if Harold Brown would voice it exactly as I have said it—we had very objective reasons for favoring this kind of change.

Another factor was the loss of our intelligence capability in Iran. I think Admiral Turner has more to say about it than I have; but that had a great deal to do with how far we could go in SALT verification. So, a number of factors came together here.

I must say that I am reminded here to some extent of our discussion this morning about the Horn. There were a lot of factors at work here, and as I begin to think more of them, I see why rather strange alliances within the U.S. government—and within the U.S., body politic—began to move policy in that direction.

**LEGVOLD:** Marshall Shulman, and then Jim Hershberg.

**SHULMAN:** I will pass, Bob, because I was going to mention this factor of the loss of the Iranian monitoring stations as adding to the concerns about China.

**LEGVOLD:** That, however, would be after the 1978 period that we are talking about now. Jim Hershberg?

**HERSHBERG:** I, too, was going to ask the Americans about the Iranian factor in accelerating the normalization process; but I also had a question for the Russian participants: Reading the documents—and especially the exchanges between the Soviet and the American leaders on China—one is struck by the intense emotionalism of the Soviet comments about China, in contrast to Gromyko's extended, more or less unemotional discussions of SALT. When one comes to China, there is a very sharp emotional edge. For an example, look at Gromyko's comment to Carter on September 23, 1977, warning him of the danger that the Chinese will embroil the United States in dangerous and dirty games and plots against the Soviets. Even more striking is the comment that Brezhnev makes to Carter in Vienna, where he explicitly says that the Chinese goal is to involve the U.S. and the Soviet Union in a world war, in which they would remain on the sidelines. And the story that we heard about moving massive amounts of civilians across the border might fit into that view. I just wonder if any of the Russian participants could shed any light on the personal fears and experiences of the Soviet leaders at that time—specifically and especially Brezhnev and Gromyko, but also Andropov and Ustinov. What made them so emotional and intense about Chinese, in ways that the Americans probably cannot understand?

**LEGVOLD:** Stan?

**TURNER:** The question of the listening station, and Soviet missile launches, has come up

several times. Let me just give my perspective on it. When we lost the second Iranian station, we had a number of other techniques up our sleeve for continuing to monitor Soviet missile launches. I do not know how much Zbig, Cy, or other people thought our ability verify compliance with SALT bore on the opening of the normalization with China; but I was not pressing for normalization with China on that account. I was delighted when we *did* normalize with China, because it made verification somewhat easier; the other methods were complicated and technically difficult. But we were working the issue without counting on the China solution.

**LEGVOLD:** Thank you Stan. The floor is open. Phil?

**BRENNER:** Let me read to you from Garthoff's *Détente and Confrontation* on the Brzezinski trip. He says, "Brzezinski played his opportunity in China to the hilt. He and his team of high-level NSC, State and Defense officials went out of their way to give briefings on American strategic policy; on the possibility of technological assistance; on aspects of the world situation; and on measures to counter Soviet policy and activities, that were very much in tune with Chinese views." At the end of the trip, he was quoted in the *New York Times* as saying, "The basic significance of the trip was to underline the long-term strategic nature of the United States's relationship with China." And what seems clear—if this is a reasonably accurate account of what went on in China—is that one of the purposes there was to frighten the Soviet Union.

What we have seen today, I would say, is a process on both sides of confidence destruction, rather than confidence building. This morning we found that the Soviets—along with the Cubans, who were seen very much a part of this Soviet nexus—undermined the confidence of the Carter administration that there was good will on the part of the Soviet Union. And in the afternoon what we are finding is that the Soviet Union felt that Carter's policy in the Middle East and China demonstrated a lack of good will on the part of the United States. In political science parlance, we talk about confidence-building measures that enable two parties to go from a position of antagonism to a position where they can negotiate. What we see here is a process of confidence destruction.

**LEGVOLD:** Mark Garrison?

**GARRISON:** Three brief points. First, responding to the Chairman's opening question about whether it was Brown who first raised the question of playing the China card, Zbig's memoirs make clear that in that period—as he says, "In order to overcome State's resistance" to his desire to make a trip to China—he had to develop alliances with Brown and Mondale. And on February 27—ahead of the March 2 meeting—he sent a memo to Carter, basically advocating playing the China card. So that is an answer to that question.

The second point I would direct to Anatoly, and it is on the question of whether the Soviets linked China to SALT. Anatoly, you said no such linkage existed. Here I would just cite one of the documents, which is a letter you sent from your Embassy in July,

which, in effect, recommended precisely that linkage: "We should continue actively and publicly to advance to the USA our thesis that the Carter administration's formation of a bloc with Beijing on an anti-Soviet basis would preclude to it opportunities for cooperation with the Soviet Union in the matter of arms limitation, particularly as regards SALT." [Long laughter.]

**DOBRYNIN:** It was merely a clever observation on my part. [Laughter.]

**GARRISON:** But I also had a feeling that on the American side there was, in fact, a real perception that in December of 1978 the Soviet side fell back from the planned summit early in 1979, and the conclusion of the SALT treaty—that there was a delay, as a result of the rapprochement with China.

Before I leave the floor, I have just one more question. If he is willing, I would like to hear General Gribkov's assessment—and the General Staff's assessment—of the degree to which China presented a military threat, and the degree to which American-Chinese cooperation on military matters might have posed a problem.

**LEGVOLD:** Anatoly, please?

**GRIBKOV:** I will present the point of view of the Soviet General Staff. When the relations between China and the Soviet Union rapidly deteriorated—and especially when the

rapprochement between China and the U.S. began—we had to significantly strengthen our forces in the far East. We created a separate conventional army in Mongolia consisting of several divisions, whereas before that we had only a symbolic troop presence there. We created separate groups of troops on the Amur frontier, where the Chinese had their military bases, and in the maritime provinces.

It has been said here that there were 15 divisions there—I think it was General Odom who said that—and that later we increased our strength to 60 divisions. No, we did not increase our presence to 60 divisions; but we eventually had about 50,000 troops there. We transferred a part of our naval forces there from the Black Sea Fleet and the Northern Fleet. The Pacific Fleet was reinforced. We restored all the fortifications that we had along the border—and the border between China and the Soviet Union, if I remember correctly, is about 9,000 kilometers long. Previously, our border troops had been armed only with light firearms; now we had to give them heavy weapons. We gave them armored personnel carriers, both wheeled and tracked, and even some small artillery. That made our border troops more independent in terms of being able to repel an attack.

There is one more important thing. You know that we were very weak in comparison with you in our nuclear arsenal during the Caribbean crisis; the ratio in strategic weapons was 17:1 in your favor. There was really no comparison. We had only 30 ICBMs, and you—together with the French and the British—could launch 500. So when we became a little more affluent in terms of nuclear weapons, and when we eventually reached parity—even before parity—and when the situation with China deteriorated, we had to target some of our missiles at nuclear bases in China. We had

never done that before. This is what I wanted to add.

**LEGVOLD:** Anatoly?

**DOBRYNIN:** First, I would like to answer my friend Oleg. Phil asked you—and I will try to answer him on your behalf [laughter]—what Zbig did in Beijing. What he was up to, and with what result? I think the answer is very clear. There is a White House document signed by Carter on May 17 instructing Zbig Brzezinski on what to tell Chinese: “Your basic goal should be convey to the Chinese our determination to compete effectively with the Soviets, to deter the Soviet military challenge, and to protect our interests and those of our friends and allies. Equally important, you should probe the Chinese for their views, seeking to establish a shared perspective, and where desirable to develop political collaboration. You should emphasize reciprocity, and stress that the pursuit of our shared objectives required mutual efforts.” Further: “With the above as your point of departure, you should then share with the Chinese my personal view of the nature of Soviet threat. To state it most succinctly, my concern is the combination of increasing Soviet military power and political shortsightedness fed by big power ambitions might tempt the Soviet Union both to exploit local turbulence, especially in the Third World, and to intimidate our friends, in order to seek political advantage, and eventually even political preponderance. This is why I do take seriously Soviet action in Africa, and this is why I am concerned about the Soviet military buildup in Europe. I also see some Soviet designs

pointed toward the Indian Ocean through South Asia, and perhaps toward the encirclement of China."

You can well imagine, given these instruction, what kind of picture Zbig presented to the Chinese. "... [A]nd perhaps toward the encirclement of China through Vietnam, and even perhaps, some day through Taiwan. The United States, however, is determined to respond." It is rather clear what instructions Zbig had, and he used them fully.

**TROYANOVSKY:** He probably he wrote them for himself. [Laughter.]

**DOBRYNIN:** Yes, he may have prepared it for himself; but never signed them [Laughter.]

And there is another interesting point, as was mentioned in the letter from Brezhnev. Immediately after the visit of Deng Xiaoping to Washington, there was the invasion of Kampuchea. Was this a coincidence, or not?

**LEGVOLD:** You mean the invasion of Vietnam.

**DOBRYNIN:** Vietnam; excuse me. We wondered whether this was a simple coincidence, or whether this was something you had discussed. According to Henry Kissinger, Deng mentioned in Washington that he was going to teach the Vietnamese a lesson.

Now, about linkage and my letter—



**GARRISON:** Earlier you had said that the Soviet Union did not attempt to hold up the SALT process because of what we were doing on China, but—

**DOBRYNIN:** Well, I will repeat it. We did not want to link these two issues, because SALT was our number one priority, and if there was a possibility to have the SALT agreement, we would sign it immediately. More than that, if Cy had not received additional instructions from the White House, we would have signed a treaty and announced it. Gromyko had instruction from my government to make an announcement in Geneva by the end of the year, even though you had already announced that you were going to receive Deng Xiaoping. He was prepared a week later to sign SALT. We did not like what you were doing with China, but we were prepared to sign. We discussed with Cy his new instructions, and he tried to find a compromise. This is why he called Washington. There was a discussion about how to formulate this new demand on encryption. He tried to find a compromise; Gromyko tried also. But when Cy asked his government, the answer was no. And we were stuck for another six months. If it were not for that, there would have been an agreement then. I know, because these were Gromyko's instructions. What could we gain by postponing? Brezhnev was prepared to come in the spring, or even earlier. Everything was prepared.

**LEGVOLD:** Thank you very much, Anatoly. Arne is next with a question. We are beyond the hour that I promised you, so I think we want to become brief now, and then we will

allow one last intervention. But first Arne.

**WESTAD:** Just a very brief question for General Gribkov, in connection with the February 1979 Chinese invasion of Vietnam. Could you outline for us the Soviet military leadership's perception of the repercussions of that intervention, and provide your estimation of the role the United States played in it? What kinds of preparations, if any, were made on the Soviet side in view of the Chinese invasion?

**LEGVOLD:** Before you respond, Anatoly, Sergei would like to add something.

**SERGEI KOMOLOV:** I also have a question for the U.S. policy makers concerning this. What we have here, it seems to me, is really a two-sided picture of intentions. On the one hand, in certain documents—those prepared by Dr. Brzezinski—it is stated that China and the United States should have a long-term strategic relationship. On the other hand, it would seem that this hasty rapprochement was rather pushed by certain events in the Horn of Africa. If we look at the picture today, it would seem that what the United States and China have is not exactly a cooperative strategic relationship. So, the question I have is this: what was the thinking at that time on the long-term prospects of the U.S. relationship with China? Was it all negative? Was it thought of in negative terms, simply as unity in the face of the common enemy? Or was there any positive plan also for a long-term relationship with China?

**LEGVOLD:** Marshall?

**SHULMAN:** Just a word to Sergei, and then something about the Soviet reaction. As I said before, Sergei, I think there was different thinking in different quarters. There were those who thought that there was a need for developing long-term relations with China. These people felt, in a sense, that we had somewhat similar problems with China and the Soviet Union. In both cases we wanted the relationship to evolve. There were some, however, who saw the relationship with China simply in terms of its usefulness as a weapon to put pressure on the Soviet Union. Although we called it a long-term strategic relationship, it really was not. It was, essentially, more of a short-term advantage.

I do want to say just a word about the Soviet reaction to the China card, because I have a very vivid memory of the meeting at the end of December in Geneva. Anatoly, pay attention. [Laughter.]

**LEGVOLD:** This was in December 1978?

**SHULMAN:** Yes. We had gone through the exercise. There were five end-game issues. We had worked our way through the five. We thought we had an agreement. Paul Warnke, who was on his final mission then before his resignation, stayed up with me all night, and we killed several bottles of Scotch, celebrating the fact that we had finally managed to do it. I still have a hangover from that occasion. [Laughter.] Anyway, the

agreement was all wrapped up; Brezhnev would visit to Washington, and the date was set for it; that was communicated back; and then the next morning the whole thing fell apart.

Now, my feeling was that it was not just the encryption issue that complicated matters, because eventually we found our way around that thorny issue. My feeling was that the Soviets interpreted the announcement that Deng Xiaoping was to come to Washington immediately before the date projected for Brezhnev's as a slap in the face. It was clearly such an affront that to say that it was an irritant underplays the intense anger felt by Gromyko. The whole end game resolution was out.

**DOBRYNIN:** I would not go that far, but there was—

**SHULMAN:** There is no doubt that it was more than just an irritated reaction. It was really an angry reaction, and it wiped the tentative agreement. The five agreements on the end game issues all were dependent on each other. The question of telemetry was not irresolvable. Eventually we resolved it. The main thing, from Gromyko's point of view, was that he felt a deliberate affront. There was a violent anger. I think it was understandable. But it did cost us a delay in reaching agreement from then until the following spring.

It also needs to be said, I think, that already by that time, the SALT process had been so prolonged that the relationship was already in decline. It had begun to deteriorate to the point where we lost hope that a SALT agreement could help us build the

relationship.

**DOBRYNIN:** I agree with you entirely, except on one point: if you had ratified SALT, the relationship would have improved.

**LEGVOLD:** The list has widened just a little bit since a moment ago. Les, and then Cy, to finish. I would only observe that this has become a relationship of wet rags. We began with a wet rag in Moscow in March of 1977, and we have now got a wet rag in Geneva in 1978. Cy, you want to comment immediately on this?

**VANCE:** I want to comment immediately. I disagree wholeheartedly with Marshall. Marshall was wrong in suggesting that things had so deteriorated that it was very hard to get to SALT quicker. We were at the threshold of getting there, and we made a mistake by not going through with what we had basically already agreed to. That is where the fault lies. I do not agree with Marshall.

**LEGVOLD:** Les Gelb, you get the last word.

**GELB:** I do not agree with either of them. [Laughter.] But I agree more with Cy than with Marshall. My memory of this is also very vivid. [Laughter.] So much for vivid memories. Indeed, there were five issues, and one of them was telemetry. And when Paul said that

night he was going to leave the next morning, I said to him, "What the devil are you doing?" He said, "It is all over." I said, "No it's not; these issues have not all been resolved."

**DOBRYNIN:** So *you* were the obstacle, then? [Laughter.]

**GELB:** No, no. To say that China was what held it up does not make sense on the face of it, Marshall, because encryption was our decision, not the Soviets' decision. They would have been willing to settle on what had been prearranged. I agree with Anatoly: China was not the reason for the failure.

And then I disagree with everybody. [Laughter.] Even if we had solved all five of those issues in Geneva in December, we had a list of almost 60 additional issues which we spent the next six months trying to clear up. And, in fact, even when we got on the plane to fly out to Vienna, we did not have a final text, because there were still two issues unresolved.

**DOBRYNIN:** You know as well as I do that once you have a basic decision announced in Washington and Moscow by two leaders, they will do whatever is necessary to clear up all remaining issues. But when they are angry, they might just wait another five or six months.

**GELB:** [To Dobrynin:] You came in to see Cy two or three times a week for six months, as we were going through all these issues. You did this the whole time.

**DOBRYNIN:** Yes, but the sole question was whether there would be a decision or not. This is the point.

**LEGVOLD:** Well, we are now at the end of the afternoon. I want to thank everyone. I want to thank Cy especially, and wish him a good trip back. We have profited much from your presence. Everyone has been a very good soldier, including the two Generals who are at the table.

Now for the evening, I am asked to announce that the dinner tonight will be in the Dunes Terrace. I do not know where the Dunes Terrace is, so we have to have a further announcement.

**JANET LANG:** The Dunes Terrace is outside, and what you do is just go through the doors as if you were going to the Sea Breeze Restaurant. The first door gets you out there, and as you get out, you go downward.

**LEGVOLD:** Toward the ocean, or toward the back?

**LANG:** We will have a sign out there.

**LEGVOLD:** Walk toward the ocean, and then there will be the sign. Dinner is at 8:00 o'clock. We will meet back here at 9:00 o'clock tomorrow morning for the meeting. Thank you.

### March 25, Session 5—Mid-1978: A Critical Moment?

**LEGVOLD:** Is everyone set to begin? This is like trying to begin a Democratic or Republican convention. Okay, I would like to welcome you back to the second session of our meeting, and before we begin the day's work, I want to put a proposal to you on the schedule. There are some in the group who would like to have a longer break at noon, in the middle of the day, and resume in the afternoon somewhat later. So, let me ask, how many of you would be in favor of resuming not at 2:15, but at 3:30, and then going a little later this afternoon rather than breaking at 4:00? Okay, it looks as though it is favored by the group. So, the schedule will change. We will break as scheduled today, at 1:00 o'clock, and we will resume at 3:30. We will probably go past our scheduled 4:00 o'clock end until 4:30 or 4:45. That will be the last session.

Now, in terms of the schedule today, this morning we are talking about the spring and summer of 1978. I will say a word about that in a moment. After the coffee break—that is, after we break at 10:45 and come back at 11:15—we will look at the military



situation in Central Europe and talk about conventional arms control and other non-strategic arms control. Then we will break for lunch. The session at the end of the day will be on Poland and Eastern Europe. Finally, this evening we have the informal session on U.S.-Russian relations. Bob Pastor gave me a newspaper clipping a moment ago, the title of which is, "Hint of a Frost in U.S.-Russian Talks." The article is not from the spring of 1978; it is from today. So, there are links between what we are talking about this morning and this afternoon, and what we will be discussing this evening, especially with the advantage of Ambassador Tom Pickering's presence.

On the morning: this session, in my mind—and, I think, in the mind of my colleagues who organized this meeting—is different from other things that we have been doing. Up to this point we have taken individual elements of the relationship—or problems in the relationship, such as Shaba II, or the Middle East, or arms control—and we have discussed them separately. In many respects this is very unrealistic, as a number of you have said around the table. That is not the way in which these things happened, as you experienced them. Instead, you experienced them as a great combination of events.

Please take from your supplementary packet the list of events that you have, because I want to show you something on that score. If you do not have copy, Janet Lang will give you a copy. Raise your hand if you do not have a copy. It is something called, "Agenda Issues and Related Issues." It is in your supplementary material. It is in chronological order with two columns. Mark, this is your paper, isn't it?

**GARRISON:** Well, I helped put it together, yes.

**LEGVOLD:** Who did it? Who deserves the credit?

**BLIGHT:** Mark Garrison.

**LEGVOLD:** Do all of you have that now? The credit goes primarily to Mark Garrison for preparing this. I think it is a useful item. Please turn to page 3, which is 1978—the first two pages are basically 1977. It is helpful to remind ourselves of what was going on. Skip down to about February. Remember, February was when those two SCC meetings on the Horn of Africa took place that we have referred to: February 28 and March 2. The first of those items is under Africa, and it says, in January and February, “Ethiopia begins the counteroffensive with Soviet-Cuban support.” Then, on March 14 Dobrynin assures Cyrus Vance that Ethiopia would not cross the border after regaining the Ogaden.

Approximately at the same time, on February 21, you have the SCC meeting, and you have Zbig beginning to link SALT and Africa, but a decision is taken not to announce a formal linkage. Then, in March, Brezhnev and Ustinov visit the Soviet Far East, stressing the problem of China. You’ve got further developments on SALT, and Africa in the right hand column. Then on March 17th Carter delivers the Wake Forest speech, which was a very different speech from the Notre Dame speech the year before. He is already beginning to emphasize the military challenge and the problems on that score. You have the Carter decision on neutron weapons in early April, and you’ve got the Romanian visit. Then you’ve got the developments in arms control, and arms is on the right hand side.

You have in your packet a summary by General Secretary Brezhnev of his discussions with Carter in Moscow—it is the first item in this division—and you notice that Brezhnev is expressing to Cy Vance his displeasure over the direction of events. By April 28, [Mohammad] Daoud [Khan] is killed in the Afghan coup. You've got some further developments in arms control area. Then you've got the Carter speech criticizing the Soviet Union in Africa. Then, in early May, in the left-hand column, you've got Shaba, the Katanga rebels. You have more public statements from Carter. On May 18th the Soviet dissident [Yuri] Orlov is sentenced. You have already had the arrest of Shcharansky and [Aleksandr] Ginzburg before that—that is not on the list. You've got more of that kind of thing May 20th. Then, on May 21—on the left-hand column—Carter announces that we will slow down that planned troop withdrawal from Korea. On May 21, or May 20, Zbig travels to Beijing. On May 27, you then have that meeting with Carter that we talked about yesterday in some detail, and three days later the meeting with Vance that we also talked about, where there were sharp exchanges over all of these issues. You have in the end of May, within a few days, NATO agreeing to a long-term defense program. In those earlier meetings with Carter and Vance, the Soviet side had already begun expressing concern about what they called "this explosion of anti-Soviet sentiment." Then you get the Annapolis speech—we have a copy of that. You have the Politburo meeting at which we have Brezhnev's speech to his colleagues on how to handle it.

In short, the point is this: in 1977, the relationship had its ups and downs. For example, by May 1977, the SALT talks had been put back on the tracks. You went from May 1977 through October 1 and the joint statement, then things began to get

troublesome. But when you look at *this* conglomeration of events in 1978, there is very little that is up. Almost all of it is down. It led to the Annapolis speech, the Politburo session on June 7th or 8th, and the formal *Pravda* statement, for which you now have the historical context, on June 16.

The interesting document in this, it seems to me, is the last item, or nearly the last item: Anatoly's report back to Moscow in the summer of 1978, where he is trying to explain to the Politburo what is going on. He gives a mixed review of relations. He is not at this point saying that there is an inevitable trend that is not going to be reversed; on the contrary, he is talking about the many negative developments, but notes recent signs that the Carter administration was drawing back. One of the problems with it, Anatoly, from my point of view, is that it reinforces the impression that the Soviet leadership evidently had: namely, that their policy of firmness—of rebuffing Carter—was working. Your analysis suggested that the Soviet Union ought to continue with essentially the same policy, although you were subtly trying to encourage the Soviet leadership to look for areas in which they could take positive steps, because you believed that détente was still, in some fashion, salvageable. In fact, you even predicted that after a difficult one or two months in the summer, and probably an election campaign with a good deal of an anti-Soviet rhetoric, you anticipated that U.S.-Soviet relations would, in fact, improve somewhere down the road—I assume in six months or so. That is an interesting assessment at that point.

I apologize for this long introduction to the morning session, but I want to repeat that what we are trying to understand is the way in which all of these things interacted—

how they came together. The first question that I put to both sides is, how did this feel to you while you were in the middle of it? Did you have some sense that this was happening, in a broad sense? Did you have some sense of what the connections were among all of these events, if you saw any connection? And what effect did it have on policy making within the two sides? Was there controversy about this? Did some people want to react to that in a way different from others? We have indications of what was going on at the individual policy levels on specific issues, such as the Horn, or arms control; but I am really asking the question of how the state of the relationship played in the deliberations on the two sides.

Again, I apologize for the length of the introduction. Marshall?

**SHULMAN:** Just a brief response with respect to how it felt at the time: I can recall in that period that I gave an interview to Bernie Gwertzman at the *New York Times*, in which I said that it was like sitting on a hill and watching two locomotives approaching each other on the same track.

**LEGVOLD:** Bob Pastor?

**PASTOR:** I want to comment on the public mood. I found a poll on U.S.-Soviet relations in the Carter library that was prepared by the Opinion Research Corporation of the United States in the spring of 1978. It contrasts very sharply with what Anatoly suggests in his

cable to the Foreign Ministry: that Americans supported détente and the relaxation of tensions. This poll suggests, actually, quite the opposite. It suggested that more Americans then believed—compared, for example, to 1976, when President Carter was elected—that the Soviet Union had greater military power than the United States, and that it could not be trusted to live up to the SALT agreement. The level of distrust was very high: three-fifths of the public said they had heard little or nothing about the SALT negotiations. The fact that the SALT negotiations were stretched out is very important, because in the middle of the negotiations, it was very difficult for the administration to defend it—or to even explain it—while still wrestling with various issues. Only when the negotiations finished was there a full articulation of why it was in our interest. The fact that the negotiation had been stretched out so long actually increased the skepticism of the American public, and eroded their support for détente.

This was partly also a result of the fact that confidence in U.S. military strength declined. There was a feeling that the Soviets were getting much stronger, and we were getting weaker. The poll numbers are quite profound. In just two years, for example, Americans' views had changed. In December 1976, 29% of the American public believed the United States was stronger—or somewhat stronger—than the Soviet Union. Only 20% in February 1978 felt that way. Similarly, an increasing percentage of the American people felt that the Soviet Union had grown stronger: from 37% to 44%.

So, I think, this was the undercurrent of the public mood that had changed partly in response to the events that you have mentioned. But this was what lay behind some of the feeling among policy makers.

**LEGVOLD:** Bob, could I ask you whether people in the White House were beginning to respond to these sentiments, and did that, in part, explain the Wake Forest speech?

**PASTOR:** Bill might be able to explain it better.

**ODOM:** I will not exaggerate the degree of my knowledge about what the mood in the whole White House was, but I think that Hamilton Jordan, in particular, had begun to think that appearing to make too many concessions to the Soviet side was not in President Carter's domestic political interest anymore. And Brzezinski began to talk to Jordan more often about that. Within the National Security council staff, I guess I did not think about it as two trains approaching one another, as Marshall Shulman has described; but it was clear that the Carter administration was having to reassess fairly fundamentally some of the directions it had taken.

In the spring of 1977, Secretary Vance and his staff—and part of the NSC staff—produced a series of Presidential Review Memoranda which led to policy initiatives, many of which, it seemed to me, provided a rather broad opening to much wider cooperation with the Soviet Union. And it seemed to me, by the spring and fall, that most of it had gone awry. A number of these initiatives had not been exploited very effectively by the Soviet side. What we were seeing in 1978 was the result of these things breaking down. And I think that the president felt many cross-pressures.

I know that I myself, as a staffer, was trying to sort out what the president wanted—

what his interests were, and how we could best serve him. It seemed that one day it was taking a hard line toward the Soviet Union, and the next day it was taking a soft line toward the Soviet Union. It was very difficult to know precisely where he was on that, and exactly what he wanted to come out. But it seemed that events kept pushing him farther and farther to marginal retreats from what he viewed as what détente ought to yield for him in 1977. I think that by 1978 a deeper degree of skepticism had developed.

Now, I also think that a factor that began to bear on our own internal calculations was the crisis looming in Iran. You see, we had a fair amount of information that things were not in good shape there in the summer of 1978. Not only the U.S. Ambassador, but a number of other friendly ambassadors were reporting extensively on that. The Shah was pouring out his heart to all of these people; you would have two or three hour conversations between the Shah and these ambassadors. Some of alternative policy courses that the Shah was considering were rather surprising, and the swings in what he was considering were extremely wide. So one could anticipate very serious difficulties occurring in Iran. I have forgotten whether or not we had the gas shortages in the summer of 1978 or 1979—

**GELB:** 1979.

**ODOM:** 1979. So they are not in this year. But I would say that the mood was changing from a kind of optimism—a lot of euphoria—in 1977, to pessimism in 1978. That



euphoria really began to disappear. Some hard realities were now confronting the president, and he was doing his best to negotiate through them.

So, I had not really thought about it in the way you are framing the context, Bob. But I think you are on to something when you ask us to consider the cumulative impact. And yes, I think that you can make an argument that there were two Carter administrations: the first two and a half-two years, and the last year and a half to two years. What you are beginning to see here is the transformation from one administration to the other.

**LEGVOLD:** I know several of you are on the same subject. Les was next, then Mark Garrison, then Bob, and then Marshall. Les Gelb?

**GELB:** I agree with everything Bill Odom just said. I think it is a very important context for all this. I will step back to reinforce it in a few ways.

In 1976, before anyone really imagined Jimmy Carter would be President of the United States—besides Jimmy Carter—relations with the Soviet Union already began to deteriorate: so much so that in the Republican primary between Reagan and Ford, relations with the Soviet Union—and Henry Kissinger in particular, on this issue—had become a campaign issue. Henry Kissinger was disinvited to the Republican convention. That is part of the backdrop here; it was already a big issue within the Republican party, and you began to see the outlines of the much tougher Reagan administration's foreign

policy toward the Soviet Union that emerged four years later. But it was there in the 1976 campaign. Things were very bitter between Reagan and Ford on this issue.

In the Democratic campaign, Jimmy Carter did not ignore foreign policy, and relations with the Soviet Union played out in an interesting way in his speeches. On the one hand, he argued that Nixon, Ford, and Kissinger had simply paid too much attention to the Soviet Union, and that the United States had other interests every bit as important as the Soviet Union. He argued that we were distorting the reality of the world. Secondly, he was saying during the campaign that what really counted for the United States—what we really stood for—was human rights. This was the area in which Nixon, Ford, and Kissinger had failed the most, according to Carter's campaign rhetoric. And both of these campaign themes became the instant spear points of Carter's policy towards the Soviet Union. Carter suggested that, in his administration, the priority of the Soviet Union in U.S. foreign policy would be replaced by a three-pronged priority: West-West relations—strengthening our relations with our allies; North-South relations—paying more attention to the developing world; and only then, relations with the Soviet Union. So, they were being downgraded. Right out of the box he made very strong statements about the human rights situation in the Soviet Union. That had been a very difficult year, 1976—you had little business to do in that year, Anatoly. And things took a sour turn right at the beginning of the Carter administration. Right at the very beginning.

As a backdrop to it, I think, most people in the foreign policy community in the United States, believed that the Soviet Union had in many respects achieved military parity. This was an ongoing argument within the foreign policy community, but I think

most people believed the Soviets had achieved military parity. That was very difficult for the United States to accept, because for the longest time we felt that the Soviets were in a very clear position of inferiority, although it was rarely so stated. Some people felt—I think that Bill can speak to this more himself—that the Soviets had, in fact, achieved superiority in a number of respects, including in nuclear war-fighting. Now, I myself did not believe it before, during, or after. But I would say, as the Carter administration progressed, my own view was more and more in the minority. Most of my colleagues really began to believe that the Soviets had this kind of capability. In fact, right in the middle of it there was a CIA estimate that really caused an absolute explosion, suggesting that the Soviets had achieved nuclear war-fighting superiority. It was a reevaluation of the capabilities of the SS-19. Prior to some time in mid-1979 the intelligence community had estimated the SS-19 did not have a hard target kill capability—that it could not destroy a missile in its silo. Then suddenly, and without any new information, the estimate was changed: the SS-19, along with the SS-18, now had this hard target kill capability. Hence the superiority in nuclear war-fighting for the Soviet side.

**LEGVOLD:** Les, when was that change?

**GELB:** The estimate was some time in mid-1977; I do not remember exactly when.

**ODOM:** It was later, wasn't it? Maybe Stan remembers; I thought it was later.

**GELB:** I am very bad on these dates. I thought it was during the first year.

**TURNER:** I will provide some detail on this.

**GELB:** It is the first year.

**TURNER:** I would be surprised if it was before 1979, but I may be wrong. The information was around in the community, but it was not in any NIEs for a long time.

**GELB:** Well, it was briefed—and it was briefed in 1979. Whether it came out as a formal NIE, I just do not remember. But I do remember your team coming over to brief me, and then I went in to brief Cy on that, because we were really startled about the change in the estimate. In any event, it was a part of the backdrop to a growing concern about the military capability of the Soviet Union.

To make matters much worse, there was a perception in Washington—and particularly in Europe—that the Carter administration was incompetent in foreign policy. We can see what that kind of perception and appreciation does to an administration just by looking at the Clinton administration now. It was very similar to prevailing view about the Carter administration, even in early 1977. Very quickly the word began to spread that this administration could not manage foreign affairs, especially so in Europe.

This provides a further backdrop to something else we are going to discuss today:

namely, perceptions of the military balance in Central Europe, which related to the medium-range missile deployments and negotiations. Because by the time Helmut Schmidt got up in London in September 1977 to give his speech calling for deployments of missiles and negotiations, there had been a pot boiling underneath of almost total European disenchantment with U.S. leadership in NATO affairs and in Soviet-American relations.

This was an administration that began to feel particularly besieged on this issue, both domestically, and in its dealings with the Soviet Union, which we perceived to have become more powerful militarily, and more assertive politically and diplomatically. The irony—and I will end on this point—was that half of Jimmy Carter, and all of Cyrus Vance, wanted desperately to pull things in the other direction. They wanted desperately to achieve arms control and diplomatic breakthroughs that would cut through these trends that I am talking about. When we went to Moscow in March 1977, the Soviets' total rejection of both alternatives we put on the table constituted a slap in the face that caused the greatest embarrassment to all of those on our side who were involved in that enterprise, even though we were not the main proponents of those proposals. It was the people back in Washington who were the main proponents; but we carried them to Moscow; we were the ones who were humiliated by that response. It was a humiliation. At that meeting, Cy spontaneously put the rest of this arms control agenda on the table. If you go back and look at our briefing book, there is nothing in there about setting up nine working groups on arms control. I am sorry Cy is not here today; as he was making one proposal after another for new arms control negotiations, I, who had this responsibility for

him in the State Department, was surprised each time. I did not know he was going to do it. The whole arms control agenda that was spread out in Moscow sprang from our concern that the Soviet rejection of SALT had seriously damaged our arms control agenda. We wanted to spread it out and make the agenda even larger—that is, Cy did. And it tended to do two things: it reinforced the importance of the arms control agenda generally; and it fed into that perception in the foreign policy community that here was an administration that had gone crazy over arms control and had lost perspective, which in turn fed even more the perception of an administration that could not manage Soviet-American relations.

**LEGVOLD:** In a moment, I am going to let Anatoly Dobrynin make a point. But I want to ask you, Les, whether you thought the spring of 1978 was a qualitative change in some fashion, or are you arguing that it was just more of the same?

**GELB:** As Bill was saying, this was cumulative. I do not think it was qualitatively different in 1978 from 1977. All these things were very much present in 1977. But the relative strength inside the administration of those who advocated the tougher line, against those who would take a more conciliatory line, shifted in favor of the tougher line. Vance was losing ground in that battle throughout the two and a half-year period, except on SALT. I mean, Carter had a commitment there to finish it, and basically when push came to shove, each time he went back to Vance over everyone else.

**ODOM:** Can I add something?

**LEGVOLD:** Very briefly, Bill. And then I will give you more time afterwards.

**ODOM:** Did we have at the last session a copy of the article from *Presidential Studies Quarterly* about the Annapolis speech?

**LEGVOLD:** Yes.

**ODOM:** I think that is terribly important, because it is a part of the very phenomenon Les is describing. You see what the president did in putting that speech together: that has often been cited as evidence of the Vance-Brzezinski split. The split was very clearly in the president's head on that.

**GELB:** Absolutely.

**LEGVOLD:** Now, before you, Mark, Anatoly Dobrynin.

**DOBRYNIN:** I would just like to make a few comments on Les's statement. I think what you said, Les, was very interesting, and from my point of view as Ambassador, it looked to me exactly the way you presented it—not in detail, of course, because I did not know

them. But I would like for you to understand what actually happened in the Kremlin at the very beginning of the Carter administration, because it is very illuminating for all further events. At the very beginning, Carter was a completely unknown figure to the Moscow leadership—and for me as Ambassador, too. When they asked me for an analysis of Carter, all I could do was give quotations from his speeches during the election campaign, which are misleading.

When I met first time Carter two or three months after he became president, I discussed SALT with him, because I already had some information that he had in mind drastic reductions, maybe up to 200 or 300 missiles. When we discussed this with him, I asked him, "Mr. President, I heard that you have a plan for really drastic reductions." He said, "Yes." I asked, "How much?" He said, "Three hundred; two hundred." Well, I said, "There is no practical way to do it, in my personal opinion, because, with great difficulty, we just successfully finished the Vladivostok agreement. It is better to finish what we have, and then go to these drastic reductions later." But he said, "I think it is not enough, we should go further." So, the first thing I sent to Moscow was the news that the Washington rumors of a plan to make drastic cuts were true; I heard it from the president. He did not make a proposal to me officially; but he confirmed the rumor which was going around Washington.

Then, of course, there were many cases of human rights, which were considered in Moscow not as individual cases—Ginzburg, Orlov, Shcharansky—but rather as a trend in American foreign policy. Rightly or wrongly, they believed that this was a new trend in American policy: for the first time, the United States proposed to interfere openly in the



domestic affairs of the Soviet Union. Never before had there been such intervention on a government level. This was a second big surprise, and it caused great resentment in Moscow.

So what happened? In my many years of being Ambassador, I had never known our Politburo to have a specific discussion in the initial weeks of a new administration on how to deal with it. But there was in this case. Usually we would wait two, three, or four months to see what happened, and what kinds of actions the new administration would take, and we would formulate our own position. But not in this case. Before you came to Moscow, Andropov and Ustinov wrote a very rough letter to the Politburo asking Brezhnev to put on the agenda as a special point our relationship with the new administration. It was very unusual. In their opinion, this administration came with a very drastic and unwise policy—I am using a mild word; they used much stronger words, such as a “subversive” policy to change everything in Soviet-American relations. The new administration proposed just to sweep away the gains we had made during the previous administration, and to begin with a completely clean slate. This was not acceptable to us. From the very beginning, the Politburo proposed to take a very firm position with the new president, to make him understand that this was not the way to treat the Soviet Union. Again, I repeat: never before had we had such a discussion about a new administration.

There was a discussion, and it was decided to send a letter from Brezhnev to Carter, explaining to Carter, in a more polite way than was said at the Politburo meeting, “Look here, let us be more reasonable. First, on SALT: this is a major issue, which is practically ready for signing. So, let us not try a new avenue now. We are prepared to look into it

further; but let us not do away with four or five years of difficult negotiations and begin toying with a new set of proposals which will take another five or seven years to negotiate." This was simply pragmatic. We already had a treaty in place.

In addition, at Vladivostok there was for the first time a real clash between Brezhnev and our military leadership. Grechko, our Minister of Defense, protested some concessions Brezhnev made. He said, "You are conceding too much to Americans. I, as a Minister, disagree with you, Mr. Secretary General." I was present at the three talks by telephone. Ultimately, Brezhnev, you know, was a rather cautious fellow. He always tried to rule by consensus within the Politburo. But here he was confronted with this situation when our Minister of Defense rather arrogantly said to him, "I am against, and many people in the Politburo agree with me." Brezhnev replied, "I think the deal we are making with the Americans in Vladivostok is a good one. If I will listen what you say, we will destroy this treaty, and for how many years will we have no treaty at all?" So, Grechko, after consulting, called him back and said, "No, no, Leonid Ilych; do not take it as an affront. If you feel this way, go ahead." But for Brezhnev, it was very difficult situation, because for the first time he was challenged openly. And then exactly within few months we had a new set of ideas from the United States—a new president with a completely new set of rules for the SALT talks. Brezhnev's reaction was very severe. "Oh my God," he said, "So I have to begin from the very beginning."

In any case, the new proposals were things in which Brezhnev himself was not convinced. Psychologically, it was very difficult to accept the idea of a reduction from several thousand missiles to two or three hundred missiles. You have to understand it. For

so many years we were discussing in terms of thousands, and then suddenly we were supposed to start talking about hundreds. It was very difficult psychologically to accept. So the impression this gave the Politburo was that President Carter was not serious—that this was just plain propaganda, to impress world opinion with the new president's new ideas. Either that, or he Carter did not know what he was talking about.

On the whole, this was a psychological issue. Our reaction to your delegation was strongly negative, because of the psychological effect of your new proposals. I spoke with Cy Vance—you probably see me in the State Department minutes. I told him very clearly two weeks before he went to Moscow, "Cy, what you are bringing, as I understand it, is a complete non-starter. There is no way." I do not know whether he thought that at that moment I was just trying to press him; but that was not the case. I really knew what the situation was. I tried to give him a warning. I tried to persuade him to have a second position. But he did not listen. When your delegation arrived in Moscow, the response was brutal on our part, because Brezhnev did not even want to listen. He was beside himself. Before you arrived, there was another meeting of the politburo. All those who were sitting around the table said, "Leonid Ilych, show the Americans how we are strong and they are not serious." So he did not want to discuss your proposals. Of course, you had the full right to expect some questions about your proposals, and my impression was that you were prepared to explain them.

**GELB:** Absolutely.

**DOBRYNIN:** But we were not prepared to discuss them seriously.

**LEGVOLD:** Anatoly, I am going to push you now to finish the point, because we need to move on.

**DOBRYNIN:** The point is very simple. SALT could have been terminated very quickly, in time for a summit at the beginning of 1977. Events would have been quite different in Soviet-American relations if we had concluded with Vladivostok, or something like it, at a summit meeting in 1977. But instead, we got stuck on Africa, and in the irritant of human rights. If you look at 1978, the main problem between us was African affairs and human rights.

At one meeting with Gromyko, Carter asked him about Shcharansky. He said, "What about Shcharansky? What are you doing with his case?" Gromyko looked at him and said, "Who is Shcharansky?" In the United States, everybody knew who Shcharansky was. Gromyko just said, "Who is that?" Carter was so surprised that he dropped the whole issue. Quite frankly, at that time I thought, "What a clever Minister we have." He avoided a long and delicate discussion just by saying, "I do not know who that is." It was very simple. [Laughter.] And Carter dropped it. There was no more discussion just then about Shcharansky.

Well; this is how the things occurred. From the beginning, the psychology was all wrong. This was the important point: the psychology of the new administration's

approach to the Soviet Union was much more important than the new proposals, the figures.

**LEGVOLD:** Anatoly, that is very helpful. What you and Les have done for us, I think, is extremely valuable. You have set the context for us. But I am now going to urge us to focus on the 1978 period to understand how that worked given everything everyone has said. Mark is next; then Bob Pastor; then Marshall; then Anatoly Gribkov afterwards. Mark?

**GARRISON:** Just two brief points. First, I would like to illustrate one of the problems with the Carter administration that we talked about at Musgrove: namely, the question of priorities. I looked again at Carter's memoirs for this period to see how he looked at all of these things. And of course he looked at the issues that we are discussing separately—in isolation, more or less, from each other. But in his diary on March 13, he wrote, "It is hard to concentrate on anything except Panama." And then, of course, he was dealing with two votes on the Panama treaty. He really was not focused on what we are focussing on here.

But what I really wanted to do was to follow up on Bob's discussion of public opinion in the United States. The question is to Anatoly. The public opinion polls described a conservative swing in the United States at that time. But in your letter to the Foreign Ministry—and I realize your Embassy officers wrote the letter; you only signed it

[laughter]—you seemed to be seeing in the United States such a strong feeling on behalf of arms control and SALT that it would force Carter to be more reasonable on these things. From the U.S. side, it looked like public opinion was forcing him in the other direction. How did you reach that assessment?

**DOBRYNIN:** I wanted to—

**LEGVOLD:** Excuse me, Anatoly; after we go through this round, what I would like us to do before the coffee break is to look at this review of U.S. relations in all of its components. I am going to ask the American side what they think of that assessment in July 1978, and I am going to ask you, Anatoly, what you think of it now, looking back on it. And at that point you will be able to talk about a number of things, because you are here, and because it is an important document; we would miss an occasion if we did not do that. So I am going to interrupt Mark's question for that reason. Bob Pastor is next.

**PASTOR:** Two quick points. First, I tried to reflect a little bit more on your initial question, which is, what was the thinking in the White House on this, in 1978? And it occurred to me that, except for the specialists—like Marshall, who was focusing on this—no one in the White House or elsewhere understood, as we can in retrospect, that this may have been a turning point. In fact, in 1978 Carter completed hundreds of initiatives which he had set in motion, not the least of which was the Panama Canal Treaties, which really did occupy

him and the whole White House, and proved, like so many of his initiatives, to be both a victory and a Pyrrhic victory, in the sense he accomplished something that his predecessors could not, while paying a very high political cost. Indeed, some of us are still paying that cost. [Laughter.] While there were some clouds evident, it was by no means inevitable that they would turn into a storm. It was just as likely that, in many of our minds, the sun was going to come out.

My second point, actually, follows from a note that Phil Brenner just passed to me. He noted that the difference in perspectives between the U.S. and the Soviet leaders at that time was great, and was widening. The Soviet leaders felt that Carter was, in some ways, tougher than the Republicans who were his predecessors, whereas in the United States the perception was that he was a lot weaker—and indeed, growing weaker over time. I would suggest that as we step back from these events and think about them, we should wonder whether, as this gap grows wider, the danger to U.S.-Soviet relations also grew proportionally wider?

**LEGVOLD:** Good point. Marshall is next.

**SHULMAN:** I think that it is possible that not only what we do here in this session, but also what we do by way of follow-up with the records to try to further develop this analysis, can turn into something very useful—not only for the history of this period, but in more general terms of studying the policy making process. I want to suggest making an analytic

contribution to the discussion, for our purposes and also for the sake of those who will follow.

The general thrust of what I have to say is that what we are looking at is a process of interaction primarily between the developments in the internal politics on both sides, and interacting with each other. And for that purpose I want to suggest six planes of analysis for us to develop here, and also in the subsequent work that will be done on this period on the basis of our records.

In the first instance, it seems to me that the important thing to take into account is the tides of politics on the American side. This was a period when there was a rising conservative tide in American politics. The shadow of Ronald Reagan was already visible. It was like a storm that you see coming across the desert from a long way away. It was developing in the United States ever since the primary race between Reagan and Ford. But it was not only a conservative tide on the Republican side; it was also evident within the Democratic party. The formation of several groups like the Committee on the Present Danger—the group led by Senator Jackson—were already apparent, and they seemed to me to have an influence on the course of events, and particularly on the Carter administration. For much of the period of the Carter administration, there was a reflexive reaction against the rising conservative tide in American politics. That is one plane of analysis to be further developed.

Secondly, within the administration, there was in a mounting, acute form the encounter that Les described yesterday, which can be called “the battle of the hidden agendas.” It is clear from the record that there were these unresolved issues that I spoke of



yesterday, but the disagreements over them were becoming increasingly sharp and articulate. There was a series of running skirmishes among the various groups within the administration. One of those skirmishes, as Les properly said, took place within the head of the president himself. And here, I want to make a special point about the need for further analysis on the human rights issue that Anatoly referred to. The interesting thing about the human rights issue was that it was not a homogeneous movement. It represented a confluence of three strands in American politics. One was a more general reaction, particularly on the liberal side of the American political community, against Henry Kissinger's *realpolitik*, and the ignoring of moral values. Another was the international projection of the civil rights movement in the United States onto the international plane. Carter himself was caught up in this, as were people around him, such as Hamilton Jordan and Jody Powell. This affected his behavior from the very beginning. It is evident in his letter to [Andrei] Sakharov, and in the reception he gave [Vladimir] Bukovsky. These were extrapolations onto the international plane of essentially the same moral position on civil rights in America. I think it was perfectly sincere commitment on his part. The third element that was important came from the conservative side—and this was as important within the conservative wing of the Democratic party as it was in the Republican party; perhaps even more important, particularly personified in Scoop Jackson, Richard Perle, and so on. This was the use of the human rights issue as an offensive weapon in the political encounter with Russia—a feeling that this was an issue on which the Soviet Union was vulnerable. The rising dissident movement in Russia beginning in the 1960s, and then the effort to control

them—from the Sinyavsky-Daniel trial, to Shcharansky, and all the other things—fed this element. They felt that human rights could be used as an offensive instrument. So the human rights movement was not a single thing, but had those three separate threads.

Third, I think we would have to take into account the particular character of international politics in this period. Some of it we talked about already: developments in Africa were a function of the dissolution of the colonial period, and all the fluidity that that set in motion. This created opportunities, conflicts, ambiguities, and uncertainty.

Fourth, there were the developments in Soviet politics in this period. Now, I will leave it to our Soviet colleagues to fill this in; but it seemed to me that there was also evident a number of divergent trends in Soviet politics. The Tula speech early in 1977—January 1977—represented an effort to articulate the doctrine of sufficiency and moderation in the strategic competition; then there was the battle that Anatoly described of Brezhnev against Grechko over Vladivostok, and all that. That represented one strand. On the other hand—

**DOBRYNIN:** You did not pay attention to the Tula speech.

**SHULMAN:** That is another question. I mean, that is true; you are quite right. But for this purpose, I think, what is important is that there were also divergent trends to be seen within Soviet politics in that period.

On the one hand, you had the actions represented by those who were seeking to

moderate positions on the strategic competition. On another level, and quite independent of that, for example, were the efforts made by the KGB, and other instruments of the security apparatus, to control the dissident movement, with its repercussions abroad. I will not develop it, I will leave it to you to do that.

Then fifth, there were the developments in Soviet foreign policy in this period, and the other actions that had a bearing on the interreaction between the two countries. There was the exploitation—uncertain in motivation perhaps; largely improvised in Africa—

**LEGVOLD:** Marshall, I am going to ask you to develop your last two points a little more briefly.

**SHULMAN:** I will do that. Simply, what I want to do is to demarcate these planes of analysis. The fifth is Soviet foreign policy. And the final one—the sixth one—would be the process of interreaction between these two sides—both their domestic politics, and their foreign policy developments. The SALT negotiations, for example, were enormously complicated by the internal conflicts within each of the two sides, which resulted in this prolonged period of negotiation which went beyond the period when it might have made a difference on the atmosphere. And then there was the rising issue that Les spoke of—the intermediate nuclear forces; the SS-20s; and the interaction on those issues. It seems to me that it is useful to separate those planes of analysis, and then to reconstruct the interaction.

**LEGVOLD:** I think that was very good, Marshall. I suspect, in terms of this evening, that Tom's mind is already turning in terms of the six planes, because the world has not changed so much. Anatoly Gribkov?

**GRIBKOV:** In October 1976, two Politburo meetings were held. They were mostly devoted to the preparation of the meeting of the Political Consultative Committee (PCC) of the state-members of the Warsaw Treaty, which was going to take place in Bucharest. I was present at that meeting. At that time I was the acting Commander-in-Chief and the Chief of General Staff, because the Commander-in-Chief was on his deathbed; he was very ill. We discussed questions of foreign policy, and in particular, what position to take at the meeting of the PCC in Bucharest. The second question was my evaluation of NATO and Warsaw Treaty forces, and on measures to strengthen our fighting readiness vis-à-vis NATO troops.

The meeting of the PCC was held in the beginning of November in Bucharest. Leonid Ilych Brezhnev gave the main speech. He gave a comprehensive picture of the situation in the world, and of the fact that there was a lot of pressure from the U.S. side on the Soviet Union. He noted that negotiations with the U.S. were difficult; nothing could be achieved until the new president came to power. He said that we should see how he would act. Everyone present at that meeting agreed with the analysis of the world situation that Leonid Ilych Brezhnev gave in his report, except Ceaușescu. He approved the report in general, but he insisted that we strike from the declaration and the resolution

such words as “aggressiveness of American imperialism,” and the like. He always was against such terms. So we had to smooth it out. There was a decision taken on the basis of my report also—a military decision regarding the need to increase combat-readiness and modernization. We took into account the fact that it was close to 1979 when we expected to reach parity in nuclear arsenals, in the strategic sphere—

**LEGVOLD:** The estimate was that by 1979 you would achieve parity?

**GRIBKOV:** Yes; and we have achieved it. Before that we possessed superiority in nuclear weapons in Europe, both in theater (*operativno-takticheski*) and in tactical weapons. NATO had Pershings, Lance, Honest John—old types of weapons. We had R-300s, *Lunas*, and the medium-range missiles of the type we deployed in 1962 in Cuba, with a range of 2200 kilometers. They were able to cover entire Europe. They were a response to the American Pershings. And then the question had come up: what to do next? I have to tell you that there was no command structure of the Warsaw Treaty forces until 1978. That was the greatest mistake. A resolution establishing the Warsaw Treaty Armed Forces and the organs of command for peacetime was adopted in 1962. We had nothing planned for wartime. Only in 1978, after our initiative, did we develop a plan for the Warsaw Treaty Armed Forces and the command structure for wartime. Everyone had signed that agreement except for Ceaușescu. That agreement regulated how the Armed Forces of the Warsaw Treaty would function in a wartime. The post of a single Commander-in-Chief of

the United Armed Forces was established; the General Staff of the Armed Forces of the Soviet Union was to be his working organ—so it was stated in the agreement. Command structures were also established for the theaters of military action.

Why did we reach this decision? Because we would have parity in 1979, and because we understood now that we could not act carelessly with nuclear weapons as we did in 1962 during the Caribbean crisis. That is why the question had come up then regarding modernization of our military technology and weapons, and also regarding the changing strategic concepts of war-fighting in Europe. This is why we created the Main Command of the Western Theater headquartered in Poland. Marshal Ogarkov, the former Chief of the General Staff became the Commander. The Main Command of the South-Eastern Theater was headquartered in Kisinau; the Main Command of the Southern Theater was headquartered in Baku. That agreement established a hierarchical order of command among all the allied forces led by those Commanders-in-Chief in each theater of military action, except for Ceaușescu—he did not sign that agreement. And so in our military maneuvers we had to act on the basis of cooperation with the Romanian Armed Forces.

What were the changes in the strategic concepts? There were several directions of change. They were similar both in NATO and in the Warsaw Treaty. First, NATO came up with a concept of destroying the strategic second echelons. In other words, a war would start not from a frontal clash, but from the destruction of the strategic reserves, which would be coming from Poland and Czechoslovakia—the second strategic echelon from the Soviet Union. This is the first change. The second change was the emergence of

new types of conventional weapons. Some of those weapons, depending on the size, were almost as destructive as nuclear weapons of small capacity: one or two kilotons. One could destroy the enemy's forces as effectively as if a nuclear weapon of 1-2 kilotons was used. The reinforcement of border fortifications was going on. Now you all know that [Erich] Honecker was tried in court—as was the German Defense Minister [of the GDR], Chief of General Staff Shtreilitz, and others also—for those reinforcements on the border, and for the Berlin Wall, which was built in 1961. I have to tell you frankly that all of us—I mean the Soviet Command and the military leaders of the Warsaw Treaty—saw that border not as a border between the GDR and the FRG, and not as a border between the FRG and Czechoslovakia, but as a border between the NATO and the Warsaw Treaty. And here we can turn to the documents which were signed by Marshal Konev when he was the Commander-in-Chief of the group of forces during the Berlin crisis of 1961, where he gave instructions to Defense Minister [first name?] Hoffmann on what to do at the border. All that was written out in detail, and I was very surprised during the trials in Germany when two soldiers received prison terms for shooting at the border. They were carrying out their military duties, and the orders that they received at the border. I want to stress again that that was the border between NATO and the Warsaw Treaty Organization, and we discussed this question several times during the meetings of the Political Consultative Committee—the need to reinforce that border. And also the question of modernization and improvement of our nuclear weapons.

We carried out important measures. The first was the establishment of the RUKs—this is how we abbreviated Strike Reconnaissance forces. They were first created by

NATO command. They were supposed to strike at the second echelons. AWACS would observe, transmit the information, and then the air and land forces would deliver precise strikes at the second echelons. We also began to create the same sorts of forces, but ours were weaker; the West had better technology. But still, by approximately 1985 we had built Strike Reconnaissance forces of similar quality.

We rejected the possibility of a global nuclear war. The Caribbean crisis has shown that you cannot recklessly deal with nuclear weapons. During the military maneuvers in Europe, both the NATO command and the command of the Warsaw Treaty Organization were practicing what was called selected targets for nuclear strikes. In essence, it was a game of nerves—watching how the enemy would react to your actions. For example, if I drop a small nuclear bomb on the enemy—one or two kilotons—how would the NATO command react? We practiced such contingencies. And the NATO command also practiced them against us. There was a competition in developing strategic concepts for war-fighting in Europe. The strategic weapons—those that were capable of reaching America across the ocean—we considered weapons of deterrence. Eventually, to our great relief, no country ever attempted either the selected nuclear strikes, or any other. Eventually, all of those middle-range missiles were removed from Europe.

My last point: You can often see a discussion in the Western press of whether the Warsaw Treaty allies had the means for delivering nuclear weapons, and debate about who had the authority to use them. Sometimes you hear that nuclear weapons were in the hands of the allied commanders. I want to clarify this point. By 1979, all our allies, including Romania, had R-300s and *Lunas*. These were attached to army divisions. All of



them had those launchers. But the nuclear warheads for those launchers were stored on Soviet military bases and in Soviet arsenals. For example, in the GDR they were in the Soviet Group of Forces. They could be given to the Eastern Germans only after a special order. In Czechoslovakia and Hungary they were in the Soviet Groups of Forces also. We had a special base for storing tactical nuclear warheads in Bulgaria, but the base was serviced by Soviet personnel. For Romania, though—even though they had the same R-300 and *Luna* launchers—the nuclear warheads were stored on the territory of the Soviet Union in the Carpathian military district. They also could be transferred to the Romanians only after a special order.

One more thing that I would like to mention is that I was present at all of the meetings of the PCC from 1976 to 1985, and that practically every meeting raised the question of simultaneously disbanding NATO and the Warsaw Treaty Organization. Some people even said, “Simultaneously; not a minute earlier, and not a minute later.” Several such appeals were made to NATO, but they did not respond to any of those. We eventually reached the point where the Warsaw Treaty Organization fell apart, with the help of certain Western consultants, and we betrayed our allies. Thank you for your attention.

**LEGVOLD:** Thank you very much. I think those of you who know these areas will recognize that there were a number of points made here that are quite valuable, and that is the reason that I wanted all of this to go on the record.

Let me tell you what I am going to do now. We’ve got five minutes left before the

break, and we will take the break. The next person on the list is Oleg Troyanovsky, and if we can get both Oleg and Georgy in before the break, we will do it. I am going to treat General Gribkov's intervention as the opening comment for the session on the military balance on the Central Front. When we turn to that after the break, I will ask either Bill Odom, or Stan Turner, or Les, or whoever wants to, to open with comments on their side. But before we do that, we will take the break at 10:45, and we will come back at 11:15.

Since we have used 15 minutes for this purpose now, we are going to use the first 15 minutes after the coffee break to focus on the Dobrynin memorandum, because I have a fear that we are going to manage to get away from this morning without talking about 1978. So I want to get back to that memorandum. If the two of you can squeeze your comments in before 10:45, do so. Oleg Troyanovsky?

**TROYANOVSKY:** Marshall referred to the issue of human rights in his summary, and of course, this question has come up every now and then. I would like to say a few words about that. I would say that this—how shall I put it?—this campaign, perhaps, which started particularly under the Carter administration, evoked considerable irritation, not only in the corridors of power in our country, but throughout the public, and even, I would say, among those who had some sympathy for the dissident movement. So, I would say that as far as putting pressure on the Soviet Union was concerned, this was counterproductive.

Furthermore, it was looked upon as a piece of hypocrisy on the part of the United States. Although we knew that President Carter had some personal feelings about all that,

it was difficult to understand how he could receive some of our dissidents, write a letter to Academician Sakharov, and then, shortly after that, go to Iran and embrace the Shah, where the situation was probably much worse than in the Soviet Union. And the list of countries which were friends of the United States where human rights questions were never raised publicly was very long: not only Iran, but Saudi Arabia, some other Arab countries, many African countries, many countries in Central America, and so forth. These were countries in which the United States could influence the situation much more easily than they could influence the situation in the Soviet Union, and yet they did not try to do so. This created the feeling that Carter was being hypocritical. When Franklin Roosevelt was President, you know, he once said, "Somoza is an S.O.B., but at least he is our S.O.B." At least that was frank.

**PASTOR:** That was not true.

**TROYANOVSKY:** I would simply like to point out that, to my mind, that whole campaign was more counterproductive than productive.

**DOBRYNIN:** In our relations—

**TROYANOVSKY:** Yes. And it created the feeling that American society was hypocritical.

**DOBRYNIN:** The *administration* was hypocritical.

**TROYANOVSKY:** At least the administration, yes. Thank you.

**LEGVOLD:** Thank you, Oleg. Is yours a brief point, Georgy?

**SHAKHNAZAROV:** Seven minutes.

**LEGVOLD:** Okay, let us wait until after the coffee break. At 11:15 I will give you five minutes; okay?

### March 25, Session 6—The Military Balance on the Central Front

**LEGVOLD:** Let us resume. We've got a number of things we need to accomplish, so I am going to ask for an extraordinary degree of individual discipline. Before we turn to the discussion of Ambassador Dobrynin's memorandum in July, Georgy Shakhnazarov has a five-minute point to make. I give the floor to him.

**SHAKHNAZAROV:** Marshall Shulman presented his suggestions in six analytical

propositions. I have only four.

Everything is relative in this world. Soviet-American relations did suffer some setbacks in this period. But there were improvements also. We should not forget that this period was marked by a major breakthrough: the signing of the SALT II treaty. And, of course, you cannot even compare this period with the one that came after. It would suffice to read the statements by [Eugene] Rostow, [Caspar] Weinberger, and [William P.] Clark, especially in the first term of the Reagan administration, to conclude that in comparison to that administration, the entire Carter administration was dovish. And still, there was some deterioration. What were the causes of that?

The first cause is an objective one. As I have already mentioned, the beginning of the Carter administration coincided with the point when the Soviet Union had completed the accumulation of forces which allowed it to create the system of the superpower control over world development. The Soviet Union considered it necessary to finalize the creation of such a system by an agreement with the United States, so that each superpower not only controlled its own sphere of international life, but also consulted the other on major international issues. This was not just competition: it was cooperation on many issues, by necessity. These are the two elements that together composed our relations. The United States did not want to agree with this. They could not agree. And that is why the competition often assumed the form of direct confrontation, and the ostensible motives behind our foreign policies took a back seat: namely our support for liberation struggles, and your support for human rights. I would like to ask you, does anybody here know what is happening now in Ethiopia? Or even in Somalia? These problems have been put on the

back burner. They were at the center of the world attention only when the two superpowers crossed their swords over them.

The second cause is a subjective factor: the disappointment that we experienced because of our high expectations of the new Democratic administration. It is well known that we, in the Soviet Union, always considered the Democrats to be the party closer to the left of the political spectrum, and more progressive than the Republican party. Every time a Democratic administration comes to power in the United States, our politicians and our analysts predict that things will take a positive turn. And every time such expectations give way to disappointment. This is because the Democrats always have to prove that they are tough. This is a well-known phenomenon. This is exactly how it happened this time. I can tell you that in our circles we had very high expectations. And we were so glad that Clinton—I mean Carter—came to power—that a Democrat won the elections. He was also a “fresh” person. Things were expected to start moving in a positive direction. So when problems arose, it was particularly frustrating and irritating. Obviously, this was reflected in our relations.

The third cause is a psychological one. It is related to what Oleg Alexandrovich has already mentioned—the clear exaggeration of the human rights issue. As we all know, our shortcomings are just a continuation of our best traits. It is very good, of course, that Carter was an idealist, and we had many chances to see the proof of that. We see it now, when he provides a lot of help in conflict resolution. He is a genuine active humanitarian. But the idealist in him stepped over all reasonable boundaries when he raised the human rights issue, not only because there was some element of hypocrisy, but also because

during the Brezhnev time there was no deterioration in the human rights situation in the Soviet Union; just the opposite. Yes, some dissidents were persecuted—Shcharansky, for example, and some other people. But it was nothing like the massive repressions we used to have before. Even the fact that the dissident movement came into existence illustrated that those people could do things they had previously been unable to do. There was some relaxation. The authorities did not persecute them as much as they did before—and I am not even talking about Stalin's time. That is why the abuse of the human rights issue strongly poisoned our relations. Among our documents we have Carter's message to Congress asking it to double the funds for Radio Liberty and Radio Free Europe. That was met in Moscow with extreme displeasure.

Fourth: it was the policy of the Carter administration—in fact, the continuous policy of all American administrations—to try to split the ranks of what we called our Socialist Commonwealth. It was most flagrant under Carter. We have here a document signed by Carter that states that the U.S. should encourage those countries of Eastern Europe that pursue policies independent from Moscow, or those which have some characteristics of liberalism. They were talking primarily about Romania, Hungary, and Yugoslavia as permanent U.S. partners in this sense—and even about China, even though China is a completely separate topic. We know that the U.S. was at that time following a policy of differentiation towards the socialist countries, and our leadership perceived that policy as a threat to the countries that were members of the Warsaw Treaty. At the same time, a special group was created in the Central Committee to monitor relations between the European socialist countries and the United States. A similar group was created within the

Warsaw Treaty. Deputy directors of Central Committee Departments of the socialist countries gathered two or three times a year to discuss those issues. They developed recommendations for their leaderships to counter the American policy of differentiation.

I think that these four factors really led to the deterioration of our relations. But still, I would like to stress that, in my opinion, the period does not deserve to be called the way we called him here—"Global competition and the deterioration of U.S.-Soviet relations."

Finally, I would like to disagree with my comrade, Anatoly Gribkov, in regards to whether the Soviet Union had betrayed the countries of the Warsaw Treaty when this bloc was disbanded. The events developed in such a way that we simply could not act in another manner. It is a separate, large theme, and I am not going to go into it here. But one cannot talk about betrayal because new regimes came to power in those countries, and those regimes were elected in democratic elections. This internal transformation sealed the destiny of our bloc. In regards to Gorbachev—and I had a personal role to play here—of course he wanted NATO and the Warsaw Treaty Organization to be dissolved simultaneously. But we did not succeed in accomplishing that task. Thank you for your attention.

**GRIBKOV:** I remain with my stated opinion.

**LEGVOLD:** I thank you very much, Georgy. On the last point, I hope that there will be conferences of this kind where we can together look at the history of this utterly crucial



period under Gorbachev, and I hope that we will be able to address these issues.

Your next to final point on Eastern Europe, and the problems of the Carter administration from your point of view—the problem of the Carter administration’s differentiated policy—we will return to this afternoon, when we discuss Poland.

Your opening point I think is an extraordinarily good one: it is in the nature of these exercises that we end up focusing on why things went wrong, but there was a much more complex history, as you suggest. And there are other ways to look at many of the same things we are looking at.

Now, it would be useful to look at the memorandum that was sent back to Moscow on July 11, 1978, as a way of having a capsule look at this crucial period. I would like to say a couple of things about it. First of all, I think, everyone at the table understands that this was a product of the embassy in Washington, and I do not think anybody overestimates its importance or centrality in the overall direction of events, or as an item within decision making back in Moscow. Secondly, I think most people understand how reports of this kind are put together, so I am no longer going to identify it as the “Dobrynin memorandum.” But it was a source of information, and it is interesting in several respects. So to Americans, what I would ask you to do is react to two things—not to the detail in the memorandum, but first to the assumptions that underlie the analysis, and how you feel about it as a judgment of this time; and second, to the quality of the recommendations that are made toward the end. And then, it is entirely up to you, Anatoly, to say whatever you want about it after the Americans have spoken. But in addition, one of the things that would be useful is if you could say a word about how something like this was done, how it

came about. I will let you speak first, if you are disciplined—if you consider the time limit.

[Laughter.]

**DOBRYNIN:** Five minutes. First of all, I am really surprised that the Chairman is treating this paper as so important. It had nothing, really, to do with big events. But here he is inviting a full discussion of it. I do not know even how you got this important document.

[Laughter.] Zubok, I would like to have a full explanation.

**ZUBOK:** Legally. [Laughter.]

**DOBRYNIN:** I am sure you got it legally; the question is *why* you got it.

**LEGVOLD:** The anti-Soviet conspiracy continues, Anatoly.

**DOBRYNIN:** This is my impression, too. [Long loud laughter and applause.] I do not see any necessary to discuss it, because it is not really worthwhile. First of all, what it was? It was, you know, customary. Gromyko ordered all embassies once per quarter to write about what was going on in their host countries.

**TROYANOVSKY:** Once every three months.

**DOBRYNIN:** Once every three months. For the active embassies—Tokyo, Paris, Washington—it was really an exercise in the futility, because there were daily telegrams. But once per quarter our counselors—or a group of counselors—would sit down and try to prepare a report. So I did not pay much attention to it, or to any others, and I am sure the Foreign Ministry did not, either. If you want to know the point of view of embassy on a given subject, I am prepared to give an answer. But this is not a helpful document. There is not a single document from the American side like this, although I am sure that your embassy wrote something similar. You do not discuss those; suddenly, we are to discuss this.

**BRUTENTS:** You should be proud of it.

**DOBRYNIN:** No, no, I am proud. [Laughter.] I am not proud that we are discussing my document. It is not mine, really, but the embassy's.

**SHULMAN:** Did you get a reaction to it?

**DOBRYNIN:** Not at all. Come on. Gromyko did not read it.

**TROYANOVSKY:** Why do you say Gromyko? *No one* read it. [Laughter.]

**DOBRYNIN:** Only our department. Only the department read it; nobody else. This is why I would like you to understand that it is not important. It had no influence. A telegram might have an influence on events, but not this.

**GELB:** If they did not pay attention to this kind of report, what reports did you make to which they did pay attention?

**DOBRYNIN:** Telegrams. Cables. They go to the members of the Politburo. But not this paper. This is a working paper for people in the American department.

**LEGVOLD:** Anatoly, in those terms then, were the cables that you were sending back at about this time different in any significant way from the judgments in this paper?

**DOBRYNIN:** They did not have this broad sweep; they were very concrete. They dealt specifically with SALT, or with human rights—with specific subjects—or they reported on what had happened that day: what happened at my meeting with the secretary or the president, and so on. None of this was in the working papers; all of this was in telegrams. Sometimes, when they asked, I gave a general analysis in telegrams. But you should not pay too much attention to this particular piece of paper. The telegrams I am prepared to defend, because I know that they were read by members of the Politburo. Maybe Kornienko read this; maybe not. This is how it was.

Second, someone mentioned public opinion polls in this connection with this paper. In your public opinion you could find many things. But they are beside the point. I had many conversations with your leading people, who spoke about the SALT talks, and about human rights, and so on—David Rockefeller, or [first name?] Austin; many close friends of the president. I spoke with dozens of them. If you look at my telegrams, you will see my reports of those conversations. Many of them disagreed with the president on human rights, as Oleg mentioned. They think that he overplayed the issue. Austin, for instance—

**TROYANOVSKY:** He was with Coca-Cola.

**DOBRYNIN:** Coca-Cola, yes; he was banker. He said, "I talked to the president. I told him that he was overplaying these things. He was just spoiling U.S.-Soviet relations, for nothing. But my impression is that he is enjoying himself. He is getting publicity as the champion of human rights." On human rights, David Rockefeller said, "I do not agree with this—with the way it is presented."

All of this leads me to ask a basic question to Marshall: Did President Carter understand the damage he was inflicting on Soviet-American relations by his public human rights campaign? Or did he believe that the Soviet Union will swallow it after all, because it was much more interested in SALT? Did he think he could pursue both goals at once? I tried to speak with him twice about this.

**LEGVOLD:** Thirty seconds, Marshall.

**SHULMAN:** I do not believe that there was any serious political calculation about what its effect would be. I think it was a direct expression of his view. Jordan, Powell, and I had discussions with him in the White House about it. But it was driven essentially by the president's own agenda, without regard to the process of interaction.

**DOBRYNIN:** This was my impression, too.

**LEGVOLD:** Anatoly, thank you very much. Now, let me make a point that flows from Mark's question and the way Anatoly has responded to it. As I read this memorandum—however you size it up—there is an important assumption here: that the administration was not being driven by domestic pressures, or domestic politics, to harden its line. Therefore, there must be some other explanation for what was happening. Nothing that Anatoly said beyond his comments about the memorandum changes that. You still seem to have felt that about public opinion was unimportant.

There are other assumptions in here too, and I would be interested in whether you, in your own judgment at the that time, and in the cables you were sending, differed on that score. So, let people on the American side react to the assumptions and the recommendations, bearing in mind your description of what this represented, Anatoly. Marshall?

**SHULMAN:** This is not a response, it is just an amusing little footnote. Anatoly has a phenomenal memory, and when he used to come in to see Vance, he would come in and would register everything in his head, and then go and send telegrams. I was always worried about Anatoly's memory. So, I would greet him at the door with a pad of paper and a pen, and say, "Here, Anatoly, take notes." [Laughter.]

**DOBRYNIN:** If I am not mistaken, you told me yesterday that you were surprised at how accurate my descriptions of my talks with you were.

**SHULMAN:** True.

**DOBRYNIN:** When we spoke of the SALT talks before your trip to Moscow in 1977, there were many very complicated technical subjects. But I did not take any single note. I wrote a seven or eight page telegram, with all the figures, and it was completely accurate.

**SHULMAN:** That is true. I just wanted to pay tribute to you. Reading your telegrams that are available here, I am impressed. You did a remarkable and an accurate job.

**LEGVOLD:** Stan Turner?

**TURNER:** I would like to play up that point also. Anatoly, are probably the Russian—

Soviet—who understands the United States better than anybody else. When Arkady Shevchenko defected to the United States, I, naturally, had a debriefing with him. The one really important question I asked him was, did he think the Politburo understood the United States? I was concerned whether we were talking past each other or not. And you know Shevchenko better than I. You know whether he is reliable or not. But he indicated that he did not think so; he did not think the reporting coming from you, and the reporting coming from elsewhere, enabled them to do this. We now have a good example here of your reporting, even though you want to distance yourself from it. We admire it. My question to you is: do you think the Politburo, reading your other telegrams, got the message that you have in here as to what the United States's motives were—what the forces were that drove the United States? Did you get this across to them in other ways, if they did not read this?

**LEGVOLD:** Anatoly; please.

**DOBRYNIN:** First a footnote about Shevchenko. I know him well, as does Oleg.

**TROYANOVSKY:** More than well. [Laughter.]

**DOBRYNIN:** He has no knowledge about what went on in the Politburo. None. It was natural for him to present himself as a man very close to the Politburo. He said that any



time he came to Moscow, he would go to Brezhnev and say, "Hello, Leonid Ilych," and so on. None of that was true.

**TURNER:** All of your defectors were like that.

**DOBRYNIN:** Yes. It is understandable. I agree with you. He was close friend of Gromyko's son. This made Gromyko available to him; he could go to his house. But you should know that Gromyko never discussed real politics in the presence of this fellow. Even with his ambassadors he was rather reserved. So, all he heard, he heard from Gromyko's son Anatoly. This is the first remark that I wanted to make.

Of course, when he came here, he read the telegrams at United Nations.

**TROYANOVSKY:** Not all.

**DOBRYNIN:** Not all. It was up to the permanent representative to determine what he would see. There was nothing in these telegrams about the opinion of the Politburo. They contained only directives: "You should vote this way, or that way," without elaboration. So, he had no knowledge of the actual thinking in Moscow. He had no access to the Politburo. Whatever he said or thought came from his own imagination. Nothing else. I do not know how much Anatoly Gromyko mentioned to him—not because he was a reserved person, but because he himself did not read telegrams. Of course, he may have

discussed some things with his father. I do not know.

Now, on the telegrams we sent. The main concern was the atmosphere which existed between the two governments. Take, for instance, May 1978. Of course, I felt disappointed that we lost SALT, and to a certain extent I was angry with the administration. I will be very frank with you. I am not trying to fault you here; I am just reporting how I felt. We felt that we were very close to signing the agreement in 1977. I took part in many of those discussion. Marshall knows, because I dealt with him for many years. I spent dozens and dozens of evenings with him and Vance on it. I felt attached to this agreement, professionally. I really wanted to have it. And then, suddenly, it was derailed, for various reasons. Human rights was one; Oleg explained it well. The problem was how you handled the issue. I was definitely against the public pressure which you tried to mount against us. Again, I am no arguing with you about the merits of the case; I am sure that everyone on the American side will defend it on its merits. That is not what I am speaking about here. I am merely saying that there are other means for communicating your concerns. Kissinger, for example, as you mentioned, was not the best champion of human rights; but even with him, by the end of this Nixon administration we reached an agreement to allow 50,000 people to emigrate, mostly of Jewish nationality. And we were prepared to permit more. There was no limit to it. But Jackson was pressing, pressing, and pressing. Carter asked me if we could invite Jackson to Moscow. I said, "I'll check it." I sent a telegram to Brezhnev, and the Politburo discussed it, and I received a telegram back saying, "Yes, if President Carter feels it would help his ideas about human rights, we will invite Jackson to Moscow." So I went to Jackson, and I invited him to come to discuss

everything. What was his answer? He said, "Okay, I am very glad; thank you very much." But a few days later, he said, "Okay, I will come; but I would like your Politburo to receive me, and at the same time I will have a public meeting with all dissidents in Moscow." Then I said to him, "Do you want to meet Brezhnev, or the dissidents? You have to make a choice." I said, "You could have a meeting with the dissidents, as Edward Kennedy had; or you can meet Brezhnev." But he wanted both. This was impossible. These are small things; but they put matters in perspective. These were unnecessary irritants. They were frustrating.

On African affairs: you probably noticed at the last meeting that I expressed irritation with your preoccupation with the Horn of Africa. Quite frankly, I felt the same way at the time. It was a small, tiny issue. I understand now that you attached importance to it. But I believed at the time—and I still believe—that this was not the main issue in our relations. It was maybe two or three levels below our main concerns: disarmament, European affairs, and so on. But you were always talking about Africa.

**LEGVOLD:** Could you draw it to a close, Anatoly?

**DOBRYNIN:** Yes. What is Somalia? You go there; you come back. Who remembers Ethiopia? These were really unimportant in our relations. But at that time it was a big issue. I felt inside that Africa should not be allowed to prevent the development of our relations. I spoke with many people in your foreign policy establishment, and many of

them also felt that the administration overplayed African affairs. There was disagreement within your own administration. In my telegrams, I reported all of these talks which I had with prominent Americans. I reported on these differences of opinion within the establishment. I did not report on press coverage of public opinion polls; I reported on the opinion of those whose opinion really mattered. And there were great differences among those people. So this was it.

**LEGVOLD:** The next person is Bob Pastor, then Les Gelb. Then we are letting go of this, and we are going to go onto the next session. Bob Pastor?

**PASTOR:** I would like to focus on one element of that letter, which I think is very important. It is on page 4, in which the Embassy is saying that “we need to continue to react strongly and negatively to anti-Soviet rhetoric and actions, but we also need to find ways to respond to positive steps, and to encourage and to reinforce positive steps.” And this is the question I would like to focus on for a moment.

Mr. Shakhnazarov made a wonderful presentation just a little while ago in saying that the early expectation of the Soviet leadership about dealing with the Democratic administration was that the Democratic administration would be more progressive—more open—and that this might be a very important opportunity. I think that was precisely the perspective that the Democratic administration brought to office: here might be a chance to connect. But we failed to do so, and one of the reasons for that was that neither side

found a way to reinforce the positive behavior on the other side in a way that the other side understood. Indeed, some of our objectives were undermined by our very tactics. That is what Oleg and Ambassador Dobrynin have just said about our human rights policy. I can say unequivocally that the Carter administration—starting with the president, and including Brzezinski, Vance, [Warren] Christopher, and others—was honestly and sincerely committed to human rights. There was nothing hypocritical about the policy. It was implemented in different ways with respect to different countries, depending upon the instruments available and the interests at stake. Every country that we criticized on human rights grounds saw itself as the sole target of our human rights policy. The Argentine generals and [Ferdinand] Marcos both said, “Why do you pick on us? Why don’t you pick on your enemy—Russia? You never say anything about the Soviet Union.” That is exactly what they said.

**GELB:** They did say that.

**PASTOR:** Each one perceived itself as being selectively targeted, and could not understand why.

I accept your interpretation that our human rights policy, as implemented, was counterproductive to its objectives. I will accept that that is your view, although I do not share it. I think that the policy raised the profile of a few people, and made it more difficult for you to take negative action against them. This was true, perhaps, of Sakharov.

It also had a very positive long-term effect. But let us assume for a moment that what you said in the short term was correct: that it was counterproductive. The real question I have is, what would have been a more appropriate way to approach this and other issues? Why did some of the positive actions—such as Carter's repeated request for a meeting with Brezhnev—fail to elicit a response that might have prevented a further deterioration in our relations?

**DOBRYNIN:** You would be surprised to know how many times the embassy sent a telegram recommending a summit meeting as early as possible. This is on the record. I state this very firmly.

**THOMAS PICKERING:** We all know how it is, Anatoly. [Laughter.]

**LEGVOLD:** Les Gelb?

**GELB:** I may provide a bridge from Anatoly's non-telegram to the next non-subject, which is Central Europe and the medium-range missile negotiations. Anatoly says that one of the things that bothered him most was not being able to finish the SALT II agreement quickly and then move on. I absolutely agree. It was our aim, too, to finish this as quickly as possible. But I think the situation was more complicated than you thought then, and than you think now, mainly because of our European allies, and because of the medium-

range missiles in Europe. When we went out to Moscow in March 1977, we went with two proposals. One said, "Let us not include the medium-range missiles at all; let us not include the cruise missiles." And the other one did include them in various ways. Now, on the way back from Moscow, we told our European allies of these proposals, and they were not very happy. It was totally unacceptable to you to exclude cruise missiles; it was totally unacceptable to *them* at that point to include cruise missiles, because they began to worry about the things we were talking about earlier: namely, the nuclear balance in Europe.

Now, leaving aside the merits of that, it was a fact that they were worried about it, and that fact had to influence our SALT bargaining position. So we were in a bind. And the bind was made doubly difficult because, in the Vladivostok agreement, you had limitations on cruise missiles. But Henry Kissinger never told the allies that he had made those agreements with you. So, when we came back from Moscow and told them that we were suggesting in one of these proposals to put limits on cruise missiles, it came as a total bolt out of the blue for them. And it set off a chain reaction that led to sort of a second wave of difficulties between us in the negotiations on medium-range missiles, and on the new missile deployments.

**LEGVOLD:** Thank you very much, Les.

Now let us turn to the second agenda item for this morning, which is Central Europe and the military balance. We had a very valuable intervention from Anatoly Gribkov earlier in the morning. Stan Turner has a couple of basic questions in this area, so

I am going to ask him to pose them first; and then Bill Odom would like to respond to some of the things that General Gribkov said, and make some further points. So, Stan, the floor is yours.

**TURNER:** I would like to start by thanking the General for a very helpful and clear exposition. But I would like to ask for three additional amplifications, if I may.

First of all, how were you measuring the prospect for parity with the United States by 1979? What terms were you using?

Second, could you give us some idea of what your concept was for the initiation of the use of nuclear weapons in a conflict in Western Europe? Would NATO start with nuclear weapons first? Would the Warsaw Pact start first? Would it just happen?

Third, could you fill us in on the thinking behind the deployment of the SS-20s? How did you see that affecting the balance, and what did you think our reaction to it might be? Thank you.

**LEGVOLD:** On the last question, Stan, are you asking why the decision was made to modernize INF by deploying the SS-20s?

**TURNER:** Yes.

**LEGVOLD:** All right. Bill Odom?



**ODOM:** I too was very impressed with the presentation, and I want to thank General Gribkov for putting a number of things on the record about Warsaw Pact and Soviet General Staff thinking, and about developments in operational doctrinal during this period. I would like to add a point which, I think, fits into your analysis from the Western side. The U.S. army in the 1960s was bogged down in Vietnam. The senior leadership devoted remarkably little attention to doctrinal evolution in the light of changes in the military balance in Central Europe. In fact, when I went to Moscow as an attaché in 1972, I was briefed that there was not much of a problem, because motor transport was a major limitation which would prevent a single big Soviet offensive from going very far into Western Europe. When I came back—

**LEGVOLD:** Sorry to interrupt you, Bill, but you are introducing technical terms that are getting a little bit lost, so you need to slow down a little bit.

**ODOM:** Okay. When I began to look at the Central Front again in late 1970s—when I was on the NSC staff—it was clear that whole transportation shortfall had been addressed. You had greatly improved the motorization and armor protection of your offensive forces. Your posture had changed dramatically. Now, this had a big impact on the U.S. Army leadership coming out of Vietnam. Roughly in 1975 and 1976, they turned and looked at what was happening on the Central Front. Only then, I think, did they begin to understand your concept of echelons, and of high-speed offensives, which is laid out fairly clearly in

general terms by Marshal Sokolovsky in his book [title?]. But it was not taken all that seriously at the tactical level—or the operational level—in the West, and in the United States, until this late period. That frightened the U.S. leadership. We saw that our defensive capabilities might succeed against the first echelon attack; but then we realized that it could not absorb what was to follow on.

So, we developed the concept of AirLand Battle. The idea was that we had to prevent these follow-on forces from moving forward according to the plan you had prescribed for them. That was when we had a huge technological push to develop non-nuclear weapons with great accuracy for deeper ranges, combined with much better analysis of where to attack in order to desynchronize the second echelon moving forward. That was the Army's doctrine. When we briefed it to the Europeans, it met tremendous political resistance from the Germans, and from other allies who did not like its offensive character. It had two parts: deep strikes, and deep attack by maneuver forces. We had to surrender the deep attack by maneuver forces, and limit it in Europe almost entirely to deep strikes. Many of you know this doctrine under the label given it by General Rogers: Follow-On Forces Attack, or FOFA, which was the doctrinal issue debated in early 1980s in NATO.

That, I think, seems to be what you were reacting to between 1979 and 1982/83. Now let me ask a couple of questions. Did I understand you correctly to say that by the late 1970s you had ceased to believe that the prospects of intercontinental nuclear exchange were high, and that we had begun to believe it improbable? Did I understand you to be saying that you were beginning to think about using strategic weapons—long-

range weapons; intercontinental weapons—to support your European operations? Does that mean then, for example, that things like the SS-19s would be allocated to war plans in Central Europe?

The last question I wanted to ask is this: Did you say that you had an agreement within the Warsaw Pact to make a command-and-control transition in wartime? If you could elaborate to some degree on how that would take place, and what that would amount to, that might be interesting for the record here. Thank you.

**LEGVOLD:** Thank you very much, Bill. Would you like to respond to the questions that were put to you by Stan Turner and by Bill Odom, or would you rather wait? The floor is yours.

**GRIBKOV:** The first question was about the parity in strategic forces between the United States and the Soviet Union that we achieved in general terms by 1979. There was a special open edited volume published by the General Staff of the Soviet Union which showed the correlation of forces in nuclear and conventional weapons between the East and the West. The editor of the volume was the Deputy Chief of the General Staff, then Sergei Fedorovich Akhromeev. The Americans had superiority in some systems; in some systems, we had superiority. But in general terms, we had parity—even in conventional weapons. If you take that volume—and as I mentioned, I was an open publication—you would see that in strategic aviation, NATO held the superior position; in fighter aviation,

we were superior; in tanks, we were clearly superior; but NATO was superior in anti-tank weapons. I can continue this list, but I think it is clear. If you take each side's weapons in general, we had parity.

On the second question: who would be the first to use a nuclear weapon? Did I understand it correctly? This is how I would like to respond to it. During one of our strategic maneuvers, which was carried out under Ustinov's command, I was a Commander of the United Armed Forces in the South-Western theater. That was before the theaters were created, which I had already mentioned. I had this question put to me.

**ODOM:** General Gribkov, when was that? When did that happen?

**GARRISON:** [In Russian:] In what year?

**GRIBKOV:** It was in 1978, before the Theater Commands were established. [Viktor G.] Kulikov was the Commander of the Western theater, and I was the Commander of the South-Western theater. After my report on my decision to Ogarkov and Ustinov—Ogarkov was then the Chief of General Staff—I had been asked this question. "Comrade Gribkov, we cannot see from your report who would be the first to use nuclear weapons, the East or the West?" I turned to Ustinov and said to him, "Who will be the first to use nuclear weapons is a decision within the authority of the political leadership of the state. Our task, as the military, is to be ready to strike at any time after having received the order." This is

my answer to your question. Of course, there was a lot of discussion about a preemptive strike, and about retaliatory strike—both in the open and in the classified literature, both in the Soviet Union, and in your publications also. Everybody was writing whatever they could. All those options were subjected to criticism.

Now, in regard to the SS-20—I did not understand what you had in mind.

**ODOM:** Can I repeat the question?

**LEGVOLD:** Please; Les?

**GELB:** Before you finish with the second question, may I ask you some additional ones?

**GRIBKOV:** Please do.

**GELB:** Did you think that the first use of nuclear weapons on the battlefield by the Soviet side could produce decisive results? Secondly, did you believe that the use of nuclear weapons by either side would escalate into much more serious generalized nuclear exchanges?

**GRIBKOV:** You probably know that the Soviet government announced—I do not remember in what year; maybe one of my comrades can help me—that it would never be

the first to use nuclear weapons. This was our doctrine on this issue. We, the military, were abiding by this doctrine.

**BRUTENTS:** They were asking, if anybody had used the nuclear weapons, would you say that that would produce a decisive result?

**GRIBKOV:** No; it would only produce mutual annihilation. With all the stocks of nuclear weapons that both sides had, it would have resulted in mutual annihilation.

**ODOM:** Is that true at the theater level?

**GRIBKOV:** No; I meant globally.

**GELB:** Let us make the question precise again. Did you believe that any use of nuclear weapons by either side would escalate to a generalized nuclear exchange, or did you see it some other way? Once nuclear weapons were used by either side, did you believe it would escalate from there to a more generalized exchange?

**GRIBKOV:** We thought that you had the same feeling in the United States. Even in 1962 President John Kennedy said that the first strike, regardless of which side did it—regardless if it was from the Soviet Union itself, or from the Cuban territory—if there was only one

nuclear strike at the territory of the United States, they would have used all the nuclear power of the United States against the Soviet Union. Those were the words of your president.

I still did not understand the question about the SS-20. What did you want to know?

**TURNER:** There are two aspects to my question about the SS-20s. One is: how did you decide that these were militarily necessary? The second is: did you anticipate some adverse reaction to the deployment from NATO?

**GRIBKOV:** Well, we had those missiles even in 1962. We brought them to Cuba. Later they were modernized. Are you talking about those missiles? These are the medium-range missiles. They had a range of 2200 kilometers.

Now, concerning the Commander-in-Chief of the United Armed Forces: before the end of 1978, it was not clear who would command the United Armed Forces of the Warsaw Treaty. In 1978, the wartime regulations were adopted, as I have already mentioned. There was a chapter in those regulations that stated that the Commander-in-Chief would be appointed by the highest leadership, and that the General Staff of the Soviet Union would be his working organ. As soon as those regulations were adopted, in the beginning of 1979, Ustinov—he was the Minister of Defense—summoned me, and instructed me to help draft the resolution of the Political Consultative Committee which

would say that Leonid Ilych Brezhnev would be appointed Commander-in-Chief of the United Forces of all the Warsaw Treaty countries in wartime. This was in 1979. I did not say anything then, but I prepared two drafts. One draft included the name and the position, the other did not. And I began to present my own draft. This is the way it sounded, word for word: "The governments of the states members of the Warsaw Treaty appoint the Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces of the Soviet Union to the position of the Commander-in-Chief of the United Forces of the Warsaw Treaty in wartime." We had a very serious discussion of why I did not write "Marshal of the Soviet Union Leonid Ilych Brezhnev." I said, "I prepared such a draft also. But, Comrade Minister, Leonid Ilych is old; his health is not good." When I said that, the Minister told me, "He is healthier than both of us. He is more intelligent than both of us. Do as ordered." So I had to say yes. [Laughter.]

So we took that document, and went to different countries to have it signed. And their General Secretaries, and the Defense Ministers, of course, read it, smiled, and asked the question, "What is the role of our Commander-in-Chief?" Because according to their constitutions, every country had its own Commander-in-Chief—in Poland, the GDR, Hungary, everywhere. What would be his role? They suggested that they be members of the Supreme Command. But the position of our leaders was that that was unnecessary; nobody else should be mentioned. Eventually, everybody signed the document, except Ceaușescu. It was approved at the Politburo. And then Leonid Ilych Brezhnev died, and the Warsaw Treaty Organization was disbanded. But that decision still remains in force, naming Brezhnev the Commander-in-Chief. [Laughter.]



There was one more question about the end of the 1970s. I have already told you that we achieved parity. Both the Soviet and the American leadership were now convinced that the use of nuclear weapons by either side would lead to mutual annihilation; that is why they could only be a deterrent force. Operational and tactical nuclear weapons were deployed in Europe by both sides—NATO and the Warsaw Treaty Organization—but nobody was planning to use them. As I mentioned at the beginning, we practiced the use of them in our maneuvers, and NATO did too—the selective use of tactical nuclear weapons. The purpose of this was to test the nerves of the military and civilian leadership—to see how they would react. But these were only paper plans. This is all I wanted to say.

**LEGVOLD:** Thank you very much. That is very useful. Georgy Shakhnazarov?

**SHAKHNAZAROV:** I would like to add a couple of words in response to Leslie's question concerning how our leadership thought about a reaction to a possible limited nuclear strike from either side. I cannot tell you about our military, but I can speak to how our political leaders and our academics felt. The Americans then had a strategy of a limited nuclear strikes. I remember that Herman Kahn had the idea that, regardless of who delivered the first strike—the Americans on Leningrad, or the Russians on Washington or New York—after the first exchange, everything would stop and negotiations would begin. By the way, such scenario was presented in Herbert Wells's novel *Liberated World* [title?].

In it, after such an exchange, negotiations began, and a world government was established. Our opinion was that this theory was mistaken, because any nuclear exchange would not be limited to such a scenario—as the General said, it would spread into a major war. This is why the Soviet government had tried unsuccessfully for many years to conclude an agreement which would absolutely ban the use of nuclear weapons. They considered them only useful as deterrents.

As far as the American side is concerned, I think that eventually a similar opinion prevailed on that side too. However, you did not always follow it in your statements and in your theory. Let me quote Director of the Arms Control Agency Rostow here. He said, “The basic national interests require that the United States be able to use all its military power in defense of the national interests not only in Europe, but if the need arises, in other strategically important regions. In my mind, and here I am speaking for President Reagan too, the existence of our nuclear arsenal should remain our minimal goal.” So there seemed to be an idea of the possibility of using nuclear weapons, and I think this idea is still alive. Thank you.

**LEGVOLD:** The floor is open. Vlad?

**ZUBOK:** Just one historical remark. I was surprised that nobody argued when Georgy Shakhnazarov said that the arrival of any Democratic administration was met in the Kremlin with hope and expectations. As a historian, I cannot but disagree with this. This

happened only once: Premier Khrushchev expected that with Kennedy, U.S.-Soviet relations might improve, but only because he had this prejudice against Eisenhower and Nixon, and expected that the new generation president would make things somehow different. In all other cases—with the Truman administration, the Johnson administration, and, as we are learning here, with the Carter administration—things were made more difficult for the Kremlin leadership. Especially after their experience with Nixon and Kissinger, they were quite firmly convinced that it was easier to deal with conservative Republicans, for some obvious reasons. Thank you.

**LEGVOLD:** Les Gelb, and then Oleg Troyanovsky.

**GELB:** This is on the medium-range missiles. Is that where you want to be?

**LEGVOLD:** I think people are trying to operate at two different places. Go ahead on medium-range missiles.

**GELB:** Your side will remember that, after March, the issue of medium-range missiles became increasingly important. It became increasingly important principally because our European allies were convinced that, with the deployment of the SS-20s, the Soviet side had either a real tactical theater advantage, or a psychological advantage—or both—and that the United States and NATO had to respond to this in some way. The preference was

to eliminate all theater nuclear missiles, but that was regarded as an unlikely outcome. So it was agreed that the United States should seek to deploy cruise missiles and Pershing-2 missiles on our own. This was a very difficult negotiation within the alliance, for reasons that you are familiar with. But it was an important point for our side, for many reasons. You deployed the SS-20s without asking American permission; but when we raised the question of deploying cruise missiles and Pershing-2s, you created a great propaganda effort to prevent us from doing so. To us it looked as though there was a severe imbalance—a political and psychological imbalance: namely, you could deploy and modernize whenever you wanted; but if we wanted to modernize, we had to get your agreement through arms control. That was an intolerable position for our side.

So, to deal with this we came up with the idea of the dual track approach: we would deploy the new missiles, even as we negotiated to reduce and even possibly eliminate those missiles. But the issue became very important to the West as a measure of our joint resolve—of NATO's resolve—in meeting what we considered new and unnecessary deployments of the SS-20 on your side.

**LEGVOLD:** I will defer to Anatoly Gribkov if he would like to respond, because I think Oleg's point is on Republicans versus Democrats, and I want to keep some coherence here.

**TROYANOVSKY:** How do you know? [Laughter.]

**LEGVOLD:** I watched your body language, and it did not look to me as though it was about medium-range missiles.

General Gribkov, would you care to respond to Les's point? No? Okay, Bill Odom.

**ODOM:** I want to add to Les's point. I think he is adding dimensions to the predicament on the U.S. side that are terribly important to keep in mind. And I would like to invoke Karen Brutents's comment yesterday about the objective contradictions in the whole idea of détente. It seems to me there are some other objective realities that both General Gribkov and I have raised here which need to be pointed out in a similar fashion.

If you listened to what he said about their weapons development and their operational changes, and if you listened to what I said about U.S. developments, I think you will realize that new technologies began to outrun the frameworks and contexts in which SALT and other arms control proposals had been framed and presented. A second objective factor at work here, it seems to me, is that the importance of nuclear weapons was actually declining. Among professional military people, the importance of these was diminishing, while at the political level of arms control, they seemed to be taking on all sorts of additional weight. And so you have rather contradictory trends. The diplomacy was behind the advance of technology, and behind the advance in military operations. Thank you.

**LEGVOLD:** Thank you, Bill. Stan Turner?

**TURNER:** It seems to me that one of the conundrums on our side in these years was that the president really wanted to reduce nuclear weapons. We have gone through all the reasons why SALT did not work out. But, internally, the administration ended up with a series of policies on nuclear weapons that laid the whole foundation for Reagan's expansion of nuclear weapons, and war-fighting and war-winning capabilities. That is why I asked a question of the General, and I wonder if he would be good enough to amplify how they calculated the strategic balance, specifically on the nuclear side. It seems to me we looked at every aspect where the Soviets might have a little better capability than we—more throw-weight, more numbers, more something or other—and we always said, "We are inferior if any one of those is smaller than the Soviets'" without much regard for the more basic question of whether we *needed* more throw-weight, or more numbers. I wonder if that same kind of thinking prevailed on the Soviet side, or whether they had some other calculation by which they said, "By 1979, we will be equal in strategic nuclear forces."

**LEGVOLD:** General Gribkov, is the question clear? [Repeats in Russian.]

**GRIBKOV:** I have already spoken on this issue. In some systems the Americans were superior—in particular, in submarine-launched nuclear weapons you were superior. We

were superior in heavy land-based missiles. You were superior in cruise missiles. Each of your bombers could carry 20 cruise missiles. Our bombers could carry only two. But overall—if you counted the overall capability—it was equal. You cannot approach this question in arithmetical terms. Generally speaking, parity had been achieved.

It is the same on conventional weapons, as I said. Take the Western Front in Europe, for example: you were superior in bomber aviation; we were superior in fighter aviation. We had more tanks; you had more anti-tank weapons—and so on. And in general we had compensated for all of that. We watched each other and tried to achieve approximately the same number. This was what intelligence was for. Those of you who worked in this sphere probably knew that we knew a month beforehand if you were planning any NATO maneuvers; which military tasks would be practiced during those maneuvers; in whose territory they would take place; which headquarters would take part, and so on. I think NATO had similar information about us—what we were preparing, what kind of maneuvers, and so on. Intelligence did not sleep—neither yours, nor ours.

**LEGVOLD:** Les Gelb?

**GELB:** A question for the General, please. We asked you before for the rationale of the deployments of SS-20s. You said it was modernization. When we sought to deploy cruise missiles and Pershing-2s, we also said it was for purposes of modernization. But your side did not accept that. What was the difference between your legitimate modernization, and

our illegitimate modernization?

**GRIBKOV:** This question we should address to our politicians. [Laughter.]

**GELB:** Now we are getting interesting. [Long laughter.]

**DOBRYNIN:** In 1980 there appeared several presidential directives. I do not have the texts, but one of these was about nuclear war. There were changes in the conception of nuclear war; it discussed protracted, prolonged nuclear war. There were other aspects. As you rightly mentioned, it paved the way for what happened in the next administration—the Reagan administration. How can you explain the fact that the Carter administration had such ambitious ideas about disarmament, and then built up its nuclear forces and began thinking about fighting nuclear wars?

**LEGVOLD:** Stan, do you want to address that?

**TROYANOVSKY:** That is a political question. [Laughter.]

**DOBRYNIN:** It is political.

**TURNER:** I will answer that, because I was involved in drafting some of these directives. I



think the motivation in the Defense Department came from watching this modernization that General Gribkov has talked about. There was an increasing effort to escape a situation where you had to think about very large global exchanges. In other words, I think, those directives have been fundamentally misunderstood in the public discussion of them. The idea behind them—the spirit behind them—was not to have a war-fighting capability so much as to avoid this awful binary choice: blowing up half the world, or doing nothing. Another aspect of those directives was to use new technology to shift weapons not on to Soviet missile silos—killing Soviet missile silos was never a part of those. To the extent that there was a doctrinal shift, it was this: if we were forced to use nuclear weapons, we would try to use them in limited numbers on Soviet forces coming into Europe—not against the silos. And certainly we were trying to move targeting away from Soviet cities and industry, so as not to be so dependent on that kind of targeting.

Now, when this got out into the press and became a political issues, it got caught up in the kinds of theological arguments that Les described eloquently yesterday. There was a gross misunderstanding of what it was all about. Those doctrinal changes also represented an expression of our understanding that technological trends made smart munitions increasingly important for the military balance, and nuclear weapons decreasingly important. I must say that we in the West read with great interest those things published under Marshall Ogarkov's name, and it appeared to me that in the period between 1982 and 1984, your General Staff was trying to find ways of avoiding moving to nuclear use in a strategic campaign. You also thought that we were headed in that direction; you thought objectively that we were entering the second revolution in military

affairs after World War II. The first revolution had been inspired by nuclear weapons, intercontinental missiles, and early cybernetics (primitive computers); the second revolution had been generated by microcircuitry—which made powerful computers in small packages possible—and also by directed energy (or lasers), and the ability to communicate through fiber-optic cables—these sorts of things. A third technology which we did not show interest in, but in which you showed interest with huge investments in your Academy of Sciences, was genetic engineering, which in principle could be applied to biological and chemical weapons. We were always very uncertain and concerned about that. We never had good hard evidence on that. But it seemed that these two families of technologies—miniaturized computational power and directed energy—were making possible a whole family of new weapons, many of which you saw used in the Persian Gulf war. It was my impression that the Soviet General Staff was very much aware of that, and was making every effort to begin modernization in that direction.

**DOBRYNIN:** You mentioned that this doctrinal change was misunderstood. You are probably right. But to us, it looked as though you were developing a new nuclear war-winning strategy. This was shortly after the meeting in Vienna, where we signed an agreement about strategic weaponry. All of a sudden you had a war-winning strategy. There was a real hullabaloo around it. Why the change? I do not understand your answer.

**ODOM:** I have no answer to that. But I would point out to you that Harold Brown, the

Secretary of Defense, used a very specific term. He called it a "countervailing strategy," not a war-winning strategy. If forced to use nuclear weapons, we would try to do so in such a way as to avoid losing.

**DOBRYNIN:** Bill—you know, this kind of jargon, which exists in military circles—yours and ours—is completely misunderstood by politicians and diplomats.

**LEGVOLD:** Stan Turner?

**TURNER:** In a further effort to answer your very appropriate question, the nuclear world has gained a life of its own over these years, and one of the things we have been fixated with since the early 1960s was whether or not we should target cities. Bill just mentioned that this directive intended to reduce the extent to which we targeted cities. But the logic of our not targeting your cities had always been that if we avoided your cities, you would not target ours. I would like to ask you, if I may, whether that made any sense to you? Do you think that if we did not target your cities, you would not target ours? Or were we doing this willy-nilly on our own here, with no effect? I personally wonder whether you would even know whether or not we were targeting your cities. If the missiles began raining down, I doubt that you would stop to analyze our targeting. But nonetheless, I wonder how felt about targeting cities?

**DOBRYNIN:** You just asked a very good question, and you gave a very good answer. So, there is no need for me to answer further. [Laughter.]

**LEGVOLD:** Marshall Shulman and then—

**GRIBKOV:** May I comment?

**LEGVOLD:** Please.

**GRIBKOV:** You said you did not target cities. The first plan of using nuclear weapons against the Soviet Union was developed in the Pentagon in 1946, and it targeted 20 cities. In 1947, it targeted 70 cities. Do you know about that? You do.

**ODOM:** I was talking about the period from the 1960s onward. In 1946 we did not have enough weapons to target anything but cities if we were going to hit you; but by the 1960s we developed a phobia about targeting cities.

**LEGVOLD:** Marshall Shulman, and then Les Gelb. We are near the break, so we need to be brief.

**SHULMAN:** Two things. First, I would be very much interested to hear General Gribkov

respond to the question about the thinking of Marshal Ogarkov and his effort to introduce the notion of high technology in the weapons field. I am interested to know what your thinking was of its significance at the time. But the main point I want to make is to return very briefly to the question of the SS-20s. I do not think it is productive to pursue the issue of what the thinking was about the deployment of the SS-20s on the Soviet side. I think we have gone as far as we could go on that. But I think it is important to note for the record that that was a very fateful decision. It not only introduced the problems that Les Gelb talked about—that is, it was the beginning of our response with the cruise missiles and the Pershing-2s—but when they were deployed, it led to a suspension of negotiations in the whole arms control field for a period, and that is an important part of the record on the deterioration of relations in that period.

**GRIBKOV:** I wanted to say something about the SS-20s. We have to say openly that it was a faulty decision on the part of the Soviet Union to deploy the SS-20s in Europe. And you bit on this mistake.

**BRUTENTS:** Or otherwise exploited it.

**GRIBKOV:** Or exploited it. You began to deploy your Pershings. But eventually we began to eliminate both the Pershings and the SS-20s. Both sides made stupid decisions.

**LEGVOLD:** That's an interesting comment. Les Gelb?

**GELB:** It is so interesting that I think almost everything we have said paled by comparison. If we had only had some idea that you felt that way, we would have never gone down that path. There is not a chance.

It is difficult to discuss these nuclear issues, because, frankly, I find talking about nuclear war-fighting totally bizarre. But back in the years we are talking about, these issues were discussed.

Now I have a question for your side: When President Carter announced this countervailing strategy, your side made much more to-do about it than when James Schlesinger announced it in the Ford administration, or when Bob McNamara announced it in the Johnson administration. Secretary Brown did not say anything different in that regard from what his predecessors had said. What was new was what came *after* the Carter administration: the idea not of *countervailing*, but of *prevailing* in a nuclear war. That was a change. But you actually made more of a fuss about what we did than what our predecessors or successors did. Why was that?

**DOBRYNIN:** I think, Leslie, you exaggerate the situation.

**GELB:** Not much.

**DOBRYNIN:** I understand that, with respect to the military and the specialists in the disarmament talks, you are right. I agree with you. But otherwise, there was not much fuss in my country. Other things concerned us more—Afghanistan, and other things. Nuclear strategy was noticeable only to those who were really dealing with it. It did not become a public issue between our two countries publicly, as others did.

**LEGVOLD:** We are now at 1:00 o'clock, and we are going to break. Oleg, I am going to allow you this afternoon to tell us whether you preferred Republicans or Democrats, particularly in the context of Eastern Europe.

Because you were so splendid this morning, and because the conversation has been as interesting and as useful as it has been, we will now give you your reward. You do not have to come back here until 3:30—you can enjoy the sunshine. Lunch will be where breakfast was. Thank you very much.

## March 25, Session 7—The Polish Crisis

**LEGVOLD:** May I have your attention, please? One side of the table is ready; we are waiting for the unruly Americans.

Well, let us open this last session of this afternoon. If we can do it, we will carry

out the conversation in the next hour. We are going to discuss the place of Eastern Europe, including the Polish moment, in U.S.-Soviet relations. Let me begin by reading two questions from the Soviet side found in their list of questions.

The first is from Georgy Markovich Kornienko: How realistically did the United States see the possibility of the introduction of Soviet troops into Poland? What was the basis of their prognosis for what would happen?

The other question is from Georgy Shakhnazarov: what was the role of the U.S. administration in the development of the Polish Solidarity crisis between 1979 and 1981? Were those developments genuinely spontaneous, or was the Carter administration somehow involved in those events, hoping to create problems within the Soviet Union?

Now, the Polish issue is the one that seems to have everyone's attention. Unless I am missing something, as I go through the documents, and as I recall the accounts we have of the period, until we get to the Polish crisis, Eastern Europe does not seem to be a major issue in U.S.-Soviet relations. In general, the issue of Eastern Europe was not very central to the problems we have been talking about. There may have been some difficulty on the Soviet side in deciding how to respond to the policy of differentiation; but that all appeared to be quite secondary. So I have a question: is that accurate that the issue of Europe really appeared quite late, and only in the context of the Polish crisis? Bill.

**ODOM:** From my memory, that is accurate, with one tiny exception, or perhaps a couple. We talked a lot in the NSC and interagency meetings about differentiation. But that was talk, and there was never any policy action on that front. The other thing we talked about



was the the return of the Crown of Stephen. I think that affected not only the Soviet side, but it also affected U.S. domestic politics. So your assessment, Bob, is exactly right, in my opinion.

**LEGVOLD:** Are there people on the U.S. side who would begin answering either of those two questions? Perhaps we should put Georgy's question first: was there any kind of American involvement from the early stages of the emergence of Solidarity? Stan, do you have any information on this score?

**TURNER:** I cannot imagine why you would turn to me for that. [Laughter.] To the best of my knowledge, we certainly were not a significant player with Solidarity. I do not know whether we had some contact with them, but let me say this: under the laws of the United States, if we were going to do a covert action, like trying to make Solidarity succeed or whatever, we had to get the president's approval and notify the Congress. I have no recollection of doing that with respect to Poland. It does not mean that my people were not talking to Solidarity, but that is an intelligence issue as opposed to a covert action issue. Once they talk beyond getting information, and start saying, "Here is what you want to do to overthrow the Polish government"—they've got me breaking the law, because they did not come to me and say, "Let's get the president's approval."

**LEGVOLD:** Anatoly?

**DOBRYNIN:** But you sent them material assistance—typographic equipment, for instance. Maybe you did not seek Congressional approval, but you still gave them assistance with publishing material, and so on.

**SHULMAN:** It is possible—I do not know this for certain—but it is possible that the AFL-CIO had been involved in precisely that sort of thing after Solidarity was created, I suppose.

**LEGVOLD:** Bill Odom?

**ODOM:** I certainly do not think the U.S. had anything to do with the creation of Solidarity. I do not know of anything that would contradict anything Stan said after Solidarity got going; but if you look at the number of non-governmental organizations in the United States; the fact that there is a large number of Poles in the United States; and the fact that there was already a pattern of many Polish workers coming to the United States in the 1970s—for example, to New Jersey, or Long Island, where settled for a year and then went back—you will recognize that there was an enormous amount of interest and contact. There was a lot of non-governmental activity, back and forth. Many American Poles were sending money to Poland to their relatives; older Polish-Americans were retiring and going back and actually living in Poland. And then, as Marshall said, there was the AFL-CIO, which strongly supported Solidarity. It is pretty clear to me that after Solidarity became

reasonably active, fax machines, computers, and all sorts of things were moving, through a wide range of channels.

**LEGVOLD:** Anatoly Gribkov first, and then Marshall.

**GRIBKOV:** I had to deal with Poland directly, especially in 1980-1981. In 1980 I stayed in Poland for six months in all, as the Chief of Staff of the United Armed Forces. I was there for about the same amount of time in 1981. There were several crises in Poland: there were socio-political crises in 1956, 1968, 1970, 1976, and then finally this. The last crisis had been developing under four different General Secretaries, in 1980-1981. Those were [Wladislaw] Gomulka, Edward Gierek, Stanislav Kanya, and Wojciech Jaruzelski. I knew them all very well; we worked together.

The question at hand was the interference in Poland from abroad helping Solidarity. What did we notice? That Solidarity, led by Lech Walesa—a shipyard electrician, and a corporal by his military rank—was receiving large subsidies in hard currency. They had been also receiving copying equipment, printing equipment, radio stations, literature, and other things, including weapons and firearms. All that was known to the Polish State Security, and they informed the leadership. All that was done openly. Western representatives toured Poland without the slightest embarrassment, agitating the people. They recommended that the people take to the streets, go on strike, and undertake a struggle for power.

I would like to tell you about the introduction of martial law, and the possibility of intervention by allied troops of the Warsaw Treaty Organization. I read a lot of materials, including those in the American press—in the Western press—speculating that had Jaruzelski not introduced martial law on December 13, 1981, the Soviet, Czech, and the German troops would have been introduced the next day. There is also a story in the West that General of the Army Gribkov arrested First Secretary Kania and Chairman of the Council of Ministers and Minister of Defense Wojciech Jaruzelski, and sent them to Moscow, virtually in handcuffs. I would like to tell the truth to this audience, as it really happened, if you do not mind.

First, concerning the introduction of the martial law: Why did this question arise? Because the Polish United Workers' Party lost its authority among the people. Even their central newspaper, the party organ, supported Solidarity. All means of mass communications gave their support to Solidarity. The church gave its complete support to Solidarity. Only one newspaper, the *Jolnost Wolnosc*—the regularly-published Army newspaper—was on our side. By First Secretary Kania's decision, the circulation of that newspaper was increased many times. But the Solidarity members bought it immediately after it was printed, and burned almost the entire edition. In essence, the ruling party lost control over the mass media. At the same time, the underground literature—newspapers, pamphlets—were printed illegally on professional equipment which was received from the West. Copying equipment was also used. Underground radio stations were working. Solidarity created two echelons: if the first echelon was defeated or arrested, then the second echelon would have started its activity. This is exactly how it happened.

Now, on the introduction of the martial law. On Wojciech Jaruzelski's request, I worked in the Polish General Staff helping to develop the plan for introducing martial law. They did not know how to do it. We did not either, but together we were able to find a common ground and develop the plan. We even drafted Jaruzelski's statement on the introduction of martial law, which he was supposed to deliver over the radio when the decision was reached. This was the first step. So when in 1981 the situation became such that the Polish United Workers' Party had completely lost all reins of power, I came to Moscow from Poland. Defense Minister Ustinov gathered us. Among those present were Marshal Ogarkov, Sokolov, Kulikov, First Deputy Chief of General Staff Akhromeev, Chief of the Main Operations Department Varennikov, and myself. Ogarkov reported on the general situation and the possible group of Soviet, Czech and German troops, without mentioning the possibility of introducing those. He just said that those troops were available. He said nothing about the introduction of troops. When the discussion began, one of the Marshals—Marshal Kulikov, who was the Commander-in-Chief at that time—spoke in favor of introducing troops into Poland. He speaks about it in his book; here I have a chapter from it. It will be published soon. Then I asked for the floor. Since I spend a lot of time in Poland, and I knew the situation very well, I spoke about the healthy forces, the forces available to Kania and Jaruzelski, the position of the Polish Army, and other things. And I concluded that it would be absolutely wrong to introduce troops into Poland. There were indigenous healthy forces in Poland, and the Polish leadership should rely on them. I said it was impermissible to introduce troops: one Afghanistan was enough for us. As soon as I finished speaking, Marshal Sokolov, and Chief of the Main Political

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was this  
meeting*

Intelligence Department Epishev, stated that they completely agreed with me. They declined to speak; they just said that they were in complete agreement.

Ustinov decided not to draw any conclusions. He dismissed us and left for the Kremlin. Approximately two hours later, I received a direct phone call from Ustinov. "Come here immediately," he said. I came. All the same people who were there before were present. He informed us that there had been a Politburo meeting, and that he had reported all the opinions expressed by us, both for and against the introduction of troops. He also had expressed his own opinion. Then other Politburo members spoke on the same topic. Secretary of the Central Committee Suslov said that under no circumstances should we introduce troops. He said that option should not be even discussed. "Let the Polish people resolve that situation themselves," he said. To help them along party lines is another question, and such help would be necessary. Similarly, assistance should be provided from the Defense Ministry, from the KGB, from GOSPLAN (the Central Planning Department) on economic issues, and so on. But under no circumstances should we send troops." This was the decision. Therefore, everything that was written in the West and in Poland about the imminent introduction of troops is wrong—there was never such a decision.

However, there was some preparation. What kind of preparation? Commanders of those divisions which were supposed to transfer to Germany through Poland from the second strategic echelon in the case of war practiced the march twice each year. We decided that those commanders with their operative groups should practice the movement now, just to check the routes. Polish officers were supposed to take part, too. The Polish

knew about all that. That is why some people even in our press wrote about reconnaissance, and speculated that had Jaruzelski not introduced martial law, we would have immediately introduced troops. Such accounts are wrong.

Now, let us turn to the question of the influence that the Soviet leadership had on the Polish leadership. When I was in Poland in 1981, I was in charge of strategic maneuvers, which lasted three months, and I had the full use of the means of communication as a part of them. The Soviet, Polish, Czech, and the German headquarters were represented. We exchanged them from time to time because that was a very long exercise. The scenario was very similar to those maneuvers which were conducted in 1968 before the introduction of troops into Czechoslovakia. Later we removed all those headquarters. Then Ustinov called me on the phone. He said that there was a Politburo decision that Secretary of the Polish Central Committee Kania and Jaruzelski should meet with Chairman of the KGB Andropov and with Ustinov in Brest, on the border between Poland and the Soviet Union. I was ordered to organize that meeting secretly, to send them there.

**LEGVOLD:** Anatoly, this was in the spring of 1981?

**GRIBKOV:** It was in 1981. In the spring; rather, in the summer. I suggested that they should board their own plane and go there as if they were touring Poland, then land at a Soviet air field. From there, I would put them on my own plane and sent them to Brest.

But they did not like the idea, and told me to fly them directly from Warsaw. So I flew my personal Tu-134 into Warsaw, and I was ordered to have two Generals with me who would be responsible for the flight, and who would also act as witnesses. The order was that nobody should be able to see those Generals. Those representatives were General of the Army [first name?] Shcheglov, and Colonel-General of the Air Force [first name?] Kapich. At the set time, Kanya and Jaruzelski showed up with a colonel at the airport. I met them. They looked very unhappy. They looked as if they thought that they were going there and would never come back. I tried to comfort them as I could. I told them that everything would be all right—that I would meet them next morning, as was agreed. But they did not believe me. Their faces were very tense. When they approached the plane, Jaruzelski turned to me and said, "Anatoly, let us go in together." I said, "Let's go." I entered the plane together with them. The pilot and the flight attendants met us immediately. They had cognac, vodka, appetizers and so on. I told them, "Greet the guests." Then we gave each other a hug, and I promised to meet them in the morning. So I sent them.

About 6:00 o'clock next morning I got a telephone call telling me that it was time to go to the airport. The call was from Brest. The meeting between Jaruzelski, Kanya, Andropov and Ustinov took place as planned in a railway car. What did they talk about? Our comrades gave their advice on how to raise the prestige and authority of the Polish United Workers' Party, how to keep the Army and the State Security under control, and told them that it was necessary to emphasize their work with labor unions which did not join Solidarity. There were two labor unions in Poland: *Solidarnost'* and those who



supported the government. They gave them other advice also. So, when I met them in the morning, they looked quite different from the last time I saw them. Primarily, I think, they drank a lot. Their faces were red. My order was to find out what their opinion was about the meeting, and to report that to Moscow immediately. I led them by the hand for approximately 200 meters between the plane and the car. It took us approximately 40 minutes to walk that distance. Every several steps I asked them a question, and they responded. Jaruzelski said that that was a good school. Kanya said that they had just graduated from the Institute of Red Professorship, that their interlocutors were such experienced people, and so on. Then they got into the car and left, and I called Moscow. I sent an encoded message through secret channels about Kanya's and Jaruzelski's impressions of the meeting. This is how it really happened. Nobody arrested them.

When martial law was introduced, approximately 600 people were interned, including former First Secretary of the Central Committee of the Polish United Workers' Party Gierek, and former Chairman of the Council of Ministers [first name?] Yaroshevich. They did not have guards; it was more like a house arrest. Some of those who were interned came home like millionaires—they received all kinds of things from the West. However, when they were detained—including Lech Walesa—the second echelon of Solidarity led by senior lieutenant Buyak [name?] began its activity. Buyak [name?] was a military officer. The second leader was [first name?] Lys. Those two people led the underground committee of Solidarity. It continued its underground work.

Now, as a conclusion, I would like to stress that there was no decision on the introduction of the allied troops. Some ideas for the plan—some drafts—were prepared,

and the reconnaissance mission was carried out. But it does not mean that had martial law not been introduced we would have introduced the troops. These are the words that Suslov said at the conclusion of the Politburo meeting, "Let even the Social Democrats come to power instead of the Communists. We will work with the Social Democrats. But we will not introduce troops under any circumstances." This is the information I wanted to give you. If you have any questions, please ask them. I have just received a note asking me to speak briefly. [Laughter.]

**LEGVOLD:** He got that from his colleague, Georgy, who would also like to have the floor on Poland. [Laughter.] That was fascinating, and very useful, and I am grateful to you. Marshall, and then Georgy. Marshall?

**SHULMAN:** Thank you for that account. It is very important. I have one question and one, perhaps amusing, comment. I am interested that were military channels were used to deal with what was partly a security problem, but mainly a political problem—that military channels rather than party channels were used for the intermediation. Why was that?

**DOBRYNIN:** But Andropov was very well connected to the Politburo.

**SHULMAN:** But I would have thought there would have been party intermediaries. I want to make a comment afterwards.

**GRIBKOV:** Do you have us, the military, in mind? That we had to deal with the party leadership? I can respond to that. All the questions we considered together with Stanislav Kanya first, when he was the First Secretary, and with Jaruzelski, who at the same time was the Chairman of the Council of Ministers and the Minister of Defense. Later, when Jaruzelski became the First Secretary, we had to deal with him, and with other party functionaries, and also with the Chief of the General Staff.

Now, I would like to mention how Jaruzelski was elected First Secretary of the Central Committee of the Party. At that time I was in Moscow. The IV Plenum of the Polish United Workers' Party was held in Poland. The main issue on the agenda was the removal of Kanya from his position of the First Secretary. Our recommendation was that Wojciech Jaruzelski should be elected First Secretary. Brezhnev—and the Politburo in general—trusted him. In his personal meetings in Moscow with our leadership, and later in telephone conversations, he was told that he should be confident that the Soviet Union would not let Poland down, and that he should be more decisive. But during the Plenum, we found out that Wojciech decided to decline the position of First Secretary. Ustinov called me on the phone in Moscow. He said, "Anatoly Ivanovich, take all possible steps to assure that Jaruzelski is told not to decline the position of First Secretary, and that he is told that Leonid Ilych and the Politburo trust him." I quickly drafted a note, sent it over our secret phone line to the Commander of the group of troops in Poland, General Shcheglov, and also to our military attaché, General [first name?] Khomenko, the same note. I told them to deliver this message to Jaruzelski by all means. Our military attaché, General Khomenko, called me back in approximately 40 minutes. He said, "Comrade

General of the Army, I carried out your order. Jaruzelski knows. Jaruzelski nodded in agreement, and he did not decline the position. He was elected First Secretary of the Polish United Workers' Party." This is what I wanted to add.

**LEGVOLD:** Thank you. Marshall?

**SHULMAN:** This is a belated thanks to you. I made a lot of money as a result of your efforts, because there was betting going on in Washington. And I bet very heavily that there would not be a military intervention. And precisely for the reason you cited. You said, "We do not need another Afghanistan." In my mind it was going to be a very powerful factor. And on the strength of that I made a lot of money. I became a rich man, and I retired. [Long laughter.]

**LEGVOLD:** Georgy Shakhnazarov, and then Jim Hershberg.

**SHAKHNAZAROV:** I think that Marshall's confession tells us that he should share his money that he earned on Poland with General Gribkov. [Laughter.] The General is a master of suspense. He is a great story teller; it is very difficult for me to speak after him. He illuminated the military side of the story for us. I would like to talk about the political side.

At that time, I was a Deputy Chair of the Department of the Central Committee dealing directly with Poland. We had a confrontation of two forces in our department;

one of them hard-liners, and the other—you can call them doves, or realists—  
democratically inclined people. This internal struggle was going on during the entire  
Polish crisis. Every paper produced by the Department bore imprints of that very intense  
polemic. The division was acute even within the Polish sector itself. All this was drifting  
to the top and continued up to the Politburo level.

*diff. opinion*

But before I continue, I want to appeal to our American colleagues to be more open  
in these questions. We are not conducting an investigation here. There will be no  
sentence here; this is the business of history. It is possible that history will recognize the  
deeds of those who helped Poland become free. I just do not understand why you are so  
shy to admit that there was massive, well-thought out pressure with a goal of pulling  
Poland away from the Soviet influence, and delivering it into the hands of the West—to  
put it bluntly—while relying, of course, on internal forces: Solidarity and the Catholic  
church. Robert Pastor, for instance, whose comments are very interesting—and I am  
listening to him very attentively—reproached me for saying that Brzezinski had appointed  
the Pope. Of course, I do not have such a lofty opinion of Zbig—even though I respect  
him—to think that he is like God or the Collegium of Cardinals. But being experienced in  
politics, I can very easily imagine how that could have happened. For example, Cyrus  
Vance, or somebody else, could have sent a telegram to the U.S. Ambassadors in Rome,  
Madrid, and Paris, where the majority of Cardinals are located, and suggest that the  
Ambassador should meet with Cardinal such and such, and let him know that it would be  
desirable to elect a Slavic Pope. They could have said, “Poland is on the eve of major  
events; we need to support it,” and so on and so forth. I tell you frankly, I simply do not

believe that the Italian and the Spanish Cardinals would have so easily given up the Papacy without strong pressure from the Americans. I am convinced that it was just one part of a well-thought out plan, which you could be proud of in terms of its effectiveness. So it does not make any sense for you to conceal anything from us on that score.

We, at this point, have nothing to hide. We are now completely liberated from all sorts of constraints, limitations, and taboos. We are, in fact, liberated to such an extent that the General even revealed the secret that I had sent a note to him to speak briefly. [Laughter.]

This is what I wanted to say: I would like to look at the Polish crisis not as an internal Polish crisis—that would be a different story—but in terms of how it affected Soviet-American relations. When the Polish crisis began, we began to receive a tremendous amount of information telling us that it was a well-planned action. It may very well be that the Admiral was not informed about those things, or that he had not been among the main actors. Maybe British intelligence was in charge; maybe French. It is worth remembering that the British were the hosts of the Polish government in exile; they knew the Polish situation much better. But it definitely was a Western action as a whole. We began to receive information that there was a constant flow of money, weapons, equipment—as it has been already said here—and instructions. The information was very concrete. For example, we received information that a Dutch resident came, gathered Solidarity leaders—Walesa, Mikhnik [name?], and others—and instructed them on what to do and how to it. We received such information constantly.

As far as the Polish leadership is concerned, it was absolutely incapable of

anything, beginning in 1975. In 1976, when the first tensions arose, Gierek was on vacation in the Crimea together with all the Polish leadership. The same situation occurred in 1979—they all came to the Crimea. I remember that we called them on Brezhnev's request to tell them that there was a very unstable situation in Poland. We tried to give them a hint that they needed to go back home. But Gierek always responded, "Do not worry; the Polish people love me. Nothing wrong will happen. They respect me. I gave them a good life." Then Kania came, and so on. The CPSU immediately created a special commission—the Polish Commission of the Politburo. It consisted of those same people: Ustinov; Gromyko; Andropov; two Secretaries from the International Department, [Boris] Ponomarev and [first name?] Rusakov; and the Ambassador to Poland, Boris Ivanovich Aristov, when he was in Moscow. I and the Chair of the Sector were always present as representatives of the working staff at the meetings of that Commission. I was present at all of those meetings. The same process that was going on in the military leadership was going on in political circles, too. Ask Shakh,

I can tell you <sup>on</sup> my oath that in this great volume [the briefing book] produced by Blight and our other colleagues, not a single person at a single meeting argued for the invasion of Poland. Keep in mind that we were constantly talking about the introduction of troops—which is a strange thing to discuss, since the troops had already been stationed in Poland. Our troops were stationed in Poland.

**GRIBKOV:** Two divisions.

*why - ask Sh. !!!*

**SHAKHNAZAROV:** They could take responsibility for some initial functions in the case of martial law—control of the roads, and the like. There was an order that they should stay put under any conditions. They were confined to their barracks. Even the officers were prohibited from leaving their bases—even from going shopping—so as not to provoke the Poles. And it is interesting to note that Suslov, who was always perceived in the West as a hard-liner, was the first to argue against the invasion. He thought it would be catastrophic for the Soviet Union. He thought that we would just commit suicide if we intervened in Poland, because Poland was different from Czechoslovakia and Hungary. This is what I wanted to clarify here.

I would like to conclude with the following. I do not know; maybe you have some special rule not to reveal secrets until 50 years have passed—that is possible, and I understand that. There are countries where secret documents forever remain secret. The fact that we have here poured out our secrets is a historic and unique event. But I would like to emphasize that the essence of our meeting here is to try to find out how things happened in reality. The fact that there was such massive, well-thought out pressure on Poland, with the goal of pulling Poland away from the Soviet Union, could not but affected Soviet-American relations. Otherwise, I just cannot imagine why would we even want to include this topic on our agenda, and why we have emphasized it as strongly as we emphasized Africa and the Middle East.

**GRIBKOV:** The West was acting openly. Dissidents were acting openly.



**LEGVOLD:** Thank you very much. Jim Hershberg is next. But to the American side, I would like to say that, apart from the direct answer to the initial question that Georgy Shakhnazarov posed, you should say more about American thought on the developing Polish crisis in 1979. I would like you to speak not just to the issue of whether we were prepared to deter the Soviets from intervening—if that was the issue—but also to the extent to which either as a collective decision—

**HERSHBERG:** Bob, can I add something on that that will help you?

**LEGVOLD:** No, wait a minute. Bill, go ahead.

**ODOM:** Did you say 1979, or 1980?

**LEGVOLD:** Well, beginning in 1979, when you begin to see the movement—the political development. Obviously, the real issue of deterrence is much later. Marshall has some things to say on that score. I am really asking this: as the emergence of Solidarity became apparent, was there not a decision in the U.S. government to try to promote it in some fashion? I will come back to you, Bill. Jim Hershberg?

**HERSHBERG:** As your comment suggested, there is a lack of clarity in a lot of this discussion, which, I think, needs to be addressed. There is a difference between the Polish

situation before August 1980, and the situation after August 1980. It is reflected in Shakhnazarov's question, where he talks about the role of the U.S. administration in developing the Polish Solidarity crisis between 1979 and 1981.

Until August 1980, there was no Solidarity crisis. However, in his memoirs, Zbigniew Brzezinski does talk about 1979 and early 1980—before the Polish crisis erupts—in terms that are somewhat more serious than implied publicly, and in your question earlier. Let me just read the one paragraph on that, because I think that might inform the responses to Shakhnazarov's inquiry as to what role the U.S. had before August 1980. It is very important to distinguish the U.S. role before August 1980, and its role afterwards—because after the strike in the Lenin shipyard, there was a dramatic public world crisis; there was no question of the interest the U.S. and the West had in seeing this succeed. Before that, however, it was an entirely different issue. It is absurd to suggest that the events in the Lenin shipyard, Walesa going over the wall, and the negotiations leading to the agreement of August 30, 1980, were somehow masterminded by the CIA. It is not absurd to suggest that both beforehand and afterwards, the West had an interest in seeing a certain trend in events. But I think there needs to be more clarity in that discussion.

Let me just read one paragraph from page 463 of *Power and Principle*. Brzezinski writes:

Carter's administration displayed considerable interest in Polish affairs, and from early 1977 on we took advantage of every opportunity to demonstrate our

sympathy. The president chose Poland to be the first country to which he paid a state visit. American economic aid was maintained and gradually increased, and contacts with the Polish leaders, both governmental and non-governmental, were cultivated. By mid-1979 I was receiving quite explicit signals from some Polish leaders that the situation was deteriorating greatly, and that the pro-Soviet elements in Poland were deliberately interfering with Polish economic programs so as to keep Poland dependent on the Soviet Union. Considering the fact that these messages were highly placed and official sources, I felt that the situation in Poland was moving toward a critical stage. I briefed the president in early September 1979 on my conclusion that developments in Poland represented "a significant change in the Soviet world, and a sign of decreasing Soviet control," and I said that we should intensify both our contacts with Poland, and our economic assistance. In late 1979 and early 1980 meetings to that effect were held in both the PRC [Policy Review Committee] and the SCC, and we continued our policy of quiet assistance.

So there is no question that before Solidarity arose in late 1979 and early 1980, there was a fairly dramatic increase in U.S. interest, even though it remained below the surface. But that is quite different from saying that the Solidarity crisis was simply a Western plot.

After August 1980, there was a different situation, and that leads to my second question, which is directly for Stansfield Turner. On page 466 of *Power and Principle*, Brzezinski discusses the crisis of December 1980, and the fears in Washington that the Soviets were about to intervene with military force. Brzezinski writes: "On Friday,

December 5, 1980 at 9:10 a.m. I received a secure call from Turner informing me that according to the Revival information, a number of Soviet divisions were scheduled to enter Poland on Monday morning. I immediately informed the president and advised him that I would hold an SCC meeting the next day if further information confirmed the report that an invasion was imminent." He goes on to say: "At the SCC meeting held on Saturday afternoon, Turner informed us that it was anticipated that Soviet divisions would enter Poland in the next 48 hours." We now know from East German documents that actually on the same Friday—December 5—a decision was made at the Warsaw Pact meeting not to intervene, and to give Kanya more time on the assurance that Kanya and the Polish leaders would declare martial law if there were no other alternatives. The next issue of the *Cold War Bulletin* will feature all of these documents, including some of these Politburo minutes.

I am interested in getting from the American side responses to two questions. One is: with this excerpt from Brzezinski, can you shed any more light on the question that Shakhnazarov raised as to how the U.S. reacted to—or tried to influence—the developing situation in Poland in late 1979 and early 1980? And for Stansfield Turner directly: can you enlighten us as to what the basis was for the belief that the Soviets would, in fact, intervene, assuming Brzezinski's account is accurate? And to what extent was the CIA's estimate that there would be an invasion influenced by not having predicted the Soviet invasion in Afghanistan a year earlier?

**LEGVOLD:** Bill Odom, you were next.

**ODOM:** I will let Stan speak.

**LEGVOLD:** The two of you can fight it out. You want to go first, Stan?

**TURNER:** First of all, we did predict the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan quite well. That is, we alerted the president that the Soviets were in position to invade. We did not say we were positive they were going to do it, but we had no problem in identifying the movement of the whole lot of military equipment to the border of Afghanistan. I was accused of missing Afghanistan as well as Poland, as well as Iran, as well as everything else. [Laughter.] I get my back up on Afghanistan, I guess.

**ODOM:** I can testify: he was actually three weeks in advance on Afghanistan.

**HERSHBERG:** We would love to get the documents and correct the record.

**TURNER:** It was just corrected. [Laughter.]

**LEGVOLD:** Stan, what about Poland?

**TURNER:** It was an intelligence report—a sensitive intelligence report that led us to believe there might be an invasion.

**HERSHBERG:** So, Zbig's account is accurate as far as it goes on that issue?

**TURNER:** I cannot confirm or deny that; my memory is not that good.

**LEGVOLD:** Georgy?

**SHAKHNAZAROV:** Then, Admiral, you have to agree that that was misinformation. You were misled, and you consequently informed the president incorrectly. Or maybe Brzezinski had his own sources. If there was no introduction of troops, it means you were mistaken.

**LEGVOLD:** Bill?

**ODOM:** All right. Let me respond somewhat to Admiral Turner's defense, and then elaborate some of my own ideas on this. I was aware of the intelligence picture at that time—and not only the report that Admiral Turner was talking about. General Gribkov said there was contingency planning. It is clear that you had called up a number of reserve troops. There are a number of open sources that say that, and Dmitry Volkogonov said it in his biography on Lenin. There are a number of other sources. You pointed out that they were doing some exercises. We had technical intelligence evidence of considerable contingency planning. What we did not know with high degree of

confidence was what your intentions were. I mean, it made imminent sense to me that you should plan for such a contingency. And I would have been surprised if you did not. It was our task to try to work out what your intentions were.

**LEGVOLD:** But Bill, let me interrupt you long enough to get Jim to clarify the language. As I recall the language in Zbig's memoir, it is not that *in two days they will be able to*; it was a prediction that *within two days they would*.

**ODOM:** Let me say what I don't think Admiral Turner can, and I will put it on open sources. If you go back and look at an article in Orbis magazine by Polish Colonel [first name?] Kuklinski, you will see that he had that impression. You will see that he was reporting. In the light of what General Gribkov said, it is possible that someone who was not in the room with Suslov, or not in these other meetings, could look at the objective activities and decide that this was a very high probability—which, in his judgment, was a certainty. So, I think, anybody who has had experience trying to judge these situations knows that you always deal with a lot of objective empirical information, and with a lot of uncertainties about intentions—uncertainties that are created by different individuals looking at the same empirical evidence from different positions, and drawing quite different conclusions about it.

So, the view, as I understood it at the time—and it is not perfect—was that we thought that this was a very high probability affair. But we also thought that it was not

absolutely clear that the Soviets would do this, and we thought that certain very minor policy steps by the U.S. might change their mind. Some publicity might affect this. That was very much the attitude in the White House at that time, certainly on Brzezinski's part: that we should use what limited public diplomacy or other instruments we had to make the decision more difficult.

I would also say that I was aware—and I think Brzezinski was aware—that the Afghan situation complicated this decision rather dramatically. This was not like Czechoslovakia. So while I think there was a real concern that it might happen, we did not know what decision Brezhnev had made. You told us—and we had seen for ourselves in Vienna on SALT II—that he was not an example of sterling intellectual clarity. How do I know what decision he would make in that particular circumstance? He might have made a very bad decision. So if you are in a policy position, you try to hedge on the many uncertainties you face. Maybe we were responsible for creating the impression in certain media that there was going to be an invasion. That was a preemptive effort to prevent it.

**LEGVOLD:** Oleg Troyanovsky, and then Anatoly Gribkov.

**TROYANOVSKY:** I just want to add a very small piece of information to what the General and Georgy Shakhnazarov said. I was at the U.N. at that time, and the situation in Poland was discussed. The feeling among some members was quite tense. I remember the British ambassador approaching me in the hallways and saying, "Oleg, will you give us a quiet



holiday, or are you going to do something in Poland?" I said that I doubted very much that this could be anything like Czechoslovakia or Hungary. But when I returned to Moscow several months later, I had a talk with Deputy Foreign Minister Kovalev, who told me that before the meeting of the Politburo Gromyko asked him and one or two others to draw up for him a list of possible options for dealing with the situation in Poland. He asked Gromyko, "Should we include the option of introducing Soviet troops into Poland?" And Gromyko said, "Do not put that in. That is absolutely out of the question."

**LEGVOLD:** Oleg, could you date approximately when Kovalev was preparing those options?

**TROYANOVSKY:** It must have been either the end of December or the beginning of January, I think.

**LEGVOLD:** Of 1980?

**TROYANOVSKY:** Yes, of 1980.

**LEGVOLD:** Anatoly Gribkov?

**GRIBKOV:** I have in front of me an interview with Colonel Kuklinski, who ran to the West

with his family. He took part in drafting the plan. He was the head of the Operations Department in the General Staff. He had access to all the documents, and he participated when we prepared the plan in the Polish General Staff for introducing martial law. In order not to arrive empty-handed in the West, he made copies of many documents and took them with him in his car.

He tells lies on many questions; this one, for example. I told you about the meeting between Kania and Jaruzelski and Andropov and Ustinov in Brest, that I was in charge of organizing. What did he write about that meeting? He wrote, "On April 3, in the evening, when it became dark, a Soviet plane delivered Kania and Jaruzelski to Leonid Brezhnev in Moscow. The meeting was brief. Later they returned to Warsaw." Brezhnev did not meet with them. The meeting took place in Brest on the border between Poland and Russia. I brought this interview with me on purpose. It is just nonsense.

**LEGVOLD:** Thank you. Les Gelb?

**GELB:** By the time of Poland I had become a private *tovarishch*, so I can speak even more freely than I have spoken before.

It is well known that private American organizations—labor unions, and the like: the National Endowment of Democracy, and what not—had been supporting the Solidarity movement in Poland for some time, providing money, and printing equipment, and advice. This was done quite openly. I think you all know that. I do not know the extent

of the funds that went into this, but they were substantial. And it went on for at least a couple of years. The administration, I think, did not make any secret of its support for these efforts through those channels. As a private citizen, I put the question you are asking us to people on the Congressional intelligence committees. They told me that the United States was not involved in any covert operation at that time. Now, that does not mean that the British, or the French, or whoever, were not, as you said. I do not know one way or another. But there was no effort made by President Carter to go inform Congress, or to seek congressional approval for covert operation. Since I know these senators and congressmen pretty well, I believe their denial.

**LEGVOLD:** Bill Odom?

**ODOM:** I would also like to respond to Georgy Shakhnazarov's request for more understanding about this. Les Gelb's answer—and also my earlier answers—go a long way toward explaining this. But let us look also at the context. There is an old standard Soviet formula that you do not export revolution—that it is a product of internal class contradiction—but you had international obligations of solidarity with revolutionary forces. Now, what clearly happened in Poland was that you had not had a good thorough purge in a long time. Corruption, and poor discipline in the Party, had gone quite far. The Party became quite incapable of manipulating the labor unions. It lost control. And as it lost control, these other reasonably open things happened very easily. And so, I think, if

you are asking what the genuine objective causes of this were, you would have to say that they were an expression of a problem that was also occurring in the Soviet Communist Party: a deterioration of ideological rigidity and solidarity. After eighteen years with no purge—no fresh blood; no turnover—you become an atrophied, bleeding institution. And these new forces—aided by the Church, by other outside forces, and by Radio Liberty—were becoming a political challenge beyond the capability of the Polish Communist Party to handle.

Let me add one slight vignette, to give you a sense of the tensions during this time at a tactical level. Jan Novak—who, as some of you remember, worked at Radio Liberty for a long time—was on the telephone periodically with Polish Solidarity members throughout the fall of 1980. He was telling his colleagues there, “Calm down. Do not create a crisis. Do not do anything provocative.” And he said, “Don’t you understand that so many tanks are assembled on the Eastern border, and on the German border?” and so on. His Polish counterparts responded, “Of course we know they are there. You are obviously excessively disturbed. Why don’t you go home and take a valium?” And they hung up the phone. Clearly, on the U.S. side, we were really worried that Solidarity was not in our control. Solidarity had its own dynamics, its own leadership—which, I would say, disturbed some people in the U.S. government at that time.

**LEGVOLD:** Stan Turner, and then Karen Brutents. Stan, we are getting close to the end.

**TURNER:** Jim Hershberg is asking about the validity of Zbig’s statements. I have waffled

on that, but let me say that there is no way that an intelligence report would have said, "They are going to invade in 48 hours." We are much more Delphic than that.

[Laughter.] I mean, I made a lot of mistakes in my life; but you did not have to predict that explicitly. What I reported to Zbig was exactly what we received as a report: it was not that we were positive that there was going to be an invasion; it was merely that there *might* be one. I thank Bill for expressing better than any of us that there were indicators—we may have read them falsely—but there were indicators out there that something was afoot with respect to Soviet forces outside of Poland coming in. You know, if communications traffic increases in a particular area, you read that as a sign that something is going on. It may not be the sign you think it is; perhaps communications traffic increased for an entirely different reason. But we certainly did believe that there were preparations being made at that time.

**LEGVOLD:** Karen Brutents has the floor next, and then you can ask a question, Anatoly.

**BRUTENTS:** I would like to join the line of friendly reproaches toward our American colleagues begun by Georgy. It is clear that the U.S. side did not cause the events in Poland; that much is clear. Nobody alleged that on our side—no one among us present here, at least. We do not deviate from truth so much as to make such statements. But we are talking about a slightly different thing. We are suggesting that the situation was being actively inflamed by the American side—not only from the American side, but from the

West in general. This is a fact. Nobody will be able to force me to believe that neither governments nor intelligence services were involved. To believe that, I would have to forget everything I have learned in 50 years of my career. And I am not going to do it. When you tell me that the intelligence was not involved in any operations, and that the government was simply observing from the mountaintop, I simply cannot believe it—if only because I have a better opinion of the American government and of American intelligence. It is so simple.

**ODOM:** [In Russian:] But we are very modest.

**BRUTENTS:** This is the first point.

The second point I wanted to make is the following. All the arguments that Mr. Odom presented I take as serious arguments. I am not rejecting any of them—what he said about the preparations, the technical intelligence: he is right about that. But I have a feeling that you had an opportunity—unrealized, in your own words—to predict the course of events with more precision. I agree with Marshall Shulman. Why did more of you not think as he did? There were several factors that prevented that intervention, the Brezhnev Doctrine and other things notwithstanding. First, the Soviet Union had already entered a period of decline. In my view, the second half of the 1970s and the beginning of the 1980s was a period of increasing stagnation, and the decline of the Soviet Union, for many reasons. And that could not but affected foreign policy. Here I have a document

reasons

that Anatoly Ivanovich just gave me. The Politburo was discussing the Polish question. They said here that Poland was not Hungary, or Czechoslovakia, and also that Afghanistan was behind our backs—all these factors worked here, and they were important. But look at what he is saying: "I do not know how things will develop with respect to Poland"—

**LEGVOLD:** Who is "he"?

**BRUTENTS:** Andropov. "If Poland emerges under the control of Solidarity, it would be one thing. But if all the capitalist countries rise against the Soviet Union—and they already have such an agreement—with all kinds of economic and political sanctions, it would be very difficult for us." This is the important point. This was not the Soviet Union of the mid-1970s, or the early 1970s. Furthermore, the aging leadership of the early 1980s was even less capable of making such radical and risky decisions than it was before. Do you understand? There was powerful inertia—a desire not to make fast moves—and it became stronger and stronger.

This is how I see it. Maybe I am mistaken, but these factors also played an important role, in my opinion. Thank you for your attention.

**GRIBKOV:** On December 3, 1980, President Carter said, "The United States of America notes with concern the rapid buildup of Soviet forces on the borders of Poland." As a military officer, I can draw an immediate conclusion from such a statement that all of the

president's subordinates in the intelligence community and elsewhere should have started running around and working day and night.

**LEGVOLD:** Anatoly, did you have a question?

**DOBRYNIN :** As the Admiral said, you were not sure what would happen, but you thought there was a real possibility that Soviet troops would enter Poland. What kinds of contingency plans did you have in case we did this? What were you prepared to do in this case?

**LEGVOLD:** Bill Odom?

**ODOM:** I cannot give you a detailed answer, because I have a bad memory on this. But I believe you might find that there was an NSC working group on the Polish problem developing contingencies: Jim Hershberg may have evidence on this. I was extremely busy at the time with the Persian Gulf area; but I can state with a high degree of confidence that we were beginning to develop contingencies, like the things that Karen Brutents mentioned: sanctions, and so on. I do not know what were they, exactly, but we were thinking about as painful of a set of sanctions as we could dream up. I make no pretense that we were not thinking about playing a very hard game in this regard. And it would have clearly worked.



**DOBRYNIN:** If you were speaking about an invasion as a possibility in two days, I guess that you had your people come up with a contingency plan a little bit earlier?

**ODOM:** Yes, but all during the fall, as I recall, there were worries on both sides that Solidarity could cause problems that could not be ignored. You cannot control Poles. Poles are very hard to control; you know that from your own experience. [Laughter.] So Solidarity—

**DOBRYNIN:** You could not control yourself. [Laughter.]

**ODOM:** Solidarity could create a problem that you could not do anything about. You might have to react. They might start shooting Soviet soldiers, and this would be impossible for you. We were very worried about that. We were genuinely hoping that you would not move in; I had a discussion or two with Zbig on this. We felt that that would be a very positive development.

**DOBRYNIN:** Well, it was. But what would you have done if we did?

**ODOM:** As I said, I do not know, specifically. But I would be surprised if we did not have a list somewhere in the NSC documents of things we were thinking about doing.

**TURNER:** But that did not reach high-level discussion, in my recollection. It may well be that we had staff working on this; but we were not *that* persuaded that there was going to be an invasion. These were very late reports; we saw the evidence. We said this was a possibility. But you are giving us too much credit if you think we had a blueprint for how we were going to respond because we were that persuaded it would happen. We were not that organized.

**ODOM:** You should also remember that the president had just lost the election. So, you know, the mood was not ebullient. [Laughter.]

**LEGVOLD:** I suppose that is the word, Bill. [Long laughter.] Jim Hershberg?

**HERSHBERG:** I inferred from Anatoly's question that he was referring to military contingency plans. I that what you meant?

**DOBRYNIN:** Yes.

**HERSHBERG:** I recommend that you take a look at the December 7 SCC minutes. We had our oral history meeting with General Gribkov and with General William Smith, who was at that time the Commander of SHAPE. It was very clear from his discussion that the U.S.—not only in the fall of 1980, but during 1981—took a number of steps to prepare for

a military contingency, but they were all geared towards the worst-case scenario that the Soviet troops would not stop—that they might continue going West and threaten Western Europe. So far as I understand, there was never any serious contingency planning for a military intervention to save Poland.

**ODOM:** That jogs my memory. I remember attending a working group in the Situation Room in which one of the major issues was what to do about refugees. We even thought that there would be thousands of refugees crossing the Baltic to Bornholm Island—a Danish Island—and coming into East Germany. We looked at other ways they could get to the West. There were contingencies for those sorts of things.

Now, I am sure we talked about a lot of other things; but as Admiral Turner said, this was never, in my knowledge, at the principal level. This was at the working group level, where Assistant Secretaries or Deputy Assistant Secretaries—or lower—participated.

**HERSHBERG:** In this document, Brown is discussing sending divisions of F-15s to Europe. But it is all for the purpose of deterring further westward movement.

**LEGVOLD:** I will allow Malcolm Byrne the last question. Malcolm?

**BYRNE:** Thanks. There are references in Zbig's book, and in some other documents, to contingency steps that were being contemplated, and there were letters that were sent by

President Carter to other Western leaders—things of that sort. In the list of reasons that the Russian side has given us for why an intervention was not seriously contemplated, there is no reference to the impact of any such intervention on the West, and particularly on the United States. Where on the scale of thinking did any possible strong U.S. or Western reaction fit in?

**LEGVOLD:** Does anyone of the Soviet side care to answer that question?

**DOBRYNIN:** It was one of the factors, but it was not really decisive. Of course we took it into consideration; but relations with the United States were so bad at that time that it was not decisive a factor. Karen quoted some of the documents thinking about some things that the West might do—not military things, but other things. So we took that into consideration. But in a very limited way.

**LEGVOLD:** Thank you, Anatoly.

Tomorrow morning we will backpedal a little bit: we will be looking at the period between the Vienna summit in the summer of 1979 and the events leading up to the Soviet decision to intervene in Afghanistan. If you wish, we can also discuss the question of the Soviet brigade in Cuba, and its effect on U.S. policy. I want to thank all of you for the session this afternoon. I think it was very interesting. I want to thank General Gribkov and Georgy Shakhnazarov particularly, for their additional new information, and I would like

to remind you that it will go very nicely with the reports that are appearing in Jim Hershberg's study. We stand adjourned.

*The Cold War History  
Bulletin*

## March 26, Session 8—U.S.-Soviet Relations from the Vienna Summit to the Eve of the Afghan Intervention

**LEGVOLD:** I want to welcome you to this third and last day of our meeting, and begin with a couple of very brief announcements. Malcolm is not here; so, Jim, would you tell people about two additional documents they have received?

**HERSHBERG:** Sure. We have some additional documents from the Russian archives that were translated last week or so.

First, there is a memorandum of conversation between the Soviet Ambassador in Havana and Raúl Castro on September 1, 1979, discussing their reactions to the beginning of the brigade controversy. Senator Church's press conference had been held just the day before, and this is an initial discussion of how the Cubans and Soviets should respond to the controversy. It is quite interesting.

We have attached two pieces of back-and-forth correspondence on the hot line between Carter and Brezhnev on the brigade issue, from September 25 and 27, 1979. This

is the exchange of correspondence that goes with the Politburo transcript excerpt that is in your briefing book. Essentially, Carter is appealing to Brezhnev to help him resolve the crisis, and Brezhnev responds firmly.

**LEGVOLD:** Thank you very much, Jim.

This morning, the core of our activities is to look at the period from the Vienna summit in the summer of 1979 until the eve of the Afghan events, and to consider the critical elements in the developing relationship. They obviously include, course, events around the SALT treaty; the prospect of ratification; the problem of the Soviet brigade in Cuba; and a number of other points. I have no specific questions to put to you at the beginning, except in a very general way, to get some sense of how fated you felt the evolution of events was by the fall of 1979. I have the impression that there continues to be differing views among Americans—and I suspect that there are differing views among Russians—about how irreversible the decline was after Vienna. Was Vienna, in a way, already too late? Or was it by October? Or was there never a moment when it was too late, until the decision to go into Afghanistan?

But the agenda is really your agenda? What it is that you are really interested in? What do you want to deal with? We will talk about that for the first portion of the morning, for as long as we have a productive discussion. Since we are going on to Oslo to look at the critical events of Afghanistan, I do not think it makes sense to try to do a summing up at this point. I have not prepared comments as I did at Musgrove. I will not inflict that on you this morning. But I think it would be useful to do the following: I think it

would be useful for those of you—the principals; the policy makers—to say what you want about the agenda that we have covered, to help the historians who are going to be interpreting that. What is it that you think now, after these two conferences, that you would want to say to the historians who will be looking at the record, and the documents?

Secondly—although I do not want to push it too hard—I think it might be useful for you to say something about what you, as individuals, think your country might have done differently. What specific things occur to you? It might be interesting to see what pattern forms out of your answers to that question. I am not asking you to redesign U.S. policy, or to redesign Soviet policy, but to pick out two or three things that you think were important that could have been done differently.

For the scholars at the table, what I would like you to do is to think about the important questions that have simply not been answered yet.

Okay, the floor is open. Anatoly?

**DOBRYNIN:** It may be a good idea to touch the Cuban question briefly, because we have two colleagues of ours from Cuba. They are sitting here showing great interest, understandably. Yesterday, Tom mentioned *en passant* but very eloquently the relationship between the United States and Cuba. We have a Cuban crisis even now. Cuba has been a topic in all of our seminars. So, I do not want to make a bigger issue out of it than it was; but maybe we should speak about the Cuban brigade a little bit, and maybe our Cuban colleagues would like to make a comment.

**LEGVOLD:** If there are no objections, I am certainly quite open to that. That is fine. Okay, who is first? Who wants to say something about this period of time?

In the materials that you have, there is a memorandum dated December 14, 1979—on the eve of the Afghan events—written by Marshall. Marshall is assessing where the relationship is, and what the possibilities are. I think it might be useful to take a look at his assessment of the events, much as we looked at Anatoly's 1978 memorandum yesterday, assess the quality of his judgment at that point. This may help us get a handle on the question of how irreversibly the relationship had declined at that point. Anatoly?

**DOBRYNIN:** I would like Marshall to enlighten us a little bit about his mysterious mission to Moscow. Marshall, were you sent as a representative of the president? What message did you carry? It so happened that you could have talked to our president, but you left without meeting him. What was it all about? It is a rather unknown chapter, except for the fact that you were there.

**LEGVOLD:** Marshall?

**SHULMAN:** I will respond to Anatoly's point. But I would like to start from your introductory comments. I have been reflecting on our discussions in the last couple of days. It seems to me, first of all, that one of the most important things about this session arises from the documents, to the extent that it gives us imperfect insight into the process



of decision making on each side. It adds an important dimension. Obviously, there are things that we did not know, on both sides. Also, this was a period in which American policy was subject to conflicting aims and purposes. The consequence was a somewhat erratic course. On the Soviet side, what struck me—and what is reinforced by the documents—is the disconnect between people who were knowledgeable—the specialists, like those around the table here—who knew either the political situation, or knew the geographical areas (such as Africa, and so on), and the top level leadership. Some of you have described a sclerotic state, or gerontocracy, at the top. But, in any case, it seems to me that there was a disconnect between the expertise that was available on the Soviet side, and decision making at the very top. That is particularly true, I think, in regard to what is revealed here about the Afghan episode. At one level—forgive me if I get pedantic on you again—but at one level of analysis, it was that imperfection in the decision making process that contributed to the decline in the relationship. And I suppose, at another level, there was, inevitably, the international situation. This was a period when the two countries were in severe competition—when, for various reasons—ideological or others—it was impossible to moderate that, despite the hopes of some people on both sides hoped.

It is useful to track all of this, because there are lessons in it. As Tom illustrated last night in his comments, there are lessons to be learned from the process. Perhaps there is not much that one can do about it; but it is useful to understand it.

Now, to come back to this memorandum. It is not quite the opposite number to the memorandum that Anatoly sent Moscow, but it had, in a limited way, a similar function. It was intended to draw a picture for Cy—and, I hoped, for the president—of the serious

decline in the relationship. This came at a moment when Anatoly and other ambassadors were called back to Moscow for a policy review. This was my effort to try to read the situation as it may have looked to Moscow. I leave it to you to judge how accurately I read it.

What was clear to me was that we had passed the time when SALT was really feasible. On this, Cy Vance and I had different views. Cy does not believe that to be true. I want you to know that I am not speaking for him on this. But I felt that, by the time of Vienna—but the time the treaty was signed—it was already too late. After the issue of the so-called Soviet brigade in Cuba in September, whatever small chance of ratification remained was gone. Cy did not think so. He thought that it could be recovered. You have to judge.

My feeling was that, almost from the beginning of the Carter administration, there was a continuous process of decline—largely, I think, as a result of internal developments on both sides.

To look ahead a little bit to the later part of our discussion on Afghanistan, I would like to say that we observed the various flights and preparations being made; but again—as in the case of our earlier Polish discussion—it was a question of reading those signs. In the period when I wrote this memorandum, I was getting three or four briefings a day from or State Department intelligence people, and from Stan Turner's people, about what they were observing—about the movement of aircraft; the call-up of conscripts in the Turkmen Military District; the building of the base in Termez; and on. It seemed to me very clear that all of this was leading toward a movement of Soviet troops into the area in large

numbers. I had the impression that the Soviets had choices at that period. Moscow would have seen a deteriorating situation in Kabul under Amin; it looked as if it was falling apart. It looked as though it might seriously open the way to an Islamic fundamentalist movement threatening the whole southern border. But it seemed to me that there were options at that point. I weighed them in my mind. One option would be to beef up the military advisers who were there in large numbers; another would be a program of military assistance. The most extreme option, I think, which might have been chosen, was the movement of Soviet troops into the area.

We sent a series of warnings to the Soviets—I personally was involved in five—either through Washington, or through Tom Watson in Moscow, saying, “Do not do it. If you do it, the effect is going to be very serious.” But I had the feeling—and it is reflected in this memorandum—that by that time, those warnings did not make any real difference. First of all, relations were already so bad that there was not much to lose. I think it was surprise to the Soviets how intense our reaction was; but I think they mistakenly believed that things could hardly get worse. They did indeed get worse—a lot worse. But I think the warnings we sent did not have much affect on the situation. In one of the other documents, Gromyko reflects in an earlier session—before the final decision—on the deterioration in relations with the United States that would result from moving the troops into Afghanistan. He seems to have taken this consideration seriously at the time. But, in the end, even he went along, largely under pressure of the deteriorating situation and the small group that made the decision. I do not know what lessons I would draw from that.

Forgive me for talking too long, but I want to take just one more minute. I sense

from our earlier discussions that some of my Russian friends here are somewhat disappointed. They feel that there was a more deliberate and coordinated effort to weaken the Soviet Union, and to bring about its collapse, than we have admitted. Undoubtedly, there were some in the United States who had that objective. It was not the policy of the government, however. I am sure some were working toward that end; but it is difficult to know who, how, and with what energy. None of us is holding back; we honestly do not know. The evidence is ambiguous and unclear. But from my point of view, it did not amount to a coordinated policy with that objective in view. I tried to stress again last night that the duality of aims in the American political system existed all through the Cold War period. And to some extent it persists today.

Since it has been only three years since the collapse of the Soviet Union, it is understandable that the view should persist. It developed over a long period of time. Old attitudes and stereotypes persist on both sides. One of the lessons here is that we must have a little resilience, and patience, and tolerance.

**LEGVOLD:** Marshall, thank you very much. Would you care to respond directly to Anatoly's question about your mission to Moscow?

**SHULMAN:** Oh, yes. I cannot remember exactly the date when this took place, Anatoly. I think it was before Afghanistan, but after the Cuban brigade issue erupted. What happened was this: Cy had a very strong feeling that we ought to keep communications

open. He wanted, in the first instance, to meet with Gromyko. The president said no. So he sought other ways of keeping the lifelines of communications open. He thought to send me to Moscow to do that at a time when things were pretty frozen.

**DOBRYNIN:** Who thought that, Cy or the president?

**SHULMAN:** Cy. As you can imagine, this was not very popular in the White House. Zbig was against it, particularly.

**DOBRYNIN:** Zbig mentioned to me that he was against it.

**SHULMAN:** I know it. And in fact, I was not really in a high enough position to carry the weight of that kind of mission. I mean, it would have been better if it had been someone with a little more public standing than I had. But under the circumstances, I was the best that Cy had at his disposal. He hoped that, since I felt I had some insight into the situation, I would be a credible envoy. Zbig did not like the idea; he did not like the idea of a meeting between Vance and Gromyko, either. And so, the idea died in the White House, essentially.

I know that Zbig talked to you, and you wondered at the time what the mission meant. It simply represented Cy's feeling that, during a time of tensions and mutual suspicions, it was all the more important to keep the lines of communication open. And I

was the best he could come up with at the time. It was not much, but it was his effort—his unsuccessful effort.

**LEGVOLD:** When did it occur?

**DOBRYNIN:** December 1979.

**LEGVOLD:** No, that is the date of his memorandum. What was the date of the mission that we are talking about?

**SHULMAN:** I simply cannot remember without checking the record.

**DOBRYNIN:** December 1979.

**SHULMAN:** Do you think that was the date of the mission? It might have been.

**DOBRYNIN:** So Cy wanted to go to meet with Gromyko, and he was overruled by the president?

**SHULMAN:** That's right.

**DOBRYNIN:** Cy came to me and told me that the president did not want him to meet with Gromyko. But then, two weeks later, he told me that the president had his own ideas—that it was *his* idea to send you, not Cy's. And then Zbig told me that he personally was against it, but that the president had decided.

**SHULMAN:** I think maybe this was post-Afghanistan. Cy was still hoping against hope to save SALT. It was a part of his indomitable optimism. He also felt that the deterioration in our relations was very serious. After every crisis—the Korean airliner incident, or the Polish crisis, and so on—there would be meetings about what to do—how to react. Every time something like that happened on the Soviet side, it gave ammunition to those who wanted to ratchet up the pressure. They would come up with a list of punitive actions. The same list would come up on every occasion in the basement meetings in the White House. The problem was that the pressure to take punitive action began to take on an inexorable force. Cy's feeling was that, although neither he nor Gromyko might have been in a decisive position to deal with the situation, at least there should be a line of communication, along with communication through Anatoly.

**LEGVOLD:** Marshall, could I get you to go another step? Some around the table have immediately fastened on this. What happened in the course of your conversation? What was the substance of it?

**SHULMAN:** Which conversation?

**LEGVOLD:** When you went to Moscow.

**SHULMAN:** I did not go.

**LEGVOLD:** Oh, you never went?

**SHULMAN:** No; the point was that the trip was scotched.

**HERSHBERG:** Bob, I've got the dates of that initiative from Brzezinski, if you would like that.

**LEGVOLD:** Okay, Jim, why don't you give them to us?

**HERSHBERG:** Yes, it is in Brzezinski's memoir, between pages 435 and 437. The discussions were between February 28 and March 2. So it was clearly after the invasion of Afghanistan. The trip was scotched when Zbig found out that the Soviet Embassy had been asked to issue you a visa, and he got quite upset.

**SHULMAN:** I should say that that was not the first he knew of the proposition. I mean, the



proposal had been sent to the White House—

**HERSHBERG:** The idea, according to Brzezinski, was for you to deliver a letter from Carter to Brezhnev.

**SHULMAN:** No, that's not right.

**LEGVOLD:** Mark Garrison?

**GARRISON:** There is a document that makes a very useful comparison to Marshall's analysis of the situation just before the invasion. I am not sure it got into the short collection. It is Watson's report of his meeting with Gromyko where Gromyko ran down—

**HERSHBERG:** It's in there.

**GARRISON:** Oh, it is? Yes, it is. It is the last document. In this conversation—which was, of course, about Afghanistan—Gromyko, without notes, proceeded to number ten points that he wanted to make, which very succinctly described his view of the U.S.-Soviet relationship at the time when the invasion of Afghanistan took place. It is worth looking at that and comparing it with Marshall's analysis, I think. They touch on many of the same

subjects, of course: they look at SALT, the INF decisions, and so on. But what struck me, so far as my notes indicate, is that, whereas Marshall made a point about China—that is, of explaining how what we did with China might have affected Soviet attitudes—Gromyko did not. It was not on his mind.

**SHULMAN:** It was on his mind; he was not saying anything about it.

**GARRISON:** Well, he said enough things that might lead you to believe that he had said everything that was on his mind. He made ten points. Actually, eight of them applied before Afghanistan.

**SHULMAN:** Just a word on that. My impression was that the fact that he did not say anything about it did not necessarily mean that it was not on his mind. He placed a great deal of importance on not showing vulnerability. He tried to give us the impression that they did not care about it. He made an effort to show a certain casual indifference, in order to diminish the effect of the China problem.

**LEGVOLD:** Anatoly?

**DOBRYNIN:** Were you in Moscow, or were you not?

SHULMAN: No, not then. I did not go.

DOBRYNIN: Why not?

SHULMAN: Well, because the trip was knocked off.

DOBRYNIN: By whom?

SHULMAN: By Zbig.

DOBRYNIN: I was under the impression that you went.

TROYANOVSKY: When did you talk with Gromyko?

DOBRYNIN: Yes, when did you speak with Gromyko? You can just—

SHULMAN: I didn't. Watson talked with Gromyko.

DOBRYNIN: Oh, it was Watson, and not you?

**SHULMAN:** That's right.

**LEGVOLD:** Phil Brenner?

**BRENNER:** David Newsome, who was Under Secretary of State, has written a book on the Soviet brigade in Cuba. He links the brigade issue to Afghanistan. This came up very briefly at Musgrove. Let me raise again the question that was raised at Musgrove—one question to the Russian participants, and one question to the American participants in this regard.

To the Russian side: Newsome argues that the brigade so soured relations between the two countries that it convinced the Soviet side that there was really no point in trying to accommodate the United States any more. So when the decision on Afghanistan came, the United States was not really taken into account. This was, in part, because of the brigade issue. Is Newsome's analysis of this accurate?

And to the American side: did you recognize that by blowing up this affair—or by continuing rather than by trying to contain it—this might have further implications for the deterioration of the relationship?

**DOBRYNIN:** May I answer this question?

**LEGVOLD:** Sure.

**DOBRYNIN:** I think Newsome was wrong. Of course it was a very sour moment in our relationship; but it did not have much influence on our decision about Afghanistan, quite frankly. There was a difference of opinion in Moscow about the significance of the Cuban brigade issue. Some people just thought that Senator Church simply wanted to be reelected, and that he created the issue for that purpose. Others thought it was a convenient tool for the opponents of SALT to prevent ratification. Still others thought it was one of the American attempts to adjust the 1962 understanding. Throughout the whole history of Soviet-American relations since 1962, there were several attempts by the American side to correct it—to try to prevent us from sending patrol boats, establishing a submarine base, sending nuclear rather than non-nuclear submarines to Cuban ports, deploying MiG-23 fighters, and so on. There was a whole series of these attempts, beginning in 1962. So many of our people considered this another attempt to redraft, in a way, this 1962 understanding, in order to get rid of all our personnel which had been there for 17 years.

At that very moment, I was in Moscow. Cy sent a personal telegram to Gromyko, asking him to send me back to Washington. I was on vacation, so Gromyko called me and said, "Well, I do not know why they need to consult you. I know you are on a vacation. But if the Secretary asks, then if you do not mind, please go." The first question Cy asked me when I met him was, "Anatoly, were those troops there during the Kennedy administration? During the Johnson administration? During the Nixon administration? During the Ford administration?" I said, "Yes. Exactly." Then he said, "Then what is this all about?" And I said, "I should ask *you* what it is all about." During four administrations

our personnel had been there. Nothing new had been introduced during the Carter administration. And he agreed with me. He said, "This is my understanding, too." And in his memoir, he simply summarized the whole episode as a "lapse of memory in American intelligence." That was his description, not mine. [McGeorge] Bundy had made a public statement during the Kennedy administration that there were some two or three thousand Russian troops there to train. It was nothing new.

We did not understand why it became an issue all of a sudden in 1979, quite frankly. In the government there were several hypotheses, as I have just enumerated. But it was not really a decisive factor in our decision making on Afghanistan. Of course it added a sour note to our relations, so to speak; but it did not affect our decision on Afghanistan. Thank you.

**LEGVOLD:** General Gribkov, and then Marshall.

**GRIBKOV:** I do not understand why the question of our motorized brigade came up 17 years after it had been stationed there. We had four motorized regiments there in 1962. We called them regiments, but they were essentially brigades. One of them we renamed a brigade, and then under an agreement with the Cuban leadership, we left it there. It consisted of about 2,500-3,000 people, at different points in time. And the American side knew about that brigade, because their intelligence—land, air, and satellite—constantly monitored Cuba. The Americans were informed about that brigade. But why the question

was raised specifically in September of 197[9]—this is hard to understand.

**DOBRYNIN:** It believe it was Senator Church who was running for reelection. He raised the issue with the initiative of the Cuban immigrants.

**GRIBKOV:** The Americans knew about that brigade without the immigrants.

**DOBRYNIN:** But he wanted to use it for reelection, and he was Chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee.

**GRIBKOV:** Until 1966, the brigade was dressed in civilian dress. In 1966, the brigade was dressed in Cuban uniform, with Cuban military insignia. Up until the end it wore Cuban uniform. There was a lot of talk, as the documents indicate, about increases in our military forces in Cuba. We did give the Cubans new planes. The MiG-21s remained in Cuba—the regiment which was stationed in Santa Clara during the crisis. And later we deployed MiG-23s—20 or 22 planes. When our instructors were training Cubans, of course, they were speaking Russian, not Spanish. And American intelligence was listening to it all the time. When our brigade carried out military exercises—tactical exercises—together with the Cuban troops, of course, all orders were given in Russian. And American intelligence knew that.

But here is another issue. The Havana Conference of Nonaligned Countries was

being prepared in Cuba. Fidel Castro was going to be the Chair. I think it was not in the U.S. interest that Fidel Castro would remain the leader of the movement after the conference until the next conference in another country. I think that factor was linked with other considerations of American policy. We had an agreement that said that was a brigade, a symbolic troop presence. Brezhnev later said that it was not a brigade, just a training center—Training Center Number 12. Ten years later, in 1989, when Gorbachev was already in power, the Americans raised the question about that brigade again. Brezhnev called it Training Center Number 12, but Gorbachev said that it was a motorized brigade again, and he pledged to withdraw it. We—the military—thought that if the question was raised about the withdrawal, it would be reasonable to make it symmetrical: we withdraw the motorized brigade, and the Americans withdraw their military base from Guantánamo. This would have put an end to the Cold War in the Caribbean. But the Cold War is still going on in the Caribbean.

We are talking here about President Carter, who cared about human rights, and all that. But why wouldn't he go to Cuba? He could speak there; he could put an end to the Cold War in the Caribbean Basin. Why did he speak only of the rights of individuals, and not the rights of an entire state? Why did he never speak about that? We—the military—when we talked among ourselves, we always said that the U.S. and its allies should stop the blockade of Cuba, and let Cuba live independently.

Also, a question was raised here about Afghanistan. If my memory serves me right, we introduced our troops into Afghanistan on December 25, 1979. That December was a very bad month. It was also the month when martial law was introduced in Poland.



Afghanistan was in December—

**SHAKHNAZAROV:** Chechnya was in December.

**GRIBKOV:** Yes; and the Chechen War began before the New Year, in December.

December is a bad month.

Now, on Afghanistan. I would like to speak about the position of the General Staff. When that question was discussed, we were decisively against it. Who are “we”? Marshall Ogarkov, the Chief of the General Staff; Kulikov, the First Deputy of the Defense Minister, and the Commander-in-Chief of the Warsaw Treaty forces; and me, as a Deputy of both of them. We were sitting in Ogarkov’s office a week before the troops were introduced, and I told them directly, “This is a reckless adventure. Why don’t you—two members of the Defense Council—tell them that this is a reckless adventure, and that we should not introduce troops? The British got burned there three times.” Then Ogarkov told me, “Anatoly Ivanovich, do you think I did not raise this question? Nobody wants to listen. And the first who does not want to listen is right there.” And he pointed downstairs. We were sitting on the third floor, and Ustinov’s office was on the second floor. He said, “This is who does not want to understand anything.” He also said that he tried to voice his opinion at one of the Politburo meetings, and that Andropov told him, “Comrade Ogarkov, we invited you here not because we wanted to hear your opinion. You should take notes and follow orders.” This was the attitude. And the General Staff

had to plan the operation.

This is what I wanted to say on the position of the General Staff on the Afghan issue. Thank you.

**LEGVOLD:** Thank you, Anatoly; that is very useful.

Now, Bill Odom is next. Bill, I think, you can help us on one further related matter. One of Georgy Kornienko's questions on his sheet is the following: What was the rationale behind the White House decision to step up intelligence activities in Cuba in spring of 1979, and how could it have happened that the previous intelligence reports—which would have shown that the so-called Soviet brigade had been stationed in Cuba since 1962—had not been reviewed in this respect?

**ODOM:** Sitting here listening to this, I am once more impressed, as several people had been earlier, that the rationale imputed to events very often has nothing to do with why these events proceed in the course they did. I think the whole Soviet brigade in Cuba issue was a product of our own internal processes, confusions, omissions, misunderstandings, and misjudgments.

It was the case that sometime in the early 1970s—and maybe in the late 1960s; Stan Turner may have a better memory for this than I do—we actually began to reduce rather significantly the intelligence resources we committed to Latin America. Latin America really fell into low priority. As the Soviets approached military parity, we shifted

our attention to the Soviet military build-up. We had to increase our intelligence effort in that regard to support the SALT negotiations. So we gave the continuing and accurate assessment of the Central Front a very high priority. This meant having more Russian speakers in the intelligence community, and fewer Spanish speakers.

Anyway, I will tell you my personal involvement with this. In August of 1978, some raw intelligence arrived on my desk that would lead one to infer fairly unambiguously that there was a Soviet ground force unit with tanks and BTRs [armored personnel carriers] in Cuba. So I raised it with Zbig, and he said, "We should call this to the attention of the intelligence community." As you know, we have an entire intelligence community, which is much larger than merely the CIA. He said that they should look into it. So we did that, somewhere between August and October; I have forgotten precisely when.

**LEGVOLD:** This is 1978?

**ODOM:** Yes; it is almost a year before the issue erupted.

**PASTOR:** It was in October 1978, when we first began picking up information about MiG-21s coming to Cuba. That was, in effect, already a product of increasing intelligence activities. Following that, Bill asked Zbig to look into some of these other aspects as well.

**GRIBKOV:** You mean MiG-23s.

**ODOM:** Well, anyway, we looked into them. I have forgotten much about this. But then more intelligence came in, and after the turn of the year—in early 1979, I believe—Brzezinski talked to Stan, or perhaps NIO—I do not remember whom he talked to—and he said, “Look, we need to get this sorted out. Is this new, or is this not new?” We did not know. Is this what we think it is? We did not know that. And this issue went round and round in our bureaucracy all spring and fall. I do not know when you learned about it, Marshall; I do not know when Cy Vance learned about it, or when you began to focus on it Maybe David Newsome clarifies this. But then, for some reason, which—

**DOBRYNIN:** The press?

**ODOM:** No, wait a minute, Anatoly; we are way before the press. We are not near the press yet. We are in the spring. I am in the spring of 1979. I remember having one or two conversations with Brzezinski, and I said, “If we don’t get this sorted out, somebody will leak this, and then we will have a problem. It will get out of control.” The hypothesis that Anatoly offered here—that Church wanted to get reelected—is valid. Almost all of your hypotheses are valid. But how we got there was unintentional.

Anyway, for reasons I do not know, in the late fall, I think, Brzezinski was actually on vacation. And suddenly David Aaron, I believe, convened a mini-SCC meeting in the

Situation Room. [Walter] Slocombe came over from the Defense Department; I was there; Marshall Bremer [name?] was there; I think you were there [indicating Shulman?]. Newsome came in, and, probably because he and Zbig had spoken about it, he said, "We are going to go and tell Congress about this." David Aaron and I said, "Do not take it anywhere. We do not have this sorted out. Why do we want to take it over to the Congress?" I mean, we could control it for quite a while. They would leak it for sure.

I have never read Newsome's book, so I don't know what happened after that. They may already have gone to see Church. But it seems to me that, at that point, we inflicted it on ourselves.

Now, I wish we had been as accurate and as thorough in maintaining our intelligence order of battle on Soviet assets in Cuba as you attribute to us, General Gribkov; but sometimes even good organizations make big mistakes. And we made big mistakes here. We did not have a continuous, thorough, and intense intelligence effort on this. I think one can explain that lapse fairly rationally by appealing to strategic considerations. Latin America was not terribly important to the U.S. in the 1970s, objectively speaking. So it was very sensible, if we were cutting resources—and we *were* cutting resources—to shift our focus to Europe. Remember that between 1968 and 1978 there was a 38% real reduction in the U.S. defense budget. The drops in the intelligence budget parallel that. That was a period of rather significant cuts in both defense and intelligence resources. So that we cut back and ended up in this predicament is not altogether surprising in light of what I have said.

Now, I do not remember the time—but I am sure Bob does—of the MiG-23

deployment. But let me say this, Anatoly: I went back and reviewed your discussions with Kissinger about SSBs and SSBNs, and my conclusion was that you were very skillful in making the understanding ambiguous.

**DOBRYNIN:** That is a separate issue.

**ODOM:** But that ambiguity came back to haunt us. I think if you had been unambiguous in 1972 and 1974 with Kissinger, the MiG-23 incident would not have been nearly as sharp, nor would the disagreement over the sub base have been nearly as sharp as it was.

**DOBRYNIN:** There was ambiguity on both sides.

**ODOM:** Let me simply say this. When we went back and got the data—and we were not looking at Cuba all that much—we suddenly were faced both with the brigade issue, and with MiG-23s, I remember looking back at those documents and saying, “My God, I thought the U.S. government had a clear and unambiguous agreement with the Soviets after 1962.” It is very clear that we did not. It was not an unambiguous agreement. You can say that there was ambiguity on both sides; but it did not look that way to me. It looked to me as though you had very skillfully built in ambiguity, and that succeeding administrations did not want to embarrass themselves by facing up to this in public. I think President Carter reached the same conclusion when he eventually said that the MiG-

23s, while not desirable, were not a violation of this agreement. I do not remember his exact words. But we perpetuated this ambiguity.

I do not think the MiG-23 episode had much to do with brigade. I think these are separate issues. But I just wanted to say all this as non-judgmentally as I can. Of course, I do not know the whole story. There were a lot of meetings about these issues with which I had nothing whatsoever to do, because I was not in the intelligence community then. But I think this gives you an idea of how we mishandled the brigade issue. Thank you.

**LEGVOLD:** Stan Turner, and then Anatoly.

**TURNER:** a few months ago I communicated to Jim Blight that I had to leave this conference yesterday, and he importuned me to stay because this conversation would come up today. Now that we are at this conversation, I realize what a bad judgment I made in staying. [Laughter.]

Yesterday, I defended myself against Jim's accusation that we blew Afghanistan. I cannot defend myself on this one: we blew it. Yesterday, I was unable to be persuasive to our Russian colleagues on Poland. There is no hope that I can persuade them on this one. [Laughter.]

All right: in early July, as a result of the proddings which came from Bill, through Zbig, to me, we had reexamined—in particular at NSA—

**LEGVOLD:** Please identify each thing where you are using initials:

**TURNER:** The NSA is the National Security Agency, which does our signals intelligence. It had reviewed a lot of material that they had on Cuba, but which they had not processed. We get more material than you can get human beings to look at. I am sure that was true also for Soviet intelligence. So we screened it and put it aside. They went back, and dug out the material they had not fully studied, and out of it came not the conclusion that they had discovered a new unit in Cuba, but that a unit of yours in Cuba was engaged in a new activity. I think that is important: we were not deceived into thinking that you had suddenly built up new forces.

**TROYANOVSKY:** What do you mean by new activity?

**TURNER:** This unit was doing combat training on its own—without training Cubans. We had not perceived before that you had a unit in Cuba that was not there simply to train Cubans. The initial report indicated that this unit was doing its own training without any Cuban participation.

The NSA—unfortunately, in my opinion—put this report out as a rather raw report. Thus began a philosophic discussion between Bill, me, and others here as to whether that was the way the NSA ought to operate. I do not want to bore you with our internal problems. But we do have a problem controlling our intelligence apparatus. I happen to



feel very strongly on that, and I won't want to get into it unless you really want me to. But because this report went out—not on a wide distribution basis, mind you—it was very quickly leaked to Senator Richard Stone of Florida. He lives near Cuba; he was running for reelection; he had voted for the Panama Canal Treaty, and had all these problem.

**TROYANOVSKY:** Church, you mean?

**TURNER:** No, Stone. Richard Stone from Florida, from this state. Church lives a long way from Cuba. [Laughter.] It is important that it was Stone, because Stone immediately discussed this in an open hearing of the Congress. Hours later, Harold Brown and I were there on a classified basis. We told him there was no substantial new Soviet activity in Cuba.

**PASTOR:** That was July 17.

**TURNER:** July 17. Harold Brown said, "There is no evidence of any increase in the size of the Soviet military presence in Cuba over the past several years." This is from a very authoritative book on this subject written by Stansfield Turner. [Laughter.] I agreed with that. Okay, I say it in my book: "I agreed with Harold Brown's statement." [Laughter.] Shortly after that it appeared on Ted Koppel's television show at night, and it appeared on other media. And it blew over. It stopped. We had a breathing space.

I told the intelligence people, "Let us get to the bottom of this now, and find out what is going on." And so we conducted the search. But, fortuitously or not, we knew that this brigade was scheduled to conduct a training operation in two weeks, and we focused all of the United States's intelligence assets on this. I am very proud that we really found out what they did in that small training exercise. [Laughter.] I mean, we zeroed in with satellites; we zeroed in with airplanes; we zeroed in with electronics; we zeroed in with human spies—we did everything. Actually, from a pure intelligence professional's point of view—I am not one—it was a very good demonstration of teamwork. We found out what they were doing, They were training in a normal infantry activity—a rifle unit kind of activity. But it was not associated with Cubans.

Somewhere in this process, the word "combat" got attached to that brigade. I contend in my book that it was labeled thus by the NSA, initially. David Newsome is ambiguous in his book. By coincidence, just three days ago—before I came here—I had a letter from a professor who is writing a book about some of these things, and he says there was a conflict between me and Newsome as to whether the NSA put the word "combat" on initially, or whether we—I—put it on after this review, or after the surveillance of this training operation. I read David's book, and you can interpret it that way. You can interpret it in other ways. Bill, do you have an opinion on this?

**ODOM:** No.

**TURNER:** My memory is vague on this. But anyway, the word "combat" was unfortunate,

because it implied that you might be sending it to Nicaragua, or something like that.

**LEGVOLD:** Stan, when was this intensive review of the exercise?

**TURNER:** In August. The exercise was in early August, and as soon as it took place, we analyzed it, and came to the conclusion that this was an independent Soviet unit doing combat-type training in Cuba. We then went to the National Security Council, and said, "Do you mind if we publish this information in one of our fairly widely distributed intelligence publications?" And they said, "Okay." And we did that.

Within a few days there was a call from a magazine called *Aviation Week*, which I think is one of the real sources of Soviet intelligence on our military. [Laughter.] Why you have spies, I do not know, because you do not need them. [Laughter.] *Aviation Week* is pretty accurate. But that meant that it was now going to be brought back into the public domain once again.

At that point, the State Department took over, because the decision was made by David Newsome—who went on to Vance—that they had to notify Stone, and also Church, because Senator Church, although from Idaho—which is very remote from Cuba—was also running for reelection; also voted against the Panama Canal Treaties; was the Chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee; and went out on a limb in 1962 saying that there were not going to be any Soviet missiles in Cuba. He was a very vulnerable individual. There is this controversial decision. Maybe this is why Cy is in the

Far East today, instead of here. [Laughter.] I'm not sure what happened between Cy and Church. I suspect that Cy did not feel he could tell a Senator, "No, you are not allowed to say anything about this." It was going to be in public domain anyway. He left it up to Church's conscience to decide whether he ought to make an issue out of this. And Church did what Cy hoped and thought he would not do—he went public immediately. Not only did he go public immediately, he also immediately demanded that SALT II be held up until this thing was clarified. And then we were in deep kimchee. Anatoly, you know much more about what happened from here than I. It was out of my hands.

There is one more real factor at work here. In the search period, I do not believe that my people in the CIA worked very diligently on this, because of the sense of rivalry they had with the National Security Agency. They did not want to give a lot of credence to this whole thing by playing to up, and so they did not dig into it as hard as I should have made them. It is my fault. It took a long time before we really got to the bottom of the fact that it had all been agreed to back in 1962-63. So, a series of errors on our part got caught up in the domestic political process. Once it got to Church's level, we were over our heads.

**ODOM:** May I add just one point?

**LEGVOLD:** Let me say something now, because we have dealt with that pretty well at this point. We want to get briefer and briefer. We have got a series of people who want to

speak. So, if your point is big—

**ODOM:** Very briefly, I just want to say that I think Stan Turner's explanation here is remarkably candid. I think he is taking more of a blame than he deserves. I think he was the victim of some interagency game plan, and that this thing could have been sorted out by the winter had people beyond his control been willing to cooperate.

**LEGVOLD:** Marshall, I know you wanted to pick up where Stan stopped. But I am going to hold you for a minute. Anatoly was next on the list.

Anatoly, the only thing I would say is that in the history of these two conferences your feeling about the "Goddamn Horn" has become well-known. I do not think that I am betraying your confidence if I say that when Cy Vance knew we were going to talk about the issue of the Soviet brigade, his basic attitude was: we screwed up, what is there to talk about?

**DOBRYNIN:** This was really what I was prepared to say. My impression—and our embassy's impression—was that this was not the creation of the administration, but that the administration simply handled a domestic political issue badly, leading to a needless mini-crisis. That was my impression. By the way, we tried to help you as you licked your wounds: we tried to help you by issuing that final communiqué covering the issue.

**LEGVOLD:** But, Anatoly, did senior officials in Moscow come to understand what you came to understand?

**DOBRYNIN:** They had my explanation; whether they accepted it or not, I do not know. But that was my explanation.

**LEGVOLD:** But did you have some sense of whether they accepted it or not?

**DOBRYNIN:** Yes, I think so; because ultimately we accepted a compromise which was really trying to help President Carter find a way out of this. He coordinated his statement with us through Cy. I met with Cy six or seven times just on that communiqué. It was not our communiqué; it was President Carter's statement to the American public. We agreed with it, and provided some help, but in an off-the-record kind of way.

In the middle of this crisis, Senator [Robert] Byrd, the Senate majority leader—whom I knew quite well—invited me to come to the Senate, to have an official talk. He said, "Please, Anatoly; you know things quite well. Tell your story about this from 1962." So, with all documents, I presented the case, and when I finished it, he said, "Well, I will have to check with our intelligence." And then later on, as Cy told me, he went to the president, and he said, "I heard the story from the Soviet Ambassador. I have checked with our intelligence, and I have come to the conclusion that you created the mess. The administration created the mess. And unless you finish it, Senate ratification of the SALT

treaty is dead in the water." This is in Cy's book.

**LEGVOLD:** Thank you, Anatoly. Jim, do you have a brief reference to the documents?

**HERSHBERG:** Yes, directly on the point of whether the Soviet leadership and Brezhnev personally blamed Carter and the Carter administration for the Cuban brigade. There are a couple of relevant passages in the documents passed around the table this morning: in Brezhnev's response to Carter's hotline message of September 25—the response sent on September 27; and in Brezhnev's conversation with Erich Honecker in East Berlin on October 4. The phrase used in the hotline response is, "We are extremely surprised by the openly hostile campaign against the Soviet Union, which has been launched in the U.S.A. with the active participation of the administration, for which the United States has absolutely no reason and no legal basis." And then, a week later, in his meeting with Honecker, Brezhnev says, "It is our impression that until recently those who supported the ratification of this treaty, SALT II, had the upper hand. Now the situation has become more complicated. The historical clamor in the United States, in which the Carter administration directly participated, over the stationing of the Soviet brigade in Cuba has become a serious impediment. We, as well as the Cubans, have taken a firm position against the American blackmail."

So, it is clear—although there is some ambiguity as to whether they blamed Carter personally—that they certainly that elements within the administration were

orchestrating—or at least participating in—the campaign.

In this respect, I think, it is useful to compare what Brezhnev told Honecker on October 4, 1979 with what Brezhnev told Honecker on July 28, 1979, a month after Vienna, and a month before the brigade crisis. In the very first paragraph of Brezhnev's comments to Honecker—unfortunately, this was omitted from the briefing book, owing to space constraints—Brezhnev told Honecker, "At the meeting in Vienna we reestablished direct dialogue between the USSR and the U.S. at the highest level. Even more, we managed to give a positive impulse to the entire complex of Soviet-American relations."

This is all, of course, very important. And the question this raises is: why were the Americans were clearly disappointed by Vienna, and almost immediately disillusioned that it had not led to much, while the Soviets were pleased with it? Had they achieved their objectives, and were therefore all the more taken aback when the brigade crisis arose?

**LEGVOLD:** There are still two people who wanted to speak on the Soviet brigade issue. I would urge you to be as brief as you can in order to include what you think is absolutely essential for the record. Relatively little needs to be said in order to drive this conversation forward. Bob, you are first, and Marshall, you are second.

**PASTOR:** First—on a personal note—I interrupted my honeymoon to come back to a meeting with Bill Odom and Zbig, where they explained to me that a new unit had been discovered in Cuba. My first reaction was that this really did not justify an interruption of



my honeymoon. [Laughter.] Since I had been working for the previous year on the Non-Aligned Movement, my second reaction was that this brigade would prove a far larger embarrassment to Castro, who was hosting the summit of the Non-Aligned Movement at that very moment, than it would prove to be a threat to the United States. I speculated that Castro would undoubtedly think that this had all been planned—that this was a part of our strategy to disrupt the Non-Aligned Movement—when, in fact, we had never even thought of it, and if *he* thought about that for one moment longer, he would recognize that the brigade would prove to be a far greater embarrassment to the United States than it would to him. But, of course, he did not realize that.

I am glad to read in the documents of Raúl Castro's confirmation that his initial reaction was that this was a provocation on our part. As Stan and Bill Odom pointed out, it was certainly not deliberate.

There are three threads that need to be understood to put this event in its proper context. The first is the expansion of Soviet-Cuban collaboration—beginning in Africa; developing through the new Soviet-Cuban military agreement on new weapon systems in Cuba; moving to the Horn; and, in 1979, Grenada and Nicaragua, increasing our concern about Cuban-Soviet activities in Latin America.

Second, after the signing of SALT, many felt that the only way this would get ratified is if Carter was able to show that he was not giving in to the Soviet Union—that he could be tough in dealing with them. In that light, the key response to Richard Stone's concern raised in a hearing was a letter Cyrus Vance sent him which was reminiscent of the missile crisis: Vance, relying on existing intelligence at that time, said on July 27 that there was no

evidence of any substantial increase in the Soviet military presence in Cuba over the past several years, or of the presence of a Soviet military "base" at that time. The fact that that was on the record caused the administration particular embarrassment when the information on the brigade was publicized by Church on September 1.

The third crucial thread, was the increasing controversy between Secretary Vance and Zbig Brzezinski—a controversy based on several different factors. One was that Vance had just previously indicated that he did not intend to stay on as Secretary of State in the second term—something that was still thought probable. That had the predicted reaction within the administration.

**DOBRYNIN:** There was an impression among the diplomatic core that Zbig was not satisfied with the outcome of that mini-crisis, and that he took a certain kind of stand within the administration.

**PASTOR:** No one was satisfied with the outcome of this crisis. But the critical thing about the debate is that there were two dimensions. First, there was a dispute on how to respond to what was perceived within the United States and in the administration as an increase of Soviet-Cuban military collaboration, with consequences in Latin America as well as globally. There was a feeling that the response up until then had been inadequate. The second question was, how do we win SALT?

Both Zbig and Vance wanted very much to win ratification of SALT, but they had two

diametrically opposed strategies for achieving that. Vance felt that the best way to win SALT would be to play down this brigade issue as best you could—to put it back on the side, and go forward. Zbig felt that the only way that you could get SALT ratified was to prove that we recognized this increasing threat of Soviet-Cuban military collaboration, and to demonstrate that SALT was one element of a larger strategy of responding to this threat.

They wrestled with these two issues over the following months. Secretary Vance's statement that the status quo was unacceptable also seemed to confirm Church's initial statement that immediate withdrawal of the brigade would be essential to get SALT ratified. In fact, at that moment in time, I think neither Brzezinski nor Vance expected the brigade to leave.

I think one last point is very important, because it relates to the lessons of this conference. The one crucial fact that was not clearly understood in August, as Stan correctly pointed out, was the idea that the brigade was an autonomous unit. We always knew that the Soviets had been training and advising the Cubans on military equipment and other things. What we did not know at that moment in time was that there would be an autonomous motorized unit in Cuba. We did not have an answer to the question of what an autonomous brigade was doing in Cuba; and when Secretary Vance approached you, Ambassador Dobrynin, asking you to explain why the Soviet brigade was there, he was not just following his instructions: he was literally seeking an answer to a question that genuinely puzzled our government. And the fact that you came back to him and said, "You are wrong, there is no brigade; it is just a training center" increased suspicion on the U.S. side that the Soviets were not leveling with us, because our information indicated that

they were not training the Cubans at all. In this atmosphere of tremendous tension—which admittedly arose out of a domestic political problem of our own making—that lack of candor contributed to the feeling that the Soviet Union was not levelling with us, and it made it even more difficult to resolve the problem.

Ambassador Dobrynin also mentioned his conversation with Senator Byrd. In the end, Senator Byrd's advice to the president was crucial. It was in late September that Senator Byrd went to the president and said to him, "SALT is still our number one priority. The best way to win it in the Senate is to downplay this." And in the end, I think, that proved to be decisive.

**LEGVOLD:** I think we want to end with this now, because, even though it is very important for the historical record to get all of this out—and this has been an important contribution—I think our Russian colleagues have probably heard more about the brigade issue than they need to at this point. Since Marshall appeared to disagree with something that Bob has just said, so I want to make sure that that disagreement is registered, so I will turn to him briefly in a moment. But I want to note what I regard as the important point of Bob's contribution: we can smile and laugh at the folly of this at a distance, but it happened for a reason. It was not just an accident. It did not just come out of thin air. It really was symptomatic of what was going on in the relationship, and it needs to be understood in a broader context. By the same token, the significance of the Horn on U.S.-Soviet relations cannot be judged on the merits of the local dispute, but only with reference to the broader context in which the dispute took place. I do not want to lose

sight of that, notwithstanding the silliness of what happened in this case. Marshall?

**SHULMAN:** I have too much to say.

**LEGVOLD:** Will you write a memo for the record, so it will be a part of this project? If there is a short version of it, feel free to give it now; otherwise, we want to go on now, because we have not really talked about anything other than the Soviet brigade in Cuba. It would be useful to go back to Jim's question about how the two sides saw this last phase coming out of the Vienna summit. Cy had a somewhat upbeat view on SALT; I would guess that at that point there were differences within the NSC on where things were going. None of that has yet been aired.

Marshall, I give you the floor.

**SHULMAN:** Well, I am torn, because I feel bottled up on this issue. I was deeply involved in it. I will try to make just a few points, if I may, Bob.

First of all, in response to Anatoly, the Nonaligned Movement was not a factor. This had nothing to do with Castro and the Nonaligned Movement at the time. Second, as everyone has said, this was primarily a domestic issue. It is important to bear in mind that this had a prehistory going goes back to the problem between Jack Kennedy and Senator [Kenneth] Keating at the time of the Cuban missile crisis, when Keating then was receiving intelligence from Cuban émigrés upon which he based his challenge to Kennedy about the

location of the missiles. Similarly, it was replayed with Senator Stone on this issue. He was also receiving information from Cuban émigrés, who were largely misleading him about this unit. It was true, as Stan has said, that we collected a lot of information, including signal intelligence, but that a lot of it remained unevaluated.

When this story broke in the *National Intelligence Daily*, I think in August, I called up one of Stan's aides—who was a friend of mine—on the green phone, and I said, "What the hell is this?" And he said to me, "Don't worry; this is just a CYA item." Now, for those of you who may not know the jargon, "CYA" meant "cover your ass." [Laughter.] The idea was to protect ourselves largely because of that prehistory, and to get something on the record about it.

The other complication to bear in mind is that this came during the Labor Day holiday. The pressure to notify the Congress was complicated by the fact that they were all dispersed. Now, the problem with Church was that he was the Chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee, so he had to be among those briefed. Not only was he running a very tough race back in Idaho, but he also had a prehistory, in that on his previous visit to Havana, he had embraced Castro, and had planted a big juicy kiss on his lips. [Laughter.] The photographers had it, and his opponents in Idaho were using it. So, he reacted very strongly to try to disassociate himself. Cy called him when he got word that Church was planning to make a public statement about it, and pleaded with him. He did not just mildly remonstrate, but he said, "Do not do it." But he did it anyway. And when that broke, it was complicated by the fact that Cy had used an unfortunate term in his public appearance on the issue. He said, "We will make the situation acceptable."

What making it acceptable meant, God only knew.

**LEGVOLD:** He said in advance of that that it was unacceptable?

**SHULMAN:** Yes, and that we had to make it acceptable somehow.

Now, what does “making it acceptable” mean? Here I want to pay tribute to Anatoly, because at that time both of his parents were in the hospital, and Anatoly was in Moscow. It was a very tough time for him. But Cy felt we needed him. I remember Anatoly coming into the office. When Cy explained to him what had happened, and why, Anatoly sat there with his head in his hands, and said, “They are never going to believe me in Moscow. They simply will not believe me.” I think one of the elements in Moscow’s reaction was that there was an inclination to believe that this was a deliberate effort to derail SALT. It was not, but it looked as though it might be. We were looking for a way to get the issue out of the way, and it was planned that the president was going to make a speech on October 1. Cy first appealed to Anatoly, “Can’t you get them to move some ships around—to move some troops a little bit—so that we could say that it was now acceptable?” And Anatoly said, “You know, after the Cuban missile crisis, there is no way. We are not going to do that sort of thing; it would be too humiliating.” But what he did do—and this is the important thing—is that he managed to get a letter from Brezhnev which was ambiguously enough worded that the president could use it in his October 1 speech. We had to go back and forth several times to try to strengthen the letter a little bit.

What Brezhnev essentially did was to say that the Soviets had not reinforced their forces in Cuba, and that they would not use them outside of Cuba. He let that stand as a personal commitment. I think Anatoly may have suggested some wording to that effect. Carter chose to treat that message as ending the episode.

This question of the combat brigade was sort of a comedy of errors, because when we finally went back and reevaluated the information we had—the signals intelligence, and all the other stuff—the conclusion of the analysts was that it did not appear to be a training brigade, since it was operating in Russian. Nor did it appear to be a medical brigade. So all that was left was a combat brigade. Simply by process of elimination, it was identified as a combat brigade.

There was no ulterior motive here. The United States was not using the issue to embarrass Castro in the Nonaligned Movement. It largely was an effort to fend off anticipated pressures from within the United States.

**LEGVOLD:** Thank you, Marshall.

Before we turn to a more general discussion, I would like us to address the question of the condition of the relationship after the Vienna summit. How did the two sides judge the relationship after the Vienna summit? Bill, we know how Marshall saw things. I would not be surprised if you had a different view.

**ODOM:** You will not be surprised. I find myself in agreement with Karen Brutents, who



brought up the point early in our discussions about an inherent objective paradox in détente. What I hear Marshall saying is that somehow these deep ideological divisions, and the inexorable aims on both sides—which were incompatible—would not have prevented some sort of cooperative outcome which satisfied both sides. I would not argue that we should have behaved terribly differently had we made the assessment correctly, but I think the big mistake we made was to overestimate Soviet power. We saw the continuing steady growth of Soviet military power and Soviet confidence about using the projection of power into the Horn and other places, and then somewhat belatedly following Cuba's successes in Nicaragua and elsewhere in Central America. That created the impression that the Soviet Union was continuing to increase its power. A more careful examination of the objective internal realities in the Soviet Union, I think—as Karen Brutents said yesterday—would have led us to the conclusion that it was peaking and beginning to stagnate, with longer-term disastrous prospects for them.

But I also get the impression from the discussion here that the Soviets were right when they said there was an ideological struggle. I felt that way at the time. There really was a struggle between two ideological camps. The ideologies on both sides framed this struggle in a way that even extremely competent and effective diplomacy could not overcome or make go away. I have forgotten who it is recently that has written about the hegemony of an idea—how ideas take hold; how they constrain the way people coordinate their activities; how they affect the way people see the world in a period of time; and how they affect the way people see particular issues. But there is great truth in that. It seems to me what we have talked about over the course of these two meetings,

and what we will conclude with in Norway, is a continuation of this struggle of a hegemony of ideas.

Now, what I hear from my Soviet counterparts—Russian counterparts now—is that some of them, like Marshall, thought that we could work out some practical arrangements, and eventually maybe something would happen to make these incompatibilities dissolve or go away. I think the term “soft-landing” has been used in this regard. There may be something to that; I am not prepared to dismiss that. I am prepared to entertain that argument, and follow it to its analytical conclusion. But General Gribkov’s fascinating observations about Ogarkov making as strong an argument as he could to Ustinov about the folly of going into Afghanistan, and being rebuffed, impressed me, and suggested that the Soviet leaders’ state of mind was not really amenable to this. I do not think that the Politburo at this stage had the view that there was any coming together, or meeting of minds, that would cause some of these political incompatibilities to go away. So, I would say that, objectively—in the longer run—this might have happened later; but simply tinkering with the details of the relationship probably would not have caused major change in the way things came out.

**LEGVOLD:** I will allow you one minute, Marshall.

**SHULMAN:** This is a crucial point. I would define the difference in views a little bit differently, Bill. It was not the question of whether or not there were deep ideological

divisions. There were. The question, as I saw it—and as I continue to see it—is whether despite the ideological differences it nevertheless was possible to find areas of overlapping interest. In particular, it seemed to me, the effort to stabilize the military competition did represent such an area, and where it was both possible and necessary to try for some understanding between the two sides in spite of their ideological differences.

**LEGVOLD:** Oleg and then Anatoly. Oh, I am sorry, I am going to reverse that because I have a long-standing promise to Georgy. So it will be Georgy first, and then Oleg. Georgy?

**SHAKHNAZAROV:** I would like to share with you my opinion on the entire complex of questions that we have discussed here, since we have come to the question of conclusions and generalizations. I agree with our military men played star roles in our conference. They made very interesting contributions, and I would like to congratulate them.

In 1977-1979 there was an attempt from both sides to move U.S.-Soviet relationship onto a new track, and to begin genuine disarmament. That attempt ended in failure. I think that it could not have been otherwise. That effort was inherently doomed to failure. Neither the Horn of Africa, nor Cuba, nor Afghanistan, nor Poland played a decisive role. The atmosphere of animosity was decisive—the atmosphere that existed between the two most prominent centers of power—we can all them superpowers; or blocs, in a more general sense; or ideologies in an even broader sense. That was the fact,

and there was no other way to go.

Of course, Marshall is right when he said that in that bipolar system there could be marginal improvements or deteriorations. Sometimes it rains, sometimes the sun shines, as a poet might say. But in the final analysis, a radical turn was impossible. For it to become possible, one of the partners had to abandon their superpower ambitions. Then a totally new atmosphere might have emerged, as it has now. Now you forgive Russia anything: the shelling of the Parliament; the bloodshed in Chechnya—things that earlier would have resulted in a campaign that would have shaken the world. Now America just swallows it—as we, in Russia, pretend not to notice things that we consider to be sins of American foreign policy. One of those things is, as has been correctly pointed out here, the rigid Cuban policy. Why does it continue now? It is simply incomprehensible. There are no grounds for such a policy any more. This is how we relate to each other now. What we have is a total forgiveness of everything—there is nothing you cannot forgive a partner or a friend. When Bill and Boris are friends, they forgive each other everything.

But this is not idyllic, really. There is still the nuclear factor. Russia remains a superpower in this respect. I have to tell you that I had a discussion about it with Kissinger in London. And he said that Russia had ceased to be a superpower. I agreed with him as far as its economy is concerned. But it remains the fact that only two countries in the world are so similar in many parameters: only Russia and the United States can destroy the world with their nuclear weapons. This fact makes them exceptional, and this same fact puts a limit on the development of Russian-American relations. I feel that it is precisely this cautious attitude towards Russian military potential that continues to deter America

from many things. For example, we still have the Jackson-Vanik amendment, and the persistence of NATO, which we discussed yesterday evening. Still, Russia is in some sort of isolation. a few demonstrative gestures do not change the essence of it. The main fear of Russia is that even if the U.S. and the West in general do not take any active steps, they would most probably still encourage the disintegration of Russia. And the West would certainly resist any re-integrationist processes in the post-Soviet era.

Bearing all this in mind, I want to say that we have accomplished a very interesting thing here, but that we need to continue it. I have already talked to some of the participants of this meeting. It so happened that the study of the Caribbean crisis by scholars at Harvard, Brown, Columbia, and Princeton Universities—and also by some Soviet and Russian scholars—finally ended as meetings of representatives of the Kennedy and Khrushchev administrations, to discuss the issues of the Caribbean crisis. The next topic is this: the study of the deterioration of Soviet-American relations came to a meeting of the representatives of the Carter and Brezhnev administration. This is an example where the form has come to be more important than the substance. Therefore, I believe that now, when the representatives of the Reagan, Bush and Gorbachev administrations are still living, it would be very nice if we could jointly organize a scholarly project dealing with such questions as the end of the Cold War, the movement toward genuine disarmament, and maybe some other issues. From my personal point of view, and as a Director of the Global Programs of the Gorbachev Foundation, I can tell you that we will be ready to take part in such a project, and even to organize one of the conferences in Moscow. Knowing Mikhail Sergeevich very well—his goals and wishes—I have no

doubts that he will support such a project. And I think that it would be very useful if the representatives of two administrations—and the scholars, of course—could meet. In Moscow such a meeting could be opened by Gorbachev—and in America, by Bush—and then the presidents would leave, not to interfere with the openness of discussion—much as we have here. So, if there are no objections, I invite you to discuss this proposition, and then later we could move to its implementation, maybe after the conference in Norway. Thank you.

**LEGVOLD:** Thank you very much Georgy, for everything, including the invitations. Before I let you go on this score, may I ask you a question that is in the minds of a couple of us? If we do not misunderstand your views, by the mid-1980s—that is, in the Gorbachev period—were you prepared to argue that if we were really going to deal with the nuclear danger, the Soviet Union would have to rethink the place the issue of the class struggle occupied in the Soviet approach to international politics? This is two questions, really: Did you come to that conclusion by the 1970s, and if you had, was there any chance within the bureaucracy that you could have made the argument?

**SHAKHNAZAROV:** I think that within the framework of the system that existed then—in the context of military parity, with each country, or each bloc, responsible for its own sphere—the two countries could have found ways to get together to discuss and solve some of their problems. But there could be no genuine disarmament in such a system.

Only an accumulation of weapons within the principle of parity was possible. Such a situation was inevitably leading us to a catastrophe. Therefore, there could be only one solution to this, from the point of view of political theory: the contradiction had to be removed by the elimination of one of the two sides. Not a physical liquidation, of course, but a destruction of its ability to carry such a burden. I am not speaking now in terms of good and bad—whether socialism or capitalism is better; whether communist ideology or some other ideology is better; which country is greater than the other—but the fact remains that the Soviet Union was in a situation where it had to compete with practically the entire outside world, and with the most developed part of the world—with the part of the world which turned out 80% of all new inventions and discoveries, and which had far more potential. We simply had our back broken as a result. And that was, as people here pointed out correctly, inevitable. This is not a defeat of the socialist ideology, as some tend to believe; the ideology will yet emerge many times and in various forms. It was our state's inability to compete with a significantly superior power.

Now, about Gorbachev: Gorbachev did not want to remove that conflict by immediately abandoning some or most of the global goals. He had another design. His design was that of democratizing the country—renewing the country, introducing a more modernized and a more effective economy. He wanted the country to enter the international arena and cooperate with the United States and other countries. But it turned out that we were not able to implement that design. I think it simply was impossible to implement it, because, as O. Henry said in one of his novels, “Bolívar will not be strong enough for two.” The world would not have been able to exist under the two-ruler

arrangement much longer.

But similarly, it will not be able to sustain a one-ruler system, either. I think that the United States will not be able to carry the burden that it assumed for a long time. It would probably prefer to distribute it among several other countries, which, in my view, would be a perfect solution for many international problems.

I apologize for answering your question a bit abstractly, but I just wanted to express my views on that.

**LEGVOLD:** It is now 11:06. At about 11:20 I am going to turn to the scholars to see what questions they think have not been answered. If they have questions, we are going to break at 11:30. Between then and now I've got three people on the list. Karen, I know you want to comment on this question, but I think that all three of you want to talk about the same thing. I know that Oleg does. So, Karen, I am going to begin with Oleg, and then I will come to you. Oleg?

**TROYANOVSKY:** I do not want to go back into the ideological question, which was touched upon by the previous speaker, because it will open up a new round of discussion. We would need another conference for that, I think. I just want to say that since this is sort of a summing up we are having now, I cannot agree with Georgy's statement that no improvement of Soviet-American relations was possible in that period.



**LEGVOLD:** To be fair to him, Oleg—so that we do not go off on a tangent—I do not think that is precisely his argument. He and Bill argued not that there was *no* chance for improvement, but that there could only have been improvement at the margins. The essentials could not have been changed. That is their basic argument, I think.

**TROYANOVSKY:** Yes, but what are the essentials?

**LEGVOLD:** This is worth talking about. What are the essentials?

**TROYANOVSKY:** After all, during the Nixon period—during the détente years—we managed to have a pretty comfortable relationship despite our differences, didn't we? That was not the case during the Carter years. Why was that? There are various reasons, I think. There were many misunderstandings; there was the issue of American internal politics sometimes; there was a lack of understanding by our leadership of the situation within the United States; there was an overreaction—sometimes on both sides—to various issues that came up. For instance, just to mention Africa, I recall a conversation with Andy Young, who was very outspoken, as you know. He said, "I do not understand these people in Washington. They so overreact to all these African issues. To me," he said, "it is obvious that as long as they are fighting for independence, they will turn to the Soviet Union for arms and assistance. Once they win their independence, they will inevitably have to turn to the United States for economic assistance. So what is needed is a little

more patience." So there were a number of various reasons which prevented an improvement of relations, which, I think, basically, both sides desired. That is one thing.

Another thing I quite agree with is that it would be a good thing to have a conference—whether in the United States or in Moscow—about the ending of the Cold War, and why at that time it became possible to put an end to the conflicts.

Third, I think we should all express our appreciation to the organizers of this conference. I am sure Bob will do it more eloquently than I will, but I think they really deserve it. Thank you.

**LEGVOLD:** Oleg, thank you very much. Karen?

**BRUTENTS:** Like Oleg, I do not want to pull you into an extended discussion stimulated by Georgy's statement. I just wanted to remind you of something that I have already mentioned before—about the deep contradictions that were inherent in détente from the very beginning. But I do not have such a fatalistic view as my colleague has just expressed: just the opposite. Of course, those contradictions aggravated the problems of détente, and they complicated the efforts to establish not only good but cooperative relationship between the United States and the Soviet Union. And they created serious causes for the future destruction of détente, as it had happened. But there was another side too: politics and politicians, who had to deal with those objective contradictions. Of course, we were not talking about changing the essence—the fundamental nature—of the

relationship. Here Georgy is right, and Bob mentioned that, too. But that is a different subject. We were talking about détente. And here I cannot agree with the statement that the need to accumulate weapons was fatally inherent in it. We made some attempts to conclude agreements to reverse the trend. So, even though the antagonistic nature of the relationship remained with us, it was not fatally predetermined that we had to arm ourselves to the end. Both systems had a sufficient sense of self-preservation, as the record shows.

One last thing: If we conclude now that the whole thing was doomed from the beginning, we would need to conclude that all our work here—as well as the work of any scholar—is useless. But that is exactly the point. This is the most interesting part of our work, of our approach, of our thoughts here at this conference—and probably of the future conferences: to ask, “What did the politicians *not* do? What opportunities did they *not* take advantage of? What mistakes did they make? Why did they *not* take each other’s psychology into account? Why did they *not* work on their diplomatic tactics well enough?” This are our questions. They do not diminish the fact that there were serious inherent contradictions in détente itself, which finally led to its destruction.

Since we have begun to make concluding statements, I would also like to thank the organizers for the invitation to this conference. It was very interesting for me; I got a lot out of it. This is the first time I have found myself in this milieu. I learned many interesting things. I would also like to thank you for the hospitality. I can say confidently that you deserve the thanks even more than in the beginning. Thank you, organizers. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Our Chairman led the meeting very confidently, but at the same time he

was very caring toward all of the speakers. Thank you for your attention.

**LEGVOLD:** Thank you, Karen. Anyone from this side of the table? It is not too soon for a wrap-up statement, if you want to make a wrap-up statement now.

**GRIBKOV:** May I say a couple of words?

**LEGVOLD:** Go ahead, please.

**GRIBKOV:** I also want to thank you for inviting me to this conference. I think I profited very much from this. I learned many new things that I did not know before, and I met many American scholars, diplomats, and military people. And thank you, Mr. Chairman, for leading our discussions so firmly.

**LEGVOLD:** Thank you very much, Anatoly. Marshall?

**SHULMAN:** I am struck by a thought, just at the very end here, stimulated by the exchange that Bill Odom and I had on an issue that I hope we can continue to work at: namely, how to define the differences in fundamental perceptions—and on the political agenda—on the American side. I am not sure that we have succeeded in defining the differences quite right yet. I hope that Bill and I can work at it privately. But it seems to me essential, in a

way, for whatever contribution this project may make, to define what the alternatives were on the American side—the assumptions each side made, their perceptions of the Soviets, and their conception of the agenda for managing a clearly competitive relationship. I think that that has not been sufficiently defined yet. I hope we can continue to work at it.

**LEGVOLD:** Thank you, Marshall.

Now, I would like to turn to the scholars and have them speak about the important questions that they feel haven't yet been answered. We do not need a full inventory of thousands of specific questions; but what are some of the more important? Phil Brenner.

**BRENNER:** Very briefly, let me point to two questions. Jim Hershberg raised a few days ago the question about the fact that the Soviets perceived two voices on the American side. Were there two voices on the Soviet side? We still don't know not enough about that.

**LEGVOLD:** At this point, do not ask questions as if you are going to get answers.

[Laughter.]

**BRENNER:** No, I do not expect an answer now. But that is an important unanswered questions. We still need information about the processes inside the Soviet decision making apparatus, and we need to have a better sense from the Americans about how they

perceived those processes.

a second question is concerned with something that Zbigniew Brzezinski wrote about: very critical remarks of Marshall Shulman. This is related to the Wake Forest speech. In the Wake Forest speech, Brzezinski thought he was conveying a message that we were getting very tough with the Soviet Union. And then Marshall, apparently, gave a statement that Brzezinski claims was unauthorized saying that this speech was really intended for internal American consumption, not to send a signal to the Soviet Union. Brzezinski was very angry at this, because he said it undermined the credibility of the United States. This notion of credibility existed throughout the Cold War. Much of what the United States tried to do was to enhance our so-called credibility. There was a strategic reason for this: credibility is very important for deterrence. But this word got used in other contexts. One of the things we do not know is how you understood this idea of credibility. What, really, did American credibility mean with respect to our relationship with the Soviet Union?

**LEGVOLD:** Arne?

**WESTAD:** I am fascinated by the interaction between the two great powers—who have been mainly represented here—and smaller powers. For me, one of the highlights of the discussions came on the first day when we talked about the Cuban-Soviet relationship. Some of the new materials and new analyses on that issue are truly fascinating. Now, in

preparation for the Oslo conference, the kinds of issues that I would like both sides to reflect on are connected to the role of smaller countries within the rivalry between the United States and the Soviet Union. The larger Gulf region, including Afghanistan and Pakistan, is certainly a very interesting case in point.

On more concrete, specific questions, I think that if we could learn more about how the Soviets perceived that region, we would learn a lot more about the background of the intervention of Afghanistan. The documents that we have here do not give us an adequate handle on this. I am hoping that we will be able to prepare a fairly substantial set of documents for the Oslo conference; but some reflection on these issues would be important as well.

I would put the same question to the American side. Did the events in Afghanistan during the last part of 1979 fit into a larger regional pattern? Does this help explain the president's reaction, and the reactions of other individuals in the administration, to what they saw happening?

These are all questions for you to think about in preparation for the Oslo conference in September.

**LEGVOLD:** Jim Hershberg is next.

**HERSHBERG:** I know that Bob fears I have a thousand specific questions to introduce now.

**LEGVOLD:** No; I *know* you have a thousand of them. But not now.

**HERSHBERG:** Let me just raise one question for Oslo; one question about sources to pursue in the future; and then one very tiny concrete specific question that maybe our Russian friends—and, in particular, Ambassador Dobrynin—might be able to say a word or two about right now.

For Oslo: I think the material that Marshall mentioned—the Politburo minutes from the spring of 1979 about Afghanistan—raise an entirely new question that we should address, because they show that the question of the Western reaction—the effect on détente and U.S.-Soviet relations—was central to the Soviet decision not to send troops in the spring of 1979. By implication, this should have been an important factor in the decision to send troops in the fall of 1979. Clearly, something had changed; a decision was made that there was not enough to lose. The price was not high enough. Gromyko could not make the same arguments in November and December 1979 that he made in March and April 1979. We need to find out what was the final straw. At what point did the Soviets say, “Saving détente is not worth the price of losing Afghanistan”? think that is an important area of analysis for Oslo.

As far as sources are concerned, the documents reveal a fascinating contradiction—or apparent contradiction—in the Soviet-Cuban reaction to the brigade crisis, because the document describing Castro’s meeting with Honecker in May 1980 confirms something that Ray Garthoff learned from Fidel: namely, that the Cubans were forced to call the



brigade a "training center" by the Soviets in order to give Carter a way out. And yet, there is another document from the Soviet Ambassador's meeting with Raúl Castro on September 1, in which he says that Fidel and Raúl have approved the idea of calling this a "training center" on the basis of their past experience with crises with Americans. Fidel mentions to Honecker that he had had an exchange of letters with the Soviets about this; that he felt that it should be called a brigade; but that after explaining all of this to the Soviet Union, it was decided to call it a study center, because the Soviets did not want to heat up the international situation. This points up the importance of getting original Cuban sources. Otherwise, we can only interpret the Cuban position through Soviet documents, East German documents, and American documents. As Arne says, the importance of these regional actors as autonomous actors is critical, and so we need to try to get those sources.

Finally, a very small concrete question for Ambassador Dobrynin, and possibly others. In *Détente and Confrontation*, Ray Garthoff raised the theory that the publication of Henry Kissinger's memoirs in October 1979—just on the heels of the brigade crisis—came as a shock to Brezhnev and the other leaders, because it revealed Kissinger's private strategies in the heyday of détente. The Soviets were shocked to learn, as Garthoff put it, that Kissinger—and Nixon too—had been deceitful in their protestations in the pursuit of peace and détente. Garthoff suggests that this may have influenced Soviet perceptions, and undermined their trust in the relationship. I would be very interested to hear from Anatoly how he felt reading Kissinger's memoirs. Did they have an effect on the Soviet perceptions of the United States?

**DOBRYNIN:** You mean on mine, or on Brezhnev's?

**HERSHBERG:** Both.

**LEGVOLD:** You probably had similar reactions.

**DOBRYNIN:** Well, first of all, I can say that I am sure that Brezhnev did not read it.

**HERSHBERG:** Not even in translation?

**DOBRYNIN:** He may have heard that there was a memoir; but I am sure he did not read it. So it had no devastating effects on our foreign policy, or on our government. There was no revolt; there were no changes in the policy. Of course, those who did not know Henry well might have had some revelations; if you know Henry as well as I do, you will know that there was nothing really surprising. [Laughter.] I can give you one example, not to go out of this room: When he wrote his memoirs, there were several sentences—or descriptions—which, to put it mildly, were more fantasy than reality, particularly dealing with his conversations with Brezhnev. Henry always had it that he was on top, and Brezhnev was lying down. [Laughter.] Sometimes I acted as an interpreter during those conversations. So I told Henry, "Look, come on; I was there. This is not exactly what happened." He replied, "Anatoly, who will know? Brezhnev is dead; Russian

Ambassadors do not write memoirs; and I do." [Laughter.] Well, this was a joke; but it was a typical joke of Henry's. So, I would not exaggerate the importance of his memoir.

Of course, his play around the Middle East was well-known to me at that time. I could tell you a dramatic story about his handling of the situation in 1973. You will remember that Henry went to Moscow, and discussed with Brezhnev and the Politburo how to prevent a further spread of the conflict. Everything went fine. He left, and then within the next few days, I heard in the press, or on the radio, that the United States had raised a military alert against the Soviet Union. Probably you know that at that time we had a direct telephone line; it is now an open secret. I had a telephone, and Henry had a telephone. Only he could pick up at his end, and only I could pick up in my embassy. So I immediately called Henry, and said, "Look here, you were in Moscow. Of course the situation is very dramatic, but there is nothing really in the situation between the Soviet Union and the United States threatening conflict. There is no military threat. What are you talking about? What kind of a military alert are you announcing?" And Henry said, "Anatoly, this is a domestic issue. Tomorrow it will end; but don't tell anyone." And that is the way he handled that situation.

Well, at that time it was helpful. That is not exactly the best way to conduct diplomacy—through a military alert of your armed forces. I should pay tribute to Brezhnev; he took it rather quietly. He did not believe the alert was serious. We knew that you had an alert, but we did not respond, because we could see no reason for it. Sometimes Henry played a rather dangerous game; it is in his character. There were many other instances. So his memoirs are revealing; but I would not exaggerate the importance

of his memoirs, or any one else's memoirs. Memoirs are memoirs.

**TROYANOVSKY:** What about your future memoirs?

**DOBRYNIN:** I do not exaggerate. [Laughter.]

**LEGVOLD:** Thank you, Anatoly.

**DOBRYNIN:** Just to finish, since all of my colleagues have expressed their attitude about the conference: it looks as though you are eager to continue the discussion, we are thankful for your efforts. The organizers did an incredible job. Bob, Jim, and Mark came to Moscow many times to prepare the groundwork and to gather materials; they are very good at finding materials in our archives—much better than we are ourselves. They have done a very good job. I think this conference was interesting for theoreticians—for those who are interested in ideology; for academics; and for practitioners. In the past we have looked too much at these issues from the point of view of history. That is good and useful; but it was good idea to have Tom [Pickering] here now. It gives the discussion a dimension of contemporary relevance. Unfortunately, Yuly Vorontsov could not make it this time—next time, I hope.

What we really have not done quite as well as we could do is come to grips with the lost opportunities. There were many lost opportunities during the Carter years, in

different fields. With skill and understanding, we could have done many things. We did some things, but we could have done much more. I am not as pessimistic as some of my colleagues. If Carter had not insisted on his drastic reductions proposal and had skillfully wrapped up Vladivostok, we could have moved on to accomplish many things. There is a practical lesson in this, and this conference has helped to make that clear to me.

I do not know how to publicize the work of this seminar series for practitioners—for the people in my Foreign Ministry and in your State Department. But that would be a very helpful thing to do. They should know more about it. Unfortunately, this seminar is not very well-known, except, of course, among a rather narrow group of people.

**LEGVOLD:** We are giving very careful thought to exactly the problem you are raising. I think it will be addressed.

**DOBRYNIN:** I think that it should be, because people are sitting here who know a lot, and who could give good advice. Students not only in universities, but also students in diplomacy, should have access to these proceedings. Now in Russia we have new diplomatic personnel. They should understand what was going on.

**KOMOLOV:** Exactly; I agree completely with Ambassador Dobrynin.

**DOBRYNIN:** They, in turn, will have their own opinions. We will learn something from

them, too, no doubt. So I think it would be helpful to make it a less academic process. But apart from that, my personal feeling is that this was a very good idea—this conference especially. I think the process should continue. I can speak for all of my colleagues and tell you that they would be pleased to accept any further invitations, first to Norway, and then maybe to some other exotic place afterwards. [Laughter.]

**LEGVOLD:** Okay, thank you.

**DOBRYNIN:** And I would like to thank Bill and Mark and everyone else for the wonderful job they have done, and for all the assistance they have given to our people, including me.

**TROYANOVSKY:** And the young ladies.

**DOBRYNIN:** Yes, especially. We applaud you. [Applause.] And many thanks for the Horn!

**LEGVOLD:** I do not think I would have ever believed that you would say that. [Laughter.]

**DOBRYNIN:** It is the influence of the seminar.

**BRENNER:** On behalf of the scholars we, of course, thank you. I just want to thank the

former officials. There was an extraordinary degree of candor and willingness to talk to each other here, that that really has helped this record. You deserve a significant round of applause for that. Thank you very, very much. [Applause.]

**LEGVOLD:** Now let us turn to Geir, who is going to talk about Oslo. It will take him a few minutes to do that. And then, after a few closing comments, we will have a buffet lunch at 11:45. People who have 1:30 flights will leave to catch planes at 12:30. Geir?

**LUNDESTAD:** Thank you, Bob. I guess, at this time, we all feel a little tired; but at the same time, I hope, these proceedings whetted the appetite for more. And there will definitely be a conference in Oslo from September 17 to 20th. As far as the topic is concerned, we see this conference focusing primarily on Afghanistan—what led to Afghanistan; the events themselves; and the consequences. In addition to focussing on Afghanistan, we will also try to place Afghanistan in a wider context, and discuss its long-term implications. The over-arching question will be, what role did Afghanistan play in the fall of détente, and what role did all of these other dimensions we have been discussing play? Undoubtedly, we will come back to Marshall's six planes, and there will be others. We have already commissioned papers from a certain number of scholars to stimulate discussion, to make it a little bit more concrete. But this will again be a conference that will focus primarily on the principals and putting their views on record.

We have issued the invitations; many of you have already accepted them. We are

very pleased about that. We will be in contact with those of you who have not yet responded; we will see what we can do to make you come to Oslo and participate in a meaningful way. We are considering the question of President Carter's role in this. I think our conclusion is that we would like President Carter to be brought into this process, but not on the same level as the rest of you, because that could have a certain detrimental effect on the free discussion at the table. I think the most likely scenario—and this is the scenario that we will suggest to President Carter—is that we will have a panel put questions to him at the end of this series of conferences. There are many things on which we would like him to speak for the record. But we want to do it in a dignified way which does not in any way diminish the free discussion at the table. But we will make an effort to bring President Carter into the final conference in Oslo.

We are very optimistic as far as the the briefing book is concerned. Great progress has been made on the American side. I think our impression is that on the Soviet side there has been definite progress between the first and second conferences. But we certainly hope to make additional progress. We do need greater equality of documentation between the two sides. So whatever assistance you can give us, as far as opening up additional records on the Soviet side is concerned, will be much appreciated.

We do have an experienced staff to help you in Oslo. We also have a certain scenic beauty in the Oslo area, and I can definitely promise you one improvement compared to this conference is that we will have a conference room with windows. We will open up to the outside world. So I would like to welcome you to Oslo in September, and we look forward to a successful conference. [Applause.]



**LEGVOLD:** Let me wind up the meeting in the following way. It seems to me that this enterprise—this installment in this enterprise—is about something much larger than a conference, or even discussing interesting historical events with the use of documents. It is something that I say to Jim when his unending optimism and ebullience looks as though it may be wavering in the face of obstacles. We have been through the post-war period of 45-50 years, and it ended in a very dramatic fashion, leading to the modern world that Tom Pickering and his colleagues are struggling with. But dramatic events do much more than merely influence the immediate period that followed. The French revolution did much more than simply influence the following ten years: it shaped the following century. What we have been through in the last ten years, is, I think, roughly equivalent. We are in the process of determining not merely the shape of the 1990s, but of the whole 21st century. It is enormously important that we understand how we got to this point over this 45-year period, and how it ended.

We have a chance to do something that no generation before has done. They had never been able to collect themselves and review that history in order to understand it. But because of the peculiar circumstances, we have a chance to penetrate that history, interpret that history, and come to terms with it. We are going to have documents sooner and in greater quantity than anyone has ever had coming through a period such as this; we have people like you who are capable of coming together and talking about it in a way that has never been done before. And while I do not want to sound like a Lutheran preacher—the church I was raised in—it is not just that we are grateful to you, as Phil said: it is your obligation; you owe it to the people on the outside, and to the the future, to help

sort this out when the opportunity exists.

The last thing I would say—and this is a direct comment that I make to Jim Blight—is that this is the first such project where it has been done. It will not be the last project, as you can hear. There will be projects on the absolutely critical Gorbachev years. There will be projects that will go back to an even earlier period, until we really do understand—or, at least, until we understand better—that critical 50-year period. What has been going on in these meetings—at Pocantico Hills, Musgrove, here, and in Oslo—is something much bigger than just an interesting conference in a useful context. I applaud Jim for having made it happen. If it were not for Jim Blight, this would not be happening. This now becomes a kind of prototype, or a pilot for the entire exercise, from my point of view. I want to thank Jim for what he has done, along with Mark.

Secondly, in terms of the broader project, I want to repeat what I said at the outset, but in the context of the importance of this 45-year period of time. The documents are being collected by a handful of very young people. It is remarkable what Jim Hershberg, Malcolm Byrne, and their colleagues—and Arne on the European side—are accomplishing. Whatever we do—whether we fulfill our obligation or not—I know these people are going to get the documents. These will provide the basis for studying the history. In advance of all the folks who will come after and benefit from their efforts, I thank them for what they are doing.

I want to thank Irina and Andrey for their work in translating. It is an enormously exhausting job, and they have done it well. [Applause.] I also want to thank all the people who have been on the outer edges of this room for your contributions to our

conversations during the lunch hours and the breaks. We could feel your interest as you sit around the edge.

And, of course—like Anatoly—I want to thank Janet, Betty, and the people who worked with them for making this possible. In gratitude to all of you, and looking forward to what comes after, I declare the meeting over. [Stormy applause.]