

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

39c

*total s/s
Peggy
12/10/64*

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

To Jayce!

November 23, 1964

Bromley Smith:

Attached are memoranda of conversation on the meeting with the Mexican President-elect.

I recommend that they be approved.

I suggest State excerpt Part I and send only that part to the other agencies that need to have it.

Part II should be made Limited Distribution. If it should get out to the public it could really hurt Diaz Ordaz.

o/s

RMS

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4

NEJ 95-188

By sig, NARA, Date 10-2-95

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

ARA:TCMann:ps:spd
(Drafting Office and Officer)

Approved in White House
12/10/64

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ - LIMITED DISTRIBUTION

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

15979

6194

396

Memorandum of Conversation

Part II of II

DATE: November 12, 1964
5:00-6:00 p.m.
LBJ Ranch, Texas

SUBJECT: Mexican-Cuban Relations

PARTICIPANTS: President Johnson
President-elect Gustavo DIAZ ORDAZ
Ambassador CARRILLO Flores
Thomas C. Mann *TCM*

COPIES TO: S/S
G
INR/OD
ARA - 5
Amembassy MEXICO CITY
White House - 2

DECLASSIFIED
Authority *State Ltr. 3-22-76*
By *Heu* NARS, Date *4-30-76*

While in the automobile, the President asked Lic. Diaz Ordaz what the Mexican people thought about Castro.

The Licenciado said that there was a small group in Mexico who loathed Castro and, at the other extreme, another small group who thought he had the cleanest political banner in the hemisphere. The great majority of people were in between and there were many variations in the way they thought.

He said that Castro had no appeal for the great majority of Mexicans and did not constitute a political threat in Mexico. The majority of the Mexican people did not like the idea of intervening in Cuba's internal affairs, particularly since historically Cuba had been a refuge for Mexican politicians in exile and, conversely, Mexico had been a haven for Cuban politicians who had fallen on evil days. Mexico's hope was that the Cuban people themselves would find a way to return Cuba to the democratic path and even harbored the idea that at some propitious time in the future -- Mexico knew that this was not the time -- Mexicans might be able to be the bridge over which Cuba could come back to freedom. Meanwhile, Mexicans were disenchanted with the undemocratic procedures and the excesses in Cuba.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

- 2 -

The President asked what Licenciado Diaz Ordaz thought about the resolutions adopted at the Foreign Ministers Meeting concerning the isolation of Cuba. The Licenciado replied that he had not had an opportunity to study in depth the validity of Mexico's juridical position but in essence it was that the decision of the majority seemed to have been directed against a minority of four and was not binding on Mexico unless and until approved by the Security Council of the United Nations.

The President inquired whether this juridical position would not basically weaken the validity and effectiveness of the Rio Treaty -- whether it did not nullify the treaty and impair the ability of the American States to protect themselves against aggression in the future.

Licenciado Diaz Ordaz stated that he personally shared the President's preoccupation. He noted that the Security Council could hardly pass favorably on a resolution of this kind in view of the Soviet veto. At this point, Ambassador Carrillo Flores asked his President whether it was not true that the essence of the Mexican position was that the facts in the Venezuelan case did not support Venezuela's assertion that an act of "aggression" within the meaning of the Rio Treaty had taken place. The Ambassador suggested that there was a difference between the facts proven during the missile crisis of October 1962 and the facts alleged in the Venezuelan case.

Licenciado Diaz Ordaz said that there were many cases where aggression had been falsely charged. He said that, for example, Guatemala had in the past fabricated stories about alleged Mexican aggressions against Guatemala. He implied that Cuban complicity in the plot to overthrow the Venezuelan government had not been proven to Mexico's satisfaction. Taking then Ambassador Carrillo's suggestion, he said that he thought there was considerable merit in the idea that the Rio Treaty should not be invoked for relatively minor offenses of the type alleged by Venezuela but rather should be reserved for grave situations.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~



CONFIDENTIAL

- 3 -

Licenciado Diaz Ordaz recalled Mexico's position during the October 1962 missile crisis and said that the United States could be absolutely sure that when the chips were really down, Mexico would be unequivocally by its side. He added that Mexico, for example, might not perhaps know about the details of what was going on in Viet-Nam or Cyprus but that he and the Mexican Government understood perfectly well what the stakes were and that Mexico's interests in a show-down would be parallel to ours.

Ambassador Carrillo noted that this was a very significant statement by the President-elect.

Licenciado Diaz Ordaz then went on to say that the juridical distinctions made by Mexico might not seem to be logical or profound. He said he would not argue that they were. He would say, however, that they were the product of Mexico's history and of Mexican tradition and sentiment. It would be unrealistic and no favor whatever to the United States for the Mexican Government to take a position on this or other issues which would be contrary to the opinion of the majority of the Mexican people. A Mexican Government policy not supported by the Mexican people would not endure. Moreover, there was considerable advantage when the issues at stake were not great if Mexico could continue to demonstrate its political independence and divergence on relatively minor issues. While divergence on relatively unimportant matters might at times create temporary discomfiture they also demonstrated that the American States did in fact enjoy independence.

The President thanked Licenciado Diaz Ordaz for his statements that Mexico would stand side by side with the United States in the event of a major crisis and did not further pursue this topic.

COMMENT: It was apparent that Licenciado Diaz Ordaz shared the President's concern about the vitality of the Rio Treaty and that he intended to give the subject further thought. I did not get the impression that the Licenciado had foreclosed the possibility of reconsidering Mexico's future relations with the Castro regime.

CONFIDENTIAL

