(as
delivered)
THE SECURITY COUNCIL, 27
JANUARY 2003:
Executive Chairman of
UNMOVIC, Dr. Hans Blix
The governing Security
Council resolutions
The
resolution adopted by the Security Council on Iraq in November last year asks
UNMOVIC and the IAEA to “update” the Council 60 days after the resumption of
inspections. This is today. The updating, it seems, forms part of an
assessment by the Council and its Members of the results, so far, of the
inspections and of their role as a means to achieve verifiable disarmament in
Iraq.
As this is an open meeting
of the Council, it may be appropriate briefly to provide some background for a
better understanding of where we stand today.
With your permission, I
shall do so.
I begin by recalling that
inspections as a part of a disarmament process in Iraq started in 1991,
immediately after the Gulf War.
They went on for eight years until December 1998, when inspectors were
withdrawn. Thereafter, for nearly
four years there were no inspections. They were resumed only at the end of
November last year.
While the fundamental aim
of inspections in Iraq has always been to verify disarmament, the successive
resolutions adopted by the Council over the years have varied somewhat in
emphasis and approach.
In 1991, resolution 687
(1991), adopted unanimously as a part of the cease-fire after the Gulf War, had
five major elements. The three
first related to disarmament. They
called for :
After the completion of the
disarmament :
·
the Council would have
authority to proceed to a lifting of the sanctions (economic restrictions);
and
Resolution 687 (1991), like
the subsequent resolutions I shall refer to, required cooperation by Iraq but
such was often withheld or given grudgingly. Unlike South Africa, which decided on
its own to eliminate its nuclear weapons and welcomed inspection as a means of
creating confidence in its disarmament, Iraq appears not to have come to a
genuine acceptance – not even today – of the disarmament, which was demanded of
it and which it needs to carry out to win the confidence of the world and to
live in peace.
As we know, the twin
operation ‘declare and verify’, which was prescribed in resolution 687 (1991),
too often turned into a game of ‘hide and seek’. Rather than just verifying declarations
and supporting evidence, the two inspecting organizations found themselves
engaged in efforts to map the weapons programmes and to search for evidence
through inspections, interviews, seminars, inquiries with suppliers and
intelligence organizations. As a
result, the disarmament phase was not completed in the short time expected. Sanctions remained and took a severe
toll until Iraq accepted the Oil for Food Programme and the gradual development
of that programme mitigated the effects of the sanctions.
The implementation of
resolution 687 (1991) nevertheless brought about considerable disarmament
results. It has been recognized
that more weapons of mass destruction were destroyed under this resolution than
were destroyed during the Gulf War:
large quantities of chemical weapons were destroyed under UNSCOM
supervision before 1994. While Iraq
claims – with little evidence – that it destroyed all biological weapons
unilaterally in 1991, it is certain that UNSCOM destroyed large biological
weapons production facilities in 1996.
The large nuclear infrastructure was destroyed and the fissionable
material was removed from Iraq by the IAEA.
One of three important
questions before us today is how much might remain undeclared and intact from
before 1991; and, possibly, thereafter; the second question is what, if
anything, was illegally produced or procured after 1998, when the inspectors
left; and the third question is how it can be prevented that any weapons of mass
destruction be produced or procured in the future.
In December 1999 – after
one year without inspections in Iraq – resolution 1284 (1999) was adopted by the
Council with 4 abstentions.
Supplementing the basic resolutions of 1991 and following years, it
provided Iraq with a somewhat less ambitious approach: in return for “cooperation in all
respects” for a specified period of time, including progress in the
resolution of “key remaining disarmament tasks”, it opened the possibility, not
for the lifting, but the suspension of sanctions.
For nearly three years,
Iraq refused to accept any inspections by UNMOVIC. It was only after appeals by the
Secretary-General and Arab States and pressure by the United States and other
Member States, that Iraq declared on 16 September last year that it would again
accept inspections without conditions.
Resolution 1441 (2002) was
adopted on 8 November last year and emphatically reaffirmed the demand on Iraq
to cooperate. It
required this cooperation to be immediate, unconditional and active. The resolution contained many
provisions, which we welcome as enhancing and strengthening the inspection
regime. The unanimity by which it
was adopted sent a powerful signal that the Council was of one mind in creating
a last opportunity for peaceful disarmament in Iraq through
inspection.
UNMOVIC shares the sense of
urgency felt by the Council to use inspection as a path to attain, within a
reasonable time, verifiable disarmament of Iraq. Under the resolutions I have cited, it
would be followed by monitoring for such time as the Council feels would be
required. The resolutions also
point to a zone free of weapons of mass destruction as the ultimate goal.
As a subsidiary body of the
Council, UNMOVIC is fully aware of and appreciates the close attention, which
the Council devotes to the inspections in Iraq. While today’s “updating” is
foreseen in resolution 1441 (2002), the Council can and does call for additional
briefings whenever it wishes. One
was held on 19 January and a further such briefing is tentatively set for 14
February.
I turn now to the key
requirement of cooperation and Iraq’s response to it. Cooperation might be said
to relate to both substance and process.
It would appear from our experience so far that Iraq has decided in
principle to provide cooperation on process, notably access. A similar decision is
indispensable to provide cooperation on substance in order to bring the
disarmament task to completion through the peaceful process of inspection and to
bring the monitoring task on a firm course. An initial minor step would be to adopt
the long-overdue legislation required by the resolutions.
I shall deal first with
cooperation on process.
It has regard to the
procedures, mechanisms, infrastructure and practical arrangements to pursue
inspections and seek verifiable disarmament. While inspection is not built on
the premise of confidence but may lead to confidence if it is successful, there
must nevertheless be a measure of mutual confidence from the very beginning in
running the operation of inspection.
Iraq has on the whole
cooperated rather well so far with UNMOVIC in this field. The most important point to make is that
access has been provided to all sites we have wanted to inspect and with one
exception it has been prompt. We have further had great help in building up the
infrastructure of our office in Baghdad and the field office in Mosul. Arrangements and services for our plane
and our helicopters have been good.
The environment has been workable.
Our inspections have
included universities, military bases, presidential sites and private
residences. Inspections have also
taken place on Fridays, the Muslim day of rest, on Christmas day and New Years
day. These inspections have been
conducted in the same manner as all other inspections. We seek to be both effective and
correct.
In this updating I am
bound, however, to register some problems. Firstly, relating to two kinds of air
operations.
While we now have the
technical capability to send a U-2 plane placed at our disposal for aerial
imagery and for surveillance during inspections and have informed Iraq that we
planned to do so, Iraq has refused to guarantee its safety, unless a number of
conditions are fulfilled. As these
conditions went beyond what is stipulated in resolution 1441 (2002) and what was
practiced by UNSCOM and Iraq in the past, we note that Iraq is not so far
complying with our request. I hope
this attitude will change.
Another air operation
problem – which was solved during our recent talks in Baghdad – concerned the
use of helicopters flying into the no-fly zones. Iraq had insisted on sending helicopters
of their own to accompany ours. This would have raised a safety problem. The
matter was solved by an offer on our part to take the accompanying Iraq minders
in our helicopters to the sites, an arrangement that had been practiced by
UNSCOM in the past.
I am obliged to note some
recent disturbing incidents and harassment. For instance, for some time farfetched
allegations have been made publicly that questions posed by inspectors were of
intelligence character. While I might not defend every question that inspectors
might have asked, Iraq knows that they do not serve intelligence purposes and
Iraq should not say so.
On a number of occasions,
demonstrations have taken place in front of our offices and at inspection
sites.
The other day, a
sightseeing excursion by five inspectors to a mosque was followed by an
unwarranted public outburst. The
inspectors went without any UN insignia and were welcomed in the kind manner
that is characteristic of the normal Iraqi attitude to foreigners. They took off their shoes and were taken
around. They asked perfectly
innocent questions and parted with the invitation to come again.
Shortly thereafter, we
receive protests from the Iraqi authorities about an unannounced inspection and
about questions not relevant to weapons of mass destruction. Indeed, they were not. Demonstrations and outbursts of this
kind are unlikely to occur in Iraq without initiative or encouragement from the
authorities. We must ask ourselves
what the motives may be for these events.
They do not facilitate an already difficult job, in which we try to be
effective, professional and, at the same time, correct. Where our Iraqi
counterparts have some complaint they can take it up in a calmer and less
unpleasant manner.
The substantive cooperation
required relates above all to the obligation of Iraq to declare all programmes
of weapons of mass destruction and either to present items and activities for
elimination or else to provide evidence supporting the conclusion that nothing
proscribed remains.
Paragraph 9 of resolution
1441 (2002) states that this cooperation shall be “active”. It is not enough to open doors. Inspection is not a game of “catch as
catch can”. Rather, as I noted, it
is a process of verification for the purpose of creating confidence. It is not built upon the premise of
trust. Rather, it is designed to
lead to trust, if there is both openness to the inspectors and action to present
them with items to destroy or credible evidence about the absence of any such
items.
The declaration of 7
December
On 7 December 2002, Iraq
submitted a declaration of some 12,000 pages in response to paragraph 3 of
resolution 1441 (2002) and within the time stipulated by the Security
Council. In the fields of missiles
and biotechnology, the declaration contains a good deal of new material and
information covering the period from 1998 and onward. This is welcome.
One might have expected
that in preparing the Declaration, Iraq would have tried to respond to, clarify
and submit supporting evidence regarding the many open disarmament issues, which
the Iraqi side should be familiar with from the UNSCOM document S/1999/94 of
January1999 and the so-called Amorim Report of March 1999 (S/1999/356). These are questions which UNMOVIC,
governments and independent commentators have often cited.
While UNMOVIC has been
preparing its own list of current “unresolved disarmament issues” and “key
remaining disarmament tasks” in response to requirements in resolution 1284
(1999), we find the issues listed in the two reports as unresolved,
professionally justified. These
reports do not contend that weapons of mass destruction remain in Iraq, but nor
do they exclude that possibility.
They point to lack of evidence and inconsistencies, which raise question
marks, which must be straightened out, if weapons dossiers are to be closed and
confidence is to arise.
They deserve to be taken
seriously by Iraq rather than being brushed aside as evil machinations of
UNSCOM. Regrettably, the 12,000
page declaration, most of which is a reprint of earlier documents, does not seem
to contain any new evidence that would eliminate the questions or reduce their
number. Even Iraq’s letter sent in
response to our recent discussions in Baghdad to the President of the Security
Council on 24 January does not lead us to the resolution of these issues.
I shall only give some
examples of issues and questions that need to be answered and I turn first to
the sector of chemical weapons.
The nerve agent VX is one
of the most toxic ever developed.
Iraq has declared that it
only produced VX on a pilot scale, just a few tonnes and that the quality was
poor and the product unstable.
Consequently, it was said, that the agent was never weaponised. Iraq said that the small quantity of
agent remaining after the Gulf War was unilaterally destroyed in the summer of
1991.
UNMOVIC, however, has
information that conflicts with this account. There are indications that Iraq
had worked on the problem of purity and stabilization and that more had been
achieved than has been declared.
Indeed, even one of the documents provided by Iraq indicates that the
purity of the agent, at least in laboratory production, was higher than
declared.
There are also indications
that the agent was weaponised. In
addition, there are questions to be answered concerning the fate of the VX
precursor chemicals, which Iraq states were lost during bombing in the Gulf War
or were unilaterally destroyed by Iraq.
I would now like to turn to
the so-called “Air Force document” that I have discussed with the Council
before. This document was
originally found by an UNSCOM inspector in a safe in Iraqi Air Force
Headquarters in 1998 and taken from her by Iraqi minders. It gives an account of the expenditure
of bombs, including chemical bombs, by Iraq in the Iraq-Iran War. I am encouraged by the fact that Iraq
has now provided this document to UNMOVIC.
The document indicates that
13,000 chemical bombs were dropped by the Iraqi Air Force between 1983 and 1988,
while Iraq has declared that 19,500 bombs were consumed during this period. Thus, there is a discrepancy of 6,500
bombs. The amount of chemical agent
in these bombs would be in the order of about 1,000 tonnes. In the absence of evidence to the
contrary, we must assume that these quantities are now unaccounted for.
The discovery of a number
of 122 mm chemical rocket warheads in a bunker at a storage depot 170 km
southwest of Baghdad was much publicized.
This was a relatively new bunker and therefore the rockets must have been
moved there in the past few years, at a time when Iraq should not have had such
munitions.
The investigation of these
rockets is still proceeding. Iraq
states that they were overlooked from 1991 from a batch of some 2,000 that were
stored there during the Gulf War.
This could be the case. They
could also be the tip of a submerged iceberg. The discovery of a few rockets does not
resolve but rather points to the issue of several thousands of chemical rockets
that are unaccounted for.
The finding of the rockets
shows that Iraq needs to make more effort to ensure that its declaration is
currently accurate. During my
recent discussions in Baghdad, Iraq declared that it would make new efforts in
this regard and had set up a committee of investigation. Since then it has reported that it has
found a further 4 chemical rockets at a storage depot in Al Taji.
I might further mention
that inspectors have found at another site a laboratory quantity of
thiodiglycol, a mustard gas precursor.
Whilst I am addressing
chemical issues, I should mention a matter, which I reported on 19 December
2002, concerning equipment at a civilian chemical plant at Al Fallujah. Iraq has declared that it had repaired
chemical processing equipment previously destroyed under UNSCOM supervision, and
had installed it at Fallujah for the production of chlorine and phenols. We have
inspected this equipment and are conducting a detailed technical evaluation of
it. On completion, we will decide
whether this and other equipment that has been recovered by Iraq should be
destroyed.
I have mentioned the issue
of anthrax to the Council on previous occasions and I come back to it as it is
an important one.
Iraq has declared that it
produced about 8,500 litres of this biological warfare agent, which it states it
unilaterally destroyed in the summer of 1991. Iraq has provided little evidence for
this production and no convincing evidence for its
destruction.
There are strong
indications that Iraq produced more anthrax than it declared, and that at least
some of this was retained after the declared destruction date. It might still exist. Either it should be found and be
destroyed under UNMOVIC supervision or else convincing evidence should be
produced to show that it was, indeed, destroyed in 1991.
As I reported to the
Council on 19 December last year, Iraq did not declare a significant quantity,
some 650 kg, of bacterial growth media, which was acknowledged as
imported in Iraq’s submission to the Amorim panel in February 1999. As part of its 7 December 2002
declaration, Iraq resubmitted the Amorim panel document, but the table showing
this particular import of media was not included. The absence of this table would appear
to be deliberate as the pages of the resubmitted document were renumbered.
In the letter of 24 January
to the President of the Council, Iraq’s Foreign Minister stated that “all
imported quantities of growth media were declared”. This is not evidence. I note that the quantity of media
involved would suffice to produce, for example, about 5,000 litres of
concentrated anthrax.
I turn now to the missile
sector. There remain significant
questions as to whether Iraq retained SCUD-type missiles after the Gulf
War. Iraq declared the consumption
of a number of SCUD missiles as targets in the development of an anti-ballistic
missile defence system during the 1980s.
Yet no technical information has been produced about that programme or
data on the consumption of the missiles.
There has been a range of
developments in the missile field during the past four years presented by Iraq
as non-proscribed activities. We
are trying to gather a clear understanding of them through inspections and
on-site discussions.
Two projects in particular
stand out. They are the development
of a liquid-fuelled missile named the Al Samoud 2, and a solid propellant
missile, called the Al Fatah. Both
missiles have been tested to a range in excess of the permitted range of 150 km,
with the Al Samoud 2 being tested to a maximum of 183 km and the Al Fatah to 161
km. Some of both types of missiles
have already been provided to the Iraqi Armed Forces even though it is stated
that they are still undergoing development.
The Al Samoud’s diameter
was increased from an earlier version to the present 760 mm. This modification was made despite a
1994 letter from the Executive Chairman of UNSCOM directing Iraq to limit its
missile diameters to less than 600 mm.
Furthermore, a November 1997 letter from the Executive Chairman of UNSCOM
to Iraq prohibited the use of engines from certain surface-to-air missiles for
the use in ballistic missiles.
During my recent meeting in
Baghdad, we were briefed on these two programmes. We were told that the final range for
both systems would be less than the permitted maximum range of 150 km.
These missiles might well
represent prima facie cases of proscribed systems. The test ranges in excess of 150 km are
significant, but some further technical considerations need to be made, before
we reach a conclusion on this issue.
In the mean time, we have asked Iraq to cease flight tests of both
missiles.
In addition, Iraq has
refurbished its missile production infrastructure. In particular, Iraq reconstituted a
number of casting chambers, which had previously been destroyed under UNSCOM
supervision. They had been used in
the production of solid-fuel missiles.
Whatever missile system these chambers are intended for, they could
produce motors for missiles capable of ranges significantly greater than 150
km.
Also associated with these
missiles and related developments is the import, which has been taking place
during the last few years, of a number of items despite the sanctions, including
as late as December 2002. Foremost
amongst these is the import of 380 rocket engines which may be used for the Al
Samoud 2.
Iraq also declared the
recent import of chemicals used in propellants, test instrumentation and,
guidance and control systems. These
items may well be for proscribed purposes.
That is yet to be determined.
What is clear is that they were illegally brought into Iraq, that is,
Iraq or some company in Iraq, circumvented the restrictions imposed by various
resolutions.
Mr. President,
I have touched upon some of
the disarmament issues that remain open and that need to be answered if dossiers
are to be closed and confidence is to arise. Which are the means at the disposal of
Iraq to answer these questions? I
have pointed to some during my presentation of the issues. Let me be a little more systematic. Our Iraqi counterparts are fond of
saying that there are no proscribed items and if no evidence is presented to the
contrary they should have the benefit of the doubt, be presumed innocent. UNMOVIC, for its part, is not
presuming that there are proscribed items and activities in Iraq, but nor
is it – or I think anyone else after the inspections between 1991 and 1998 –
presuming the opposite, that no such items and activities exist in Iraq. Presumptions do not solve the
problem. Evidence and full
transparency may help. Let me be
specific.
Information provided by
Member States tells us about the movement and concealment of missiles and
chemical weapons and mobile units for biological weapons production. We shall certainly follow up any
credible leads given to us and report what we might find as well as any denial
of access.
So far we have reported on
the recent find of a small number of empty 122 mm warheads for chemical
weapons. Iraq declared that it
appointed a commission of inquiry to look for more. Fine. Why not extend the search to other
items? Declare what may be found and destroy it under our supervision?
When
we have urged our Iraqi counterparts to present more evidence, we have all too
often met the response that there are no more documents. All existing relevant documents have
been presented, we are told. All
documents relating to the biological weapons programme were destroyed together
with the weapons.
However,
Iraq has all the archives of the Government and its various departments,
institutions and mechanisms. It
should have budgetary documents, requests for funds and reports on how they have
been used. It should also have
letters of credit and bills of lading, reports on production and losses of
material.
In
response to a recent UNMOVIC request for a number of specific documents, the
only new documents Iraq provided was a ledger of 193 pages which Iraq stated
included all imports from 1983 to 1990 by the Technical and Scientific
Importation Division, the importing authority for the biological weapons
programme. Potentially, it might
help to clear some open issues.
The
recent inspection find in the private home of a scientist of a box of some 3,000
pages of documents, much of it relating to the laser enrichment of uranium
support a concern that has long existed that documents might be distributed to
the homes of private individuals.
This interpretation is refuted by the Iraqi side, which claims that
research staff sometimes may bring home papers from their work places. On our side, we cannot help but think
that the case might not be isolated and that such placements of documents is
deliberate to make discovery difficult and to seek to shield documents by
placing them in private homes.
Any further sign of the
concealment of documents would be serious.
The Iraqi side committed itself at our recent talks to encourage persons
to accept access also to private sites.
There can be no sanctuaries for proscribed items, activities or
documents. A denial of prompt
access to any site would be a very serious matter.
When Iraq claims that
tangible evidence in the form of documents is not available, it ought at least
to find individuals, engineers, scientists and managers to testify about their
experience. Large weapons
programmes are moved and managed by people. Interviews with individuals who may have
worked in
programmes in the past may
fill blank spots in our knowledge and understanding. It could also be useful to learn that
they are now employed in peaceful sectors.
These were the reasons why UNMOVIC asked for a list of such persons, in
accordance with resolution 1441.
Some
400 names for all biological and chemical weapons programmes as well as their
missile programmes were provided by the Iraqi side. This can be compared to over 3,500 names
of people associated with those past weapons programmes that UNSCOM either
interviewed in the 1990s or knew from documents and other sources. At my recent meeting in Baghdad, the
Iraqi side committed itself to supplementing the list and some 80 additional
names have been provided.
In the past, much valuable
information came from interviews.
There were also cases in which the interviewee was clearly intimidated by
the presence of and interruption by Iraqi officials. This was the background of resolution
1441’s provision for a right for UNMOVIC and the IAEA to hold private interviews
“in the mode or location” of our choice, in Baghdad or even abroad.
To date, 11 individuals
were asked for interviews in Baghdad by us. The replies have invariably been that
the individual will only speak at Iraq’s monitoring directorate or, at any rate,
in the presence of an Iraqi official.
This could be due to a wish on the part of the invited to have evidence
that they have not said anything that the authorities did not wish them to
say. At our recent talks in
Baghdad, the Iraqi side committed itself to encourage persons to accept
interviews “in private”, that is to say alone with us. Despite this, the pattern has not
changed. However, we hope that with
further encouragement from the authorities, knowledgeable individuals will
accept private interviews, in Baghdad or abroad.
UNMOVIC’s
capability
Mr President, I must not
conclude this “update” without some notes on the growing capability of UNMOVIC.
In the past two months,
UNMOVIC has built-up its capabilities in Iraq from nothing to 260 staff members
from 60 countries. This includes
approximately 100 UNMOVIC inspectors, 60 air operations staff, as well as
security personnel, communications, translation and interpretation staff,
medical support, and other services at our Baghdad office and Mosul field
office. All serve the United
Nations and report to no one else.
Furthermore, our roster of inspectors will continue to grow as our
training programme continues — even at this moment we have a training course in
session in Vienna. At the end of
that course, we shall have a roster of about 350 qualified experts from which to
draw inspectors.
A team supplied by the
Swiss Government is refurbishing our offices in Baghdad, which had been empty
for four years. The Government of
New Zealand has contributed both a medical team and a communications team. The German Government will contribute
unmanned aerial vehicles for surveillance and a group of specialists to operate
them for us within Iraq. The
Government of Cyprus has kindly allowed us to set up a Field Office in
Larnaca. All these contributions
have been of assistance in quickly starting up our inspections and enhancing our
capabilities. So has help from the
UN in New York and from sister organizations in Baghdad.
In the past two months
during which we have built-up our presence in Iraq, we have conducted about 300
inspections to more than 230 different sites. Of these, more than 20 were sites that
had not been inspected before. By
the end of December, UNMOVIC began using helicopters both for the transport of
inspectors and for actual inspection work. We now have eight helicopters. They have already proved invaluable in
helping to “freeze” large sites by observing the movement of traffic in and
around the area.
Setting up a field office
in Mosul has facilitated rapid inspections of sites in northern Iraq. We plan to establish soon a second field
office in the Basra area, where we have already inspected a number of
sites.
Mr.
President,
We have now an inspection
apparatus that permits us to send multiple inspection teams every day all over
Iraq, by road or by air. Let me end
by simply noting that that capability which has been built-up in a short time
and which is now operating, is at the disposal of the Security
Council.
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