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ARGENTINA PROJECT (\$200000044)

U.S. DEPT. OF STATE, A/RPS/IPS

Margaret P. Grafeld, Director

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REPORT ON THE SUBVERSIVE SITUATION

(May lst / June 3rd)

5-12---

I. General situation.

Marxist gangs are in actual retreat. This is evident also through daily chronicles, but it becomes much more vivid by having a look at a list of their casualties:

1. Dead subversive criminals: to May31st, 1977

5/1 5/1	Lomas de Zamora Ramos Mejía	(Prov.	of of	Buenos Aires) Two killed. Buenos Aires) One committed suicide	
5/2 5/2		(Prov. Prov.	of of	with a cyanid pill. Santa Fe) One killed. Santa Fe) One killed.	
	La Plata	(Prov.	of	Buenos Aires) Two killed.	
5/3	Avellaneda				Buenos Aires) Two killed.	
5/4	Mar del Plata	(Prov.	of	Buenos Aires) One killed.	
5/6	La Plata	(Prov.	οſ	Buenos Aires) Two killed.	
5/6		(Prov.	of	Buenos Aires) One killed.	
5/10	Capital Federal				One committed suicide	
	. •				with a cyanid pill.	
5/11	San Nicolas	.(Prov.	of	Buenos Aires) One committed sùicide	
·					with a cyanid pill.	
5/11	Remedios de Esca	al	ada (E	iue:	nos Aires) One killed. He had set	
•	a bomb at Bs.As. Province sub-headquarters.					
5/12	Martínez				Buenos Aires) Two killed.	
5/12	Monte Grande	(Prov.	of	Buenos Aires) Five killed.	
5/12	Lanús	(Prov.	of	Buenos Aires) One committed suicide	
·					with a cyanid pill.	
5/15	Rosario Rosario	(Prov.	of	Santa Fe) Three killed.	
5/15	Rosario	Ò	Prov.	of	Santa Fe) Three killed. Santa Fe) Two killed.	
5/15	Castelar	Ò	Prov.	of	Buenos Aires) One killed.	
5/16	Capital Federal	`			Two killed.	
	Capital Federal				Four killed, who	
<i>></i> / ->					execute an executive.	
5/19	Capital Federal				One committed suicide	
21 -2	Capital Icacial				with a cyanid pill.	
5/10	Son Mortin	1	Prov	οf	Buenos Aires) One committed suicide	
21 -2	Dan Hartin	(1100.	01	with a cyanid pill.	
5/10	Santa Fo	1	Prov	٥f	Santa Fe \ Three killed	
5/21	Canta Fo	7	Drow.	of.	Santa Fe) Three killed. Santa Fe) One killed.	
5/21	Monte Grande	>	Pro	01 0£	Buenos Aires) Sixteen killed. O.C.P.O.	
5/24	Monte Grande	(Frov.	OI	heads and others.	
5/0h	Avellaneda	1	Pmorr	۸f	Buenos Aires) Two killed.	
	Haedo				Buenos Aires) Twelve killed. Coordinat	
2/20	naedo	(FFOV.	Οī	ing meeting.	
5/20	To Dista	7	Dmorr	٥f	Buenos Aires) One killed.	
2/23	La Flata	1	Frov.	OI	buenos Aires / One Killed.	
to June 3 <u>rd</u> , 1977.						
00 omie 270, 1211.						
6/1	Témperley	7	Prov	οf	Buenos Aires) Five killed.	
	Monte Grande				Buenos Aires) Five killed.	
J/ J	nonve or ande	1	1104.	ΟŢ	DUCHOS ATTES) LIVE KITTEG.	



2. <u>legal Forces casualties</u>: May 1st to 31st, 1977.

5/1 Valentín Alsina (Prov. of Buenos Aires) Cabo 1° José AGUILAR, Buenos Aires Province Police. 5/5 Villa Adelina (Prov. of Buenos Aires) Two former members of Railway Police. 5/9 Wilde (Prov. of Buenos Aires) Cabo 25.677 Alberto LABASSO. Federal Police. 5/11 Capital Federal Cabo 1°5.121 Marcos EERGER, wounded 4/18. (Prov. of Buenos Aires) Srgto. 1 Juan Carlos 5/23 Bernal PEREYRA. Federal Police. Srgto. Doroteo ROJO, Federal Police. 5/31 Témperley (Prov. of Buenos Aires) Colonel (RE) Angel SUREDA. Army.

During the period there were also five persons wounded, and the attempt on the Minister of Foreign Affairs, Admiral César Augusto GUZZETTI on May 7th, in the Capital Federal. Admiral Guzetti is now recovering favourably at Police Hospital "Bartolomé Churruca", praised and recognized as one of the best health centers.

Among the victims of the subversives, there are two executives:

5/19 Capital Federal Aníbal BATTISTA from "Celulosa Argentina, kidnapped by e.r.p. They demanded a million dollar ransom for

5/20 Santa Fé (Province of Santa Fé) Hipólito MAMANA from "Daneri, S.A." Technical manager, killed when leaving his home by montoneros.

II. Montoneros group situation.

Montoneros forces have been weakened to a degree unsuspected by public opinion. At the same time, their basic infrastructure intelligence has almost been annihilated. This has caused them to miss important information.

The well-known Rome meeting may be taken as a starting point (April 20th, 1977). The following people, who signed a document, are known to have attended that meeting:

-FIRMENICH, Mario. -OBREGON CANO, Ricardo.
-BIDEGAIN, Alberto. -PUIGROSS, Rodolfo.
-IESGART, Adriana. -GALIMEERTI, Rodolfo.
-GIAVEZ; Gonzalo. -VACA NARVAJA, Fernando.
-MASSAFERRO, Alicia. -FEDREIRA, Enrique.
-IOVELY, Osvaldo. -MONTENEGRO, Martín.

That document, which is very important, appeals to: "Unity around an apeacement program, including even the Communist party..." demanding in turn "their recognition of all political parties without exception, for the freedom of all political prisoners, students, labour union leaders, churchmen, journalists, military men and writers." In another paragraph the document demands from the Government the summons to free elections and appeals to the opposition parties to form a "Social and National Liberation Front".





An analysis of the document reveals the fact that the leadership of the movement is aware of their weakening, since, as has been seen, it makes an appeal for apeacement and union of all political groups, which is a way of trying to gather strength.

Statistically, montoneros suffer two daily casualties, decreasing mili-

tary operations and increasing psychological ones.

1. Front activities.

a) Military front: This organization, the same as the others, tried to manifest themselves in the military aspect, but legal forces hindered the achievement of this goal. As a result of this, their activities were restricted to the already estimated setting of bombs and leaflet distribution. They fundamentally act in the psychological field, though with poor text contents, because they are iterative and do not con tribute new proposals. Their losses have forced them to give certain autonomy in sub versive activities, to platoons (3 to 5 men). They have been obliged to change their hierarchical denominat ions, to make them easier to understand and perhaps to give the idea that they might become a regular army. After all, this shows the low intellectual level of their recruits. The most important operations (disregarding occasional fights) were: the attempts on Admiral César Augusto GUZZETTI and the executive Hipólito MAMANA. In both cases montonero personal risk was almost inexistent. The period closes with Colonel SUREDA's death.

b) Political front: May be said to be the most important.

This front is mainly after two goals:

-The formation of an "anti-dictatorial "resistance front. For this purpose they try to organize clandestinely in: factories, districts, rural areas, shanty towns, etc. They thus attempt to fill the "political space" left by the fall of Peronism and its structures.

-To ruin the prestige of the Government and weaken its internal and foreign position. For this purpose they resort to denounce ments of human rights violations.

In a more ambitious attempt they would try to reinstate the "Authentic Peronist Party " for eventual free elections.

In the aforementioned Rome meeting, they announced the creation of the "M. P. M." (Montonero Peronist Movement), whose secretary general would be Mario FIRMENICH.

This "M. P. M. " in turn summons the opposition to form the "F. N. L. S. " (Social and National Liberation Front). Propagan da related to the "M. P. M. " and "F. N. L. S. " is done through: the magazines "EVITA MONTONERA" and "EL MONTONERO" and other media, such as: internal bulletins, manuals, courses, leaflets, etc. Their main concern is the international recognition of the "M. P. M. "as a representative Argentine party. To fulfil this, they look to socialist countries, democrats and socialists the world over, the Vatican, Palestine Liberation Movement, Latin American political progressive forces, American democrats, etc.

c) Labour Union front: The main attitude was the "organization of resistance".

-Organization: To achieve this objective, well trained leaders infiltrated into workers associations, try to organize the General Labour Confederation for the Resistance (C.G.T.-R.), for the coordination of resistance in the whole country. The base of this organization would be clandestine groups.





-Fight procedures: The movement gave instructions for: sabotage, reluctant working (also called "gloomy working"), creation of armed workers groups (pickets) (P. O. A.) for violent assaults on executives, owners of companies, etc.

The general plan on which they will base their operation encom passes:

- 1. Unity of all worker movements.
- 2. Defence of labour union liberties.
- 3. Defence of salaries and popular welfare.

4. Boycott to Martinez de Hoz's economic plan. The fundamental intention is to attract militants from the worker movements and at the same time to rekindle every labour conflict, or to create it in case it does not exist.

d) Student front: This front is not wholy unified. Each college acts according to what the prevailing political movement dictates. In the particular montonero case, they are trying to create the " C. E. A. R. " (Center of Architecture Students for the Resist ance), following the same procedures in other colleges. Propaganda in different university centers shows us that they mean to form the "G. E. R. " (Student groups for the resistance) concealing their aim: to exert pressure. Thus they try to use the J. U. P. " (Peronist University Youth) as a base.

2. Loss of strength of montonero gangs.

Legal forces have inflicted Montoneros the following important casual-

5/4/77 Miguel ROMERO, who tried to poison General VILAS.

5/4/77 Carlos PAIRA, District responsible for the labour union front.
5/4/77 xx., alias "Lia", Berisso area press responsible (prov. Bs. Aires)
5/4/77 xx., alias "Rodolfo", in charge of press affairs in the area.

5/4/77 xx., alias "Cacho", Column 27° member in charge of military

affairs.

5/11/77 Alfredo MARTINEZ: He set a bomb at Buenos Aires Province Police sub-headquarters.

5/21/77 Hector RETAMAR, military trainer and in charge of labour union affairs.

5/21/77 Luis BUSTOS, highest U.E.S. leader.

5/24/77 at MONTE GRANDE (Province of Buenos Aires), 16 persons killed.

One from the Federal Political Area.

5/28/77 at HAEDO, 12 persons killed, one of them being Julio ROQUE, company chief.

6/2/77 José SALGADO, former police agent who set a bomb at the Federal Security headquarters dinning-room.

6/3/77 Ramón FERREYRA, who participated in the bombing of an "Hercules"

plane.

The casualties mentioned at the beginning of this report have to be added to this group of important montonero leaders. The blows delivered to this group on the finantial field, as for example the Graiver case, turned out to be of unsuspected importance.

The fact that most important leaders have escaped abroad is an evidence of their precarious condition.

The documents siezed and the cooperation given by the population enabled the legal forces to act effectively against montoneros.





III. P. R. T. - E. R. P. Situation.

This organization, practically destroyed in the military field, has not been able to recover since the death of its major leader, Roberto SANTU CHO, alias Robby, and his staff.

In spite of being almost completely dismanteled, some sporadic activiti es meant to keep their names alive for the public opinion are to be expected. This might also be done to keep high the morale of its members.

They have been forced to reduce their intelligence, proselytism and $\boldsymbol{\tau}_{\boldsymbol{\tau}}$ personnel apparatus and in order to feel the vacuum they created a " Political Secretariat ".

Their losses have made the batallions and company levels disappear.

1. Front activities.

a) Military front: In the month of May, the P. R. T. - E. R. P. kill ed two policemen: Raúl González and Felipe Bayer. The blows on the movement undermine their morale. In order to raise it, their leaders try to impress on the minds of their followers, the following ideas which belong to Lenin: -In times of deterioration, the revolutionaries must save and

strengthen the party, keep close to the masses and get ready for new fights.

-All the legal possibilities are to be taken advantage of, and at the same time learn to use all illegal procedures. They have a regional base organization:

-"Capital Federal" region: the best structured one. It is divided into Northern, Central and Southern areas. It is made up of one unit and three commandos. It can only act in minor, quick and short operations (as for instance, personal attempts).

-"Buenos Aires North-western" region: divided into Northern and Western areas. It is made up of two units and two commandos. It acts in the factory front.

-"Buenos Aires Southern" region: Divided into Northern and Southern areas. The Southern one has almost been annihilated. It has two units.

-The rest of the regions: The only one left, which has very small operational capacity, is that of Córdoba.

-Special Unit "Benito Urteaga": Depends directly from the Political Bureau. It is in charge of very important operations (the noun "important" refers to its trascendence in the public opinion, not'to its military capacity).

In this period the P. R. T. - E. R. P. could only carry out a few minor operations, as for example the murder of engineer Anibal BATISTA (kidnapped by them).

b) Political front: The main political event was the moving abroad of its Bureau to avoid complete annihilation (a measure similar to that of Montoneros). The Bureau members that might be abroad are the following:

-GORRIARAN MERLO, Haroldo

-KREMMER, Juan Arnoldo -ALL, Carlos Emilio

-SIVORI de GORRIARAN MERLO

-CONCETTI, Raúl or GALEANO, Rogelio

-ORZOCOA, Carlos

-OROPEL, Julio Alfredo

Commander "Ricardo" or "El pelado". Captain "Luis" or "Luis Martini": Captain "Alejandro" or "El cuervo". Sister of the first member and ALL's wife.

"El gringo". "El Vasco" or "Daniel". "El negro Jorge".





The Political Secretariat might be formed, among others, by:

-IRURZUM, Hugo Ramón

-STREGGER, Martin Eduardo

-HEDESMA, Juan Carlos

Captain "Santiago". Lieutenant "Martín" or "la tía"... "El Vizcachón".

The persons responsible for the national apparatus might be:

-COCOZ, Javier Ramón

-AGUIRRE, Luis Mario

-BIESSA, Sonia Alicia

-CODAN, Elena

-LOPEZ, Héctor

-MUNITIA de MEBILHAA, María

Lieutenant "Pancho", INTELLIGENCE
"Tato", MILITARY POSELYTISM
"Angela" NATIONAL DOCUMENTS
"Paula" NATIONAL PERSONNEL
In charge of NATIONAL PROPAGANDA
"Alicia" INTERNATIONAL PROPAGANDA

It is believed that they are receiving money from sources which are the object of research.

In their self-criticism they recognized: having taken a wrong view of reality in 1975, excess of security in its possibilities, and not having analyzed the blows they have been receiving from 1975 on.

The E. R. P. Political Bureau might work from Rome, where they might have held a meeting in April 1977. The aim of this meeting might have been the appointment of a new P. R. T. Secretary General to replace Santucho, and the appointment of a Central Commitee of 15 permanent members and 3 replacements. They also might decide on a political lineament for the party according to the present state of affairs As a result of this meeting, another one was held in Brazil (San Paolo) in which Arnold Juan KREMER was chosen Secretary General to replace Santucho. The E. R. P. Executive Committee decided:

-To be on the defence, insisting that this is only a strategic and temporary measure.

-To descentralize leadership.

-To preserve as far as it is possible, materials, elements and infrastructure that might still be in their possession.

-Intensify internal political work, in order to enlighten leaders as to their past mistakes and correct future trends.

-To infiltrate into front of the masses through cultural centers, clubs, associations, etc.

-To organize agile and movable commandos, that must learn how to fight by fighting.

-Hijacking factory vehicles and seizing of internal guards.
Sabotage and reprisals against factory executives and owners.
The kernel idea is to improve members qualitatively, as a previous step to increase the number of followers.

c) <u>Iabour Union front</u>: In general it follows the lineaments already described for montoneros. They are bent on organizing clandestine labour union organizations. The leit-motif of their action will be the expression of salary problems and labour conditions, as well as labour union rights. Their most ambitious aim is to monopolize mass movements, agitating them with real or fictitious problems, to force the Government to grant concessions that might lead to the recovery of the C. G. T., federations, etc. To achieve this, clandestine groups must infiltrate into existing organizations to handle them from inside.

According to P. R. T. - E. R. P. regulations, a "front" is a mass sector towards which the party directs its activities. A " Party Front" is regarded as constituted when in the field chosen for a party activity, three or more cells are formed. It is to say, three or more cells infiltrated into an industrial center constitute a





"factory party front". Several groups of "party fronts" make up an " E. R. P. " squadron. It is to be expected that the E. R. P. will employ new methods in this task.

d) Student front: In this period the E. R. P.-P. R. T. practically did not operate as such in this field, but did this through the "Guevarist Youth Movement". In spite of this, their work was not fecund, because the left-wing group of students is atomized. Students field was subjected to a minimum psychological action, specifically based on socio-political aspects.

In this aspect E. R. P. was practically overpowered by montonero activities (J. U. P.).

It is believed that the situation will not change much in a near future:

2. Loss of strength of P. R. T. - E. R. P. Gangs.

The weakening experienced by this organization forced the leaders to order their base groups to preserve their forces. This resulted in a noticeable reduction of activities.

Among the achievements of legal forces against this organization, we can mention:

- -Destruction of the National Direction and severe casualties in their Intelligence, Propaganda, Sanity and Solidarity apparatus.
- -Arrest of those responsible for the Chaco, Formosa, Paraná and Misiones areas.
- -Dismantelling of National and Capital clandestine printing \cdot,\cdot,\cdot center "Benito Urteaga".
- -Neutralization of about 40 operation houses. Among them, a meeting house at Avellaneda (Province of Buenos Aires), a library and files of that region, which enabled the annihilation of the Buenos Aires Southern region.
- -Discovery of places where they hid the persons they kidnapped (as for example the "Celulosa Argentina" executive, for whom they demanded a million dollar ransom).
- -Death of Luis CRISTOFARO and Manuel ARROSINIW, who were responsible for the graphic and national document front.

It is very improbable that they will recover to the degree of reaching the standards of an international subversive organization. They find it difficult to recruit new members, because the youth in general is aware that it is not profitable as a way of acting. All that has been said leads one to think that the E. R. P. will have to stop acting in this country.



The next five (5) pages have been eliminated because they are entirely non-responsive.