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SALT VI

A- 743

# MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION U.S. SALT DELEGATION VIENNA, AUSTRIA

DATE: January 26, 1972

TIME: 1:00 - 3:45 p.m.

PLACE: Stadtkrug Restaurant

Vienna

SUBJECT:

SALT

to print deducate in the graph of

PARTICIPANTS:

US

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USSR

Ambassador J. Graham Parsons Dr. Raymond L. Garthoff Mr. O. A. Grinevsky Mr. N. S. Kishilov

The American participants were hosts, in accordance with rotation, at a working luncheon which was scheduled after indication from the Soviet side that it considered such a session timely.

#### Interpretations

Grinevsky said that the Soviet Delegation had been giving further consideration to the question of handling interpretations of the agreements. Garthoff said that the American side also had wished to return to the subject. Grinevsky stated that, after consideration, the Soviet Delegation believed it would be preferable not to have any formal protocols attached to the treaty and interim agreement. Important questions of interpretation -- such as the future ABM question raised by the American side, and the interpretation on non-transfer which the Soviet side had raised--could be handled by formally placing agreed language on the plenary record. Such statements, and indeed other appropriate interpretations, would have the same legal effect as a more formal protocol, but would not encumber the basic texts. Garthoff noted that he had earlier proposed a formulation on future ABM systems, and on OLPARs, as "agreed minutes". The American side believed a number of other points such as non-transfer, and offensive test and training launchers, could best be handled in precisely the fashion now proposed by the Soviet side. Nonetheless, he agreed to transmit the Soviet proposal for treating all such agreed interpretive statements in the same latter fashion.

Garthoff noted that it would be necessary, in seeking legislative approval for the treaty and interim agreement, to make such interpretations


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available. He also suggested that it would be in the interest of both sides that there not be any "secret protocol", so that each side could so state if the question were asked. Grinevsky and Kishilov agreed.

Grinevsky had referred , in his opening comments on this general subject, to the suggestion that had been made on January 21 to compile some kind of list of agreed understandings and interpretations. In commenting on this point, Garthoff noted that it would almost certainly not be possible at this stage to have any complete listing of such statements, but we did think it was useful to discuss the subject and introduce some agreed interpretations on to the record at this time, and discuss some others on which agreement had not yet been reached. Kishilov and Grinevsky agreed. Garthoff noted that he had with him texts of several such statements which he wished to raise at that luncheon.

#### Non-Conealment


Garthoff asked if the Soviet side had considered further the suggestion for amending Article XIII(c) to include specific reference also to "unintended concealment" Grinevsky replied that, as he had told Garthoff on January 21, the Soviet Delegation did not see need for such an addition to Article XIII. Garthoff said that in that case, the American side was prepared to agree that such an explicit addition to Article XIII would not be necessary. We were prepared to change the word "special" to "deliberate" in Article XII, and at the time that this change was recorded in the Special Working Group Ambassador Parsons would simply make a statement on the record of our understanding that any questions regarding unintentional concealment which hinders verification by national technical means would of course be among the subjects which could be raised in the Standing Consultative Commission in accordance with Article XIII. Grinevsky asked if he understood correctly that the Soviet side would not be called upon to make any statement in that connection. Garthoff noted that there evidently was agreement on the substance of the matter, and that since such was the case and we were merely noting our understanding in this regard, it would not be necessary for the Soviet side to explicitly address the question. Grinevsky expressed satisfaction with this outcome of the problem, and it was agreed that this matter could be dealt with at the next meeting of the Special Working Group.



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#### Future ABM Systems

Grinevsky then asked about the subject of "other" or future ABM systems. Garthoff suggested that before discussing the substance of a formulation, all four participants agree not to leave the table until they had agreed among themselves on a text. This suggestion, made in a light vein, was agreed upon. Garthoff then asked if the Soviet participants had a response to the most recent American suggestions, made on January 21 in response to the Soviet proposal of that date. Kishilov then produced a draft statement, accepting all but one of the earlier American suggestions. point of difference was inclusion of the words "the question of" before "specific limitations". Garthoff then said that he also had a new text to present, one which was in most respects identical with the one which Kishilov and Grinevsky had just provided, but that it did include a few changes from the earlier American proposals. First was an editorial simplification, referring to "the treaty" rather than "the treaty on the limitation of ABM systems". Grinevsky agreed to the change. Second was a change from "and" to "or" in the listing of ABM interceptor missiles, ABM launchers, and ABM radars. Third was the addition for clarification of a clause reading "to perform the functions of ABM interceptor missiles, ABM launchers or ABM radars," as a penultimate clause. The US had no other changes to suggest, but he did ask for the deletion of the words "the question of" from the new Soviet draft. Grinevsky agreed to that deletion, and to the substitution of "or" for "and". He could not, however, agree to the other newly proposed addition, and asked why it had been advanced. Garthoff explained that it was intended to make more precise the intention of the sentence, which he believed both sides shared, that we were talking about future system components which might take the place of ABM interceptor missiles, ABM launchers or ABM radars. He recalled Grinevsky's earlier reference to telescopes supplementing but not supplanting radars, and noted that we believed this additional language would help make more clear that additional elements of such kinds were not the subject of the sentence. Grinevsky said that he now understood, but could state definitely that his Delegation would not wish to make such an addition to the sentence. The American side evidently had not considered such an addition necessary when it provided the earlier formulation, and the Soviet side did not consider it necessary. He noted that the sentence already makes clear that reference is to future ABM system components other than the three indicated in the sentence and in Article II of the treaty. Article II made clear that these are the three components currently comprising ABM systems, and the language under discussion made clear that it was referring to precisely such system components other than the three



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
current ones which were listed. He strongly urged that the American side not pursue this proposed addition. He also commented that his side had now accepted the earlier American formulation completely, and in fact had accepted the American position on the subject entirely, save only that it would be a jointly agreed interpretation rather than a paragraph in the treaty. Garthoff and Parsons agreed to report that fact to the American Delegation, and to seek agreement on the basis proposed. (The text of the agreed formulation is attached as Attachment 1.)

#### OLPARs and MARCs

Grinevsky asked about the American reaction to the "Dvoika" discussion on the preceding day. Garthoff said that the American side had found it useful, and in the context of that discussion he wished now to present a draft agreed minute on OLPARs (see Attachment 2). He noted that this proposal for an agreed interpretive minute or statement was offered as an alternative to Article VI(c) of the draft treaty, taking into account the need for resolving the questions of MARC ABM radar limitations, and agreeing on the deployment radius for ABM radars. The American proposed Article VI(c) would remain in the joint draft text, in brackets, until such time as there would be agreement on such a minute or agreed statement; at that time, Article VI(c) would be supplanted by the agreed language and dropped.

Grinevsky said that, as he understood it, the context of the discussion the day before had included one other element: agreement on MARCs for limiting ABM radars for defense of the national capital, and agreement on a different way of handling ABM radars for defense of ICBM silos. He asked was not the American side in agreement on treating ABM radars for ICBM defense in a different way from MARCs, which would be appropriate for a defense of the capital. Garthoff agreed that the discussion the day before, as he understood it, had included the question of possible difference between handling of ABM radars for NCA defense and defense of ICBM silos. He said that it was not, however, the US position that there should be the kind of difference suggested by the Soviet side; the US side believed the MARC concept was appropriate and applicable both to ABM radars for NCA defense and for ICBM defense.


Garthoff remarked that he was not clear on one point from the Dvoika discussion the day before. Was it the Soviet position that MSRs or MSR level radars could be deployed in unlimited numbers for ABM defense of ICBM silos, or was the MSR radar considered to be in the same category



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as PAR and Spartan interceptors, which would be allowed where they were deployed as an exception. Kishilov said that the PAR and Spartans at Grand Forks could be allowed as an exception if other points were agreed on, the MSR was not in the same category, and it was correct to understand the Soviet position as allowing deployment of an unlimited number of such radars in ABM complexes for ICBM defense. Grinevsky, however, demurred, and said that he thought the MSR was also an exception. Kishilov said he would look into the matter further, and clear up this point.

Turning to the proposed agreed minute on OLPARs, Grinevsky asked how it differed from the early draft agreed minute which Garthoff had given the Soviet side in December. Garthoff noted that, in response to suggestions from the Soviet side, the numerical limit threshold of one million watt meters squared had been removed, and replaced with the level of the MSR radar. Grinevsky asked if the MSR was greater than one million watt meters squared, and Garthoff replied that it was. Grinevsky and Kishilov asked how much greater than a million, saying they needed to know what it represented. Garthoff replied that the aperture power product of the MSR was something between two and three million watt meter squared. Accordingly, in addition to removing a specified numerical level, it raised the threshold for specific limitation on OLPARs. Grinevsky noted that the general formulation also seemed to differ; what was the effect of the change? Garthoff noted that the proposed formuation would single out radars for space-tracking and use as national technical means, and require prior consultation rather than mutual agreement for such radars. Also, because of the greater power of the MSR as compared with one million watt meters squared, radars for other purposes up to the power of an MSR--so long as they were consistent with the limitations of Article VI -- could be deployed without consultation or agreement. At the same time, other radars of this power level or greater would not be deployed. Grinevsky said that he understood that from the text, but was concerned because this would seem to include air defense radars. Garthoff confirmed that it would. Grinevsky stated that, as the American side knew, the Soviet side was strongly opposed to placing any limitations on air defense radars. Grinevsky noted the great importance of Soviet air defense requirements, and the fact that air forces would not be limited. Garthoff and Parsons explained that the US was not placing any limitations on air defense radars as such, and was not seeking to limit Soviet air defenses. Nonetheless, in order to establish and maintain necessary ABM radar constraints, it was necessary to deal with other powerful radars with inherent capability for ABM use. Garthoff noted that the Soviet side had already agreed to restraints on air defense radars and other kinds of radars in Article VI(a) of the Joint Draft Text, to the extent that such radars would not be given capabilities to perform an ABM role or a



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dual air defense and ABM role. Grinevsky acknowledged that fact, but thought that the proposed OLPAR formulation would go beyond that. Garthoff again noted that the new formulation now proposed would permit air defense radars up to well over two million watt meters squared, rather than one million, as earlier proposed. Grinevsky still seemed dubious about the acceptability of the new proposal. Nonetheless, he of course agreed to transmit it to his Delegation for consideration.

#### Non-Transfer

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
Garthoff stated that the American Delegation wished to suggest some purely editorial changes in the agreed statement relating to Article IX of the draft treaty. Grinevsky at first misunderstood, and thought that a change was going to be considered for Article IX itself. He also protested that the interpretive statement concerning non-transfer had been earlier agreed. Garthoff again acknowledged the latter fact, and again stressed that the new language (which he provided in English and Russian) did not affect the substance of the statement, but editorially removed the superfluous repetition of the language of Article IX itself. Grinevsky agreed to transmit the text for consideration by his Delegation. (The revised formulation is attached as Attachment 3.)

# Multi-Warhead Interceptor Missiles

Garthoff stated that, as part of the process of agreeing on certain interpretive statements, the US Delegation would probably raise two or three matters at the next minimplenary meeting on January 28. One of these he now wished to mention, and in fact would provide the text of what we planned to say. It was a subject which the US had addressed once before, on August 17: a ban on ABM interceptor missiles capable of deliverying more than one warhead per missile.

(The statement is attached as Attachment 4.)

Grinevsky and Kishilov said that they did not believe there was any problem on substance, but they did not believe the Soviet Delegation would be in a position to reply on Friday. Garthoff said that it would be desirable if they could, and it was to facilitate consideration by the Soviet side that he was now providing the text in advance. Nonetheless, we could understand if it was necessary for the Soviet Delegation to respond at a later time. The important thing was that we considered the subject to be one that deserved an agreed interpretation on the record, and for that reason we intended now to raise it. The Soviet participants did not comment further, but expressed appreciation for the advance text.



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Garthoff commented that the American Delegation might also make a statement also designed to reach an agreed interpretation on the meaning of mobile land-based ABM systems. (He did not, however, supply a text.) The Soviet participants took note of this point, but it was not discussed further. Garthoff also noted that there might be some additional points of this character which would be raised on Friday or later.

#### National Technical Means of Verification


Garthoff recalled agreement that the US would make an interpretive statement to the effect that use of national technical means of verification would not require changes from current operating practices. He provided the text in English and Russian (see Attachment 5). He asked that the Soviet Delegation consider expressing on the record its agreement with this interpretation. Grinevsky asked if this interpretive statement was necessary. Garthoff replied that we considered that it was, and that it had been agreed earlier, at a time when Grinevsky was absent from the Delegation. Grinevsky and Kishilov acknowledged this fact, but recalled that it had been described as a statement that the US side would place on the record. Garthoff confirmed that fact, but said that he was now suggesting that the Soviet Delegation consider whether it might express agreement on the record, since we understood that there was in fact agreement on the substance of the statement, and that in any case the Soviet sidewould not object. Grinevsky agreed that the Soviet Delegation would consider the matter.

#### Offering of SDO

For completeness, and since the American Delegation might make several of these statements in forthcoming sessions, Garthoff also provided texts in English and Russian (see Attachment 6) of a statement it would make on the offer of selective direct observation. He supposed that it would not be likely that the Soviet Delegation would wish to endorse the American interpretive statement, although it was agreed that it would not object. Grinevsky confirmed that the Soviet Delegation would not wish to endorse the statement, but would not object.

#### Interim Offensive Agreement

Ambassador Parsons suggested that the Special Working Group might meet the next day, hopefully to deal with the future ABM system and concealment questions in the ABM Joint Draft Text, and to consider some aspects of the interim freeze agreement. He said that the American




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side might introduce some amended language into Article II. At first, Grinevsky appeared quite concerned, until he realized that Parsons was speaking about Article II of the offensive agreement and not Article II of the ABM treaty. Garthoff and Parsons asked if the Soviet side would have any new positions to advance on the offensive text. Grinevsky indicated this was unlikely.

Grinevsky raised the question of the language in Article II on not increasing depth and interior diameter of ICBM silos. He asked if that provision were necessary. Garthoff and Parsons assured him that, in the US view, it was. Grinevsky then said that he could understand the point we had in mind as far as interior diameter was concerned, but he wondered whether depth made any difference. He asked if it was really possible to have a much larger missile simply by increasing its length, and after fumbling for an expression suggested it seemed implausible to have a pencil-like missile. Finally, he did not understand how we could tell by national technical means what the depth of a silo was. Garthoff replied that the provision was important, that it was possible to considerably increase the size of a missile by increasing the length, and that we were able through national technical means to monitor increase in depth as well as in interior diameter. Both Grinevsky and Kishilov continued to press on the question of feasibility of checking depth by national technical means. Garthoff replied that that was our problem, and what we were seeking was an appropriate and verifiable limitation to support the undertaking not to convert to modern large ballistic missile launchers. Grinevsky appeared to be genuinely perplexed as to how one could look in and determine the depth of a silo: Garthoff replied that that might not be the way to describe it, but asked if the Soviet participants were suggesting that they would be prepared to accept the provision if we would explain how it could be monitored by national technical means. Grinevsky said that was not what he had in mind, but that the matter had been discussed in their Delegation, and he replied that others more knowledgeable on such matters had questioned the feasibility of monitoring such a provision.

Parsons asked about the definitions on Articles I and II, and recalled our suggestion of possibly avoiding a numerical limitation in describing "heavy" missiles. The Soviet participants did not respond on that point, but Grinevsky did raise the question of the definition of an ICBM. He recalled that the Soviet position throughout SALT had been that an ICBM was a missile capable of striking the national territory of the other side, and that they did not believe it was necessary or appropriate to mention a specific range, such as 5,000 kilometers. He asked whether that was important from the American side. Garthoff and Parsons both replied that the American Delegation did believe that



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the five thousand kilometer definition was the proper definition; for ICBM.

Parsons asked whether the Soviet side would be prepared to address our proposal on test and training launchers at the next meeting of the Special Working Group. Grinevsky said that they would not. He said that he did, however, wish to comment on it. He remarked that, speaking frankly, our substitution of a ten percent increase in place of the quota for each side advanced earlier was not helpful. He said that he had been in touch with Timerbaev by telephone, and he knew unofficially that Moscow preferred the quota over the percentage. He asked if the quota approach could still be used instead of the percentage approach. Garthoff and Parsons said that it could, and asked if the Soviet side was prepared to proceed on that basis. Grinevsky said that he did not think his side would be in a position to do anything on the subject before the recess, but he could state that as far as the basic substance of the matter was concerned, it would not be an obstacle to reaching agreement.

Attachments:

As indicated

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
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Attachment 1

January 26, 1972

# Agreed Interpretive Statement on Future ABM Systems

In order to insure fulfillment of the obligation not to deploy ABM system components except as provided in Article III of the Treaty, it is agreed that in the event ABM system components other than ABM interceptor missiles, ABM launchers, or ABM radars are created in the future, specific limitations on such system components would be subject to discussion in accordance with Article XIII and agreement in accordance with Article XIV of the Treaty.



# SECRET

January 26, 1972

# US Draft Agreed Minute on OLPARs

Phased-array radars of a capability equal to or greater than the U.S. Missile Site Radar (MSR) would not be deployed except as provided for under Articles III, IV and VI of the Treaty, or except for space-tracking or use as national technical means of verification. Prior to deployment of such radars for space tracking or use as national technical means, there would be consultation in the Standing Consultative Commission established under Article XIII.



January 26, 1972

#### U.S. Revised Draft Agreed Statement on Article IX

The two sides understand the obligation of Article IX of the ABM Treaty to mean that neither the U.S. nor the USSR will provide to other countries technical description or blueprints specially worked out for the construction of ABM systems and their components limited by the Treaty.

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By L.J. NARA Date 9/27


January 26, 1972


# Statement on Multi-Warhead ABM Interceptor Missiles

On August 17, 1971, the US side made a statement relating to what is now Para 2 of Article V -- a ban on ABM interceptor missiles capable of delivering more than one warhead per missile.

At that time, we stated: "...the Agreement would place stringent limitations on ABM systems. In particular, it would provide for a complete ban on ABM launchers with a rapid reload capability. In keeping with the intent of this Agreement, we would interpret these limitations to prohibit the development, testing, production, or deployment of ABM interceptor missiles for the delivery of more than one interceptor warhead by each interceptor missile."

We believe there should be an agreed interpretation on this point. Does the Soviet side agree with the view expressed by the US Delegation on August 17, 1971?





January 26, 1972 ?

# U.S. Statement on OPERATION OF NATIONAL TECHNICAL MEANS OF VERIFICATION

It is agreed that each side shall use national technical means of verification at its disposal, in a manner consistent with generally recognized principles of international law.

This obligation will not require changes from current operating practices and procedures with respect to employment of national technical means of verification.

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January 26, 1972

# U.S. Statement on OFFERING OF SELECTIVE DIRECT OBSERVATION

The Standing Consultative Commission, established in accordance with Article XIII of the ABM Treaty, will undertake identical responsibilities with respect to the Interim Agreement on Certain Measures. It is agreed that, in connection with both agreements, each side shall have the option of providing on a voluntary basis information necessary to assure compliance. The U.S. side interprets this option to include the right to offer selective direct observation in order to clarify ambiguous situations.

