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DATE RECEIVED 30 Nov 62

RETURN TO: Office, Chairman, JCS
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DATE OF DOCUMENT 30 Nov 62

SUBJECT:

Letter to Mr. James T. Kendall, Chief Counsel, Preparedness Investigating Subcommittee

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D R A F T

CM-

MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

Subject: Letter to Mr. James T. Kendall, Chief Counsel
Preparedness Investigating Subcommittee

Attached is a proposed letter to Mr. James Kendall, in connection with deceptive activities in Cuba. Its signature is recommended.

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DRAFT

DECLASSIFICATION BY JOINT STAFF

DATE: SEP 29 2000

Mr. James T. Kendall, Chief Counsel
Preparedness Investigating Subcommittee
United States Senate Committee on Armed Services
Washington 25, D. C.

Dear Mr. Kendall:

Senator Stennis, in his letter of 23 November, asked that I make a classified reply to you concerning measures which he suggested be undertaken to hasten the end of Communist control in Cuba.

Training exercises of the deceptive type described by the Senator have given abundant proof of their worth in the past. In World War II the intensive training of our large airborne formations in the British Isles kept the German Army in France continually apprehensive and off balance, and caused them to expend their resources unnecessarily. Likewise, following the Korean conflict, evidence of active training on the part of one U.S. amphibious division in Okinawa absorbed the attention of some twelve Chinese Communist divisions, which were committed exclusively to beach defense tasks on the Chinese mainland.

Similar deceptive procedures were again called upon in the current Cuban situation to provide meaningful clues to Castro and to the USSR. Classifying this reply will permit a presentation of the concept of those actions taken in the Cuban situation involving logistic buildup, tactical deployments and troop training which were employed to signal U.S. intent, either deceptive or real as the situation called for, to the intelligence mechanisms of Cuba and the Soviet Union.

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When the Soviet military activities in Cuba came to be viewed by us as considerably more than a simple defensive development, it was decided to signal, through deceptive means, that our military interest in Cuba was increasing. Increased naval activity in the area was portrayed by the rerouting of traffic transiting the Caribbean from Roosevelt Roads through the Windward Passage. Similarly, an increase in tactical air traffic in the area was high-lighted by rerouting it so that it would reflect on inquisitive Communist radars. These indicators were reinforced further by the conduct of joint, land, sea and air training exercises in the Caribbean and southeastern United States.

As our intelligence information continued to confirm the offensive buildup in Cuba, we increased the tempo of our military training activity in this area and initiated an actual logistical buildup at selected key points on the east coast for possible use in any required military action in Cuba.

Subsequent to the President's declaration on 22 October actions were taken openly to deploy land, sea and air forces with their associated equipment, to forward debarkation points for possible immediate intervention in Cuba. This included the withdrawal of military dependents from the Guantanamo Naval Base, suspension of discharges and the call-up of certain Reserve units. This was intended to exemplify further our resolution and our determination to invade Cuba, if necessary to accomplish our national objectives.

It is obvious that these overt actions had an effect upon the Soviet and Cuban intelligence apparatus, in that they portrayed our intent to use military forces to the extent necessary in support of our national policy. Cuban regular and militia forces were brought to the maximum war readiness of which they were capable and, as the Senator suggests, the reaction on economy and day-to-day activity in the country was great.

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Now the President has taken open and publicized steps to diminish certain elements of our high readiness posture, as an exhibition of our willingness to participate in a mutual relaxation of tensions. At the same time, military training exercises, of the exact type which Senator Stennis suggested in his letter, are being conducted not only to exercise and train our forces, but to portray to the Communist Bloc that we remain firm in the determination that our essential objectives shall be fully met. These military exercises run the full gamut of tactical operations, and cannot fail to have an effect upon both the judgements and the responsive military training activities of the Castro regime. In this regard, we are mindful, as are they, of the insular nature of Cuba, and of its remoteness from its well-spring of Soviet military equipment and supplies. Thus, as our own training activities cause the Cubans to expend their materiel and to consume the limited resources which the Soviets have given them, there must be a ponderable increase in the cost of the Cuban adventure to the Soviet Union as well as a growing strain on the Cubans' own economy.

From all of this, it will be plain that we share with the Senator a respect for the usefulness of delusive actions in dealing with the international intelligence apparatus. Having exhibited an interest in this area of activity, it may be that the Senator will desire to know more regarding our techniques. The Joint Chiefs of Staff maintains an element in the Joint Staff whose purpose is to devise and coordinate actions of the type under discussion here. When convenient to you or upon Senator Stennis' return to Washington, I will be happy to have an officer from that activity elaborate further upon the procedures which we follow, and to discuss events which are then current.

Meanwhile, please forward my appreciation to the Senator for his suggestions. With all good wishes, I remain

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turn to Correspondence Control, OSD, Room 3A948, by 11:AM

DEC 3 1962

DAILY REPORT ON OVERDUE CORRESPONDENCE

WHY OVERDUE AND DATE WHEN
ACTION WILL BE COMPLETED

ITEM

FROM STENNIS, John		USS	CONTROL NO. 11389	
DATE 20 Nov 62	F	NO. OF CYS. 1	FILE NO. <i>11174-2</i>	
ADD. LA-DOD	C	11174-2		
CR. CUBA			1st SUSPENSE DATE	2nd SUSPENSE DATE
CR. COMMUNIST CONTROL			29 Nov	
TO LA HC	Ack 28 Nov	JCS HC		
DATE 23 Nov		28 Nov		
FOR FAA	File 28 Nov	PRFSDSD		
INFO. Cy Dir HC, ADSEC, DSD, File (routing per Mr Wright)				
SUBJ.				

Makes reference to Ltr received in response to his Ltr of 13 Nov 62 regarding measures to hasten the end of communist control of Cuba. Requests a classified reply be prepared and sent to the attention of Mr Kendall when it is completed.

NUMERICAL

(SIGNATURE)