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3THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF  
THE JOINT STAFF  
WASHINGTON 25, D. C.J-5 794-62  
29 October 1962

## MEMORANDUM FOR THE DIRECTOR, JOINT STAFF

Subject: Checklist of Operation Raincoat (U)

1. Submitted for your information is a check list of actions to be taken beginning at Strike Hour (S) minus 48 hours which was prepared by the Department of State in collaboration with OSD/ISA. Its purpose is to provide a list of actions which should be taken in connection with the implementation of the subject operation to eliminate by direct means the IREMs and MRBMs in Cuba.
2. The list of actions set forth in the subject plan are considered feasible, appropriate and timely if modified as indicated by the proposed Joint Staff changes.
3. The modifications proposed by the Joint Staff have been furnished to OSD/ISA.
4. At one time this paper was being given considerable impetus as to the actions to be taken prior to initiation of a military operation. Obviously, its importance has diminished, but it might be worthwhile for the Chiefs to review it at their convenience.

PAUL S. EMRICK  
Major General, USAF  
Director for Plans and Policy

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E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.3

NW 34082  
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STATE DEPARTMENT DRAFTOPERATION RAINCOAT

The objective of this operation is to eliminate the MRBM's and IRBM's in Cuba by:

a. A sequence of actions oriented toward Cuba that will increase pressure on the Soviets and the Cuban regime to dismantle and remove them; failing that

b. To destroy them in an air attack.

The major prerequisites before a decision to strike at S-12 hours are as follows:

a. A veto of the US resolution in the Security Council.

b. Evidence that no major actions are being made to dismantle the MRBM's, IRBM's and IL-28's in Cuba.

c. The rejection, or low probability of implementation of the US version of the Latin American nuclear free zone proposal.

~~TOP SECRET~~TOP SECRET - SENSITIVEThe Problem of Timing

Some problems in warning of use of force against offensive systems and the timing of action:

In favor of visible crescendo pointing towards air strike;

1. We would like to have prior consultation with Allies.
2. We would like to have increasing pressure succeed in removing build-up prior to strike.

In favor of generalized pressure not specifically keyed to air strike:

3. We would like to have good security for military reasons.
4. We would like to preempt commitments by Khrushchev.

To have thorough consultation risks letting Soviets and Cubans learn of the operation. They could take military action to lessen its effectiveness and increase our losses; prior launch of some of their aircraft and conceivably a few missiles in attack on the US is conceivable. Politically the Soviets could bring strong pressures to bear by quickly announced threats or commitments.

To omit consultation risks a disunited Alliance at the very time when unity may be most essential. If the major Allies lack the sensation of having been heard before final decision were taken, and especially if the Soviets react in Europe, we are open to the serious charge of unilateral recklessness if the outcome does not at once look hopeful. Should Berlin access be blocked following a Cuba strike about which we had not consulted, there is a real risk that we might not get the contingency plans executed in a way convincing to the Soviets.

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TIME TABLE

<u>Time</u>	<u>Political Action</u>	<u>Military Action</u>	<u>Responsibility</u>
S-48 hours or earlier	1. Letter to Castro to be delivered by Brazilian Ambassador		State
	2. Statement to Dobrynin that intolerable build ups continuing and that those involved in Cuba may suffer.		State
	3. OAS request US act as agent for OAS to continue surveillance and help OAS evaluate threat.		White House
	4. White House statement that offensive build up continuing; dangerous and provocative act which increases gravity of situation. State instruct embassies to follow up		White House
		5. Advise <u>CINCEUR</u> all unified and <u>specified commanders</u> concerning possible US actions, likely timing results expected and schedule of notifications and consultations with NATO governments, ask for recommendations about USG action to facilitate NATO readiness.	
	<p><u>REASON:</u> All commanders particularly CINCSAC, CINCLANT, CINCARIB and USCINCEUR should be thoroughly apprised of the course of action contemplated in Operation RAINCOAT. Decision as to the need for recommendations for increasing readiness in NATO, SEATO or other areas/alliances should be left to the Joint Chiefs of Staff.</p>		
	6. Consult with (i.e., advise concerning latest intelligence, range of possible US actions, and results expected) the following:		
	a. UK, France, FRG		
	b. Canada		

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|-----------------------------|--|-------------|
|                             | 7. Inform CINCEUR concerning nature and timing of operation. Authorize CINCEUR to place USEUCOM on appropriate NATO alert at S-hour but not more than measures contained in Defcon.  | DOD         |
| S-36                        | 8. Consult with Quadripartite Group, NAC and OAS on continuing US concern about weapons in Cuba; latest evidence of continued construction; negotiation track being pursued but not promising; have communicated with Castro; restate determination to remove weapons.   | State       |
| S-24<br>hours or<br>earlier | 9. Rejection, or low probability of implementation in Cuba of US version of nuclear free zone proposal.  | State       |
|                             | 10. Veto of US resolution in Security Council.   | State       |
|                             | 11. Leaflet-drop in Cuba-warning Cubans to stay clear of missile-sites.  | DOD         |
|                             | REASON: Execution of a leaflet drop in Cuba with the attendant possibility of the loss of the delivery aircraft is militarily unsound at this point. Loss of the aircraft over Cuba would provide the Cubans with propaganda that could defeat the objectives of Operation RAINCOAT. It further might trigger off overt action against the US by the Cubans. Instead of the leaflet drop, we should use radio for greater coverage of Cuba and announce to the Cubans that they should stay clear of all military installations rather than missile sites, as proposed in the paper. |             |
|                             | 12.11. Summon Congressional Leaders to Washington.   | White House |
| <u>S-12</u>                 | 13.12. Appropriate military alerts in US and abroad  | DOD         |
| S-12                        | 14.13. Inform Standing Group of military readiness measures being taken by US forces.  | DOD         |

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	22. <u>21</u> . Inform of nature of operation: a. All other NATO governments b. NAC	State
S-hour	23. <u>22</u> . Air strike against all known MRBM and IREB sites followed immediately by low level recce; have follow up strike in air ready for release.	DOD
	24. <u>23</u> . Notify Dobrynin of attack	State
	25. <u>24</u> . Notify Ambassadorial representative at UN	State
	26. <u>25</u> . Briefing of Latin Ambassadors.	State
	27. <u>26</u> . Briefing of NATO Ambassadors	State
	28. <u>27</u> . Call for Security Council Meeting that afternoon	State
	29. <u>28</u> . Briefing of Congressional leadership	White House, State, DOD
S+1	30. <u>29</u> . Brief, public announcement of fact of attack and preliminary results	White House
S+4	31. <u>30</u> . Inform Standing Group, Military Committee and UK, French and FRG Ambassadors of details of results.	State, DOD
	32. <u>31</u> . Inform Congressional Leadership of details of results	State DOD
	33. <u>32</u> . Presidential announcement of attack and results	White House
	34. <u>33</u> . Leaflet drop in Cuba stressing fact that attack limited to Soviet bases; weakness of Soviet strength in Cuba.	DOD
S+14	35. <u>34</u> . Briefing in friendly capitals in Western Europe	State
	36. <u>35</u> . Briefing for CENTO	State

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37-36. Continue DOD  
military preparedness  
measures to include  
deployments recom-  
mended by SACEUR and  
agreed by the United  
States.

S+14

38-37. Meeting of OAS fol-  
lowed by Organ of Con-  
sultation Meeting

State

39-38. Meeting of Security  
Council at which US repre-  
sentative would pursuant to  
Article 54 of the Charter  
inform the Security Council  
of the action taken.

State



~~TOP SECRET - SENSITIVE~~ADVANTAGES OF THIS COURSE

1. Carries out President's pledge to eliminate offensive threat to US and Hemisphere from Cuba and avoids any erosion of US momentum and position. The pledge carried out shows that US has will to fight and to protect vital interests (of great importance vis-a-vis Berlin).

2. Since directed at offensive weapons, keeps issue focused on Soviet nuclear presence in Cuba in defiance of OAS and majority of Security Council.

3. Sharp, possible one time action, may carry smaller risks of further escalation than a series of confrontations over a period of time. Soviet decision to risk major war unlikely to be decisively affected by this action in an area non-vital to the Soviets.

4. Prompt action will avoid danger of a growth of hands-off Cuba movement throughout Latin America which might make it increasingly difficult to strike at offensive weapons. Present willingness of Latin Americans to support strong action probably cannot be maintained indefinitely.

5. Signals clearly that US not prepared to bargain bases in Cuba for positions in Berlin, Nato and elsewhere.

6. It could demonstrate to Cubans, Castro and others, the weakness of Soviet position in Cuba. In the absence of a strong Soviet reaction in defense of Cuba, we would start the process of disenchantment and disaffection requisite to undermining Castro and Cuban reliance on the Soviet Union. We would also weaken any tendencies to rely on Soviets elsewhere in world.

7. Removes a military threat to US from Cuban territory.

8. Denies Khrushchev a possible cheap victory through successful maintenance of offensive weapons in Cuba.

9. Pressure preceding strike may be sufficient to accomplish objective without execution of attack - especially if a suitable out available to Khrushchev and Castro.

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1. This action may force Khrushchev to react strongly and could result in some type of war. Khrushchev will not order launch of a missile from Cuba unless he is ready for war essentially on other grounds. There is greater likelihood of a riposte in kind. However, it is unlikely that the risks of major war are greater than through escalation of blockade.
2. There is remote possibility that some local Soviet commander in Cuba may order firing of a missile.
3. Adverse effect on US image of initiation of use of force against a small country. This can be minimized by making attack selective and focused solely on Soviet offensive weapons. At same time there would be positive increments to our image from demonstration of clear willingness to take on the Soviets in protection of our vital interests.
4. Unless carefully handled could damage long-range US-Cuban relations.
5. May not totally eliminate offensive weapons thus calling for follow up attacks and/or invasion, unless full and unlimited international inspection is agreed to.