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DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF MESSAGE CENTER

PTTCZYUW RUESGTA2714 1062230
PRIORITY/ROUTINE
P R 162040Z APR 82

APR 20 1982

DIA NIS-28

TO DIA WASH DC

INFO DIA WASH DC//DB-3E/DB-3E2/OS-1/JST-4B//
SECSTATE WASHDC DA WASH DC//DAMI-ISH/FII//
HQ USAF WASH DC//XOCDM// USCINCSO QUARRY HTS PW//SCJ2//
NAOIS INTEL CEM SCOTT AFB IL//BNW//
CNO WASH DC//OP-098// CINCLANT NORFOLK VA
COMUSFORCARIIB KEY WEST FL
USCINCPAC HAWAII AFB HI//RCJ2//
CDR470NIGP FT CLAYTON PW//IAGPP-PW//
COR193INF8DE (PAR) FT CLAYTON PW//ANZU-DS//
USDAO MEXICO CITY M7 USDAO TEGUCIGALPA HD
USDAO PANAMA CITY PW USDAO SAN SALVADOR ES
COR JSOC FT BRAGG NC//J-2//

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DIA FOR IR BRANCH

SUBJ: IR [REDACTED] GUATEMALA/CONTINUING MANIPULATIONS
WITH IN THE ARMED FORCES (U)

THIS IS AN INFO REPORT, NOT FINALLY EVALUATED INTEL

1. (U) CTRY: GUATEMALA (GT)
2. (U) IR NO: [REDACTED]
3. (U) TITLE: CONTINUING MANIPULATIONS WITHIN THE ARMED FORCES
4. (U) DATE OF INFO: 820413
5. (U) ORIG: SEE FM LINE
6. (U) REQ REFS: [REDACTED]
7. (U) SOURCE: [REDACTED]

B. ~~(UNFORM)~~ SUMMARY: APPROXIMATELY 300 OFFICERS HAVE ALREADY BEEN REASSIGNED WITHIN THE ARMED FORCES AND ANOTHER 100 ARE EXPECTED TO BE TRANSFERRED WITHIN THE NEXT 30-45 DAYS. THESE MASSIVE OFFICER REASSIGNMENTS ARE PART OF BG JOSE (FRAN) RIOS' MONTI'S PLAN TO CONSOLIDATE HIS POWER BASE WITHIN THE ARMED FORCES AND DIFFUSE ALLEGED COUNTERCOUP PROTAGONISTS. DISSATISFACTION WITHIN SEGMENTS OF THE JUNIOR OFFICER CORPS CONTINUES. HOWEVER, THIS DISCONTENT IS DIVIDED AMONG TWO DIFFERENT GROUPS: (1) THOSE JUNIOR OFFICERS WHO SUPPORTED THE COUP AND WHO BELIEVE THAT BG RIOS IS VACILLATING OVER NEW ELECTION DATES, AND (2) THOSE JUNIOR OFFICERS WHO DID NOT SUPPORT THE COUP AND HAVE SINCE LOST THEIR "CUSHY" JOBS. BOTH GROUPS ARE ALLEGEDLY BEING COURTED BY MEMBERS OF THE MOVIMIENTO DE LIBERACION NACIONAL (MLA) POLITICAL PARTY WHO HOPE

ACTION DC-4(*) DIA(*) (U, E, F, R, F)
INFO WIDS(*) J3:NMCC(*) J5(*) RJTF:LO(*) OPG-3PG(*)
SECDEF:(*) SECDEF(*) USDP(**) ASD:PAR(*) DT-1(*)
NMIC(*) RT5-28(1) RDN-281(*) OS-14(*) SWS(*)
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+CMC CC WASHINGTON DC
+DIRNSA F: GEORGE G MEADE MD

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TO FIRST DIVIDE THE ARMED FORCES AND THEN TAKE OVER THE REINS OF GOVERNMENT WHEN THE JUNTA FALLS. DESPITE THIS CONTINUING DISSENSION, THE HIERARCHICAL CHAIN-OF-COMMAND APPEARS TO BE REESTABLISHING ITSELF, AND DISCIPLINE WITHIN THE ARMED FORCES IN GENERAL AND AMONG JUNIOR OFFICERS IN PARTICULAR HAS NOT POSED A SERIOUS PROBLEM AS OF YET. FINALLY, BG RIOS ALLEGEDLY MET WITH POLITICAL PARTY REPRESENTATIVES DURING THE FIRST WEEK OF APRIL TO OFFER THEM THE OPPORTUNITY TO REVISE THE ELECTORA LAW AND THAT HE (BG RIOS) WOULD GUARANTEE THAT ELECTIONS WOULD BE HELD SIX MONTHS FROM THE DATE THAT THEY (POLITICAL PARTIES) PRESENTED REVISIONS IN WHICH THEY ALL CONCORDED.

9. ~~(UNFORM)~~ DETAILS: (ENTIRE TEXT CONFIDENTIAL/UNFORM)
(1) OFFICER CORPS REASSIGNMENTS: SINCE THE 23 MARCH COUP D'ETAT BG JOSE (FRAN) RIOS' MONTI HAS ATTEMPTED TO CONSOLIDATE HIS POWER BASE WITHIN THE ARMED FORCES THROUGH LARGE SCALE OFFICER REASSIGNMENTS. TO DATE, APPROXIMATELY 300 OFFICERS HAVE BEEN TRANSFERRED WITH 170 OF THESE INCLUDED IN THE MINISTRY OF DEFENSE (MOD) GENERAL ORDER NUMBER 10 WHICH WAS RELEASED ON 12 APRIL. ALLEGEDLY, APPROXIMATELY 100 MORE OFFICERS WILL BE SHIFTED WITHIN THE NEXT MONTH TO COMPLETE THE MASSIVE REORGANIZATIONAL PLAN. IN ADDITION, ORDER NUMBER 10 SUPPOSEDLY INCLUDES THE REASSIGNMENT OF SEVERAL OFFICERS WHO WERE STRONGLY TIED TO PRESIDENT FERNANDO ROMEO (LUCAS) GARCIA'S GOVERNMENT AND WHO HAD MANAGED TO RETAIN THEIR JOBS FOLLOWING THE COUP, THEREBY RAISING THE IRE OF MANY JUNIOR OFFICERS WHO FELT THAT THESE OFFICERS SHOULD HAVE BEEN IMMEDIATELY REASSIGNED ON 23 MARCH. AT LEAST TWO OF THE AFOREMENTIONED "LUCAS" CLIQUE OFFICERS, COLONEL HECTOR ISMAEL (MONTALVAN) BATRES, FORMER CHIEF, PRESIDENTIAL STAFF; AND COLONEL AUGUSTO ANTONIO (BATRES) BARREDA, FORMER DIRECTOR, CIVIL AVIATION, ARE ALSO RELATED (THROUGH MARRIAGE) TO BG RIOS, WHICH PROMPTED SOME JUNIOR OFFICERS INITIALLY TO ACCUSE THE JUNTA PRESIDENT OF NEPOTISM WHEN THESE OFFICERS RETAINED THEIR POSITIONS FOLLOWING THE COUP. COL MONTALVAN IS NOW ALLEGEDLY SLATED TO ATTEND THE INTER-AMERICAN DEFENSE COLLEGE, WASHINGTON, DC WHILE COL BATRES REMAINS TEMPORARILY UNASSIGNED, TO AVOID ANY FURTHER DISSENT BG RIOS MADE SEVERAL CHANGES TO ORDER NUMBER 10, ALLEGEDLY REMOVING THE NAMES OF OTHER FAMILY MEMBERS WHO HAD BEEN ASSIGNED TO "KEY" POSITIONS (MFI). FINALLY, ORDER NUMBER 10 INCLUDES THE REASSIGNMENT OF ALL SIX JUNTA ADVISERS TO ESTABLISHED MILITARY BILLETTS, THEREBY EFFECTIVELY ENDING THIS GROUP'S ADVISORY ROLE TO THE JUNTA. A SEPARATE GENERAL ORDER WILL SUPPOSEDLY BE PUBLISHED LATER THIS MONTH OFFICIALLY TERMINATING THE TITLES AND POSITIONS OF "JUNTA ADVISERS." TWO OF THE SIX ADVISERS WILL BE REASSIGNED AS FOLLOWS: COLONEL VICTOR MANUEL (ARGUETA) VILLALTA, CHIEF, PRESIDENTIAL STAFF, AND FIRST CAPTAIN CARLOS RODOLFO (MUNOZ) PILONA, S-3 OFFICER, PRESIDENTIAL STAFF. THE ELIMINATION OF THE JUNTA ADVISER POSITIONS WAS THE DECISION OF BG RIOS WHO HAD ALLEGEDLY BECOME IRRITATED BY THE CONSTANT DEMANDS PRESENTED BY THIS GROUP WHICH WAS ACTING AS THE PRINCIPAL VOICE OF THE JUNIOR OFFICER CORPS. INITIALLY, BG RIOS COUTIFULLY LISTENED TO THE DIVERSIFIED POINTS OF VIEW PRESENTED BY THE SIX-MAN GROUP; HOWEVER, AT RECENT JUNTA MEETINGS BG RIOS HAS HAD TO USE HIS MILITARY SENIORITY AND POSITION AS JUNTA PRESIDENT TO TERMINATE DISCUSSIONS WHEN THE ADVISORY GROUP ATTEMPTED TO PRESSURE THE JUNTA INTO ACCEPTING THEIR WISHES. AS THE GROUP CONTINUED TO CHALLENGE HIS AUTHORITY AND DISRUPT MEETINGS, THE GENERAL DECIDED TO TERMINATE THE "RULE BY COMMITTEE" PROCESS AND REASSIGN ALL SIX OFFICERS.

(2) DISSATISFACTION CONTINUES: AT THE PRESENT THERE ARE TWO SEGMENTS OF THE JUNIOR OFFICER CORPS THAT REMAIN DISPLEASED WITH THE STATUS QUD. ONE GROUP IS MADE UP OF JUNIOR OFFICERS WHO SUPPORTED THE COUP BUT WHO DO NOT BELIEVE THAT BG RIOS AND THE JUNTA ARE MOVING QUICKLY ENOUGH TOWARDS NEW ELECTIONS. THESE OFFICERS ARE CONCERNED THAT THE 606 JUNTA GOVERNMENT IN GENERAL AND BG RIOS IN PARTICULAR ARE SETTLING IN FOR A LONG STAY IN POWER. WHILE THESE SAME OFFICERS NOW REALIZE THAT THEIR INITIAL HOPE FOR ELECTIONS WITHIN 30-60 DAYS WAS UNREALISTIC, THEY ARE NOT PREDISPOSED TO ACCEPT A 2-3 YEAR WAIT FOR A CIVILIAN GOVERN

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MENT. SUPPOSEDLY, A SPOKESMAN FOR THIS GROUP TOLD [REDACTED] "WE STAGED THIS COUP TO STOP ANOTHER MILITARY MAN FROM ASSUMING POWER ("CONTINUISHO") AND NOT SIMPLY TO REPLACE HIM WITH OTHER MILITARY MEN." THE SECOND GROUP OF ANGRY JUNIOR OFFICERS IS ALLEGEDLY MADE UP OF 46 CAPTAINS/LIEUTENANTS WHO WERE FORMERLY ASSIGNED TO THE PRESIDENTIAL STAFF AND GUARD WHO HAVE LOST THEIR "CUSHY" JOBS AND ARE TO BE SUPPOSEDLY REASSIGNED TO TACTICAL UNITS. THIS GROUP MET WITH BG RIGGS ON 1-2 APRIL AND PRESENTED A LIST OF DEMANDS (NFI) WHICH, IF NOT ACCEPTED, WOULD RESULT IN THE GROUP SUBMITTING THEIR RESIGNATIONS IN MASS. IF NEITHER THE DEMANDS NOR RESIGNATIONS WERE ACCEPTED THEM BG RIGGS WOULD BE RESPONSIBLE FOR THE "ACTIVE RESISTANCE" (NFI) THAT WOULD FOLLOW. BG RIGGS ALLEGEDLY RESPONDED THAT HE WOULD NEITHER ACCEPT BT

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SECSTATE WASHDC DA WASH DC//DAMI-ISH/FII//
HQ USAF WASH DC//XDXKX// USCINCSO QUARRY HTS PN//SCJ2//
MACOS INTEL CEN SCOTT AFB IL//INW//
CNO WASH DC//OP-009// CINCLANT NORFOLK VA
COMUSFORCARTB KEY WEST FL
USCINCPAC HONOLULU HI//RCJ2//
CDR470WIGP FT CLAYTON PN//AGPP-PR//
CDR191INFBD (PAN) FT CLAYTON PN//ANZU-DS//
USDAO MEXICO CITY MX USDAO TEGUCIGALPA HD
USDAO PANAMA CITY PN USDAO SAN SALVADOR ES
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THEIR DEMANDS NOR ACCEPT THEIR RESIGNATIONS AND IF THERE WAS ANY ATTEMPTED RESISTANCE ON THEIR PART TO COMPLY WITH ORDERS ISSUED BY THE JUNTA THEY WOULD BE PUNISHED TO THE FULL EXTENT OF THE LAW.

[REDACTED]

BOTH DISSATISFIED GROUPS APPEAR TO BE MADE UP OF JUNIOR OFFICERS FROM UNITS IN AND NEAR THE CAPITAL CITY. OFFICERS OF UNITS OUTSIDE THE CAPITAL HAVE NOT INTERESTED THEMSELVES WITH THE ONGOING POLITICAL BATTLES BUT ARE ANXIOUS TO RESUME MILITARY OPERATIONS AGAINST THE GUERRILLAS BEFORE THEY (GUERRILLAS) CAN FULLY TAKE ADVANTAGE OF THE RECENT "LULL" IN THE MILITARY'S PROSECUTION OF THE WAR. BG RIOS CONSIDERS THAT THE FIRST WEEK TO TEN DAYS FOLLOWING THE ISSUANCE OF ORDER NUMBER 10 WILL BE CRITICAL AND MAY WELL DETERMINE IF THE GOG JUNTA GOVERNMENT WILL SURVIVE IN THE NEAR TERM. DURING THIS PERIOD, THE LARGE NUMBER OF OFFICERS (170) REASSIGNED BY ORDER NUMBER 10 WILL BE REQUIRED TO REPORT TO THEIR NEW ASSIGNMENTS. IF GROUPS OF OFFICERS REFUSE TO OBEY THE GENERAL ORDER, IT COULD PRECIPITATE A VIOLENT CONFRONTATION OR AT THE VERY LEAST CAUSE A SERIOUS BREAKDOWN IN MILITARY DISCIPLINE, WHICH WOULD SHARPLY DIVIDE THE MILITARY AND GREATLY BENEFIT THE GUERRILLAS. DESPITE THE AFOREMENTIONED CONSEQUENCES, BG RIOS WAS CONFIDENT THAT THE ORDER WOULD BE OBEYED, AND ALTHOUGH THE "GRUNBLING" WOULD CONTINUE, NO CONFRONTATION WOULD TAKE PLACE. HE (RIOS) WAS ALSO CERTAIN THAT THE RECENT OFFICIAL VISITS MADE BY MEMBERS OF THE JUNTA TO ALL THE MAJOR MILITARY GARRISONS WAS BENEFICIAL IN AIDING THE OFFICER CORPS TO BETTER UNDERSTAND THE OBJECTIVES OF THE NEW GOVERNMENT AND THE IMPENDING LARGE-SCALE TRANSFERS.

(3) MLN AGITATION: THE MOVIMIENTO DE LIBERACION NACIONAL (MLN)

ACTION DC-4(*) DIA(*) (I,M)
INFO WIDS(*) JJ:NMCC(*) JS(*) R0JTF:LO(*) OPG-JPGI(*)
SECDEF:(*) SECDEF(*) USDP(**) ASD:PA&E(*) O1-1(*)
NMIC(*) RTS-2B(1) RCM-2B1(*) OS-31(*) SMS(*)
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DB-3E(*) DB-3E2(*) DB-4A(*) DB-5D(*) DB-1E(*)
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+CIA WASHINGTON DC
+DWC DC WASHINGTON DC
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POLITICAL PARTY HAVING BEEN EFFECTIVELY EXCLUDED FROM ANY POSITION OF INFLUENCE BY BG RIOS HAS ATTEMPTED TO TAKE ADVANTAGE OF THE ONGOING CONTROVERSY WITHIN THE JUNIOR OFFICER CORPS BY ACTIVELY PURSUING BOTH GROUPS (PARA 2) OF DISSATISFIED OFFICERS. MLN GOALS ARE TO BRING DOWN THE JUNTA AND HAVE THEIR OWN LEADERS INSERTED INTO POSITIONS OF POWER. MLN REPRESENTATIVES HAVE ENCOURAGED THE GROUP OF JUNIOR OFFICERS WHO SUPPORTED THE COUP BUT ARE NOW UNHAPPY WITH THE PERCEIVED DELAY IN ANNOUNCING ELECTORAL DATES TO PETITION THE JUNTA TO ANNOUNCE AN ELECTORAL TIMETABLE SO THAT THE PEOPLE OF GUATEMALA WILL NOT LOSE THEIR NEW-FOUND RESPECT FOR THE MILITARY. SINCE ONE OF THE MAJOR REASONS FOR THE COUP WAS TO INSERT A "CIVILIAN GOVERNMENT," THE JUNIOR OFFICERS HAD EVERY RIGHT TO DEMAND THAT THE JUNTA CONSIDER THIS A FIRST PRIORITY. IF THE JUNTA DOES NOT WORK TOWARD THIS END IMMEDIATELY, THEN THE JUNIOR OFFICERS HAVE BEEN BETRAYED AND HAVE EVERY RIGHT TO REMOVE THE JUNTA AND REPLACE IT WITH OTHER PEOPLE (READ MLN) WHO WOULD ORGANIZE FREE ELECTIONS IN THE NEAR TERM. REGARDING THE SECOND GROUP OF OFFICERS WHO (1) DID NOT SUPPORT THE COUP, (2) HAVE SINCE LOST THEIR "CUSHY" JOBS, AND (3) HAVE NOW BEEN TRANSFERRED TO TACTICAL UNITS, MLN REPRESENTATIVES HAVE TRIED TO CURRY THEIR FAVOR BY STATING THAT THE MASS TRANSFERS WERE NOT FAIR, THAT THESE JUNIOR OFFICERS HAD BEEN FAITHFULLY FOLLOWING THE ORDERS OF THEIR SENIORS AND SHOULD THEREFORE NOT BE PUNISHED FOR THE CORRUPT ACTS OF OTHERS, AND THAT THESE TRANSFERS WERE JUST A WAY FOR THE JUNTA MEMBERS TO ENSURE THAT THEY COULD STAY IN POWER BY SURROUNDING THEMSELVES WITH THEIR OWN PEOPLE. THEREFORE, THE OFFICERS HAD EVERY RIGHT NOT TO ACCEPT THEIR ORDERS AND DEMAND THAT THEY NOT BE MADE TO SUFFER FOR THE MISDEEDS OF OTHERS. BY SHOWING FAVOR FOR BOTH SIDES THE MLN HOPES TO CREATE A SCHISM WITHIN THE JUNIOR OFFICER CORPS, BRING DOWN THE JUNTA, AND THEN HAVE THE JUNIOR OFFICERS COME TO THE MLN TO FORM A NEW GOVERNMENT.

(4) MILITARY DISCIPLINE: ONE OF THE MAJOR CONCERNS OF SENIOR OFFICERS WITHIN THE ARMED FORCES FOLLOWING THE 23 MARCH COUP WAS HOW EVENTS OF THAT DAY WOULD AFFECT DISCIPLINE AND RESPECT FOR AUTHORITY. THERE WAS NO QUESTION THAT FOR THE FIRST WEEK FOLLOWING THE COUP MILITARY DISCIPLINE BROKE DOWN. THE REFUSAL BY SOME UNITS TO ACCEPT NEWLY NAMED COMMANDERS TOGETHER WITH ISOLATED INCIDENTS OF JUNIORS VERBALLY ABUSING SENIORS WERE EXAMPLES OF THE INITIAL DISCIPLINE PROBLEMS ENCOUNTERED. HOWEVER, DURING THE LAST TWO WEEKS RESPECT FOR THE CHAIN OF COMMAND APPEARED TO BE RETURNING, AND INCIDENTS SUCH AS THOSE MENTIONED ABOVE HAD NOT REOCCURRED. THE INITIAL PROBLEM AND GRADUAL RETURN TO NORMALCY TO TWO FACTORS: FIRST, THE SUCCESS OF THE COUP GAVE THE JUNIOR OFFICERS A SENSE OF POWER OVER THEIR SUPERIORS. THIS WAS TRANSLATED INTO HOSTILITY TOWARDS SENIOR OFFICERS, ESPECIALLY THOSE BELIEVED TO BE CORRUPT AND/OR POOR COMMANDERS. HOWEVER, AS THE JUNTA CONTINUED MAKING COMMAND CHANGES AND THE INITIAL EUPHORIA OF 23 MARCH 82 -2-6, THE JUNIOR OFFICERS BEGAN TO FALL BACK INTO LINE. SECOND, BG RIOS VISITED MOST CUARTELS AND SPOKE TO BOTH JUNIORS AND SENIORS, EMPHASIZING THE NEED FOR OBEYANCE OF ORDERS AND RESPECT FOR AUTHORITY. HE ALSO STATED HE WOULD NOT TOLERATE CONTINUING DISOBEDIENCE AND THAT HE WOULD PERSONALLY SEE TO IT THAT ANY OFFICER WHO DISOBEYED LAWFUL ORDERS FROM A SUPERIOR WOULD BE PROSECUTED ACCORDINGLY. SUPPOSEDLY, BG RIOS' COMMENTS HAD SOMEWHAT OF A SOBERING EFFECT ON THE JUNIOR OFFICERS AND GREATLY CONTRIBUTED TO THE LACK OF INCIDENTS SINCE THE FIRST WEEK FOLLOWING THE COUP. HOWEVER, THE PRESENT SITUATION MAY BE THE "CALM BEFORE THE STORM". IF THE MASS TRANSFER ARE NOT ACCEPTED, OR IF THE MLN SUCCEEDS IN THEIR ATTEMPTS AT BRINGING ABOUT A CONFRONTATION, THE ARMED FORCES COULD VERY WELL DESTROY ITSELF INTERNALLY. ANY SIZEABLE ACT OF DISOBEDIENCE FROM ANY GROUP COULD SPARK A BLOODY CONFRONTATION WHICH WOULD TAKE YEARS TO CORRECT. IF A SERIOUS DIVISION OCCURRED AT THIS TIME WITHIN THE ARMED FORCES THE GUERRILLAS WOULD BE ABLE TO WALK INTO GUATEMALA CITY UNMOLESTED.

(5) FUTURE OF OUSTED GENERALS AND COLONELS: IN THE NEXT 2-3

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MONTHS THE GOG MILITARY JUNTA WILL REVIEW THE RECORDS AND PERFORMANCE OF THOSE GENERAL OFFICERS AND COLONELS WHO WERE REMOVED FROM THEIR JOBS AND SENT HOME ("DISPONSIBLE"). SOME OFFICERS WILL ALLEGEDLY BE ALLOWED TO RETURN TO ACTIVE DUTY WHILE OTHERS WILL BE RETIRED. THOSE WHO HAVE INVOLVED THEMSELVES IN ACTS OF CORRUPTION WILL BE PROSECUTED AND EITHER THROWN OUT WITHOUT PAY OR JAILED, DEPENDING ON THE SERIOUSNESS OF THEIR CRIMES. IMMEDIATELY FOLLOWING THE COUP, SOME SENIOR OFFICERS WHO DID NOT APPROVE OF THE ACTIONS OF 23 MARCH REQUESTED TO BE RETIRED; HOWEVER, EG RIOS REFUSED TO GRANT THE RETIREMENTS FOR TWO REASONS. FIRST, HE WANTED TO BE SURE THAT BEFORE ANY OFFICER WAS ALLOWED TO RETIRE IT COULD BE PROVEN THAT THE OFFICER HAD NOT STOLEN FROM THE GOVERNMENT. SECOND, SINCE THERE MIGHT BE A NEED FOR SOME OF THESE OFFICERS TO BE RETURNED TO ACTIVE DUTY HE (RIOS) DID NOT WANT TO LOSE EXPERTISE WHICH MIGHT LATER BE NEEDED TO HELP ORGANIZE THE NEW GOVERNMENT AND/OR ARMED FORCES. ADDITIONALLY, HE DID NOT WANT IT TO APPEAR INTERNATIONALLY AS THOUGH THE ARMED FORCES WAS DIVIDED BETWEEN JUNIOR AND SENIOR RANKS. THEREFORE, EVEN THOUGH BT

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INFO DIA WASH DC//DB-3E/D8-3E2/OS-1/J51-46//
SECSTATE WASHDC DA WASH DC//BAMI-ESH/F11//
HQ USAF WASH DC//XOKRW// USCINCSO QUARRY HTS PM//SCJ2//
MACOS INTEL CEN SCOTT AFB IL//INN//
CNO WASH DC//OP-009// CINCLANT NORFOLK VA
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CDR193JEWBOE (PAM) FT CLAYTON PA//ANJU-DS//
USDAO MEXICO CITY MX USDAO TEGUCIGALPA HD
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SOME MIGHT EVENTUALLY BE ALLOWED TO RETIRE, THEY WOULD HAVE TO WAIT UNTIL THE AFOREMENTIONED CONDITIONS HAD BEEN MET.

(6) BG RIOS AND THE POLITICOS: SOME TIME DURING THE FIRST WEEK OF APRIL, BG RIOS ALLEGEDLY MET WITH REPRESENTATIVES OF ALL DULY RECOGNIZED POLITICAL PARTIES. THE PURPOSE OF THE MEETING WAS TO PRESENT THE FOLLOWING CHALLENGE: IF IN THE NEXT 3 MONTHS THE PARTIES COULD COME UP WITH REVISIONS TO THE ELECTORAL LAWS WHICH THEY COULD ALL AGREE TO, BG RIOS WOULD GUARANTEE TO CALL ELECTIONS SIX MONTHS FROM THE DATE THAT THOSE REVISIONS WERE PRESENTED TO HIM. HOWEVER, BG RIO SUPPOSEDLY WENT ON TO STATE THAT IF AT THE END OF THE 90 DAY PERIOD, THE PARTIES COULD NOT PRODUCE REVISIONS WHICH THEY ALL CONCURRED IN, HE (BG RIOS) WOULD THEN FORM HIS OWN ELECTORAL REVISION COMMITTEE TO WORK ON THE NECESSARY CHANGES. IF THE LATTER COURSE OF ACTION WERE FOLLOWED, ELECTIONS MIGHT BE DELAYED BY AS MUCH AS ONE TO ONE AND ONE HALF YEARS FROM THE TIME RIOS COMMITTEE BEGAN ITS WORK. FOLLOWING THE DEPARTURE OF THE POLITICAL REPRESENTATIVES, BG RIOS ALLEGEDLY CONFIDED TO ONE OF HIS PERSONAL ADVISERS THAT HE WAS CERTAIN THE POLITICAL PARTIES WOULD NEVER BE ABLE TO SET ASIDE THEIR PERSONAL JEALOUSIES/AMBITIONS TO FORMULATE A NEW ELECTORAL LAW THAT WOULD BE AGREEABLE TO ALL. THEREFORE, IT WOULD BE UP TO HIM (RIO) TO FORM A COMMITTEE AND OVERSEE THE PROJECT.

9B. ~~(S//NOFORN)~~



ACTION DC-4(*) DIA(*) (I,N)
INFO WIDS(*) J3:NMCC(*) J5(*) ROJTF:LO(*) OPG-JPG(*)
SECDEF(*) SECDEF(*) USDP(*) ASD:PA&E(*) DI-1(*)
WMIC(*) RTS-2B(1) RCN-281(*) OS-1(*) SMS(*)
J51-4B(*) AT(*) AT-X(*) AJS(*) DIO(*) DE(*) DB-16(*)
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 - 12. (U) SPEC INST: DIRC
 - 13. (U) PREP BY: [REDACTED]
 - 14. (U) APP BY: [REDACTED]
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 - 16. E17.: NA
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