

S E C R E T

I. PRELIMINARY STEPS

Representatives of British Intelligence met with Near East and Africa (NEA) Division representatives in Washington during November and December 1952 for the purpose of discussing joint war and staybehind plans in Iran. In attendance for British Intelligence were Mr. Christopher Montague Woodhouse, recently Chief of Station for British Intelligence in Tehran; Mr. Samuel Falle of the British Intelligence station in Tehran; and Mr. John Bruce Lockhart, SIS Washington representative. In attendance for NEA Division were Mr. Kermit Roosevelt, Chief of Division, Mr. John H. Leavitt, Chief of Iran Branch; Mr. John W. Pendleton, Deputy Chief of Division; and Mr. James A. Darling, Chief of NEA Paramilitary Staff.

Although it was not on the previously agreed agenda of the meeting, British Intelligence representatives brought up the proposition of a joint political action to remove Prime Minister Mossadeq. The NEA Division had not intended to discuss this question at all and was unprepared to do so. The meeting concluded without any decision being made and with the NEA Division committing itself only to study in more detail the political action proposals advanced by British Intelligence.

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In March 1953 a telegram was received from the Tehran Station which stated that General [redacted] had contacted the assistant military attache and had requested Ambassador Henderson's views as to whether or not the US Government was interested in covertly supporting an Iranian military effort to oust Premier Mossadeq. A meeting was held in the Embassy at which Headquarters personnel, then in the field, and station personnel were in attendance. A cautiously worded reply was drafted at Headquarters and its substance delivered to General [redacted]. The reply did not commit the United States in any way but was mildly encouraging and revealed some US interest in the idea.

On the basis of the [redacted] overture and other clear signs that determined opposition to Mossadeq was taking shape, and in view of the totally destructive and reckless attitude of the government of Prime Minister Mossadeq, General Walter Bedell Smith, Under Secretary of State, determined that the US Government could no longer approve of the Mossadeq government and would prefer a successor government in which there would be no National Frontists. The change in policy was communicated to CIA, and the NEA Division was informed that it was authorized to consider operations which would contribute to the fall of the Mossadeq government. The Department of State and CIA

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jointly informed Ambassador Henderson and the Chief of Station, Roger Goiran, of the new policy and of the operational authorization. The Director, on 4 April 1953, approved a budget of \$1,000,000 which could be used by the Tehran Station in any way that would bring about the fall of Mossadeq. Full authority was given to Ambassador Henderson and the Chief of Station enabling any part or all of the \$1,000,000 to be used without further authority, as long as the Ambassador and the station concurred.

On 16 April 1953 a comprehensive study entitled: "Factors Involved in the Overthrow of Mossadeq" was completed. The Study indicated that a Shah-General Zahedi combination, supported by CIA local assets and financial backing, would have a good chance of overthrowing Mossadeq, particularly if this combination should be able to get the largest mobs in the streets and if a sizeable portion of the Tehran garrison refused to carry out Mossadeq's orders.

Subsequent contact was made with General Zahedi. Although his motives appeared serious, it soon became apparent that he had no concrete plan and was in fact in no position to take action against Mossadeq.

General Zahedi, who at one time was a member of Mossadeq's cabinet, stood out as the only major personality in undisguised opposition to Mossadeq. For this reason

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he attracted to himself a considerable following. The Tehran Station, in April 1953, reestablished covert contact with Zahedi through Commander Eric Pollard, the US Naval Attache. In order to make the covert liaison with Zahedi more effective and reliable, and also for security reasons, Zahedi's son, Ardeshir Zahedi, was selected as the means of contact with General Zahedi in June 1953. After 21 July 1953, contact with General Zahedi was made directly.

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- B "London" Draft of the TPAJAX Operational Plan
- C Foreign Office Memorandum of 23 July 1953 from  
British Ambassador Makins to Under Secretary  
of State Smith
- D Report on Military Planning Aspect of TPAJAX
- E Military Critique - Lessons Learned from TPAJAX  
re Military Planning Aspects of Coup d'Etat