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Kissinger Telephone Conversations: A Verbatim Record of U.S. Diplomacy, 1969-1977
Digital National Security Archive (ProQuest)
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ESSAY
During his tenure as National Security Advisor and Secretary of State,
Dr. Henry A. Kissinger directed his staff to prepare transcripts of
his telephone conversations, or telcons, with presidents Nixon and
Ford, government officials, foreign leaders and ambassadors,
backchannel contacts, journalists, friends, and others. According to
the official finding aid published online by the National Archives and
Records Administration, “Initially, secretaries listened in on calls
using a ‘dead key’ extension on the phone system and prepared
summaries of conversations. This practice was later refined and
resulted in verbatim transcripts transcribed from secretarial
shorthand notes. While most of the conversations were recorded by
secretaries listening in on ‘dead keys,’ many conversations were
recorded mechanically with tapes that were immediately transcribed and
then destroyed.”[2]
The telcons are a unique and nearly verbatim record of diplomacy.[3]
Fortunately for scholars, the telcons overlap with another unique and
literally verbatim primary source: the Nixon tapes. Beginning in
February 1971, tape began to roll in the White House basement. The
initial taping system was limited to the Oval Office, but the Secret
Service soon expanded it to include the White House telephone
switchboard starting in April 1971. The Nixon taping system
automatically recorded the president’s conversations with nearly
everyone he talked to on the phone, including Dr. Kissinger. The Nixon
tapes currently open to the public include more than 200 of these
Kissinger conversations, some of which were independently transcribed
as telcons by Kissinger’s staff. Moreover, the collection assembled
here is the first time all
of these conversations have been made available in the same place in a
single format.
Telcons exist for conversations that were not captured by the Nixon
taping system, just as there are conversations captured by the Nixon
taping system for which there are no telcons. When a telcon was not
made, the tape is the only record of the conversation. For example,
Kissinger called the Soviet Ambassador, Anatoly Dobrynin, from the
Lincoln Sitting Room on January 25, 1972 before the President
delivered a major speech on peace prospects in Vietnam. In Nixon’s
presence, Kissinger warned the Soviets that there would be “serious
consequences” if the Soviet ally, North Vietnam, launched an offensive
against American ally South Vietnam.[4]
Compare to other telephone recordings, the audio quality of the tape
is poor, perhaps caused by competing recording systems at the White
House and the Soviet Embassy. Similarly, audio quality and gain
(similar to volume level) are generally lower for many of the
conversations that overlapped between the Kissinger’s telcons and the
Nixon tape recordings than other telephone conversations. This may
have been due to the President’s and his NSC Advisor’s independent
taping systems sapping voltage and interfering with one another.
Feedback or buzz can also be heard in many of the overlapping
conversations, like the noise generated when a microphone is too close
to speakers.
Since the taping system operated automatically around President Nixon,
the conversations are usually between Nixon and Kissinger. Some of the
conversations were initiated or received by Dr. Kissinger in the
presence of President Nixon, while other recordings cover Kissinger
talking to other officials, such as Nixon’s Chief of Staff, H. R.
“Bob” Haldeman, who were with the president in the executive offices.
Similar to the telcons, the tape recordings vary in utility and
quality. Some of the Kissinger recordings are very clear while others
are virtually unintelligible. Nevertheless, tapes and telcons used
together, when possible, facilitate fact-checking and assessing
accuracy. A comparison of some telcons and tapes reveals that telcons
were not always verbatim and sometimes were incomplete. When Dr.
Kissinger’s phone conversations were not transcribed by a “dead key”
secretary, from shorthand, or otherwise recorded by his staff, the
Nixon tape recordings alone have preserved conversations that
otherwise would have been lost to history.
We have included transcripts for several recorded conversations for
which there are no telcons, and several conversations that overlap
with telcons. This is by no means a comprehensive transcription
effort—in fact, Mr. Moss transcribed most these conversations for his
dissertation—but we hope scholars use this collection as a starting
point and understand the inherent strengths and pitfalls of using
tape-recorded conversations as historical sources. We have included
transcripts for several conversations released by the National
Archives as recently as December 2, 2008.
A.
Nixon Tapes Without Telcons:
1. White House
Telephone Conversation No. 17-125, 10:57 – 11:19 a.m., January 1, 1972
SUMMARY: Kissinger
called Nixon from New York on New Year’s Day 1972. The two briefly
discussed Maltese Prim Minister Dominic Mintoff’s demands that the
British remove their military base from Malta. They then discussed the
fallout over the Indo-Pakistani War of 1971 that had ended weeks
earlier. The conversation focused largely on statements made by Indian
Prime Minister Indira Gandhi, and how to handle the recognition of
Bangladesh (formerly East Pakistan). The second half of the
conversation dealt primarily with Vietnam and how to handle the issue
of POWs, withdrawal of American forces, and peace negotiations. Nixon
told Kissinger, “the new factor we’ve got here, as to what we can
wheel—and they’re quite aware of this…it’s just the attrition of
support for the war.” Discussing the problems of Vietnam in public
opinion, the president added, “I’m trying to set the stage of where
we’re going to be in June…basically so we have a way to just take the
issue out of the debate for about 3 months.” Noting the impact
President Johnson’s 1968 bombing halt had had on the campaign of
Nixon’s political opponent, Hubert Humphrey, Nixon proclaimed, “Let’s
face it, Henry, the bombing halt was a totally political move. You
know it didn’t mean a goddamned thing in terms of that, and it damned
near won the election for Humphrey.” Then men concluded by discussing
scheduling, the State of the Union message, and the President’s
upcoming trip to China set for February 1972.
AUDIO (.MP3)
TRANSCRIPT (PDF)
2.White House Telephone Conversation No.
18-66, 3:43 – 3:49 p.m., January 11, 1972
SUMMARY:
Kissinger gave President Nixon a status update on the annual foreign
policy report he was preparing with his staff and quickly got to the
substance of the conversation: the effect of the President’s upcoming
trip to Peking and the Sino-Soviet interplay.[5] Kissinger reported to
the President that the Russians were putting the North Vietnamese up
to the offensive (which actually began on March 30, 1972) in order to
overshadow the presidential trip to China in February. Kissinger
explained, “We have an intelligence report today…in which one of their
people in Paris says they’re going to do it [launch an offensive] so
that they, in February…can overshadow your trip to Peking.” Kissinger
qualified the statement by adding, “I don’t think they’ve got that
much power…On the other hand…it’s a double-edged sword for them,
because if they do it at that time you’re overshadowing their
offensive.” The President chuckled in agreement.[6]
AUDIO (.MP3)
TRANSCRIPT (PDF)
3.White House Telephone Conversation No. 19-65, Unknown time
between 8:55 p.m. and 10:03 p.m., January 25, 1972
SUMMARY: Kissinger called the Soviet Ambassador,
Anatoly Dobrynin, from the Lincoln Sitting Room right after the
President delivered a major speech that evening on peace prospects in
Vietnam.[7] In a bombshell announcement, the President disclosed that
Kissinger had been conducting secret negotiations with the North
Vietnamese in Paris over the previous 30 months, but that the talks
had reached an impasse. In Nixon’s presence, Kissinger warned the
Soviets that there would be “serious consequences” if the Soviet-ally,
North Vietnam, launched an offensive against American-ally South
Vietnam. Kissinger also expressed the willingness of the U.S. to begin
anew confidential contacts with the North Vietnamese.
AUDIO (.MP3)
TRANSCRIPT (PDF)
4. White House Telephone
Conversation No. 22-62, 8:02 – 8:07 p.m., March 30, 1972
SUMMARY: Although the audio quality of this conversation is poor the
content can be ascertained. Reports had been coming into the White
House since the morning of March 30, 1972, but the ground situation
was still uncertain at the start of the North Vietnamese Easter
Offensive. Kissinger counseled restraint, to “watch for another day to
see…whether it was just a high point or a real offensive.” Nixon and
Kissinger discussed taking out North Vietnamese Surface-to-Air
Missiles (SAM), and the use of deadly C-130 gunships against the
developing attack. Nixon said, “If we have a good provocation, I’d
just whack ‘em in there, and, you know…on the basis of
protective-reaction there isn’t going to be a hell of a flap.”
Kissinger noted, “I think [the North Vietnamese] have their own
massive problem. They have been trying to get their offensive all
year.” The offensive, which became known as the “Easter Offensive,”
was eventually repulsed by the use of American air and naval assets
against North Vietnam.[8]
AUDIO (.MP3)
TRANSCRIPT (PDF)
5.White House Telephone Conversation No. 35-35, 4:00 – 4:15 p.m.,
December 28, 1972
SUMMARY: In a telephone conversation between President Nixon and Henry
Kissinger, after ten days of the heaviest bombing since World War II,
both men concurred that the North Vietnamese were eager to return to
the negotiating table. Nixon agreed to cease bombing within 36 hours
(which he ended the following day). Nixon also told Kissinger that if
necessary, new negotiations should take place bilaterally with North
Vietnam, and that any agreement reached would then be promulgated with
South Vietnam. There is no telcon for this conversation because Dr.
Kissinger was vacationing in Palm Spring, CA.
AUDIO (.MP3)
TRANSCRIPT (PDF)
B. Telcons
That Overlap With Nixon Tapes:
1. Telcon + White House
Telephone Conversation No. 20-106, 10:52 – 11:00 p.m., February 28,
1972
SUMMARY: This tape recording overlaps with a Kissinger telcon. We have
prepared a transcript to show the differences between telcons prepared
at the time and a more verbatim transcript produced from the
recording. In this conversation with the President, Kissinger reports
on his efforts to mollify conservatives (Reagan, Barry Goldwater, and
James L. Buckley) about retaining U.S. defense commitments to Taiwan
after the opening to Communist China. Nixon also advises Kissinger to
invite Soviet Ambassador Anatoly Dobrynin to a private dinner at the
White House in order to symbolically reassure the Soviets that the
China trip did not affect U.S. plans for a May 1972 summit meeting in
Moscow.
AUDIO (.MP3)
TRANSCRIPT + TELCON (PDF)
2. Telcon + White House
Telephone Conversation No. 33-92, 12:15 – 12:20 p.m., November 18,
1972
SUMMARY: In
this conversation, Nixon and Kissinger discuss the “hard line” the
administration sought to take with South Vietnamese President Nyugen
Van Thieu on peace negotiations. If the U.S. ally refused to go along
with the negotiations after a letter urging cooperation, Nixon quipped
“why it may just be one of those breaking of relations.” Alluding to
press reports out of Saigon that the South Vietnamese would not agree
to the peace concessions, Nixon continued: “as I pointed out in my
letter…we’re going to negotiate as hard as we can, get the best
position that we can, and that we’re on this course, and that he must
realize that we will not be subjected to pressure or harassment on
this thing.” Nixon stressed that he would not accept an emissary from
President Thieu, and that all communications were to go through the US
Ambassador to South Vietnam, Ellsworth Bunker. Nixon said, everything
“is to be transmitted through Bunker. That’s the way it’s to be done.”
Kissinger complained of the stream of revisions from the US ally: “The
trouble is that if we accept all of these on top of all of the others,
we have an entirely new document and [North Vietnamese negotiator] Le
Duc Tho is going to walk out.” Nixon reiterated that the negotiations
were to be conducted through Ambassador Bunker: “The withdrawal has
got to be handled on the basis that we’ve already suggested.”
Kissinger saw an opportunity in the adversity, and counseled delay: “I
think we should wait until we see what we get. If Hanoi kicks us in
the teeth, then we don’t have problem. But if Hanoi accepts the
changes which we are bringing […] then an already-good agreement
becomes excellent.” The conversation ends with a brief discussion of
moving Peter Peterson out of the Commerce Department as part of
Nixon’s planned executive branch reorganization following the November
1972 election.
AUDIO (.MP3)
TRANSCRIPT + TELCON (PDF)
3.Telcon + White House
Telephone Conversation No. 34-114, 10:49 – 11:11 a.m., December 17,
1972
SUMMARY:
In this long phone conversation, Nixon and Kissinger discussed a
number of topics, including the Christmas bombing of North Vietnam and
the use of “smart bombs” against North Vietnamese targets. They also
discussed negotiations with the North Vietnamese, the role of the
Chinese and the Soviets, American ally South Vietnam and its President
Nguyen Van Thieu. Click here [link to tape log] for an excerpted
version of the National Archives and Records Administration tape log.
Nixontapes.org did not transcribe this conversation, but has included
the telcon prepared by Kissinger’s staff at the time.
AUDIO (.MP3)
TELCON (PDF)
A
NOTE ON AUDIO QUALITY AND TRANSCRIPTION
Every effort
was made to preserve the fidelity of the included audio, which is
based on the first complete set of digitized, publicly available Nixon
tapes, prepared by nixontapes.org and the National Security Archive.[9]
For this posting, Moss and Nichter went through over 120 hours of
telephone conversations and “clipped” the conversations with
Kissinger. Although the audio is in the compressed, “lossy” MP3
format, the bit rate is near CD-quality. We have coordinated with
Joyce Battle at the National Security Archive to integrate the tape
conversations into the National Security Archive’s major production of
the Kissinger telcons, available through Proquest at the Digital
National Security Archive collection.[10]
Both Moss and
Nichter reviewed each of the transcripts on several occasions for
accuracy. Different people hear different things, and the audio
quality is far from perfect. Please use our transcripts as a guide,
not as a definitive source. We encourage you to listen to the audio,
which is available for each transcript, and we welcome feedback at
nixontapes@nixontapes.org.
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
We wish
to thank Bill Burr, Joyce Battle, Marry Curry, Carlos Osorio, Maria
Martinez, and Sue Bechtel of the National Security Archive for working
with us to make the audio recordings and the Kissinger telcons
available to us. Most significantly, we would like to thank Thomas
Blanton, the Director of the National Security Archive, without whose
vision and support (pecuniary and moral) this project would not have
been completed. Thank you also to John Carland and Anand Toprani for
feedback on the material and constructive suggestions. Lastly, thank
you to James and Lilian Charapich who aided the original transcription
effort.
ABOUT THE AUTHORS
Richard A. Moss is a Contract Historian at the Historian’s Office,
U.S. Department of State, and a Ph.D. candidate in U.S. Diplomatic
History at The George Washington University, Washington D.C. His
dissertation, entitled “Behind the Back Channel,” examines the use of
back channel diplomacy in U.S.-Soviet relations, 1969-1972. Moss is
the State Department’s resident Nixon tapes expert. Since 2001, he has
produced and reviewed transcripts for over two-dozen published and
forthcoming Foreign Relations of the United States (FRUS) volumes.
DISCLAIMER: Views expressed in this summary are those of the authors
and do not necessarily reflect those of the U.S. Government or the
Department of State. Work on these conversations was done in a private
capacity.
Luke A. Nichter is an Assistant Professor of History at
Tarleton State
University-Central Texas (soon to be known as Texas A&M
University-Central Texas). He received his Ph.D. in History from
Bowling Green State University, in Bowling Green, Ohio. His
dissertation, entitled “Richard Nixon and Europe: Confrontation and
Cooperation, 1969-1974” examined key elements in relations between the
United States and its traditional postwar European allies, including
Great Britain, France, and Germany. This multi-archival, multi-lingual
research was based on the Nixon tapes, as well as sixteen government
and historical archives in Belgium, France, Germany, Italy, the United
Kingdom, and the United States. He teaches courses in the field of
America and the World, including Diplomatic history and selected
courses on the history of Asia.
In
collaboration with Moss, Nichter created nixontapes.org in July 2007
with the intention of finally making available to researchers and the
public a user-friendly, complete version of the Nixon tapes.
[6]
Conversation between Nixon and Kissinger, White House Telephone
Conversation No. 18-66, 3:43 - 3:49 p.m., January 11, 1972, WHT,
NPMP, NARA II.
[7] Dobrynin
wrote that Kissinger had called him twice before the speech. The
first time, Kissinger had called the Soviet ambassador on
presidential orders “to meet and speak…briefly about this upcoming
speech.” Kissinger called back to say he had “been urgently
summoned to see the President” and would therefore send General
Haig, “who was aware of the matter at hand,” to the Soviet
embassy. Kissinger-Dobrynin Memcon (USSR), January 25, 1972, in
Soviet-American Relations: Détente Years, 1969-1972 (Washington:
US GPO, 2007), pp.569-571. No record of the conversations has been
found in the Kissinger Telcons. Nixon’s speech of January 25, 1972
can be found online at:
http://www.nixonlibraryfoundation.org/clientuploads/directory/archive/1972_pdf_files/1972_0021.pdf
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