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United States Department of State



Washington, D. C. 20520

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November 28, 1987

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SECRET/NOFORN/NOCONTRACT/ORCON

INFORMATION MEMORANDUM
S/S

TO: The Secretary
FROM: INR - Morton I. Abramowitz
SUBJECT: Gorbachev's Private Summit Agenda

The Soviets are signaling that there are several topics Gorbachev is particularly interested in raising in Washington. Some of these lie outside the formal agenda; many of them are, in the Soviet view, items not just for talks with the President, but for what is shaping up as Gorbachev's efforts to reach out to Congress and the public. We could thus see some surprises or unusual approaches.

The attached INR study examines some of these "wild cards" and the spin Gorbachev may put on the visit and the issues:

- Gorbachev will be conducting a personal reconnaissance of the political landscape in Washington, as well as seeking to shape it to improve the prospects for a productive follow-up summit in Moscow.
- As the Soviet leadership puts together the next Five-Year Plan (1991-95), outyear constraints on SDI assume increasing significance. The US budget crisis has already given the Soviets some breathing room on SDI/ABM. But Gorbachev still has an incentive to strike a deal on START/D&S which will assure a more stable environment in which to plan for the future.
- Gorbachev is sure to focus on START sublimits and D&S compromises. He will use the momentum of INF and the decision for Joint Instructions to the delegations to push for progress with the prospect of an agreement next spring.
- Gorbachev will press Soviet positions on CW and SNF, particularly in his public statements, to rebut Western concerns over post-INF conventional imbalances. He will urge a commitment from the US for early completion of an international ban on CW; Soviet negotiator Nazarkin

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recently suggested a late May target. Genscher's pressure on NATO to negotiate reductions in battlefield nuclear weapons gives new life to Soviet calls for a Third Zero in Europe.

- On regional issues, recent Soviet statements strongly suggest they will do something splashy on Afghanistan at the summit, perhaps, as they seem to be signalling, committing themselves to a reduced troop withdrawal timetable of under 12 months.
- Gorbachev could resurrect the notion of a US-Soviet code of conduct in the Third World or of some kind of new bilateral consultative mechanism, on regional or other issues.
- On trade, Gorbachev will undoubtedly stress that the USSR is interested in being part of the world economic community and appeal to Congress and the US business community for a reduction in US "discrimination" against the USSR.
- In other areas, Soviet officials have recently indicated a strong interests in bilateral discussions on restructuring the United Nations. Under the rubric of his Comprehensive System of International Peace and Security Gorbachev may push for communique language on UN peacekeeping and even terrorism. Here, he will be playing more to larger US and world audiences than the Administration.

Attachment:
As stated

Drafted: INR/SEE:WLimberg/MSchwartz/JParker
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GORBACHEV'S PRIVATE SUMMIT AGENDA

Gorbachev will come to Washington prepared to discuss each of the four main areas on the formal summit agenda: arms control, bilateral relations, regional policies, and human rights. In each of these areas, however, he will have his own ideas and sub-agendas. Indeed, the Soviets have been signaling that there are a number of topics Gorbachev is particularly interested in raising in Washington. They include Afghanistan, START/D&S, human rights, S&T cooperation, reform of the UN, and trade.

This paper focuses on what might be some of the "wild cards" on the summit agenda and examines how much weight Gorbachev may attach to them, the nature of Moscow's interest, and the chance of surprises. Given Gorbachev's strong personal views and personality, we may find ourselves, either through Soviet design or unexpected events, in uncharted waters during his visit to Washington.

* * *

Appraising the Future. Gorbachev first agreed to a summit in the US two years ago in Geneva. His reluctance to follow up suggests a tactical ploy to increase his leverage on the summit agenda, and perhaps a wariness about meeting with the President on his home ground. Gorbachev is sure to come with his guard up. Aside from domestic considerations, he has probably opted for a fairly short and geographically limited summit to reduce the odds of being burned or embarrassed.

Gorbachev has strong views and a dominant personality. He will use the summit aggressively to try to mold the climate of public and official opinion here and abroad and to advance the Soviet diplomatic agenda for 1988. Nevertheless, Gorbachev can also be influenced by what he hears and sees in Washington, and his personal assessment could color relations well into the 1990s.

Gorbachev's Agenda. Despite the domestic turmoil accompanying Yeltsin's recent ouster, we think Gorbachev will want to move ahead on a number of issues. Party Secretary Dobrynin recently indicated that Gorbachev is fully prepared to negotiate on a broad variety of topics. While he will be prepared to address each of the four main areas of the formal agenda, he will give each his personal spin and will undoubtedly raise other topics.

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Moscow summit? Gorbachev will want to probe the political climate for doing business with the Reagan Administration as it heads into its final year. Gorbachev is not enamored of the US and there are constraints on how far he can go in seeking to improve relations. But he continues to signal that he wants a respite in international tensions in order to concentrate on his reform program at home.

Gorbachev will be conducting a personal reconnaissance of the political landscape in Washington, as well as seeking to shape it to improve the prospects for a productive follow-up summit in Moscow. As the Soviet leadership puts together the 1991-95 Plan, outyear constraints on SDI assume increasing significance. The US budget crisis has already given the Soviets some breathing room on SDI/ABM. But Gorbachev still has an incentive to strike a deal on START/D&S which will assure a more stable context in which to plan for the future.

START and D&S. Gorbachev will argue that the INF accord is a good beginning for 50% reductions in START and an interim compromise on D&S. [REDACTED]


[REDACTED] We believe, however, that Gorbachev views some compromise on D&S as a necessary ingredient for a final agreement on START.

We continue to believe that the Soviets view the status quo in strategic weapons as acceptable and that they are less eager than the US for an agreement in this area. However, they recognize that a START accord is the price they must pay to establish limits on SDI, which continues to be their main goal. This calculation may be behind the recent hints from Soviet spokesmen that Gorbachev would extend his stay in the US for an extra day or two--something the President is widely reported to desire--if there were a breakthrough in START. But the hints are also intended to pressure and put the onus on the US should there be no movement forward in this area at the summit.

Noting that the sides have agreed to issue Joint Instructions to their START and D&S delegations, Gorbachev will likely propose a few key elements that he will portray as leading to a START agreement this coming spring. He probably calculates that the President is under strong compulsion to join in such a move. If the President resists, Gorbachev would expect to pocket the lion's share of the credit for INF while the President is blamed for the absence of a START agreement in the near term.

Gorbachev realizes that the package must be a compromise on the major issues of sublimits and strategic defense:

--Sublimits Compromise. The Soviets judge that their recent sublimits proposal has had time to make its intended point--that restructuring of forces hurts.



--SDI Compromise. In the D&S part of the package, Gorbachev may drop his attempts at a narrower-than-narrow-interpretation of the ABM Treaty designed to kill the SDI program. He could settle for a compromise that guarantees preservation of the Treaty in some form plus continuing negotiations on the issue. Several factors could lead to such a Soviet position. While recognizing the President's obvious commitment to SDI, the Soviets are also aware of the US deficit and cuts in the SDI budget; current limits on US space launch capabilities; mounting critical assessments of SDI near-term feasibility and the upcoming US election.

The compromise package would most likely include a "nonwithdrawal" commitment from the ABM Treaty for ten or possibly seven years. It would allow both sides to conduct strategic defense activities during that period, but only within the limits set by the Treaty--leaving questions of interpretation to the SCC. The Soviets will probably want an escape clause allowing them to withdraw should the US restructure SDI to take advantage of the broad interpretation. The compromise could also take the form of a "list/labs" approach, or a combination of that and non-withdrawal. Either way, they would want some assurance of follow-on negotiations.

There is always the chance that Gorbachev will demand instructions tightly limiting the SDI program, although we view this as less likely. Gorbachev realizes that the President would be unable to accept such proposals and that a second summit might not materialize.

The possible Soviet compromise positions outlined above do not contain any surprises. Coupled with the momentum of signing an INF agreement, however, they might become a public relations bonanza for the USSR and put great pressure on the US to constrain SDI in exchange for 50 percent cuts. Given Gorbachev's past performance, however, we cannot rest assured that he will stay within the October 30 joint announcement on the summit arms control agenda.

Until Gorbachev lays out his ideas in Washington, we will not know to what extent the Soviets judge that their concerns over SDI could be met by a mutual commitment to abide by ABM. Although a larger, more ambitious package proposal cannot be ruled out, we think the difficulties of the looming INF ratification process will tilt Moscow more toward caution than experimentation.

Other arms control issues. Given the concerns in the US and in Europe over Soviet conventional superiority and strategic retargeting advantages in a post-INF environment, the Soviets have ample political motivation to work both ends of the arms control spectrum in the coming months. Besides discussing START, Gorbachev could use the summit to advertise Soviet positions and a sense of urgency on completing a CW treaty and agreeing to a mandate for the Conventional Stability Talks. He is also sure to reiterate the Warsaw Pact's proposal for a comparison of military doctrines with NATO, and the need for both sides to adhere to no more than "reasonable sufficiency."

Particularly in his public statements, Gorbachev will urge a commitment from the US for early completion of an international ban on CW. Soviet negotiator Nazarkin recently suggested by late May. [REDACTED]

On a mandate for the Conventional Stability Talks, the Soviets have been resisting a compromise so far, perhaps saving their concessions for maximum favorable impact on the INF ratification process. Genscher's recent calls for NATO to negotiate reductions in battlefield nuclear weapons, however, give new life to the Soviet campaign for a Third Zero in Europe, and for continued dickering on a CST mandate. Although rumors of unilateral Soviet troop withdrawals have surfaced occasionally, any substantive reductions proposal at the summit is unlikely.

Regional disputes. Recent Soviet statements suggest they see potential benefit in doing something splashy on Afghanistan

at the summit. Gorbachev could even try to engage the President in some serious horsetrading. But much of what the Soviets might do could be meant simply to get them past the summit with minimal political damage, or to set the stage for the next round of proximity talks in Geneva in January, or to generate greater pressures on Pakistan.

Nevertheless, Soviet spokesmen are now privately asserting their intention to get out of Afghanistan by the end of the Reagan Administration. It seems increasingly likely that, in the immediate run-up to the summit or at the summit itself, the Soviets will commit themselves to a reduced troop withdrawal timetable of under 12 months--with or without conditions.

If so, Gorbachev would try to get the President to join him in a joint statement spelling out certain guarantees, including a US pledge to end "outside interference", i.e. arms to the mujahidin. Gorbachev would also seek private US assurances on cooperation in working out a coalition government in Kabul. But the bargaining over its composition and the starting date for the timetable can be expected to be excruciating.

A further possibility is that Gorbachev might try to get us to sign onto a pledge of non-interference and non-use of force in the Third World, in essence resurrecting the idea of a superpower code of conduct. This could be tied to the Soviet call for a UN force in the Gulf and revitalization of the UN Military Staff Committee. As part of this or as a proposal on its own, Gorbachev might raise the idea of creating a more formal and systematic consultative mechanism for US-Soviet exchanges on regional issues.

Human Rights. In his talks with the Deputy Secretary, Adamishin proposed several areas of possible US-Soviet cooperation on human rights, including contacts between the Supreme Soviet and the US Congress and the Soviet Ministry of Interior and the Department of Justice. Some of these proposals may surface at the summit, either singly or in a package. The asking price for Soviet agreement to such cooperation will undoubtedly be a positive US reply to the Soviet proposal for a Moscow human rights conference.

A year ago Gorbachev surprised the world when he personally phoned Sakharov in Gorkiy to recall him to Moscow to do "patriotic work." Along with the expected high-profile gestures on human rights, the Soviets could hint that Sakharov is now free to travel abroad.

Trade/Joint Ventures. Dobrynin in mid-November said that Gorbachev hopes to cover the issue of expanded trade relations with the US at the summit. Like Khrushchev and Brezhnev during their visits, Gorbachev is also planning to meet with US business leaders. A strong effort will undoubtedly be made to

appeal to the Congress and the US business community for a reduction in US "discrimination" against the USSR.

The Soviets realize, however, that their highest priority--achievement of most-favored-nation-status--is unlikely in the near term. Especially since the Nikonov visit in early October, Soviet officials have been playing up creation of joint ventures. Eight or nine have reportedly been approved as of mid-November, including one with Armand Hammer. The summit may see additional high-profile announcements such as the conclusion of an agreement with PepsiCo for opening of two Pizza Huts in downtown Moscow.

Gorbachev will probably try to put us on the defensive about US opposition to full Soviet participation in the international economic community, citing their request for GATT observer status in particular.

Science and Technology Cooperation. A Soviet science official said in early November that cooperation in the field of energy and space would be the general theme of a Gorbachev proposal seeking expanded science and technology cooperation. Mentioned, in particular, were cooperation on fusion energy, nuclear power plant safety, the Mars "phobus" project, and joint projects concerning the impact of industry on the environment.

Reform of the UN System. Another Soviet official reported in mid-November that Gorbachev would propose bilateral talks with the US on revising the UN Charter to make the mandate of the UN conform more adequately to demands made by member states. A Soviet proposal for bilateral discussions along these lines could well be in the making. While Soviet officials have indicated a strong interest in fundamental restructuring, we do not expect to see specific proposals calling for Charter revision.

The Soviets are touting their proposed Comprehensive System of International Peace and Security (CSIS) as a mechanism to strengthen rather than replace the UN system. Gorbachev is almost certain to parade the CSIS at the summit. While little more than a repackaging of longstanding Soviet initiatives on such issues as "disarmament for development," peaceful use of space, nuclear-free zones and zones of peace, limiting nuclear testing, and creation of a new economic world order, the Soviets see greater emphasis on the UN as especially embarrassing for the US, given its slowness in paying its assessed contributions.

In terms of specific summit proposals, Gorbachev might push for communique language on UN peacekeeping and mediation of regional conflicts and greater international cooperation to combat terrorism and AIDS.

Who's Coming? The Soviet delegation list provides some clues on agenda items and how seriously Gorbachev intends to pursue them. Akhromeyev's inclusion in the formal delegation of eight already suggests more rather than less flexibility on arms control issues, and Kamentsev's a serious focus on trade. It will be illuminating to see which advisers are included in addition to the top figures. Were Adamishin also to accompany Gorbachev, we would expect to see greater weight put to human rights issues; Vorontsov, arms control and Afghanistan; Petrovskiy, Middle East and Gulf.

Possible Summit Spoilers. Gorbachev has in the past displayed flashes of temper and a sense of pride in what is due him as the leader of the other superpower. He will not want to appear "soft on imperialism" or the victim of US manipulation, or allow himself to be caught in a situation where he might become the subject of ridicule back home. A variety of surprises or remarks on the US side could cause him to take offense.

Additionally, the Soviets have frequently charged that anti-Soviet elements in the US traditionally stage some sort of provocation, e.g., the Daniloff affair last year and the publication of the active measures review this year, on the eve of high profile bilateral events in order to derail relations. Should the Soviets desire, umbrage could be taken at any event of their own choosing. VOA has already been accused of spreading disinformation about Soviet "tactics of terrorism" in Afghanistan in order to "poison the atmosphere" of the summit.

Candidates for Soviet pique could include anti-Soviet jokes; US military maneuvers close to the USSR; JDL-type violent demonstrations on the margins of the November 6 meeting in Lafayette Park by the organized Jewish community; or "Captive Nation" demonstrations. Gorbachev could also flare at Congressional criticism of the summit, bad manners in meeting with him, or various measures in the final stage of the legislative process in Congress.

The ultimate surprise Gorbachev could spring in Washington would be to refuse to sign or to postpone signature of the INF treaty, most likely on the grounds that this agreement alone did not satisfy Soviet defense needs. His goal would be additional concessions on SDI. We think this highly unlikely. Given what it would cost the USSR and Gorbachev internationally, it would likely be the result of some unknown, egregious internal problem, and would fly in the face of all the other indicators. Were, however, Gorbachev to surprise us, he would most likely claim that the sides had failed to work out suitable instructions on START and, especially, D&S in keeping with the October 30 announcement.