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108

United States Department of State

Washington, D.C. 20520

August 26, 1992

SECRET/NOFORN/NOCONTRACT/ORCON  
DECL: OADR  
MEMORANDUM

RELEASED IN PART  
B1, 1.5(D), B6, B5

TO: DCI/NPC - [redacted] B1

FROM: INR/SPA - [redacted] B6

SUBJECT: PAWG Draft Paper on South African Nuclear Inventory

[redacted]  
draft report on Pretoria's declaration to the IAEA.

B1, B5

B1, B5

We strongly believe the collective body of information is ambiguous, and contradictions must be resolved before any firm judgments can be offered with confidence. Some information tends to support the notion of an "honest declaration"; some tends to support the "cheating" scenario; and much is open to both interpretations. There is no basis at present for assigning greater likelihood to the "cheating" scenario. More importantly, we feel it is premature to offer any general verdict at present on South Africa's conduct.

[redacted]  
B1, B5

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UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE  
REVIEW AUTHORITY: FRANK E SCHMELZER  
DATE/CASE ID: 18 JUL 2003 200201126

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- 2 -

[REDACTED]

B1, B5

[REDACTED] recent estimates (while phrased in a variety of forms) involve a range from over 1100 kgs weapon-grade uranium down to roughly 500 kg. While INR (and other agencies) attach greater probability to the higher end of this scale, [REDACTED]

B1, B5

[REDACTED] -- 600 kg weapon-grade equivalent -- is plausible, [REDACTED]

B1, B5

[REDACTED]

We also note for the record that the PAWG meeting was not attended by DOE (whose technical contributions have been essential toward framing USG estimates of South Africa's HEU production); [REDACTED]

B1, B5

[REDACTED]

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