Washington,
D.C., September 9, 2005 - Ten minutes after American
Airlines Flight 11 crashed into the north tower of the World Trade
Center on September 11, 2001, Federal Aviation Administration
(FAA) controllers in New York saw United Airlines Flight 175 heading
"right towards the city," [p.13] but thought
it was aiming for an emergency landing at a New York airport,
according to FAA documents released this week under the Freedom
of Information Act and posted on the web by the National Security
Archive. Minutes later, Flight 175 hit the south tower of the
World Trade Center.
The FAA documents, which are referenced extensively in Chapter
1 of The 9/11 Commission Report, provide further detail
on the report's chronology of the hijackings and its overall observation
that the FAA was woefully unprepared and disorderly in its response
to the attack. Distracted by Flight 11, the FAA notified the military
at about 9:03 am that Flight 175 had been hijacked, almost the
exact time the plane crashed into the second World Trade Center
tower. Records show Flight 175 first exhibited signs of distress
at 8:46 am.
Previously undisclosed, these documents contain minute-by-minute
accounts of unfolding events as experienced by FAA officials,
including radar reports and extensive
chronologies tracking the larger U.S. government
response to the attacks from September into late October 2001.
Unsettling quotes from hijackers on radio transmissions are also
included in the documents. Passengers on flight
11 were told at 8:24 am, "we have some planes
just stay quiet and you'll be ok we are returning to the airport."
[see p. 4] The Cleveland Air Route Traffic Control Center heard
a "radio transmission, mostly unintelligible… with
sounds of possible screaming or a struggle and a statement, "get
out of here, get out of here,"" [p. 20] from United
Airlines Flight 93 at 9:28 am, before hearing "another mostly
unintelligible, stated words that may sound like, "captain…bomb
on board…our demands, …remain quiet."" [p.
21]
Documents
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Document
1: FAA record, Chronology ADA-30, Sept. 11, 2001
(FAA representatives joining at 9:40) [Excised] [Referenced Chapter
1, The 9/11 Commission Report, "We Have Some Planes,"
footnote 189]
This 25-page chronology of government proceedings from September
11, 2001 to September 26, 2001 discusses specific FAA personnel
and the roles each played in managing the crisis. The document
also notes the involvement of various members of congress and
executive branch officials attempting to work together towards
a coordinated response.
Document
2: FAA record, New England Region Daily Log, Sept. 11, 2001
[Referenced Chapter 1, The 9/11 Commission Report, "We
Have Some Planes," footnote 112]
Filled with handwritten notes, this chronology details FAA actions
in the northeast in response to the 9/11 hijackings. It describes
a USN (Navy) FAA military representative being alerted of a possible
hijacking at 8:36 am; 10 minutes later, at 8:46 am, American Airlines
Flight 11 struck the north tower of the World Trade Center.
Document
3: FAA report, Administrator's Fact Book, July 2001
[Referenced Chapter 1, The 9/11 Commission Report, "We
Have Some Planes," footnote 92]
The FAA Administrator's Fact Book in effect for September 11,
2001 provides answers to FAA and transportation safety organizational
questions. The September 11 attacks led directly to the strengthening
and reorganization of the transportation security system.
Document
4: FAA report, Chronology of the September 11 Attacks
and Subsequent Events Through October 24, 2001, undated [Referenced
Chapter 1, The 9/11 Commission Report, "We Have
Some Planes," footnote 62]
An FAA chronology of events pertaining to the terrorist attacks
and subsequent events through October 24, 2001 that includes details
about the first unplanned FAA shut-down of civil aviation, the
later reopening of airspace, congressional efforts to compensate
airlines, warnings to pilots that entering restricted airspace
could lead to the use of deadly force against their aircraft,
measures taken to secure cockpit doors, and air strikes in Afghanistan.
An interesting element of the chronology is the 8:43 am FAA notice
to NORAD that UA175 had been hijacked. This directly contradicts
The 9/11 Commission Report (Chapter 1, page 23) and the
FAA's own Summary of
Air Traffic Hijack Events, which both state the FAA
failed to alert NORAD to UA175 until about the same time the flight
crashed into the World Trade Center between 9:03 and 9:05 am.
Document
5: FAA report, Executive Summary, Chronology of a Multiple
Hijacking Crisis, September 11, 2001, Sept. 17, 2001 [Referenced
Chapter 1, The 9/11 Commission Report, "We Have
Some Planes," footnotes 40, 41]
An FAA executive summary of the major events of September 11,
2001, this report also contains a bulleted synopsis of actions
taken by the government to manage the crisis.
Document
6: FAA report, Report of Aircraft Accident, Nov.
13, 2001 [Referenced Chapter 1, The 9/11 Commission Report,
"We Have Some Planes," footnote 59]
This official FAA Report of Aircraft Accident for American Airlines
Flight 11 specifies the number of fatalities at 81 and property
damage to include the destruction of the World Trade Center's
North Tower. Weather data reports mostly sunny skies, but records
a new smoke plume drifting southeast following the crash. The
document also includes a detailed chronology of Flight 11.
Document
7: FAA report, Summary of Air Traffic Hijack Events: September
11, 2001, Sept. 17, 2001 [Referenced Chapter 1, The 9/11
Commission Report, "We Have Some Planes," footnote
44]
The most comprehensive chronology of the hijackings released
by the FAA in this series, this report contains factual records,
observations from FAA officials and general official commentary
seeking to better explain events. Remarking on United Flight 175,
the report observes, "The controller communicating with UL175
was also monitoring the flight track of AAL11. Based on coordination
received from ZBW [Boston Air Route Traffic Control Center] indicating
a possible highjack, most of the controller's attention was focused
on AAL11." Although difficult to read due to the poor quality
of the document, the report also contains radar diagrams of the
planes and a useful summary chart of all four hijacked flights
that provides an overview of events as they unfolded.
Document
8: TSA report, Criminal Acts Against Civil Aviation for
2001, Aug. 20, 2002 [Referenced Chapter 1, The 9/11 Commission
Report, "We Have Some Planes," footnote 61]
This 69-page report compiled by the Transportation Security Administration
details all criminal acts against non-military aircraft in 2001
and includes useful statistics, trends, and analyses of unlawful
attacks on or around aircraft from 1997 to 2001 around the world.