Document No. 109: East German Intelligence Assessment of NATO's Intelligence on the Warsaw Pact, December 16, 1985

This Stasi document shows that the East had an accurate indication of how NATO evaluated the Warsaw Pact. The authors judge that NATO's knowledge is "mostly accurate and reliable," and that the west has concluded that Warsaw Pact military strength and war preparations are constantly on the rise. Intelligence information, such as that

compiled in this kind of document, usually came from various sources, mainly West German, thus showing that East German spies and their informants had an extensive run of the FRG Defense Ministry as well as of NATO headquarters.

Assessment of Adversary's Intelligence on Development of Warsaw Treaty Forces, 1983–1985

PREFACE

The Intelligence services and military intelligence of the NATO countries relentlessly pursue their activities aimed at a comprehensive exploration and assessment of the Warsaw Treaty's military policy and doctrine, armed forces and armaments Treaty.

For these purposes, they continuously use all sources of information (human intelligence, technical intelligence, official channels). Intelligence collection is realized through a comprehensive and intensive evaluation increasingly based on the use of electronic data. NATO countries conduct this business on a national level and synchronize the results through an intensive informational exchange within NATO structures. These data are constantly being updated at NATO's operational head-quarters. [...] These assessments also serve as justification for NATO force requirements and as guidelines for developing weapons technology.

The main actors in intelligence activities, in qualitative as well as quantitative terms, are always the United States, Great Britain and the FRG. France is also very active in this respect and integrated into joint NATO actions through informational exchanges.

Other NATO countries make their contributions according to an agreed division of labor (e.g. the Netherlands against Poland) and their specific potential. Intelligence information also comes from other capitalist countries. Cooperation between the U.S. and the FRG concerning intelligence services and military intelligence has been increased. Besides [providing] mutual support to complete the actual state of knowledge on a worldwide scale, they [NATO] primarily undertake efforts to clarify unresolved questions. [...] It is evident that not all the intelligence obtained flows into NATO channels.

All in all, the adversary is believed to possess an appropriate, and in the details mostly accurate and reliable, state of knowledge about the Warsaw Treaty. Two major conclusions have been drawn from this intelligence:

- 1. The Warsaw Treaty is constantly increasing its military potential, especially in quantitative terms. Concerning the technological state of armaments, the Warsaw Treaty does not lag behind NATO in most areas (with the exception of electronics). This tendency will continue.
- 2. The Warsaw Treaty's war preparations have reached a high level and will be pushed further.

The adversary is going public with its knowledge in a targeted and planned manner. That activity is cleared within NATO as well. There are limits, however. In particular in the U.S. they are restrictive with certain kinds of intelligence. For instance, this results in the publication of drawings instead of pictorial documentation that has been obtained, as the 1985 issue of *Soviet Military Power*⁴¹ demonstrated. Demands by NATO's supreme commander, U.S. General [Bernard W.] Rogers, "not to protect the enemy's secrets" were not accepted. The U.S. in particular goes to some lengths to prevent the Warsaw Treaty from obtaining clues about the real internal state of NATO's knowledge. In general the other NATO countries follow the same principle. Thus a contradiction exists between increasing requirements for classifying information, and the intention to influence their own people and the public around the world with the "Warsaw Treaty Threat" by means of outwardly correct facts.

[Source: Die Bundesbeauftragte für die Unterlagen des Staatssicherheitsdienstes (BStU), Zentralarchiv, HVA, 39, pp. 62–147. Translated by Bernd Schaefer.]

⁴¹ The U.S. Defense Department began to produce this annual publication under the Reagan administration in the early 1980s.