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Authority AND 003027By SPNARA Date 06/03/02~~SECRET~~
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51. Bossard, "Recommendations drawn up at request of Gen. Chamberlin for the attention of Gen. Walsh," 27 June 1947

Recommendations drawn up at request of Gen. Chamberlin for the attention of Gen. Walsh (June 27, 1947)

The German organization at ~~Wesel~~ is the center of the operation and is to be treated separately from the non-German networks which it directs. This German organization has been entrusted with the recruiting of agents, the briefing and direction of operations, and the receipt and evaluation of the product. American authorities have exercised what can be considered a minimum of control over the German organization, and the German operators have placed a similar degree of confidence in their non-German agents. In other words the entire organization is supposedly united and disciplined by mutual trust and the common interest in resisting Soviet or Communist aggression.

The basic facts stated above should be fully appreciated in acting on any of the following suggestions to control or to liquidate the operation. It would undoubtedly cause a serious loss of prestige for American clandestine operators in Germany if it could be demonstrated that we had abused loyal German agents by breaking faith with them. The American reputation for "fair play" in intelligence operations is obviously a valuable asset which deserves the utmost protection.

Reduction of Personnel

1. I suggest that the German group be told frankly to proceed to liquidate their non-German networks which have proved undesirable or have outlived their usefulness. The White Russian network should be examined first of all with this purpose in mind and following that, the Ukrainian and Armenian networks should be subjected to the same treatment.

2. The organization has at its disposal advisers such as the ~~Group~~ "professors" at Starnberg and at ~~Schiff~~ ~~Starnberg~~ who serve as a brains trust to Baum in advising operations and preparing evaluations of political and economic intelligence. This group should be brought to an irreducible minimum to prevent our intelligence from acquiring a strong German point of view.

3. Unless it can be demonstrated that individuals with political ~~background~~ (former Nazis, SS men, etc.) are vital to the conduct of operations, they should be eliminated from the organization.

4. Unless a man has proved himself to be an indispensable agent, and security demands such action, no commitments should be made to shelter and feed dependents of the agent.

5. The actions described above should reduce the number of bodies associated with the organization and thus ease the problem of control.

II. Controls

1. Encouragement of C.I. devices and operations within the organization by the Germans for their own protection against penetration, etc.

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2. A highly qualified American intelligence officer should pass in review all intelligence projects developed by Baum and should be present at all discussions between Baum and his chief agents.
3. At least one American officer should be assigned to the field to prevent contact between German agents and CIC or MG when local problems arise.
4. It would be desirable to have a highly qualified intelligence officer associated with the evaluation group. If it were not to be considered a permanent assignment, he should inspect procedures in the evaluation group periodically.
5. Any plans for cover, economic camouflage, etc. should be stated, reported on, and reviewed in the utmost detail.
6. There should be the strictest accounting for the expenditures of funds and supplies.
7. Agent records must be kept in detail and be made available to American authorities at any time they are requested.
8. Agents will under no circumstances be granted credentials to prove an assignment with American intelligence authorities, nor will they ever carry briefs for missions.



IV I have not attempted to review or recapitulate the points that were developed and recorded in the meeting of June 26. In those points affecting a clear definition of the intelligence mission of the operation, its limitation within certain boundaries, the need for decentralization, partial liquidation, and an entirely new cover, I concur.

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