

On 14 February 2004, a panel of officers, directed by Major General Antonio Taguba, conducted the following interview. Major General Taguba was appointed as an Investigating Officer under the provisions of Army Regulation 15-6, by Lieutenant General David D. McKiernan, Commanding General of the Coalition Forces Land Component Command (CFLCC), to look into allegations of maltreatment of detainees, detainee escapes and accountability lapses, at Abu Ghraib, also known as the Baghdad Central Confinement Facility (BCCF). The panel also inquired into training, standards, employment, command policies, and internal policies, concerning the detainees held at Abu Ghraib prison. Finally, the panel looked into the command climate and the command and supervisory presence

The following persons were present:

COL [REDACTED] MP, CFLCC – PMO, **Interviewer**
LTC [REDACTED] 705th MP Battalion, **Interviewer**
CPT [REDACTED] 265th Engineer Group – SJA, **Interviewer**
MAJ [REDACTED] 800th MP Brigade, **Interviewee**

The interview is summarized as follows:

My name is MAJ [REDACTED] Social Security Number, [REDACTED] I'm presently assigned to the 800th MP Brigade. I originally came from the 367th Military Police Group out of Ashley, Pennsylvania. I'm probably going back to that unit, when the 11th MP Brigade stands up in Ashley, Pennsylvania.

I was the S1 for Detainee Ops at Camp Bucca, also the ICRC POC. I was responsible for Theater Reporting that went to CENTCOM, also the NDRC POC, which is the National Detainee Reporting Center Point of Contact. At Camp Bucca, I was responsible for the Family Visitation Program, and I was also responsible for the interpreters. We had 16. Other than that, I was responsible for Processing Operations, and tracking all the releases.

I had a processing line. It varied at different phases, during the deployment. For the first 3 months we worked 24/7, and we ran 2 lines. So, there were actually 6 different units. I was responsible for 4 different shifts. Each shift would consist of 6 people. I had an NCOIC on every shift and a technical representative on every shift. As we moved north, we scaled down. We went from 3 battalions at Bucca, down to 1 battalion at Bucca. As far as Theater Reporting, I had 2 people from 530th, up until the last month, that assisted me with Theater Reporting. After they left, I did it myself. As far as the NDRC, I basically did that all myself. I used to have assistance from one of the Spec 4s from the 530th, until they went to the MEK. The ICRC I took care of that myself, and the Family Visitation, I initiated that all myself, and an interpreter helped me take care of that.

BG Hill and BG Karpinski are significantly different. BG Hill is more of a listener. He's very approachable. He will listen to any type of problems you have, and gather all the facts in, and make a decision. He's a very good person to work for. BG Karpinski is the

opposite. She kind of has her mind made up, and doesn't listen to different courses of action, suggestions, or issues.

We had several versions of ROE come out, of course, and then we had a policy that came out, regarding release procedures from CJTF 7. But, other than that, not a whole lot of policies and procedures, regarding detainee operations came out. Towards the end, they published more, as far as the proper way to transport detainees, as they were released, things like that. Making sure they were fed, making sure they had a way home, I was doing all that at Bucca, so it was more transparent to the Bucca operation, than Abu Ghraib.

The policy explained the different classifications of detainees, and how they would be released. Basically, they are Major Criminal, Minor Criminal, or Security Detainee. For a minor criminal the Battalion Commander has the authority to release those detainees. Major criminals, have to go through a Criminal Release Board. I think there's a moratorium still out on that. And Security Detainees left through the Security Detainee Review Board. HVDs would go through ISJ.

As far as detainees being released that shouldn't have been released, I'm not aware of any, other than the escapes, or mix ups in courts. Well, I remember, if this is the same person, that somebody called directly to the Battalion, and didn't go through the proper chain of command, and said to go ahead and release him. He was going to be released from the Security Detainee Review Board in a matter of 48 hours, but they went ahead and jumped the gun. There was another one released at Camp Bucca, by an Article 5 Tribunal. It was a big mix up.

Camp Bucca started out on a landfill. It was hot. There were massive sandstorms. There was no d-fac, no showers, no latrines, absolutely nothing there. Today, there are trailers, it's all graveled in, and there are showers, MWR, and an Internet café. It's significantly different, now.

We really didn't see BG Karpinski at Camp Bucca. I can only remember her spending the night one time. That's when BG Hill was there. BG Hill actually lived there. But, for a while, Bucca was the only game in town. So, I'm sure he would have been splitting his time between Bucca and Abu, if he had Abu, then. We saw a lot of BG Hill. He was very visible. He was a familiar face. We just didn't see BG Karpinski, so it would be hard to comment on it. I've only had a couple of conversations with her.

I reported the incident involving the 10 soldiers, who were escorting a busload of 44 detainees from Talil to Bucca, and some of the detainees were roughed up pretty badly. One of the detainees came through my line with his nose smashed in, and blood running down his face. So, I asked him what happened, and he told me. One of the DOD interpreters witnessed the incident out in the field. They were kicking the detainees, and stepping on one of their necks. A couple required surgical procedures. Two other soldiers, from 2 different units, also reported this to me. So, I reported it to COL Ecker and BG Hill, and they initiated a 15-6 Investigation. This happened in May of last year.

I probably know of every incident. Another incident that happened, prior to this one, involved a Canadian detainee. He reported to me, directly, being punched in the stomach several times by the same soldier, MSG [REDACTED]. I reported this to COL [REDACTED] and he initiated a CID investigation, but it was the detainee's word against MSG [REDACTED] word, so that didn't go anywhere. Then, one of our juveniles had a broken arm, and reported to

[REDACTED]
his story, and said he had fallen.

In my opinion MSG [REDACTED] had a good record, and nothing was proven. She had a lot of involvement with detainees, and detainees would make up stories, thinking they would be released, if they said someone had hurt them. We were careful to check them all out, and there was very little abuse at Camp Bucca. I saw every single detainee that left, and ninety percent of the detainees thanked me and thanked the guards for the good treatment at Bucca. That is no lie. So, I was proud of Bucca and the soldiers, particularly the 724th soldiers and the 530th soldiers. The detainees spoke highly of the 724th soldiers. For the most part, I think we were sensitive about the Geneva Convention, and making sure we followed all the Articles.

The 800th didn't have training on the Geneva Convention, at Bucca, but I kind of monitored that. I had very close contact with the Red Cross. The Red Cross came to Camp Bucca every single day for 6 weeks straight. So, the guards must have asked me once a day, what this article meant or what that article meant. Sometimes, I would ask the Red Cross about what their interpretations of different things. The policy at Bucca was to treat everybody with dignity and respect. We weren't lax on discipline, but we tried to be fair.

A couple of months after the incident, I had a birthday. Some friends of mine from the battalion invited me over for a drink, which I went and had one. I went back, and the individual I was sharing a tent with thought I reported her relationship with the Battalion Commander, which I hadn't. So, she proceeded to go to COL [REDACTED] and tell him that she thought I had a drink. I told him the truth, and somehow it escalated, and I had to see General McKiernan. I accepted responsibility, and continued to do my job. I probably came out more focused after that.

I was in the Gulf War, and I don't remember anything like the incidents I've seen in this Brigade.

I think we've had it easy at Camp Bucca, compared to Abu. Abu is so spread out, they have more detainee movements, and the mortar attacks. So, I don't think it's fair for me to judge what's happening, there. Abu should be a 2-battalion operation. I don't know how 1 battalion can keep that straight. I've felt that from the get go.

In general, I would say that every single person I've had interaction with, at the new Brigade, has been very professional, and they were very supportive. Of course, they're coming in fresh. They're not coming in to Indian Country. At Abu, things are progressing, and a lot of improvements have been made.

I know LTC [REDACTED] I think he's extremely intelligent, and I think he truly cares about the soldiers, but I don't think he's had enough I/R experience. The 220th has, hands down, the most difficult mission of any battalion in Theater, and, after the incident that happened at Bucca, I would put them in there with another battalion; it's just too overwhelming. They were pretty beaten down, by what happened. It caused a big riff. There are still some soldiers, today, that think those soldiers didn't do anything.

We knew that BG Karpinski didn't seem to like him; every time she saw him, she pretty much beat him up. That was the word I got from his staff. So, we were all told that he was relieved and sent to Arifjan, where he kind of got a spring in his step. We were all happy, when he was re-instated. We thought he hadn't gotten the proper support. I don't think he was officially relieved. MAJ [REDACTED] covered for him, during this break. Later, MAJ [REDACTED] became his XO, which was a very positive step. I think he helped him out a lot.

I've had battalions call me to say CID wants to hold detainees. If someone questions me, I would hold a detainee for an extra day. I would also call to double-check. There's MI and CID representation on the Security Detainee Review Board. So, there's no reason that anybody on CID or MI Hold should be released.

I didn't have a good experience with BG Karpinski. The only conversation I had with her was very negative. I went to a brief to pitch detainee operations. I didn't want to go, because I was super busy, but I received 3 emails, saying I should go. I don't think she was happy that I came. She said, if she knew I was coming, she would have told me not to. We had a dress rehearsal, and she be-rated and demeaned me in a way I've never been demeaned in my 17 ½ years as an officer. She told me I shouldn't have done the brief, that MAJ [REDACTED] should have, which would have been fine with me, but he just wasn't involved with detainees. She thought I was a poor officer, but later she said I should be a Battalion XO, which was inconsistent. She said I didn't present myself professionally enough, and she referenced the drinking incident. I don't think it was personal; she's done that to many, many officers. It's just her style, and maybe it's effective with some people, but it doesn't work with me, because that's not motivating to me.

I think she saw my name a lot, when she first started, because after I turned in the abuse incident, that made my life kind of rough. There was a Congressional filed by MSG [REDACTED] brother-in-law, saying I failed to call QRF, when they shot a detainee, when I was even there. There were a series of IG complaints. It was kind of rough on me, as well as MAJ [REDACTED] and SGM [REDACTED] after this happened. After the abuse incident, everyone was trying to deflect attention from their own situation.

There's no point in taking anything to BG Karpinski, because you can't get a sentence out, without her giving you the answer, or saying no, or fix it. She's just not approachable.

As far as the abuse, I think there should be training for soldiers on the Geneva Convention, as it relates to the treatment of detainees, and I think there needs to be an avenue where these things can be reported, because it's not a popular thing to report.

Initially, I don't think anybody believed the abuse happened. LTC [REDACTED] told me he didn't believe it, and I had to say, "Sir, I'm sorry. I know. I was there. I saw the detainee." These were docile detainees. I don't think this was the first time they done it. Then, there became 2 factions; some that did believe it and were ashamed because it was hurting the MP Corps, and some that said they didn't. I lost a lot of friends, but I would report it, again.

I know the abuse occurred. I don't think any soldiers would make that up about an MP. I think the NCOs should have been more severely dealt with, because they lead soldiers down that path, and had them convinced that they were doing the right thing.

We've had 3 deaths. Two were medical, and 1 was a shooting. We felt, if we had less than lethal, it might not have gotten to the point where someone was killed. But, we all think they did the right thing. CID cleared them. It was self-defense.

I encouraged them to stop using the conex for segregating detainees. I threatened them with ICRC. Conexes were used, before we had an isolation area. We had to stop, because the weather was so hot, that they might cook in those. So, we set up a better area. A vacant building was secured, and individual cells were built inside.

The MP's view of the detainees varied from battalion to battalion. The 724th they treated them all with dignity and respect. If they saw someone who was overzealous, or went to strike a detainee, they pulled them out. 530th the same thing; they were very professional. In general, they treated them like people. Whereas 310th weren't always I/R, so they're struggling a little.

Finished with their discussion, the panel gave MAJ [REDACTED] a list of items, to be addressed, and brought back on a Sworn Statement.

On 15 February 2004, MAJ ██████ returned, to provide a sworn statement, documents, and a follow-up interview.

The interview is summarized as follows:

There were three reports that I had to prepare every evening, that were due at 0200 to CJTF-7 and CENTCOM, and these reports were used in the SECDEF Briefs, in the briefings to General Sanchez, and to the 800th MP Brigade. The S1s from each detention facility would send me a feeder report to me that would start with their beginning strength, and categorize all the gains, which could include new captures, transfers in from another detention facility, transfers in from Iraqi Police, transfers back from the hospital, as well as losses, which could include release in place, paroles, deaths, escapes, transfers to another detention center, or transfers to another hospital with an ending number. The S1s would also supply their in-camp manifest, as well as their not in camp manifest. I would roll up all those numbers, and do reconciliation between the gains and the losses, and provide the total Theater count. I would also report Tribunals, the different nationalities we had, who was in the hospital, and then I would put down any significant issues there were. I would also break them down by category and location.

There are no accountability issues at Camp Bucca, because we do a daily headcount, which ties to their in-camp manifest, which ties to the report. They had 100 percent accountability. There were problems, initially, after the transition from the Brits. We patched their database into ours, and they had quite a few escapes. So, we went through the reconciliation process, but after that, Camp Bucca has maintained 100 percent accountability.

Abu didn't have enough people in their processing line. They had less people in their processing line than we had at Bucca, but they had three times the amount of detainees, and ten times the amount of movements. Because of the number of movements, at that place, you need one person to just log the movements in between the facilities. So, I requested a corporal, who worked with me at Bucca and was at Mosul, be tasked to the 320th for the purpose of scrubbing their database. She worked 12 hours a day for 6 weeks straight, and they were able to get 100 percent accountability of their security detainees. When I left, they still had a ways to go to account for their criminals. They were still about 100 detainees off, maybe less.

I was asked to go up and help. The COL ██████ the Chief of the National Detainee Reporting Center, at the Pentagon, asked me to go up. The 320th asked me to go up, as well, but BG Karpinski asked that I stay at Bucca. I was never given a good reason. I did want to go up and help, but I was told that they would have to sink or swim. I don't think accountability was a priority, until COL ██████ sent emails directly to BG Karpinski, saying we were not in compliance with AR 190-8, or the Articles of Geneva. At that time, I did go up for a couple of weeks, and help them put together a plan.

As you know, we took over a tent full of bags of property with no identification from the Brits. In addition they burned a lot of the personal property and money of the detainees.

So, it was difficult, but what we did was go box by box, and re-inventoried every single piece of detainee property. Things we couldn't identify, we put as unclaimed, in case it was claimed at a later date. I was hoping Civil Affairs could come in and help. I had them put the property annotated in the DRS System. It took a long, long time, but there was no other way to do it. I got the finance section of the 724, and they split up into 2 shifts and chipped in. They were also able to count over fifty five million Iraqi Dinar and exchange that. We made contact with a bank near the port, and we were able to get the money exchanged just at the deadline. Those soldiers worked hard and very long hours just to do that. The money that wasn't claimed, we set aside, because a lot of detainees will come back and make a claim. A lot of those claims weren't paid, because the SJA required documentation. Now, unfortunately, Iraqis don't have documentation. It's a paperless society, and a lot of times they have all their possessions on them. All the money they ever had is going to be on them in a little box that they're carrying. So, if they came, and said they had x amount of dinar, and they have a capture tag, we'll go ahead and satisfy their claim. If they don't have a capture tag, but have a creditable story, we will pay half of their claim. It's fairly subjective, but I had them write up an SOP, and that's the way it's done. It's not perfect, but it's come a long way. I should also say, that I had soldiers from the compound patrol teams volunteer to come in and help.

I have received my report card, and it is significantly different from when BG Hill was my senior rater. BG Hill gave me a top block, and put me in for a Bronze Star. BG Karpinski gave me a middle block, and COL ██████ told me that she had put a couple of comments in there, that he had to personally ask her three times to take out, or it would have been an un-referable OER, but they were taken out, and I'm sure it won't hurt me. Its kind of what I expected, because there's been no interaction, and I doubt she knows what I do, but I'm alright, and I'm satisfied with what I've been able to accomplish.

The interview complete, MAJ ██████ was dismissed.

SWORN STATEMENT

For use of this form, see AR 190-45 the proponent agency is ODCSOPS

PRIVACY ACT STATEMENT

AUTHORITY: Title 10 USC Section 301; Title 5 USC Section 2951; E.O. 9397 dated November 22, 1943 (SSN)
 PRINCIPAL PURPOSE: To provide commanders and law enforcement officials with means by which information may be accurately
 ROUTINE USES: Your social security number is used as an additional/alternate means of identification to facilitate filing and
 DISCLOSURE: Disclosure of your social security number is voluntary.

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|--|----------------------------------|--------------------------------|----------------|
| 1. LOCATION CAMP DOMA | 2. DATE (YYYYMMDD) 2004 02 14 | 3. TIME 1000 HRS | 4. FILE NUMBER |
| 5. LAST NAME, FIRST NAME, MIDDLE NAME [REDACTED] | 6. SSN [REDACTED] | 7. GRADE/STATUS O-1 RESERVE | |
| 8. ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS 800th MP BDE, CAMP ARIFJAN, KUWAIT, 4PS AF COSUB | | | |

9. I, [REDACTED], WANT TO MAKE THE FOLLOWING STATEMENT UNDER OATH:

- HOW COULD RIPS BE MORE EFFICIENTLY EXECUTED:
 IN order to avoid transitional lapses, BNs should not be assigned to exercise command and control over an Internment Facility on an interim basis until the "permanent" BN is assigned. This has the potential to cause:
 - unnecessary disruption of operations
 - loss of institutional knowledge
 - disruption to care provided to detainees
 - unnecessary paradigm shifts in philosophy
 Recommend holding existing BN or calling forward new BN to bridge the 4-2 month gap. This should also be applied to guard companies.
- My involvement to change connex holding area. Due to questionable appropriateness of the isolation area used at Camp Bucca, I strongly encouraged the command to consider

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| 10. EXHIBIT | 11. INITIALS OF PERSON MAKING STATEMENT [REDACTED] | PAGE 1 OF 3 PAGES |
|-------------|---|-------------------|

ADDITIONAL PAGES MUST CONTAIN THE HEADING "STATEMENT _____ TAKEN AT _____ DATED _____"
 THE BOTTOM OF EACH ADDITIONAL PAGE MUST BEAR THE INITIALS OF THE PERSON MAKING THE STATEMENT, AND PAGE NUMBER MUST BE INDICATED.

STATEMENT OF [REDACTED]

TAKEN AT 1160001725

DATED 2-7-2015

9. STATEMENT (Continued)

an alternative to utilizing connexes for housing detainees with disciplinary, mental illness, or other protective custody needs. With escalating temperatures and the apparent mental deterioration of detainees who were interred in the connexes over an extended period of time, I made the recommendation that one of the compounds be split into individual areas @ a EP small and a common area @ latrines and shower be installed at the IF. This was an interim arrangement until a permanent solution was confirmed. With an upcoming site inspection by the ICRC scheduled in the immediate future; this accelerated the move from the connexes to the IF. The isolation area was leveled and the connexes were removed.

3. Recommendation on reporting mechanism for detainee abuse:

There should be a dedicated ombudsman at the theater level for the purpose of investigating allegations of detainee abuse. This would negate any cover-up by

INITIALS OF PERSON MAKING STATEMENT [REDACTED]

PAGE 2 OF 3 PAGES

STATEMENT OF

[REDACTED]

TAKEN AT

1100 HRS

DATED

20/4/02

9. STATEMENT (Continued)

the local chain of command and potential
retaliation against members of the
command who seek to pursue investigations
these complaints.

nothing further

AFFIDAVIT

I, [REDACTED], HAVE READ OR HAVE HAD READ TO ME THIS STATEMENT WHICH BEGINS ON PAGE 1, AND ENDS ON PAGE 3. I FULLY UNDERSTAND THE CONTENTS OF THE ENTIRE STATEMENT MADE BY ME. THE STATEMENT IS TRUE. I HAVE INITIALED ALL CORRECTIONS AND HAVE INITIALED THE BOTTOM OF EACH PAGE CONTAINING THE STATEMENT. I HAVE MADE THIS STATEMENT FREELY WITHOUT HOPE OF BENEFIT OR REWARD, WITHOUT THREAT OF PUNISHMENT, AND WITHOUT COERCION, UNLAWFUL INFLUENCE, OR UNLAWFUL INDUCEMENT.

[REDACTED]
(Signature of Person Making Statement)

WITNESSES:

Subscribed and sworn to before me, a person authorized by law administer oaths, 14th day of Feb, 04 at CAMP DHA KUALA

[REDACTED]
(Signature of Person Administering Oath)

[REDACTED]
(Typed Name of Person Administering Oath)

UCMAJ AR-136
(Authority To Administer Oaths)

INITIALS OF PERSON MAKING STATEMENT

[REDACTED]

PAGE 3 OF 3 PAGES